

IBN TAYMIYYAH
EXPOUNDS ON
ISLAM

Selected Writings of Shaykh al-Islam
Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyyah
on Islamic Faith, Life, and Society

compiled and translated by
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مجموعه
ابن
تيمية

**IN THE NAME OF ALLAH
THE COMPASSIONATE THE MERCIFUL**

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FOREWORD

All praise and thanks belong to Allah, and may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon the Messenger of Allah.

The pride and honor of every nation is concentrated in two main principles: The first is the principle of upright and sound thought for the Muslims. The infallible Divine Revelation exemplifies this. The second is the principle of the carriers of the thought and its leaders. They are the scholars of Islamic law (Shari‘ah). For this reason praise of knowledge and its people came in the Noble Qur’ān and the pure prophetic Sunnah. Allah, the Exalted, said: “Allah bears witness that none has the right to be worshiped but He, and the angels and those having knowledge (also give this witness); He always maintains His creation in justice. None has the right to be worshiped but He, the All-Mighty, the All-Wise” [3:18]. He also said: “It is only those who have knowledge among His slaves who fear Allah” [35:28]. And in the authentic *ḥadīth*: “Truly the scholars are the heirs to the prophets. Truly the prophets did not leave behind dinars or dirhams (to be inherited); rather they left knowledge. So whoever takes it has taken an immense portion of good.”

Islamic thought, by which I mean the thought of the Muslims, has gone through many different stages with regard to remaining upright or deviating. Thus there were successive stages in which Islamic thought was pure and enlightened. We also notice other states in which Islamic thought had been struck with confusion and deviance.

One of the periods when Islamic thought was not enlightened was in the seventh and eighth centuries of the Hijrah. Blind zeal and weakness of thought were widespread in Islamic society, as

well as the strengthening of innovation (*bid'ah*) and superstition. There was also division in the community and empowerment of the external enemies of Islam.

In the shadow of these difficult conditions Imām Aḥmad Ibn 'Abdul-Ḥalīm Ibn 'Abdus-Salām Ibn Taymīyyah Al-Ḥarranī (d. 728 H.) appeared. He was brilliant of mind, sharply intelligent, pure of thought, strong in reasoning and encyclopedic in knowledge, all these coupled with his complete uprightness in religion and character. His supporters as well as his opponents all bore witness to these facts. This made him fit for the exploration of a distinguished school of thought that mirrored the Salafī school and its methodology in the first three generations of Islam. It is the same school of thought upon which Muḥammad Ibn 'Abdul-Wahhāb based his call to Islam and that which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was based upon before and is based upon now.

This imām wrote on numerous fields of Islamic knowledge: in the fields of belief and thought, worship and social life, and character and good manners. He also wrote in other fields that assisted with the fundamental fields, such as logic, language, and the like. His works were elevated, with strong academic style, precise verification and objective arguments.

It is from this viewpoint that the University saw it appropriate to choose selections from his scholarly legacy and compile them into a single book. This was done to make it easy for the seekers of knowledge to obtain this information, also to make the noble reader aware of and turn his sights to this immense knowledge which has not ceased to be a minaret of light by which the reformists, scholars, callers to Islam and others are guided.

The University entrusted the selection process as well as the translation to Dr. Muḥammad 'Abdul-Ḥaqq Anṣārī, Researcher in the Deanery of Academic Research, who has put forth a great

effort that is well worth mentioning and for which he is to be thanked. The University then entrusted the final review process, the editing, printing and publication of the work to the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America, which is a branch of the University.

I ask Allah to cause benefit to come through this book. I also thank the Deanery of Academic Research at the University for its great efforts in the field of authorship, translation and publication, and I thank the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in the Washington area for reviewing and publishing the book.

Allah is sufficient for us, and He is the best trustee.

Dr. Muhammad Ibn Sa'ad Al-Salem , Rector ,
Al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Sa'ūd Islamic University

PREFACE

The history of Islam is a history of struggle between Islam and *jāhiliyyah*, ignorance. *Jāhiliyyah* invades Islam with its ideas and forces; it enters the body and the soul of Islam; it distorts its faith; it upsets its values; it changes its life style; it undermines its institutions; it weakens its impulse; and it alters its image. To counteract this invasion, people with clear perceptions of Islamic ideas, values, life and institutions have appeared at various periods in Islamic history. They have fought the *jāhiliyyah* on various fronts, defeated its forces, and revived and reinvigorated Islam. They are hailed as *mujaddid*, or renewer, of the religion, following a *ḥadīth* of the Prophet to that effect. Shaykh al-Islām Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah was one of those great personalities of Islam; he occupies a place of honor among them.

For various reasons the West has not been able to appreciate Ibn Taymīyyah's place in Islam. His criticism of Ash'arī *kalām*, Greek logic and philosophy, monistic Ṣūfism, Shī'ī doctrines, and Christian faith have proved great obstacles to appreciating his contribution. His way of writing has also been to an extent responsible. Most of his writings are short or long responsa (*fatāwā*) to particular questions, often recurring, put to him by different men at different times, rather than planned, systematic works on particular subjects. This makes the appreciation of his contribution somewhat difficult. Henri Laoust in France was the first to take serious notice of him. Since the publication of his *Essay on the Social and Political Doctrines of Ibn Taymīyyah* (1939), a few articles and books have appeared on Ibn Taymīyyah's thought, but they are far from giving any clear idea

of his overall contribution to Islam, even less of assessing his role in its revival and renewal (*tajdīd*). In fact, there has been little understanding of the concept of *tajdīd* in Islam.

This volume consists of selections from various writings of Ibn Taymīyyah included in the *Majmū‘ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām* (37 volumes) published in Riyadh, *Jāmi‘ ar-Rasā’il* (2 volumes), published by Dr. Rashād Salīm in Cairo, as well as some of his major works, such as *Minhāj as-Sunnah an-Nabawīyyah*, *Dar’ Ta’āruḍ al-‘Aql wa An-Naql*, *Kitāb ar-Radd ‘alā al-Mantaqiyyīn*, *Al-Istiqāmah*, and *Iqtidā aṣ-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm*.

These selections will, I hope, present in a single volume a clear and complete view of Ibn Taymīyyah’s concepts of Islamic faith, life and society. They are primarily intended to highlight his positive position and mention his criticisms and refutations of other positions only to the extent needed. I hope that, in going through these selections, the reader will also form an idea of the work of *tajdīd* that Ibn Taymīyyah undertook. In the Introduction to this volume I have discussed at length the notion of *tajdīd* in Islam and underscored the contribution of Ibn Taymīyyah in this regard. This will, I hope, help the reader understand the tremendous impact that his writings have exercised on all the efforts that are being made to revive and reinvigorate Islam in our times.

The idea to compile a selection of Ibn Taymīyyah’s vast corpus of writings, presenting in his own words his basic religious thought, was presented to me a few years ago to the then Director of the Research Center of Imām Ibn Sa‘ūd Islamic University, Riyadh, Dr. Muḥammad Ar-Rubay‘. He very much welcomed the idea and got the approval of the president of the University, His Excellency, Dr. ‘Abdullah ‘Abdul-Muḥsin At-Turkī. The

completion of this work was interrupted, due to engagement in another, no-less-important project, the translation into English of Ibn Abī Al-‘Izz’s voluminous *Commentary on the Creed of Aṭ-Ṭahāwī*. After finishing that project, I returned to Ibn Taymīyyah. The present Director of the Center and Dean of Academic Research, Dr. Abdullah Al-Rabi ee, has consistently followed the progress of this work with great interest. Thank God it is now completed. Let me pray that this volume succeed in bringing Ibn Taymīyyah closer to the English-speaking world, as well as in promoting a better understanding of the pure, pristine Islam which he tried to expound in his writings.

Muḥammad ‘Abdul-Ḥaqq Anṣārī

INTRODUCTION

The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, has said: “God will raise, at the head of each century, such people for this *ummah* as will renew (*ujaddidu*) its religion for it.”¹ This means that the history of Islam will not be smooth sailing; the forces of ignorance (*jāhiliyyah*) will continue to be at war with Islam. As a result, some far-reaching changes will occur over a century which will disfigure Islam and seriously endanger the faith and life of the *ummah*. When this happens God will raise from the community someone or some men who will fight the *jāhiliyyah*, right the wrong which it has caused, restore Islam to its own shape, and give the community a new lease on life.

The changes and distortions which the *ḥadīth* implies will not be something petty and superficial, happening only in a decade or two and affecting only a part of the *ummah* or some people in one geographical area, such that they could be rectified by small reformatory efforts. They will be profound and far-reaching, colossal and widespread, and will require a Herculean effort to rectify them. They will affect the very basis of Islam, erode or compromise the validity of the revelation, subject it to reason or intuition. They may even do the opposite: negate or undermine reason or intuition and destroy the balance which Islam maintains between them. They will affect the faith of Islam. They will change the concept of God and His relation to the world, they will distort the idea of His *tawḥīd* and its meaning for human life, and compromise it in various ways, overt and covert, and smear it with *shirk*. They will change the view of prophethood and prophetic mission, the view of the life hereafter and its relation to the life in this world. They will also affect the Islamic system of values,

replace the ultimate good of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah with some other good, alter the order of priorities, make the lower higher and the higher lower, or just drop or ignore certain values and replace them with others which are alien to Islam. They will change the manner and the method which the Qur'ān and the Sunnah prescribe to affirm, strengthen and cultivate Islamic values and accomplish Islamic perfection, and replace partly or mostly the prophetic *sulūk* with a *sulūk* which draws upon foreign sources and is geared to different ends. They will affect Islamic society, weaken the bond of unity which binds it together, make it forget the mission which God has set before it, and replace it with another not approved by Him, shift power and authority from hands which are supposed to wield it to hands which are not supposed to wield it, alter the principles which are stipulated to integrate the Islamic society, and institute in their place those that are opposed to the faith and the values of Islam.

The *mujaddid* whom God raises to revive Islam is gifted with great talents. He perceives minutely all the changes which occur in the life of the *ummah*. He gauges the extent to which they have sapped its strength. He brings those changes to the knowledge of the people. He makes them aware of all the forms they appear in. And finally, he points out the factors which have caused them. He attacks those factors, assails the doctrines which are involved, exposes the methods by which they work, traces the process through which they have developed, demolishes the excuses which people have advanced, and destroys the justifications they have offered. He rejects all the compromises which have been made with respect to God's unity, and puts in the language of the time the pure undiluted concept of *tawhīd*.

He restates the mission and the way of the Prophet and restores his authority. He elaborates the Islamic system of values, puts

every element in its place, and defines their priorities. He demonstrates that Islam is the only religion which corresponds to the nature in which God has created man. He states the *ṭarīqah* which the Prophet taught his companions to serve God and perfect themselves, reviews the *ṭarīqah* which people have worked out by themselves and shows what is right and what is wrong in them. He defines the structure of Islamic society, the principles of its organization, the place men and women occupy in it, the rights which individuals have and the duties they are to fulfill, the hands which should wield power, the way they should exercise it, and the ends they should achieve thereby. He addresses himself to the new issues and problems which the society of his time faces, and, using the insight God has given him in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, he tries to solve them without ignoring either the tradition of the community or the demands of the new conditions.

This is the work that a *mujaddid* does on the plane of ideas. On the practical plane, he strives to correct the practices which *jāhīyyah* has introduced, and revives the ones which it has suppressed. He fights *shirk*, misguided innovations, and unlawful practices, and promotes true faith and real piety. He wages war against the forces that support unbelief, injustice and sin, and strengthens those that work for truth, justice and virtue. He tries to ensure that power is exercised not to secure personal, group, or class interests, but to establish the rule of the *shar'* and promote the good of each and every human being. He also stands up against the external forces which try to subdue the *ummah*, or check the fulfillment of its mission. In short, he strives to establish the religion of Islam and the rule of God in all its aspects. The *mujaddid* is the heir (*warīth*)² of the Prophet. He tries to do the job of a prophet though he is not a prophet.

This is the work which a *mujaddid* whom God raises to renew His religion is supposed to do. But what part of it he really succeeds in doing depends upon the powers he has and the conditions he works in. He may succeed in some areas and fail in others. He may also make mistakes and, as he is not a prophet, his mistakes need not be rectified by God. This means that in reviewing the work of a *mujaddid* one need not justify each and every idea which he has expounded, or commend every work which he has done. It should also be borne in mind that the *ḥadīth* which we quoted earlier does not mean that there is only one person at a time who deserves the title of *mujaddid*. God may raise more than one person at a time who strives to renew His religion. In fact, He has sent more than one prophet at a time to save some people.

Shaykh al-Islām Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah was one of those great men whom God raised to renew Islam. He occupies a place of honor among them. To call him an eminent Ḥanbalī jurist and theologian, or an outstanding Salafī scholar, or a great Sunnī reformer does not do his achievements justice. He was the *mujaddid* of Islam *par excellence*. In the following pages I will try to highlight some facets of the renovatory work which he undertook and successfully accomplished. I must confine myself to those facets which lie within the purview of this book, and I must leave out some non-related facets; I mean those which belong to the field of *fiqh*, or relate to Shī‘ism and Christianity.

Ibn Taymīyyah (661/1263-728/1328) was born in Harran, in northern Iraq, near present day Mosul, to a family known for its learning. His grandfather, Majd ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah (d. 653/1255), the author of *Muntaqā al-Akḥbār*, a renowned compilation of legal *ḥadīth* and tradition, was the most outstanding

Ḥanbalī jurist of his time. His father, ‘Abdul-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymīyyah (d. 682/1284) was a distinguished scholar of *ḥadīth*. When Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah was seven, the family had to leave for Damascus, as the Mongols, who had overrun Baghdad five years earlier, were threatening to move north. In Damascus, his father was offered the post of professor of *ḥadīth* at the Sakkarīyyah Madrasah where he gave lectures on *ḥadīth* and Ḥanbalī *fiqh* till the end of his life.

Ibn Taymīyyah studied with his father and with many famous scholars of his time. On the death of his father, Ibn Taymīyyah, who was twenty-one at the time, was called to teach *ḥadīth* at Sakkarīyyah. He was also asked to give lectures on the Qur’ān at the Umayyad mosque. The rest of his time Ibn Taymīyyah devoted to the study of various branches of knowledge known in his age. Az-Zamalakānī, a contemporary scholar not favorably disposed to Ibn Taymīyyah, said - and his saying so is fully borne out by Ibn Taymīyyah’s writings - that whatever subject he discussed, he surpassed all the scholars of his times in that subject.³ In Arabic grammar, for example, he had acquired such proficiency that Abū Ḥayyān, the leading grammarian of the time, paid a visit to him and wrote an ode in his praise. As for *ḥadīth*, it was a popular saying that the *ḥadīth* which Ibn Taymīyyah did not know was not a *ḥadīth*. In *fiqh*, Ibn Taymīyyah rose to the status of a *mujtahid muṭlaq*, one who does not limit himself to any particular school but goes directly to the basic sources of the Shari‘ah to form his opinion.

By the time Ibn Taymīyyah appeared on the scene, most of the major developments in philosophy, *kalām* and *taṣawwūf* had taken place. To speak of philosophy first, thanks to the efforts of a number of thinkers, there had emerged a version of philosophy

which was in its essence neo-Platonic, but which they had projected, after some modifications, as Islamic philosophy, or at least not opposed to the Islamic faith. They had conceived of God as a self-existing necessary being, reflecting on Himself and on universal realities which were part of His essence. The world of particular things they had not considered to be worthy of His knowledge or His will. In fact, they had conceived of God's unity in a way which did not admit of any will or action on His part. They had reduced His authority either to negative epithets or to mere relations. The world, they believed, proceeded from Him of necessity through a series of beings in an ontologically regressive order from intelligences, spheres of material objects. It was an eternal, self-operating system of causes and effects supervised by the Active Intellect.

Man was a combination of matter and spirit, and his perfection lay in the subordination of his body to his reason, in reflection and action. His ultimate perfection, however, lay only in pure rational activity, in contemplation alone. In this way, man could imitate God, which is his ultimate happiness. After death, the material body would perish forever. Most of the philosophers believed that there would be no resurrection of the body. Paradise would be the abode of the spirit, and its inhabitants would be such as had perfected their reason and transformed it from potentiality into actuality.

In principle, human reason is competent to know God and all other realities, as it is competent to know good and evil. Revelation is needed for the common people, whose reason is overwhelmed by passions. It is for them that prophets are sent, and it is in their language that they speak, a language of parables and metaphors. When interpreted properly and put into non-figurative language, their ideas will never differ from those which the philosophers

discover through reason. For truth is one, whether taught by Plato and Aristotle, or by Moses and Muḥammad. Besides an extraordinary power of knowing truths, the prophets were given unusually strong imaginations which projected rational ideas in material forms, as well as the power to work wonders. However, those powers are also available to non-prophets to some degree.

Before Ibn Taymīyyah, Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) had examined many of these ideas in his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* and subjected them to searching criticism. He had tried to show that some of these doctrines were simply false, and others that were true the philosophers were not able to prove conclusively. Reason, he had shown, was not competent to reach the truth on theological issues. On three of their doctrines, namely that particular things are not the object of God's knowledge, that the world is eternal, and that resurrection would only be of the spirit, he had charged the philosophers with unbelief (*kufr*).

Extensive as it was, Al-Ghazālī's criticism did not cover many other parts of philosophy. He did not touch upon logic or ethics. On the contrary, he hailed logic as the epitome of all knowledge and made it part of the Islamic curriculum without realizing its epistemological and metaphysical implications. He also adopted the philosophers' view of human perfection and happiness. In his later writings, the authenticity of some of which is disputed, he reiterated some philosophical doctrines and revised some of his own earlier views. Reviewing Al-Ghazālī's criticism of philosophy, Ibn Rushd (d. 598/1201) partly agreed with his criticisms and admitted that cosmological or etiological arguments developed by Aristotle, or the argument from contingency advanced by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1036) for God's existence were not convincing. On the other hand, with respect to the argument from design or creation of man which the Qur'ān states, he attacked the

theologians' doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, and said that it could not be supported by the Qur'ān. He also pointed out that the whole emanationist doctrine which Al-Ghazālī had criticized was not Aristotelian; it was only put forward by Farabī (d. 329/950) and by Ibn Sīnā. He found fault with other doctrines of Ibn Sīnā, and showed that Al-Ghazālī was not correct to attribute them to Aristotle.⁴

These developments, as well as the ideas which Ibn Sīnā in his later writings and Shihāb ad-Dīn Suhrawardī Al-Maqtul (d. 587/1191) in his philosophy of illumination (*ishrāq*) had expounded, demanded a more thorough criticism of philosophy and a better statement of Islamic concepts.

While philosophers were committed above all else to reason, or what they thought to be rational, the theologians (*mutakalimūn*) were supposed to be loyal first to revelation, but they paid little attention to it. They believed that the Qur'ān only stated the creed. As for arguments, it did not say much or, if it said anything, it was rhetorical. They underestimated Qur'ānic arguments regarding credal issues. On the other hand, they overestimated the efficacy of reason in theology and did not realize its limitations. They could not see that many of their arguments were inconclusive and unconvincing. Moreover, they had borrowed concepts from philosophy or had developed them by themselves, which led them to interpret the words of the Qur'ān in a metaphorical way, as opposed to how the Elders of Islam understood the Qur'ān. They even negated many attributes of God or rendered them inoperative. The Mu'tazilah, for example, represented the attributes of God as accidents (*a'rad*) that exist in a body, and on that account denied speech to God and asserted that the Qur'ān was something created. Similarly, on the grounds that vision can only be the vision of a

body in space, they denied that the believers would see God in the Hereafter.

On the other hand, the Asha'irah, the dominant schools of theology at the time, reacting to the Mu'tazilī view regarding the rationality of good and evil in the impression that it implied an obligation on God and limited His absolute power, denied that there was anything good or bad in itself or that its goodness or badness could be known through reason, independently of revelation. This led them to deny God's wisdom and render His will completely arbitrary. They also did not realize that their doctrine left no grounds for morality and religion in man, and robbed them of all justification. It left man with nothing with which to judge a prophet's claim to prophethood or to distinguish between a true prophet and an imposter. Their idea of an absolute, divine will led them to deny efficacy to human will, as well as causality in nature. They asserted that man was not the doer of his acts; he only acquired them. There is only one doer or actor there: God. Besides contradicting many statements of the Qur'ān, as well as the universal judgment of mankind, this doctrine paved the way for the much more damaging doctrine of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). From the oneness of the actor, Ṣūfīs and philosophers had only to take a small step to reach the oneness of being.

On the popular level, the Ash'arī doctrine regarding the *ṣifat khabariyyah* caused greater alarm, and was regarded as being influenced by *I'tizāl*. They denied reality to these attributes and treated them as metaphors. They said that the face (*wajh*) of God means His being, His hand means power or favor, His *istawā* on the Throne means His rule, and His descending (*nuzūl*) to the lowest heaven means His blessing.

A considerable section of the people, led by scholars of *ḥadīth* and some Ḥanbalīs, reacted to this and other doctrines very strongly. They condemned theology as such, failing to distinguish between right *kalām* and wrong *kalām*. They would not admit that it had ever served any good purpose. They took the *ṣifat khabariyyah* as literally true, completely anthropomorphized God and ascribed all the parts of the human body to Him. They thus smeared the good name of the Salaf, who had rightly abstained from such action. Among them, however, there were scholars like Ibn Al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) who condemned this extreme reactionary trend and pleaded for a more moderate view.

Like philosophy and *kalām*, *taṣawwūf* had stretched a long distance and had reached its climax before Ibn Taymīyyah. In its first phase, during the second century Hijrī, it was only a way of self-purification (*tazkiyat an-naḥs*). Ṣūfīs like Ibrāhīm Ibn Adham (d. 160/776) and Fuḍayl Ibn ‘Iyāḍ (d. 187/803) lived ascetic lives and devoted themselves to worship and *dhikr*. Their successors in the third century, like Abū Yazīd (d. 261/875), Junayd (d. 298/910), and others, developed definite *ṭarīqah* of their own to reach God, which consisted of stages and stations and culminated in the experience of God which they called *fanā’*, self-effacement, and *jam’*, union with God. They developed a whole terminology to describe various experiences through which the Ṣūfī passes on the path, which As-Sarrāj (d. 378/988) and Al-Qushayrī (d. 485/1072) have discussed in their works. Reflections on the way and the experience in this phase of Ṣūfism was in its early stages, as we find in the statements of Al-Junayd on *tawḥīd*, or in the description of Abū Yazīd of his own experience.

The third and final phase of *taṣawwūf* was marked by philosophical speculation in the light of mystical experience, as we

find in the doctrine of *ḥulūl*, in-dwelling of God in man, at the hand of Al-Ḥallāj (309/923), or of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, Unity of Being at the hand of Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240). Between Ibn ‘Arabī, who had also taken Damascus as his seat, and Ibn Taymīyyah, there was a gap of less than a century, but in that short span, the former’s doctrine had spread throughout the Islamic world, and different versions of it had been brought out by Ṣūfīs like Al-Qūnawī (d. 672/1273), Ibn Sab‘īn (d. 668/1269), At-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291) and others. Earlier in the fifth century, Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), who had also developed a mystical philosophy in some sense similar to that of Ibn ‘Arabī in his *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* and in a disguised form in some parts of his *Ihyā al-‘Ulūm* and other writings, to some that also interpreted religious concepts like *tawḥīd*, trust (*tawakkul*), patience (*ṣabr*), and love (*maḥabbah*) on Ṣūfī lines. He strongly advocated the Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*, and underlined the need for Ṣūfī *kashf* as a means to comprehend ultimate realities and interpret theological truths.

These developments in *taṣawwūf* posed great problems for a *mujaddid*. He had first to define the place of *kashf* in theology and religion vis-à-vis revelation and reason. Second, he had to review the whole gamut of theosophical doctrines which Ṣūfism had put forward and show what parts of this were right and what were wrong. Third, he had to examine the *Sulūk* which the Ṣūfīs were advocating and point out what part of it was consistent with the Qur’ān and Sunnah. Fourth, he had to scrutinize the values of life which Ṣūfism had developed and the interpretation of moral and religious virtues which it had offered and show what part of it was acceptable and what was not.

This rapid survey of philosophy, theology and Ṣūfīsm will show what tasks Ibn Taymīyyah had before him. Let us see how he accomplished them.

It is time now to state the bases of Ibn Taymīyyah's approach to the renovation of Islam. First, he maintains that the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are not only the sources of Islamic law; they are also the sources of Islamic faith and belief. They tell how life is to be conducted, how society is to be organized, how economy is to be managed, and how government is to be administered. They further show the way (*ṭarīqah*) Muslims should purify themselves, cultivate piety and serve God best. The basic principles of all these areas have been laid down in the Qur'ān. They have been explained and elaborated further by the Sunnah of the Prophet. Hence, in all these matters one must look to them first; everything else comes next and can only be acceptable if it is consistent with them.

The correct procedure for understanding a Qur'ānic statement is first to refer to other relevant verses of the Qur'ān, for one part of the Qur'ān explains another. Then one should refer to the Sunnah of the Prophet, which is the authoritative explanation of the Qur'ān and should never diverge from it provided its authenticity is established. Third, one should look to the words and the practices of the Companions. In their understanding of the Qur'ān, and in their views on major issues of faith, values and conduct of life they had few differences; their words and practices have a normative value. Last, the comments of their successors (*at-ṭabi'ūn*) on the Qur'ān are also to be taken note of: one should not diverge from agreed-upon views; and where they differ one should adopt that which is closest to the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In their practice, too, the Successors were closest to the ideal of the Qur'ān

and Sunnah, and were little affected by foreign ideas, values and traditions.

Besides these two generations, Ibn Taymīyyah also refers to the views of the *a'immah* of Islam, whose knowledge and piety the *ummah* trusts. Among them he counts the four imāms, Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/667), Mālik (d. 179/795), Ash-Shāfi'ī (d. 204/819) and, above all, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl (d. 241/855), then the scholars of distinction within their schools, as well as independent thinkers like Al-Awzā'ī (d. 157/774) and Sufyān Ath-Thawrī (d. 160?771), leading critics and scholars of *ḥadīth* - such as Al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), and the rest of the great compilers of *ḥadīth* - occupy a place of honor on this list. All the people that we have so far mentioned are referred to by Ibn Taymīyyah as the Righteous Elders. Their understanding of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, as well as their interpretation of Islamic faith and values, he holds, must be honored and followed. The language of the Arabs does have a role in the understanding and interpretation of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, but it only comes after them. Moreover, the language that matters is what was used before Islam or in its early period when the language was not affected by new usage.

Reason is the next principle of Ibn Taymīyyah's innovative work. He says that God created man with a particular nature, *fiṭrah*. The beliefs, values and the principles of Islamic life and society have their roots in this *fiṭrah*. Islam is the religion of *fiṭrah*, and the whole purpose of Islam is the perfection of man on the lines of his *fiṭrah*. Reason is part of *fiṭrah*. Here there is and must be complete agreement between reason and revelation. This places two obligations on Ibn Taymīyyah. He has to show, on the one hand, that the beliefs, values and the principles of life and society that the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the *Salaf* expound have their

rational justification; they are neither irrational nor arbitrary. He has to show, on the other hand, that whatever philosophers, theologians, or scholars of any field claim to be rational is not in reality rational if it goes against the Qur'ān, Sunnah and the views of the *Salaf*.

In addition to these principles, Ibn Taymīyyah also affirms a source of knowledge which may be called intuition. Commenting on the claim of Al-Ghazālī that piety is often the cause of an extraordinary knowledge which God imparts directly to the heart, Ibn Taymīyyah expresses his complete agreement and cites in support verse 8:29 and the *ḥadīth* which counts 'Umar among those who receive inspiration *muḥaddathūn*.⁵ But how this principle stands with respect to what Ṣūfīs call *kashf* or *mukāshafah* he does not discuss. He does, however, very seriously limit the efficacy of this principle, and completely subjects it to revelation, just as he does in case of reason.

There are two main sources of knowledge: one that is available to every human being in varying degrees - senses and reason; and the other which is for prophets and messengers - revelation. In the former category there is a part which is self-evident, such as two and two make four, or two things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other. Mathematics is based on these axiomatic truths that need no argument to prove them. Another category of knowledge is what is gained through sense perception and experience. This knowledge is of particular things which exist in reality - this man or that man, this chair or that chair. There is no knowledge of man as such, or of chair as such, for universals, Ibn Taymīyyah says, have no existence in reality; they exist only in our minds. And there is no knowledge of things which do not exist out there. Like the Stoics before him, Ibn Taymīyyah is a

thoroughgoing nominalist; he opposes every doctrine which imputes any real existence to universals. All scientific knowledge, he says, proceeds from the perception of particular things from which reason forms ideas and concepts. This is the case for all physical and social sciences.

Logic, as a science dealing with the rules of correct reasoning, is not in itself opposed by Ibn Taymīyyah. His criticism of logic is directed against its formulation by Aristotle and against the efforts by Al-Ghazālī and others to make Aristotelian logic the major source of all correct knowledge. However, his criticism often degenerates into a denunciation of logic as a worthless science. In this he displays the influence of the earlier denouncers of logic, like Ibn Aṣ-Ṣalāh (d. 643/1245).

Nevertheless, there are many constructive aspects of significant importance in his review of logic. The first concerns the theory of definition. For Aristotle, the way to know the essence of a thing, what it really is, is to find out what genus it belongs to and what differentiates it from the rest of the members of that genus. A definition which comprises the genus and the differentia of a thing gives the essence of a thing. Ibn Taymīyyah argues in detail that defining a thing by pointing out its genus and differentia is not the proper way, let alone the best way. The proper and the best way to teach someone what a thing is is either to show him the thing itself, point out to him something similar to it, or describe to him its various qualities and properties. These are the ways by which we know things' common life, and not by definition as Aristotle suggests. To appreciate the value of Ibn Taymīyyah's criticism of Aristotelian definition it is enough to point out that the standard method which modern science has adopted in its quest for knowledge is the one which Ibn Taymīyyah suggests.

His second concerns syllogistic reasoning, which comprises a major and a minor premise and a conclusion which follows from them. He show that the truth of a major premise (All As are Bs) is derived from the observation of individual cases of As and Bs. Since it is not possible to observe all the cases, the truth of the major premise is based on reasoning from analogy. It is strange, therefore, that syllogistic reasoning is said to produce certain knowledge, while analogy, on which it is based, is regarded as generating only possibility. Further, in syllogistic reasoning one moves from the general to the particular, whereas knowledge of things which exist must proceed from the particular, for only individual things exist in reality, not universals.

Last, with respect to God, syllogistic reasoning is absolutely not applicable, for God is not a member of a genus; He is one and unique in His existence as well as attributes. It follows that the logic which philosophers make use of in theology is not applicable there, and the ideas which they thereby come upon, contrary to their claim that they are true and certain, are no more than mere conjectures. The correct kind of reasoning in theological matters, Ibn Taymīyyah says, is not syllogistic, but reasoning by priority (*qiyās al-awlā*). He defines this concept in this way: Every perfection which we think of in the case of created beings, and which is free from all defects, is to be affirmed for the Creator first and foremost; similar, every imperfection which we think of in the case of created beings is to be negated of the Creator prior to anyone else.⁶

Besides the basic law of logic, there are certain ethical ideas which are also part of man's original make up (*fiṭrah*). The Qur'ān says that God has endowed every human soul with the knowledge of good and evil, as well as with the sense of responsibility that one should do good and avoid evil. These ideas are not simply

conventional ideas (*mashhūrāt*) whose validity is limited to the society in which they are prevalent, as philosophers think. They are part of man's *fiṭrah* and are universally true. We know of their truth prior to any revelation; in fact, they form part of the criterion on which the truth of revelation is judged.

Ibn Taymīyyah sides here with the Mu'tazilah and the Māturīdīyyah, and opposes the Asha'irah, who make the knowledge of good and evil completely independent of revelation. He says that things that are good or bad are of three kinds. First is those things which are known to be good or bad prior to their pronouncement by revelation, such as justice and truthfulness. We know the goodness of these things through reason; revelation only confirms that knowledge. Second is things that *become* good or bad after revelation has commanded or forbidden them. Third is things that God commands in order to see whether people will submit to or defy His commandments. Things that are thus commanded not to be done at all *become* good like those in the second category. An example of this kind is the command of God to Abraham to sacrifice his son. When Abraham submitted to God's command and proceeded to carry it out, the purpose of the command was served and Abraham was stopped from proceeding further, and was given a lamb to sacrifice instead. The Mu'tazilah failed to see this kind of good as well as the preceding category; they only saw the first category of good. The Asha'irah, on the other hand, thought every good to belong to the third category and negated the others.

Ibn Taymīyyah separates the question of knowledge of the good and the bad from the question of recompense in the Hereafter. Those who commit evil will not necessarily be punished by God in the Hereafter as the Mu'tazilah believe, unless God

sends, Ibn Taymīyyah says, His messengers to warn them against evil deeds. He quotes many verses and the *ḥadīth* on the point.

Ibn Taymīyyah is not opposed to theology (*kalām*) as such. He distinguishes between right and wrong theology. He even recognizes that theologians like the Mu‘tazilah have done service to the faith, have defended against the onslaught of other faiths and won a number of people from among them to the fold of Islam.⁷ His criticism of *kalām* can be summed up in three points. First, the theologians attend only to the statements of the Qur’ān and Sunnah on credal issues, and ignore or do not pay sufficient attention to the arguments which the Qur’ān advances. Two, the arguments which they themselves advance, though they do not realize it, are not convincing. They have too much faith in the efficacy of reason, and give it priority over revelation or its understanding by the *Salaf*. They are not aware of the limitations of reason in theology. Third, some of the premises on which they build their arguments are either taken from other sources or just put forth in reaction to their opponents without critical examination of their validity. These premises often lead them to wrong consequences, such as denying a text or interpreting it wrongly and making it inoperative. They even lead them to deny some common-sense ideas which are accepted by all. Ibn Taymīyyah’s effort was to work out a theology that is free from these shortcomings, is more faithful to the text of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah as understood by the *Salaf*, and is more rational and convincing.

About philosophy, Ibn Taymīyyah’s attitude is completely different; it is a thoroughly critical and completely negative attitude. He may agree with one or another minor philosophical idea, but he does not see any possibility for an Islamic philosophy. He does not discuss it as an issue, but this is the impression that

one gets from his criticism of philosophy and from the fact that he does not try to work out any philosophy, as he does in case of theology.

We have observed that Ibn Taymīyyah recognizes a third principle besides revelation and reason, and although he does not go into details as to how it stands with what the Ṣūfīs call *kashf* and mystical experience, he limits its efficacy and subjects it to the prophetic revelation. Ibn Taymīyyah's criticism of Ṣūfism is first in the area of doctrine, such as the doctrines of *ḥulūl*, in-dwelling of God in man, and *waḥdat al-wujūd*. In particular, he discusses the latter at length, refutes the premises on which it is based, and points out all its implications to Islamic faith and values. He reviews next the *ṭarīqah* which the Ṣūfīs developed and denounces the unauthorized innovations which they introduced in the forms of worship and remembrance of God (*dhikr*), and points out the effects which they exercise on Islamic life. It may be noted that he does not denounce the experience of *fanā* as such, which distinguishes the way of the Ṣūfī from the way of a simple ascetic (*zāhid*) and devotee (*ʿābid*).⁸ He also examines the ascetic and mystical orientation which Ṣūfīs have given to virtues such as abstention, love, trust, sincerity and resignation, and points out what part of it is right and what is wrong. He himself explains and elaborates them in the light of the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* and the practices of the *Salaf*.

On credal issues, neither reason nor mystical intuition can provide certain knowledge. The only correct source is the *waḥī* of the Prophet. A part of the prophetic *waḥī* is literally the word of God Himself, which the angel conveyed to the Prophet and is preserved in the form of the Qur'ān. Another part is an idea which God put in the Prophet's mind and which the Prophet articulated

and put as the word of God. A third part is what the Prophet said under the guidance and supervision of God. Its truth is guaranteed by God; and if on any occasion any mistake creeps in, it is immediately corrected by God. Reports on the actions of the Prophet, if they are correct and have come down to us through reliable channels, are also treated as part of revelation. His actions are supervised and their correctness is guaranteed by God in the same way as his words.

Reports of the Prophet's words or the reports on his life and actions, which are called *ḥadīth* or *Sunnah*, are the sources of faith, values and laws. Their statements regarding things unseen provide certain knowledge regarding them, and their prescriptions lay down certain rules to guide human life and action and are imperative. These rules are either obligatory and must be carried out, or commendatory and should be followed.

Some of the *aḥādīth* report the exact words of the Prophet, some only convey their ideas, and some report very faithfully the actions of the Prophet. If these *aḥādīth* are transmitted by a number of transmitters, honest and true and with reliable memories, they are called *mutawātir*; they provide certain knowledge for belief as well as action. The *aḥādīth* which are called *ḵabar āḥād*, reported by one or more transmitters, fewer than those required for a *mutawātir ḥadīth*, are also to be believed and acted upon, provided the transmitters are honest and of reliable memory. These *aḥādīth* are called *ṣaḥīḥ*. The best compilation of *ṣaḥīḥ aḥādīth* is that of Al-Bukhārī and then of Muslim. *Ṣaḥīḥ aḥādīth* and to a lesser degree the *ḥasan*, or the fairly good *aḥādīth*, may also be used as arguments in matters of faith. But the *aḥādīth* which are weak (*ḍa'īf*) must be avoided. Ibn Taymīyyah goes into the rational justification of this position in different writings.

The creed which Ibn Taymīyyah presents is well grounded in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, has the support of the majority of the Elders, is more reasonable and convincing, avoids the pitfalls into which the theologians, philosophers and Ṣūfīs had landed themselves, and is put in terms comprehensible to all.

Take, for example, the existence of God. The argument which the theologians had advanced for God's existence runs like this: The world consists of bodies, which are made of atomic substances (*jawāhir fardah*) and incidents (*a'rad*). Since no substance exists without incidents, and since incidents are contingents, and since whatever is infected by incidents is contingent, the world is contingent. And whatever is contingent needs a non-contingent cause to bring it into existence, and that cause can only be God. These various premises which make up the argument are obviously not self-evident; they have to be established. Ibn Taymīyyah examines them at length and shows how they lack certainty and how the argument as a whole is far from being conclusive.⁹ He also points out the consequences which follow from these premises and which conflict with the Qur'ān and Sunnah and go against common sense.

The arguments which the philosophers had advanced did not fare any better. One of the arguments which was put forward by Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā begins by distinguishing between necessary and possible existence. The underlying assumption is that the possible has an essence different from its existence, and that the essence is at one time qualified with existence and at another time with non-existence (*'adam*). But this very possibility needs to be established. Ibn Taymīyyah argues that it is far from the truth; essence is always one with existence, as the philosophers admit in the case of God.¹⁰ Their third argument, which Aristotle and Ibn

Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) advanced and which is based on the idea of movement, is also not convincing, as Ibn Sīnā had said.¹¹

The Qur'ān, Ibn Taymīyyah says, starts with the idea that the belief that the world is created is a part of the natural endowment (*fiṭrah*) of man. This is corroborated by the fact that there has been no community on the earth which has not believed in a Creator. As further support, the Qur'ān argues for the creation of man from dust, then from sperm, then from congealed blood, then from a lump out of which bones are formed which are next clothed with flesh (23:12-14). This argument is perfectly rational and convincing. Everyone knows that he is not self-born, that he is created, that at one time he did not exist and then came into existence, that his body is made of material that comes from earth, that he is produced from sperm and then from congealed blood, and then from a lump from which the bones are formed which are then clothed with flesh. Each part of this argument is open to perception and is well established. The strength of this argument is admitted by Ibn Rushd, the famous commentator on Aristotle. He hails it as the most natural argument which the prophets offer for the existence of God.¹²

As for the attributes of God, the philosophers started with the Greek idea that God must be absolutely one, simple and non-composite, that he has to be above all distinctions, mental and real. As a consequence, they interpreted His attributes negatively or reduced them to relations. All His names, they believed, only refer to His essence, of which either something is negated or of which some relation is asserted. Al-Ghazālī had examined this idea earlier and refuted it in his *Tahāfut*. Ibn Taymīyyah carries the criticism further. His point is that the existence of positive attributes like knowledge are not other than He: they are one with Him. Hence it is not right to say that God is dependent upon something other than

Himself. Further, a being devoid of all attributes is simply a mental abstraction, a void, a non-entity.

For the Mu'tazilah, the reason for denying the existence of attributes was different. They thought that it either implied plurality of eternal beings if the attributes are taken as eternal, or the existence of contingent things in God if they are taken as contingent, which would render God contingent. To avoid these circumstances, they reduced either the attributes to mere relations (e.g. knowledge as the relation of the Divine Essence with the object known), or the states of the Divine Essence like knowing (*al-'alimīyyah*), which were said to be neither existing nor non-existing. Ibn Taymīyyah refutes this argument by saying that to affirm the existence of attributes is not to posit in any sense the existence of independent entities other than God. Neither is it the hypostasization of attributes on Christian lines, which the Mu'tazilah wanted to avoid.

The Ash'arīs, Ibn Taymīyyah recognizes, developed a better concept of God's attributes. They affirmed of Him seven essential attributes: knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, sight and speech. They said that these attributes are not the same as the Divine Essence, for they have existence over and above the Essence, not reducible to mere relations or states. Nor are they different from the Essence, as they do not exist separately from the Essence, neither by themselves nor by anything other than the Essence. God is one single Being, one Essence qualified with attributes. We can only distinguish between Essence and the attributes in thought, not in reality. Out there there is no pure Essence devoid of all attributes, nor is there any attribute existing there by itself.

The Asha'irah, however, conceived of each one of these seven attributes of God as a single eternal attribute working independently of His will for fear that it would make them

contingent. They said, for example, that God knows everything past, present and future with one eternal will, and speaks every word with one eternal speech; for they thought that the alternative was to posit a plurality of contingent knowledges, wills, and speeches which would render the Divine Essence the locus of contingent things and jeopardize its eternity. Ibn Taymīyyah concedes that this is true only of God's life and existence, but not of His will, speech and other attributes, since that would imply the eternity of their objects, willed, spoken, seen, etc. Obviously, the subject of God's will, for example, which is all powerful, cannot be conceived to lag behind His will. It is also obvious that one will is not another will, and knowledge of one thing is not knowledge of another thing; even knowledge of the same thing before its existence is not same as knowledge after its coming into existence.

Ibn Taymīyyah says that the correct solution to this problem is to distinguish between an eternal will and contingent wills, between eternal knowledge and contingent knowledges, between eternal speech and contingent speeches. God's will as a class is one and eternal, but His individual knowledges are multiple and contingent; His speech as a class is one and eternal, but His individual speech acts are multiple and contingent, for all individual wills, knowledges, and speeches depend on one eternal will, and what depends on will is contingent. This solution to the problem is not free from difficulty, but it is certainly more reasonable.

As philosophers conceived of God as being obviously simple and beyond all distinctions, and denied as a result His will and action, they considered the world as proceeding out from God necessarily, without any non-being intervening. It was also eternal because there was not any time before the worlds came into existence, for time is the measure of movement and there was

nothing there to move before the world came into being. Al-Ghazālī had refuted in detail in his *Tahāfut* the argument of the philosophers for the eternity of the world; he had affirmed its contingency, and had shown that it was created by the will of God. But like the other Ash‘arīs he maintained that God creates everything with His eternal will. As to the question why God should create a thing at one particular time and not at another, when every time is equal for an eternal and all-powerful will, the answer that he and other Ash‘arīs gave was that an eternal, all-powerful will was sufficient in itself to create anything any time.

The Mu‘tazilah, in the opposite view, posited contingent wills for God not existing in any locus.¹³ They came out with the idea of a will without a locus to avoid the existence of contingent things in the Divine Essence. They also asserted that in the beginning God was not creative and only became creative afterwards. This implies, Ibn Taymīyyah says, either His inactivity for a time or His *inability*, neither of which is to be attributed to Him.¹⁴ His view on the subject is that God is and has ever been creative. His will as a class is eternal, and things of the world as a class are also eternal, but since they are the results of individual wills which are contingent, as individual things they are also contingent.

Both the philosophers and the Ash‘arīs were of the view that God does not act in order to achieve anything in... His actions are not motivated by any motive nor done with any purpose. For the Asha‘irah, things are produced by the eternal will of God, hence the world as it is could not have been different. For the philosophers, on the other hand, the world is the emergence of things in existence in their time according as they are in the knowledge of God from eternity. The difference between them may be stated as follows: The philosophers deny purpose because they do not attribute any will to God; they think that will implies

want, which cannot be ascribed to God. The Ash‘arīs deny purpose, not because God does not have will; they do attribute will to Him, but they think that to ascribe purpose to Him means attributing imperfection to Him that He seeks to overcome by producing the thing He has in mind. They think that God’s will is all-powerful and self-sufficient and needs no purpose or reason to move it.

Ibn Taymīyyah refutes the point that purpose necessarily implies want. He says that God’s actions are the expressions of His knowledge and power, and He loves to exercise them, but they do have a reason and a purpose. He quotes texts from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, which affirm reason for God’s actions, and at the same time deny any want on His part, and affirm His complete self-sufficiency.

The Mu‘tazilah attribute reason and purpose to God’s will. They say that He has created men, and sent prophets and messengers to them with His messages and books so that they may live a good life and may be rewarded for their good deeds. Ibn Taymīyyah appreciates this point, but he says that it is not right to relate purpose to creatures alone. There are texts, he points out, which also relate purpose to God Himself. He does want people to remember Him, glorify Him, worship Him, and obey His commandments, as well as fear Him, love Him, and put trust in Him. And when they worship Him and obey Him, He is pleased with them and loves them, but this does not mean that He needs their worship, their praises, or their obedience. It also does not mean that He was incomplete without them; on the contrary, He does these things because He loves them.

One may point out that, although God sends the prophets for the good of mankind, and a number of them who believe in them and follow them benefit from this act of God, many others who do

not believe in them suffer. What wisdom (*ḥikmah*) is there in an action which causes colossal suffering besides immense good? The Mu‘tazilah tried to meet this objection by saying that the prophets are sent only to those who believe in them and obey them and not for those who do not believe in them and defy them. For God does not will anything which is evil, nor does He will anything which does not happen. This answer is obviously not correct, for if God has not sent the prophets to the disbelievers and the defiers, why should He punish them for their disbelief and disobedience? It is also not true that disbelief or disobedience occur without God’s will.

Ibn Taymīyyah affirms, on the contrary, that whatever good or bad happens in the world happens with God’s permission, and is brought out by His will and power. He points out that God’s will is of two kinds, creative and prescriptive. Sending the prophets, giving them a message and ordering them to follow it is part of His prescriptive will, which implies that what He commands is also loved by Him. However, man is free to submit to His prescriptive will. If he obeys His commands he will be rewarded; if he defies them he will be punished. And everything God commands is good and approved of and loved by Him. As for the creative will, its object may be good and may be evil, as it does not involve His approval or disapproval. All those who deny or defy the prophets are addressed by God’s message and are the objects of His prescriptive will, just as those who believe in the prophets and submit to them. God wills, in this sense of will, the good of each and every human being, believer and unbeliever, obedient and sinful. But the lack of faith and the misdeeds of the former are willed and created only by His creative will. Similarly, the suffering which is the recompense of lack of faith and misdeeds is also produced by His creative will.

It may, however, happen that God wills something good which involves some evil, as He sends rain for the good of the people but which may also cause suffering to some. But in such cases the good always outweighs the evil. Similarly, the good that follows from sending the prophets also outweighs the evil which may follow from it in the form of suffering for those who reject them.

The philosophers viewed bodies as consisting of matter and form, which is the sum of all the essential properties to which a thing inheres. They believed that the form of a thing is unalterable. Fir, for example, whose property is to burn, will never cease to burn, or water, whose property is to cool, will never cease to cool. They believed that there is a necessary connection between cause and effect. On that ground they rejected miracles except in appearance. Al-Ghazālī subjected this view of causality to scathing criticism in the *Tahāfut*. He denied that things in themselves have any fixed form, nature or property, and that one thing causes another. Everything, he said is caused directly by the will of God. What people call cause is only a condition, the only cause is the will of God.

Ibn Taymīyyah refutes both these doctrines, the doctrine of the philosophers that things have unalterable form, and the doctrine of Al-Ghazālī and the Ash‘arīs that things have no form or nature at all, and that nothing causes anything and is simply a condition for its existence. He affirms both form and causality, but only denies that form is unalterable. This makes miracles possible. The reason which he cites for affirming causality is the one which Ibn Rushd had pointed out earlier - that it would otherwise make knowledge impossible.¹⁵

As a consequence of their denial of will and knowledge of particular things to God, the philosophers also refused to attribute speech to Him. Instead, they attributed it to the Active Intellect,

which they identified with Gabriel. They also denied that the prophet's experience with Gabriel was an external experience. They said that prophets hear words and see figures inside themselves, not outside. On all these points, Ibn Taymīyyah shows, they go against the clear texts of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The Mu'tazilah recognized only three attributes of God (life, knowledge and power) as real attributes, and treated the rest as relations, states or negative attributes. Therefore, they could not recognize speech as an attribute existing in the Divine Essence. They said that when God speaks, it only means that He creates speech in something other than Him.

Ibn Taymīyyah ridiculed this view, saying that this is not what we mean when we say X speaks, or X is the speaker. We say that only when words are spoken by X, or when it is X who is the speaker. We call X living or knowing or moving when X himself is alive or knows or moves, and not when he brings someone else to life, or produces knowledge in some being, or causes movement in some body; similar, we can only say that God speaks or that He is the speaker when it is He Who speaks, and not when He creates the speech in something else.

The Asha'irah recognized speech as a real and essential attribute of God. But they said, as they said in the case of His knowledge, will and power, that He speaks with His eternal speech. Since they did not distinguish between speech as a class, which is one and eternal, and individual speech acts, which are multiple and contingent, they said that God speaks with one eternal speech. It is one single speech, whether it is a command, prohibition or statement, and it is one single speech which when put in Hebrew was called Torah, when put in Syriac was called Gospel, and when put in Arabic was called Qur'ān. To justify these outrageous statements, they said that God's speech should be

understood as mental speech, without words or sounds, only as an idea or meaning.

Ibn Taymīyyah subjects this view to scathing criticism. His own view, which he says is the faith of the *Salaf*, begins with the description of speech as eternal and as contingent. He says that the speech of God as a class is eternal. God has been speaking from eternity when and as He has chosen to speak. But particular speech acts of His are not eternal. Further, as objects of His will they are contingent. However, they are not to be called created (*makhlūq*), for speech is related to the speaker in a way different from the way the sun, the moon, a lion, or a man whom God has created are related to Him. Speech exists in God, but the sun, moon, lion and man exist out there separate from God. The statement that the Qur'ān is neither eternal (*qadīm*) nor created, underscores this special relation which God's speech has with Him.

The Qur'ān is literally the word of God. Its meaning as well as its words are from God; and the Qur'ān in both essences is uncreated, though not eternal. Gabriel got it from God as such, and delivered it to the Prophet without adding anything to it or subtracting anything from it. And the Prophet likewise delivered it to his people without any change whatsoever. So the Qur'ān that we have is the word of God exactly as He spoke it to Gabriel. It was the same word of God which was written down in the *muṣḥaf* during the time of Abū Bakr and 'Uthmān, the same word of God which Muslims have been transcribing since then in their *muṣḥafs*. Similarly, the words of the Qur'ān that anyone recites and hears from any reciter are the words of God. In all these forms, the Qur'ān is the uncreated word of God. However, the ink and the paper which are used in writing, as well as the act of writing, are ours; they belong to man and are created. Similarly, the voice in

which the Qur'ān is read or recited, as well as the act of reading and reciting, are human voices and acts and are created.

Ibn Taymīyyah's general stand on divine attributes is that whatever attributes God and His Prophet have affirmed of God should be affirmed, and whatever they have negated of Him should be negated, and what they have neither affirmed nor negated should be analyzed first. Concerning the last category, if the affirmation implies something which agrees with what God and the Prophet have affirmed, it may be affirmed, otherwise not. However, regarding the names of God, only those names are to be affirmed which have been affirmed by God and the Prophet, even if the proposed name has nothing wrong with it.

Second, the attributes of God which are also predicated of His creatures are not to be compared with the attributes of the creatures. They are absolutely non-similar and unique. Creatures in no sense participate in the attributes of the Creator, just as they do not participate in His essence. There is nothing common between them except in name. Third, they should be taken on their *ẓāhir*; that is, they should be understood in the sense they ordinarily mean, or, as we say, they should be taken at face value; they should not be interpreted metaphorically. However, this does not mean that the Qur'ān does not use metaphors; it does. But whenever it does there is invariably an indication by its speaker to that effect. Hence, when, following such an indication, a word of the Qur'ān is interpreted in a non-literal or metaphorical sense, it is the *ẓāhir* of that word there.

The attributes of God which are called *aṣ-ṣifāt al-khabariyyah*, such as *istiwā*, descent (*nuzūl*), face (*wajh*), eye (*'ayn*), hand (*yad*), shank (*sāq*) or anger (*ghaḍab*), love (*ḥubb*), pleasure (*riḍā*) smile (*ḍaḥik*), and so on, which we know only through revelation, are

also to be taken on their *ẓāhir*, that is, as they are ordinarily understood. Similarly, when God is called Al-‘Ālī or Al-A‘lā, the Most High, or when He is said to be above (*fawq*) the heavens, His ‘*ulū* and *fawqīyyah*, transcendence or being-above should be understood in the sense they ordinarily mean (*ẓāhir*). However, their modality (*kayfīyyah*) should not be conceived on human pattern. What exactly God’s transcendence or being-above means, or what their mode is, is not known to us, even though we know what they ordinarily mean and know that they should be taken in that sense. The same applies to all the attributes which we have mentioned or which belong to their category. Apparently the sense in which Ibn Taymīyyah takes God’s *ma‘īyyah* being with man or any creature, seems to be inconsistent with his general stand, for he understands it in the sense of knowing, watching or helping. However, the truth is that it is fully consistent with his general stand, for as we have said, the interpretation of a word in a non-literal sense is also the *ẓāhir* meaning of the word if there is an indication by the speaker to that meaning. Ibn Taymīyyah shows that every time *ma‘īyyah* is mentioned in the Qur’ān, God has in some way indicated that He uses the word in the non-literal sense.

This is Ibn Taymīyyah’s position, not only with regard to the *ṣifat khabarīyyah*, but also with regard to all other attributes. It is one of the most important points of his creed. He has stated and defended it in many of his writings, and it was due to that that he was twice jailed. He argued that this was exactly the position of the *Salaf* and that he was only stating their faith. To support his claim, he quotes profusely from them. Generally, philosophers and theologians who interpret these attributes on metaphorical lines do so because, so they claim, they imply a body for God and

anthropomorphize Him. Ibn Taymīyyah discusses this charge at length and refutes it.

Let us now move to the second part of the creed, prophethood. God chooses men from different nations at a time of His choosing, reveals to them His message and sends them to their peoples to guide them to the right path. If He sends a person to his people who already believe in some prophet, but who do not act upon his teachings, he is a *nabī*, prophet. But if He sends one to a people who are unbelievers (*kāfir*) or polytheists (*mushrik*) he is *rasūl*, messenger. Scholars have distinguished between *nabī* and *rasūl* in various ways, but this is how Ibn Taymīyyah distinguishes between them.

Prophets and messengers are the best men of their communities, with the best powers of mind and heart, most righteous and very respectable in their society. But prophethood should not be treated as a natural gift, nor the prophet as one who has greater talents than others. Prophethood is a special gift from God to a person whom He chooses for some important task; He endows him with some special powers to accomplish those tasks and He helps him in supernatural ways. Al-Fārābī first, followed by Ibn Sīnā next, and then other philosophers, even some Ṣūfīs, conceived of prophethood as a natural phenomenon. They said that the prophet is only distinguished from other people in that he has a better and more powerful faculty to know things, an extraordinarily strong imagination which presents to him his idea in visible forms in waking or in dreams, and a highly developed psychic power which works wonders.

Ibn Taymīyyah reviews in detail this view of prophethood. He points out that, first, prophethood is not a natural phenomenon, that it is not something which the prophets earn; on the contrary, it is simply a divine gift. Second, his revelations are not the ideas

which he himself discovers or works out; they are given to him by God. Third, the angel that comes to him and the things of the *Ghayb* which appear in his vision are realities which exist outside his mind, not within it; they are not at all the creations of his imagination. And the miracles which he works are not the work of his psychic powers; they are brought by God with His Own powers. Further, they are not like the wonders of soothsayers, diviners, and magicians, which do not breach the ordinary laws of nature; they do in reality breach natural laws.

One way to distinguish a real prophet from an imposter is by looking into the wonders they work. Knowledge of things in the future which an imposter mentions are not free from elements that are false; the effects he produces on natural objects are superficial and hardly breach the laws of nature; and the extraordinary experiences he has are caused by Satan. They produce no good effect either on his life or on the lives of his people. On the other hand, the best proof of a true prophet is his life, his teachings, his work and his effect on human beings.

Ibn Taymīyyah has discussed the different forms of *wahī*, or revelation, which the prophet receives. One form is imparting an idea in the mind of the prophet while awake or asleep. This form is not confined to prophets; it is also given to non-prophets, men and women, who have faith and piety. The second form of *wahī* is that which is given only to the prophet by an angel, who delivers it either directly to the heart of the prophet or appears to him in human form or in his own angelic form and delivers the *wahī*. The third kind of *wahī* is the word of God which He directly addresses to the prophet, as He did to the Moses at Sinai or to Muḥammad during his ascension (*mi' rāj*),

The third article of faith is life hereafter. Philosophers have had various opinions on this subject. Al-Kindī (d. 247/861) affirmed

the resurrection of the body. Al-Fārābī (d. 329/950) had three opinion which he expressed in his different books. In *Al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* (The Ideal City), he says that all human beings will survive death, the virtuous as well as the wicked. The former will enjoy eternal happiness and the latter will suffer eternal damnation.¹⁶ But in *As-Siyāsah al-Madanīyyah*, on the other hand, he says that only those souls which are perfect in knowledge and virtue will survive death and enjoy happiness thereafter, but the ones which are ignorant and wicked shall perish with death.¹⁷ The third view, which Ibn Taymīyyah also attributes to Al-Fārābī but which is not found in his extant writings, denies resurrection altogether, of the body as well as the soul. Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1036) affirms the resurrection of the body along with the resurrection of the soul¹⁸ in his *An-Najāt* and other writings,¹⁹ but in *Ar-Risālah al-Udhwīyyah* he affirms only the resurrection of the soul.²⁰ This is the view which most philosophers held.

The reason that the soul, or the rational soul, to be more precise, will survive death, whereas the body will perish forever, lies deep in the metaphysics which the philosophers borrowed from their Greek masters, according to which pure reason and the immaterial realities that are its object of contemplation are alone everlasting. However, the argument which Ibn Sīnā offers may be stated as follows: so far as the soul is concerned, everyone believes that it will survive death. The body, on the other hand, everyone knows decomposes and is mixed with other particles of the earth. From that part of the earth grow various crops which are eaten by men and animals and become part of their bodies. When they die their bodies again decompose and are assimilated into the earth, from which other crops grow which are again eaten by different men and animals and are assimilated into their bodies. This process

goes on. How then, he asks, are the original particles that constitute the body of the first man to be re-collected? They are no longer intact; they are scattered and assimilated in hundreds of bodies. Again, the particles which once formed part of one became part of a second man and then of a third man. Whose part will they be regarded as, and whose body will they form when resurrected?²¹

Ibn Taymīyyah says that it is not all difficult for God to recreate from the material into which one's body turns after decomposition. The Qur'ān cites cases which God has created from the material into which bodies have turned after decomposition. One such case is that of a person who died, and whose body decomposed and became part of the earth in a hundred years (2:259). The Qur'ān asks why people should wonder that God could create man once again from the earth. Did He not create him from dust in the beginning, and then from sperm, then turned the sperm into a clot of blood, then the clot into flesh, and from the flesh did He not create bones, and finally a perfect man? (23:12-14) If it was possible for God to transform dust into sperm, and the sperm into a clot of blood, and that into bones, and then clothe it with flesh, and finally form a man, why can He not create man from dust again? Every day God is creating innumerable things from other things by transforming one into another, such as the dried earth into green crops, and the dust into a variety of insects and animals on the earth, in the air and under the sea. It asks further why it should be difficult for God to create man again when it was not difficult for the One Who has created greater things like the heavens and earth to create a smaller thing like man. (37:257).

Further, it is not necessary that God create an individual from the same material into which his or her body has decomposed; He can create from similar material. After all, the body that an individual will have in the next life will not be the same body

which or she had earlier. It will be a body similar to the earlier body in some respects and different in others. In fact, it will be a body quite different in size, immensely larger than the former, able to live forever, not just a few years as it is now, a body which will not procreate, which will neither sweat nor pass urine or stool. To the objection that it will not then be the same body, the answer is that it will be in a sense the same body. Even our present bodies in old age is not exactly the same bodies that they were in our youth, or that they were in our infancy, or that they were when we were in the wombs of our mothers. But we do call them the same bodies, and consider them to be our bodies. In the same way the bodies that we will have in the Hereafter will be our bodies, though they will be different in some respects from our present bodies.

The first important idea of Ibn Taymīyyah's regarding man is that he has a particular *fiṭrah*. Drawing upon the verse, "Set your face steadily and truly to the faith, the handiwork of God on which He has created mankind" (30:30), and the *ḥadīth*, "Every child is born with the *fiṭrah*; it is their parents who thereafter turn him or her into a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian,"²² Ibn Taymīyyah asserts that human beings are born with a definite nature (*fiṭrah*) which provides the grounds for Islamic obligation. We have referred to this concept earlier. We have said that Ibn Taymīyyah finds rational justification for Islam in the original nature (*fiṭrah*) of man. There are some ideas which are, he says, part of the human mind, necessary and self-evident as Descartes calls them, or *a priori*, as Kant characterized them. Some of them were singled out by Aristotle and made part of logic; others lie at basis of the mathematical sciences; still others form the grounds on which the moral codes of man are based. Belief in the Creator, too, is part of *fiṭrah*.

We have already mentioned these ideas. We will now add that Ibn Taymīyyah's concept of *fiṭrah* is wider than this. He says that it is also part of *fiṭrah* that God is one, that He is qualified with all the perfection we can think of, that we should be thankful to God for the blessings He bestows on us, that we should glorify Him, worship Him, and submit to Him. *Fiṭrah* has also biological, social and psychological facets. When we say that man is a social being, that he has certain biological and psychological needs which are to be fulfilled in a proper way, we are referring to another part of *fiṭrah*. It is *fiṭrah* in this comprehensive sense which is the basis of Islam. Islam does not want to change this *fiṭrah*; it only wants to perfect it. No one before Ibn Taymīyyah had ever elaborated the concept of *fiṭrah* in the way he did.

The idea that man is free within certain limits, that his actions are his actions, that he is responsible for what he does and is accountable for it is also a part of his *fiṭrah*. Freedom within limits and responsibility for the deeds one does are inalienable parts of human conscience. They are not contradicted by the belief, which is also part of *fiṭrah*, that God is all-powerful. *Fiṭrah* is a harmonious whole; one part of it does not conflict with another, provided each is conceived of and pursued in the right way. This is the fact to which the Qur'ān refers when it says, "We have created man on the best of patterns (95:4). Ibn Taymīyyah explains at length that God's omnipotence and foreordainment of things are not inconsistent with man's freedom and responsibility. The belief of the determinist that man has no freedom of will at all has no basis in the *fiṭrah* nor in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Nor is there any reason for the Mu'tazilah, on the other hand, to limit God's omnipotence and place human acts outside His power and ordainment. There is no contradiction in saying that man is free to

choose and do his deeds, while their actual happening depends on the will of God and is brought out by His power. Man is the doer of his deeds while God is their Creator.

On this issue, the Asha'irah also went wrong. They overemphasized God's omnipotence and reduced the efficacy of human will. In addition to asserting that God is the Creator of human acts, they made Him their doer to a great extent. Some of them even said very clearly that there is only one agent there - God. Ibn Taymīyyah rejects this view and says that besides violating common sense, this doctrine goes against Qur'ānic statements. The Qur'ān unambiguously refers various actions to man and calls him their doer. Ibn Taymīyyah also points out that the doctrine of a single Divine Agency paves the way for monistic Ṣūfīs and philosophers to say that God alone exists. The correct view, Ibn Taymīyyah says, is to affirm the reality of both divine and human wills and show that there is no contradiction between them.

For the philosophers, the goal of human life and the ultimate happiness of man lie in the perfection of reason, in the comprehension of ultimate realities and contemplation of them. This is the way, they believe, to imitate God, whom they reduce to a self-thinking thought. For Ṣūfīs the goal of man and his ultimate happiness lie either in the direct knowledge (*ma'rifah*) of reality (*ḥaqq*), self-annihilation (*fanā'*) in God and union (*jam'*) with Him, or the realization that Being is one (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). The goal of the philosophers follows from their metaphysics, and the goal of the Ṣūfīs follows from their mystical experience.

Ibn Taymīyyah says that this question is not to be decided in the light of metaphysics or mystical experience, for neither reason nor experience is competent enough to pronounce a verdict on this

issue; and in fact, there is no need to invoke either. We have the Qur'ān and the Sunnah which give a clear answer to this question. The Qur'ān and Sunnah directly state that man is the servant (*'abd*) of God, and the purpose of his creation is to serve Him. It is in the service (*'ibādah*) of God, that is, in worshiping Him and obeying His commands, that man's happiness lies. Only by serving Him and working for His religion will man achieve the purpose of his life, not by knowing Reality, or losing himself in God, or realizing that Being is one.

Some people think that this *'ibādah*, which is the goal of man's life, only means to worship God, to glorify Him, to offer *ṣalāh*, keep the fast, perform *'umrah* and *ḥajj*, offer sacrifice, read the Qur'ān and recite God's names. These are certainly *'ibādah*, but not the whole of *'ibādah*. *Ibādah* means to submit to God in humility and love. Everything which one says or does in submission to God with humility and love is *'ibādah*, whether it is worship, pursuit of virtue, or compliance with divine commandments in any part of life, individual or social, whether it concerns an action of the body, like *ṣalāh* and *jihād*, or action of the mind like faith and *dhikr*, or feelings of the heart like fear, love and trust.

Not only is the goal of man's life and his ultimate happiness to be derived from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, their details are also to be learned from the same source. How God is to be worshiped, what virtues are to be cultivated, what values are to be pursued, what norms are to be followed, what duties are obligatory, what acts are recommended, and what things are permitted - all these are to be learned from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. All questions regarding values, norms, and priorities are to be decided on the

basis of the *shar'*, not on any other basis, be it social tradition or mystical experience.

Similarly, the way to serve God best, or how to be a perfect servant of God is also to be learned from the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The Prophet was sent to teach the way to God, the way to purify oneself, to cultivate virtues and piety, to seek God's pleasure (*riḍā*) and nearness (*qurb*). That way (*ṭarīqah*) he fully explained. His companions, by following that *ṭarīqah*, did attain the goal of their lives, their ultimate happiness. Ibn Taymīyyah states all the principal elements of the prophetic *sulūk*: *ṣalāh*, fasting, reading the Qur'ān, *dhikr*, righteous living, loving mankind, preaching Islam, bidding the good and forbidding the evil, and *jihād* in the cause of God. He says that the details of all these elements as the Prophet taught them and the Companions practiced them have been fully preserved and are available to everyone.

Over centuries the Ṣūfīs worked out their own ways (*ṭarīqah*) and pursued their own *sulūk*. They took various elements from the prophetic *sulūk*, but added many things to it. Ibn Taymīyyah mentions two of them in particular. One was the practice of *khalwah*, to retire to a secluded place away from people, to a cave in the mountains or a place in the forest, or to a *zāwīyyah* or *khanqah* built for the purpose, to devote oneself to worship and devotion for a specific period, forty days, for example. Ṣūfīs set a high value on this practice and seek support for it from the retiring of the Prophet to the cave of Ḥira' in his pre-prophetic period. This practice, Ibn Taymīyyah says, is a *bid'ah*, an unjustified innovation. In principle, the actions of the Prophet in pre-prophetic days are not enough to prove that it is his *sunnah* or that we should follow it. It may be noted that during the whole prophetic period he never visited the cave of Ḥira'', though he could have if he had so

wished, nor any other cave. Furthermore, none of his Companions retreated to any cave during his lifetime. Had it been something desirable the Prophet would have recommended it to his people.

The second thing to which Ibn Taymīyyah strongly objects concerns the Ṣūfīs' practice of *dhikr*. He says that all the *dhikr* which the Prophet taught and which are preserved in the books of Ḥadīth are meaningful sentences. There is nothing in them like saying merely the word Allah or the pronoun *hū* (He). Such is reported neither from the Prophet, nor from any of his Companions. This practice is an innovation of the Ṣūfīs and is completely unjustified. Al-Ghazālī is more mistaken when he says that *lā ilāha illā Allah* is the *dhikr* of the common man, and saying *Allah* is the *dhikr* of the elite.

The most important part of the Ṣūfī *sulūk* is the experience of *fanā*. Ibn Taymīyyah knows well that it was part of the prophetic *sulūk*. Later Ṣūfīs like Sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624) and Shah Walī Allah (d. 1176/1762) of India have clearly said that it was never part of the prophetic *ṭarīqah*.²³ Nevertheless, Ibn Taymīyyah does not call it *bid'ah*. He only objects when a Ṣūfī like Shaykh 'Abdullah Al-Anṣārī Al-Ḥarwī (d. 481/1088) extols the experience as the goal of *sulūk*,²⁴ or when one like Ibn 'Arabī builds on it the doctrine of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*).

Ibn Taymīyyah's strongest and most vehement criticism of *taṣawwūf* is directed against the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. As expounded by Ibn 'Arabī, the doctrine stands on two premises. First, the essence of a thing is other than its existence, and it is not a mere non-entity, but something which exists there before it is qualified with existence. Second, the existence of God is identical with the existence of the world.²⁵ Ibn Taymīyyah refutes both these doctrines. We have noted earlier that he is a thoroughgoing

nominalist. Hence, starting from that position, it is not difficult for him to refute the reality of the essence prior to its existence. It is easy to see the reason he refutes the identification of God's existence with the existence of the world. He denies in principle anything as absolute existence, or existence as such. What exists out there is this thing or that thing, and the existence of one thing is not the existence of the other. The existence of God is the existence of God, and the existence of the world is the existence of the world. One is not identical with the other. Existence as such is only a mental abstraction, not a reality.

Other grounds on which Ibn Taymīyyah assails the doctrine of the unity of being are those damaging consequences to religion, morality, and life which follow from it. For example, it follows that God's attributes are not real, they are mere relations; the world proceeds from Him necessarily and is not created by His will; man has no will of his own; his actions are done not by him but by God; it is God Who believes or disbelieves and who does good and does evil; it is He Who worships and He Who is worshiped, He Who kills and He Who is killed; there is nothing good or bad in itself; faith and unfaith are one; *tawhīd* is the same as *shirk*; the worship of idols or gods other than God is the worship of God, for there is no one in existence other than God; the call of the prophets to worship one God is a guile, for there is no god in existence other than God; Hell is not a place of suffering but of joy, different from the joy of Paradise.

Some Ṣūfīs, on the basis of their experiences, the ideas that they get in *kashf*, or the powers they have developed, have said that their *walayāt* is better than the *walāyah* of the prophets, or a *walī* is greater than a *nabī*. They have also said that, like the seal of the prophets, there is also a seal of the saints. Ibn Taymīyyah examines these ideas and shows that they are untrue, that no *walī* is greater

than a *nabī*, or even equal to one. Further, no *walī* can dispense with the revelation and the guidance of the *nabī*. For a man to secure God's *walāyah*, friendship and support, two things are required: faith in God and obedience to His Prophet. Whoever has faith and follows the Prophet is a *walī* of God. It is not necessary for him to follow a Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*, have mystical experiences, acquire *kashf* and work wonders; *walāyah* is open to everyone, be he a farmer, trader, scholar, *mujāhid* or ruler.

Ibn Taymīyyah reviews the interpretations which Ṣūfīs give to religious virtues such as abstinence (*zuhd*) and love (*war'*), trust and *riḍā*. He shows what part of them is correct in the light of the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, and the words and practices of the Elders, and what part is influenced by their own experiences and ideas. Ibn Al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) before him had made a similar review in his *Talbīs Iblīs*. Ibn Taymīyyah goes beyond him and expounds in detail what these virtues positively mean in the light of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. This task was further carried out by his disciple, Ibn Al-Qayyīm (d. 751/1350) in his *Madārij as-Sālikīn* and other writings.

An Islamic society is an organized society. Its affairs are to be managed by a government. If there is no government, the community is required to establish one. Except for some innovationist sects like the Khawārij, the rest of the *ummah* is agreed that it is the *duty* of the community to establish a government (*imāmah*) which manages its affairs, promotes its well-being and secures its happiness, establishes the daily prayers, the prayers on Fridays and 'īd occasions, organizes the ḥajj, collects and distributes the *zakāh*, promotes the true faith and protects it from idolatrous practices, supervises the morals of the society, enjoins the good and forbids the evil, enforces the *hudūd*

punishments, administers justice in all affairs, social, political and economic, maintains peace and order, and protects the community from disruptive elements within and from invading forces without. In short, it establishes the religion (*iqāmat ad-dīn*) in all aspects.

Opinions have differed as to whether the basis of this obligation is reason for the *shar'*. Some Mu'tazilah consider it to be rational and *shar'ī*, while the Asha'irah consider it to be purely *shar'ī*. Ibn Taymīyyah, in consonance with his general position with regard to good and evil, states that it is rational as well as *shar'ī*. Man is a social being; he cannot be happy or secure his well-being unless he lives in an organized society ruled by a just government. The Prophet has commanded a party of just rulers to set up a leader over them and obey his commands. He would all the more like that the community set up a government and obey its regulation. Many of the provisions of the Shari'ah, such as the collection and the distribution of *zakāh*, the enforcement of *hudūd*, establishment of justice, and so on, require an effective government. There are verses in the Qur'ān and many *ahādīth* of the Prophet which explicitly command Muslims to obey their rulers and order the rulers to fulfill their duties towards the people. Hence the setting up of a strong government is both a rational and *shar'ī* obligation on the community. Not only an obligation, every effort to establish it and serve it in any capacity once it is set up is one of the most commendable acts which secure God's pleasure (*ridā*) and favor (*qurb*). It is not at all a secular occupation, as many ignorant people think

The concept of an Islamic government on which there is consensus in the *ummah* is that the real ruler is God. He has created the people, and it is for Him to rule them. Sovereignty is His, and He is the Law-giver and the Ruler. Human rulers are to

exercise their power and authority within the limits set by God, according to the law given by Him, in the way prescribed by Him, and for the purpose laid down by Him, either directly or through His Prophet. They are also accountable before Him for each and everything they will do. In other words, authority is a trust (*amānah*) from God, and people act as trustees. Ibn Taymīyyah prefers to use the term *amānah* rather than *khilāfah*. He thinks that the imām, the highest authority in the government, should not be called the deputy (*khalīfah*, or caliph) of God, which implies, in his view, the absence of the real authority or his inability to rule personally. Much can be said against his assumption. It will be sufficient, however, to point out that in actual practice there is no difference between an *amīr* and a *khalīfah*; the difference between them is only a matter of semantics.

The head of the Islamic state and the chief ruler of the government, the imām or the *khalīfah*, is to be chosen from among the Muslim community. Is it necessary that he be from the tribe of Quraysh? On this point most Muslim thinkers have said that he should be a Qurayshī. The Khawārij were the first to differ from that condition and believed that any Muslim could be imām provided he fulfilled the other requirements. From among the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah, Qāḍī Abū Bakr Al-Baqillānī (d. 404/1013), as Ibn Khaldūn has said, also believed that the post was open to all Muslims.²⁶ Ibn Taymīyyah sides with the majority view, but says that if a competent Qurayshī is not available, a non-Qurayshī may be chosen.

On the procedure for the election of an imām, the constitution of an electoral college (*ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd*), and the ratification of the elected imām by the oath of allegiance (*bay‘ah*) from the community, Ibn Taymīyyah subscribes to the view of the majority

of the scholars. However, with regard to the qualifications for *imāmah*, he is more realistic than his predecessors, Al-Mawrādī (d. 450/1058) and Abū Ya‘lā (d. 490/1097).

It is possible for an imām to make mistakes or commit sins. Like the scholars of the Ahl as-Sunnah, Ibn Taymīyyah rejects in the strongest terms the Shī‘ī doctrine of the infallibility and innocence of the imām, as he rejects in unequivocal terms their effort to confine the *imāmah* to the family of ‘Alī and Fāṭimah, may God be pleased with them. He is also one with the majority of the Sunnīs’ view that the imām may be deposed by the people if he fails to perform certain of his duties. However, obedience to the imām in things that are not wrong is a bound duty on the people. They are only to abstain from obedience when it involves sin against God.

Imāmah or *khilāfah* as defined above is the correct and the proper kind of government in Islam. But if someone seizes power and establishes his rule and acts according to the Sharī‘ah, it will be acceptable on grounds of expediency. Monarchy (*mulk*) is a legitimate form of government under certain conditions, but it is not at all the ideal Islamic government. Its legitimacy is based on the fact that the effort needed to change it may cause more harm than good. Though legitimate on grounds of expediency, a monarchy is bound by the same rules as the caliphate; so it should work within the same limits and according to the same laws. Absolute monarchy is inconceivable in Islam.

The constitution of the caliphal government, the distribution of powers among the authorities, and other matters of detail are open questions to be decided by the community in the light of the traditions of the rightly guided caliphs (*al-khulafā’ ar-rāshidūn*). The guiding principle should be how to accomplish best the

objectives which God has set before the Islamic government and how to secure the well-being of all sections of the community, not only that of a person, family, tribe, class or section.

These are some important aspects of the great innovative work which Ibn Taymīyyah did on the plane of ideas. We have not touched on all the aspects. The reader may go through the pages of this book and find others from the words of the *Shaykh al-Islām* himself. He will certainly find them no less illuminating and inspiring. Ibn Taymīyyah did not limit himself to expounding ideas; he preached them, fought for them and bore patiently all the suffering that his opponents might inflict on him. For the cause he was sent to prison time and again, and it was in prison that he laid down his life like a true martyr.

Ibn Taymīyyah did not carry out *jihād* with the pen alone: he also fought with the sword. History will remember how he worked day and night, persuading Muslim armies and commanders to fight against the Mongols, and how he himself fought alongside them with faith and courage until God turned the tide against the Mongols. This side of his work, and the campaigns that he led against popular forms of *shirk* and against the enemies of Islam within the community itself, we have not mentioned, but they are also worthy of study.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, malāhim:1.

² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm:10; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'ilm:1; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah:17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, v:196.

³ Salāḥ ad-Dīn Al-Munajjid, *Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymīyyah, Sīratuhu wa Akhbāruhu 'ind al-Mawrikhīn*, Beirut, Dār Al-Kutub Al-Jadīdah, 1976, p. 19.

⁴ For these details see Majīd Fakhri, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1970, pp. 313ff.

⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah:6; anbiyā':54; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah, 23; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib:17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 6:55.

⁶ For discussion of these points see Dr. 'Alī Sāmī Nashshār, *Manhāj al-Baḥth 'ind Mufakkirī al-Islām*, Beirut, Dār An-Nahḍah, 1984, pp. 187-279.

⁷ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Al-Furqān bayn al-Ḥaqq wa al-Bāṭil*, 1:74.

⁸ See my *Ṣūfism and Sharī'ah*, Islamic Foundation, Leicester, U.K. 1986, pp. 31-33.

⁹ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Kitāb an-Nubūwwāt*, Riyadh, n.d., p. 39.

¹⁰ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Minhāj as-Sunnah*, Cairo, Bulāq, 1321, 1:96.

¹¹ Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-Asghar*, Cairo, Maṭba'at as- Sa'ādah, pp. 12-16. For Ibn Sīnā's remark see 'Abdur-Raḥmān Badawī, *Araṣṭū 'ind al-'Arab*, Cairo, An-Nahḍah, 1947, p. 23.

¹² Ibn Rushd, *Al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillah*, Muḥammad Qāsim, ed., Cairo, Maktabat Al-Anjalo, 1964, p. 15- 154.

¹³ Sayd Sharīf Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, 1325 A.H., 8:379.

¹⁴ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Minhāj as-Sunnah*, op. cit., 1:39.

¹⁵ Ibn Rushd, *Al-Kashf ‘an Manāhij al-Adillah*, op. cit. p. 232.

¹⁶ Al-Fārābī. *Arā’ Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah*, Cairo, Maktabat Al-Husayn At-Tijārīyyah, 1948, p. 121.

¹⁷ Al-Fārābī, *As-Siyāsāt al-Madanīyyah*, Hyderabad, 1994, p. 53; See also, M. ‘Abdul-Ḥaqq Anṣārī, *The Moral Philosophy of Al-Farabi*, Aligarh, 1965, pp. 53-54.

¹⁸ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Ar-Radd ‘alā al-Mantiqiyyīn*, Bombay, 1949, p. 458.

¹⁹ Ibn Sīnā, *An-Najāt*, Cairo, Al-Kurdī, 1938, p. 291; *Fī Aqṣām al-‘Ulūm al-‘Aqlīyyah*, included in *Tisā’ Rasā’il fī al-Ḥikmah wa Aṭ-Ṭabī‘īyyāt*, Hyderabad, 1908, pp. 114-15.

²⁰ Ibn Sīnā, *Ar-Risālah al-‘Uḍwīyyah fī Amr al-Ma’ād*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo, 1949, p. 57.

²¹ See note 20.

²² Al Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā’iz, 80: tafsīr, 30:1, qadr:3; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr, 22, 23, 24; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 315, 346.

²³ Sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, *Maktubāt Imām Rabbānī*, Vol. 1, letter 113; Shah Walī Allah, Hamdāt, ed. Nūr Al-Ḥaqq ‘Alawī and Ghulām Muṣṭafā, Hyderabad; Pakistan, 1964, pp. 16-17. See also my *Ṣūfism and Sharī‘ah*, pp. 64, 66-67.

²⁴ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Majmū’ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām*, Riyadh, vol. X, p. 498.

²⁵ Ibn Taymīyyah, *Ḥaqīqat Madhhab al-Ittiḥādiyyīn*, included in *Rasā’il wal-Masā’il*, ed Rāshid Riḍā, Cairo, Vol. 4, pp. 6-17.

²⁶ See Ibn Khaldūn, *muqaddamat*, Dār Baḥṭh, Makkah, 4th. ed. 1978, p. 194f.

PART I

EPISTEMOLOGICAL

FOUNDATIONS

1. Human Nature (*Fiṭrah*), Reason and Revelation

(1.1) The essential nature (*fiṭrah*) of man

Every human being is born in the nature of Islam. If this nature is not subsequently corrupted by the erroneous beliefs of the family and society, everyone will be able to see the truth of Islam and embrace it.

The Prophet (pbuh) said, “All human beings are born with *fiṭrah*, the nature (of Islam). It is their parents who make them Jew, Christian or Zoroastrian.”¹

What he meant is that there is a certain nature with which God created man, and that is the nature of Islam. God endowed mankind with this essential nature the day He addressed them saying, “Am I not your Lord?” and they said, “Yes, You are” (7:172). *Fiṭrah* is the original nature of man, uncorrupted by subsequent beliefs and practices, ready to accept the true ideas of Islam. Islam is nothing but submitting to Allah, and to none else; this is the meaning of the words, “There is no god except Allah.”

Elucidating this concept, the Prophet (pbuh) said, “Man is born with a perfectly sound nature (*fiṭrah*), just as a baby animal is born to its parents, fully formed without any defect to its ears, eyes or any other organ.”² He thus emphasized that a sound heart is like a sound body, and a defect is something alien which intervenes. Muslim, the famous compiler of *ḥadīth*, has recorded in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* from ‘Iyād Ibn Ḥimār that the Prophet (pbuh) once quoted God’s words: “I created my people faithful to none but Me; afterwards the devils came upon them and misled them. They forbade them what I had permitted, and commanded them to associate with Me ones I had never authorized.”³

The *fiṭrah* is to the truth as the light of the eye is to the sun. Everyone who has eyes can see the sun if there are no veils over them. The erroneous beliefs of Judaism, Christianity and

Zoroastrianism act like veils, preventing people from seeing the truth. It is common experience that people whose natural sense of taste is not spoiled love sweets; they never dislike them unless something spoils the sense of taste.

However, the fact that people are born with *fiṭrah* does not mean that a human body is actually born with Islamic beliefs. To be sure, when we come out of the wombs of our mothers, we know nothing. We are only born with an uncorrupted heart which is able to see the truth of Islam and submit to it. If nothing happens which corrupts the heart we would eventually become Muslims. This power to know and to act which develops into Islam when there is nothing to obstruct it or affect its natural working is the *fiṭrah* on which God has created man.

[*Fatāwā* 4:245-7]

(1.2) Prophets address the *Fiṭrah*

Prophets address the fiṭrah of man and appeal to it, for knowledge of the Truth is inherent in the fiṭrah.

No prophet has ever addressed his people and asked that they should first of all know the Creator, that they should look into various arguments and infer from them His existence, for every heart knows god and recognizes His existence. Everyone is born with the *fiṭrah*; only something happens afterwards which casts a veil over it. Hence, when one is reminded, one recalls what was there in one's original nature (*fiṭrah*).

That is why God sent Moses (and Aaron) to Pharaoh. He said, "Speak (to him) in soft words; he might recall" (20:44); [that is, he might recall] the knowledge inherent in his original nature regarding his Lord and His blessings on him, and that he depends upon Him completely. This may lead him to faith in his Lord, or cause him "to fear" (20:44) punishment in the Hereafter in case he denies Him. This, too, may lead to faith. That is why God has said,

“Call to the path of your Lord with wisdom (*ḥikmah*) and polite admonition (*maw‘izah*)” (16:725). *Ḥikmah* is to explain the truth so that one who wants to accept it rather than reject it may accept. But if he rejects it because of his evil desires he should be admonished and warned.

Knowledge of the truth leads to its acceptance, because the love the truth is endowed in human nature. Truth is dearer and more acceptable to the *fiṭrah* of man than untruth, which has no basis on which to stand and is abhorred by the *fiṭrah*. However, if truth and knowledge do not lead a person to faith, he should be warned against his refusal and threatened with punishment. People do fear punishment and try to avoid what may cause them pain, even though they may not move to secure what is good and useful.

Some people only indulge in base desires and belie the punishment they are threatened with, or try to forget it so that they may do what they want without feeling any prick in their hearts, for if they recognized the punishment and remembered it, they would not indulge their evil desires. One is either ignorant or forgetful before one commits evil. That is why all sinners against God are ignorant.

[*Fatāwā* 16:338-9]

(1.3) Reason is necessary but not sufficient

Reason is prerequisite to the acquisition of knowledge, as well as for the performance of a good deed or righteous act. Mystical states like ecstasy or intoxication, which involve the suppression of reason, are imperfect states of mind, and ideas that conflict with reason are false. However, reason is not self-sufficient; it cannot dispense with revelation, which alone gives the knowledge of realities that transcend it.

Many theologians base their ideas simply on reason, and rely exclusively on it. They subject it to the faith and the Qur’ān.

Knowledge is derived from general principles of reason sufficient in themselves without a recourse to faith on the Qur'ān.

Most Ṣūfīs, on the other hand, condemn reason and find fault with it. They assert that sublime states and higher spiritual stages are never attained without negating reason. They expound ideas which contradict reason and lead to rapture, ecstasy and intoxication. They believe in truths and experiences which, as they claim, accrue only when reason is completely suppressed; they also believe in things that are clearly denied by reason or are not attested to by it.

Both these sources are wrong. To be sure, reason is prerequisite to all knowledge, as it is the prerequisite of virtue and good life. With it we acquire knowledge and virtue, but it is not sufficient by itself. It is only a faculty of the soul, a power like the power of vision in the eye. It works only when it receives light from faith and the Qur'ān, as the eye sees only when it receives light from the sun or a fire.

Left to itself, reason cannot know things which it is not equipped to know by itself. On the other hand, when it is completely suppressed, the ideas that one receives and the acts that one performs may be things such as happen to the animals. One may have love and ecstasy and other experiences, but they will not be different from what the animals get. Hence the states that one attains to by negating reason are defective, and the ideas one receives contrary to reason are false.

Prophets came with knowledge which reason could not attain in and of itself; never did they come with what reason considers to be impossible. People who place unjustified faith in reason readily make statements regarding the necessity, possibility or impossibility of things purely on the basis of reason; they work all the while under the impression that their views are correct, whereas they are false; they are even audacious enough to oppose the views which the prophets taught. On the other hand, those who decry reason and affirm things that are false, revel in satanic states

and evil practices, and cross the boundaries which the sense of discrimination (between good and evil) draws, with which God has endowed man and elevated him above other creatures.

Among the people of *ḥadīth* (*ahl al-ḥadīth*)⁴ there are also some who lean towards one or the other of these two groups. They sometimes bring down reason from its position, and sometimes put it against the prophetic practices (*sunan*).

[*Fatāwā* 3:338-9]

(1.4) Knowledge of good and evil

Acts are of three kinds. One is those which are good or bad even before the shar‘ comes with its verdict regarding them; their goodness or badness is known through reason (as well as the shar‘). This, however, does not imply that one who commits evil will be punished in ‘alā, although the shar‘ had not declared its verdict. The second kind is those that acquire the property of goodness or badness on account of the command of the Law-Giver (Ash-Shari‘) regarding them, and thus become good or bad. The third kind is those which the Law-Giver commands only in order to see if one will obey Him or not. In such cases what matters is the command, not what is commanded.

On the question of whether good or evil are known through reason, there are different views among the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah,⁵ the followers of the four schools of jurisprudence, as well as others. The Ḥanafīs and many of the Mālīkīs, Shāfī‘īs and Ḥanbalīs believe in their rationality. This is also the view of the Karrāmīs⁶ and the Mu‘tazilah,⁷ as well as that of many sects among Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and other religions. On the other hand, many followers of Ash-Shāfī‘ī, Mālīk and Ibn Ḥanbal oppose that position; this is the view of the Ash‘arīs.⁸

However, the Ahl as-Sunnah do not differ with respect to the issue of *qadr*.⁹ They believe that God has power over everything,

that He is the Creator of human acts as well as all other things, and that what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen. The Mu'tazilah and others who uphold the autonomy of human will (Qadarīyyah)¹⁰ hold the opposite view; they deny *qadr* and are guilty of unjustified innovation (*bid'ah*). Some people think that those who believe in the rationality of good and evil deny *qadr*; they bracket them with the Mu'tazilah on the issue of divine justice (*ta'dīl wa tajwīr*).¹¹ This is not correct. The majority of Muslims do not side with the Mu'tazilah in this regard, nor do they agree with the Ash'arīs in their denial of purpose in divine actions, or in their negation of causes in the nature. On the contrary, all these groups believe in *qadr* and affirm that God is the Creator of everything, including human acts, and that what He wills happens, and what He does not will does not happen.

However, it is only the extremists among the Mu'tazilah who deny God's fore-knowledge of things or His fore-ordaining of human actions. All others believe that God knows in advance what men will do, and testify to the prophetic sayings on the issue that God has determined everything before their creation. They believe, for example, in the *ḥadīth* which Muslim has recorded on the authority of Ibn 'Umar, "God ordained everything pertaining to creation fifty thousand years before He created the heavens and the earth, when His throne was on the waters."¹²

Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have also recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn Mas'ūd: The Prophet said - and he has said nothing but truth - "Your formation in the womb of your mothers goes on in stages: The first stage of semen extends to forty days, the second stage of blood-clot extends also to the same duration; then the angel is called and given orders regarding four things. He is asked to write the provision of the person, the duration of his or her life, his or her actions, and whether he or she shall be happy or unhappy. Then the soul is breathed into him or her. By God, Who has power over all life, you may go on doing good deeds, as the people of Paradise should do, till Paradise is at your arm's length.

Then God's writ overtakes you and you do the deeds of the people of Hell, and eventually enter into Hell. On the other hand, you may go on doing the deeds of the people of Hell till Hell is at your arm's length. At that time the writ of God overtakes you, and you do the deeds of the people of Paradise and finally enter it."¹³ There are other *aḥādīth* also on the subject. Most of the Qadarīyyah accept them; only the extremists among them deny them.

The majority of Muslims also affirm the existence of causes which God has ordained as causes in the process of creation He carries on and off reasons regarding the commands He issues. They affirm the wise purpose which He pursues in His creation as well as in His enactments. They testify to all the statements that God has made to this effect in the Qur'ān, such as: "(There are signs) in the rain which God sends down from the skies, and in the life which He gives therewith" (2:164); or "He causes rain to descend on (the dead land) and produce every kind of harvest therewith" (7:57). The Qur'ān and the Sunnah abound with such statements. Muslims in general also make statements such as "X has done this by means of Y," rather than "X has done this at the time of Y."

The point I am making is that the issue of knowledge of good and evil is not tied to the issue of *qadr*. Now that this has been clarified, let me state that there are three different views regarding knowledge of good and evil, two on the extremes and one in the middle. The first view is that good and evil are rational, that they are the essential properties of acts, and that the *shar'* only reveals those properties rather than generating them. This is the view which the Mu'tazilah hold and which is not sound. If one extends this ethical doctrine to theology and claims that what is good for man is also good for God and what is evil for man is also evil for God, one would arrive at the false notion of the Qadarīyyah, including that regarding divine justice. These people are guilty of anthropomorphism; they liken divine acts to human acts and human acts to divine acts. This is as wrong as likening divine

attributes to human attributes or human attributes to divine attributes.

God's acts cannot be judged on the pattern of human acts, for people are servants while He is their Lord. They wrong each other and commit shameful acts, and He has power to stop them, but He does not do so. This is not something evil for Him, for He may have some higher purpose behind it or may have some good to bestow on His people. This is what the Elders, the *fuqahā'* and Muslims in general believe; they all affirm that creation, as well as the legislative activity of God, is purposive.

Those who say that God's creative act has no purpose or that His command pursues no need affirm a will that chooses one thing against the other without any reason. Ibn Kullāb¹⁴ and his followers subscribe to this view, which was propounded originally by the Qadarīyyah and the Jahmīyyah.¹⁵

The second view on the issue is that acts of God have neither the qualities of goodness nor of evil, nor the properties on account of which they are characterized as good or evil. God simply wills one thing against another just because He wills it, rather than for any reason or purpose which He may pursue by creation or command. The expanders of this view are not even shy to say that God could command one to associate partners with Him, or find fault with serving Him alone, or order unjust and shameful acts, or forbid virtue and piety. For them, all ethical judgments are relative; good is not something good in itself, nor is evil something evil in itself. When God says, "He [the Prophet] commands them what is just (*ma'rūf*) and forbids them what is evil (*munkar*), He is permitting what is good and prohibiting what is evil (and impure)" (7:157). This would mean, according to their view, that He commands what He commands, forbids what He forbids, permits what He permits and prohibits what He prohibits. In fact, the objects commanded or forbidden, permitted or prohibited are neither good nor evil nor right or wrong in themselves, except when they are taken to mean what suits people. It also follows that

God neither loves any good nor hates any evil.

This view and its implications are unacceptable, for they are opposed to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and to the consensus of the Elders and the jurists. They are also opposed to common sense. They have nothing to do with God, for exalted is He above them. He has Himself said, "No, God never commands what is shameful" (7:28). He has also dissociated Himself from putting good on the same level as evil when He has said, "What! Do those who seek after evil ways think that We shall hold them equal with those who believe and do righteous deeds, that equal will be their life and death? Ill is the judgment that they render" (45:21); or, "Shall We then treat the people of faith like the people of sin?" (68:35); or, "Shall We treat those who believe and work deeds of righteousness the same as those who do mischief on earth? Shall We treat those who guard against evil the same as those who turn aside from the right? (38:28). But according to the view of these people who deny (objectivity to ethical judgments) it is all the same if you equate the righteous with the wicked or elevate them over the latter. To dissociate God from the former is no better than to associate Him with the latter. This certainly violates the Scripture as well as reason.

God has said, "God knows best whom to charge with His mission" (6:124). But for these people charging someone with a mission does not require any qualities on his part before or after his commission, just as obligating people with some act does not presume any properties in the act. Jurists as well as the common folk of the Muslim community say, on the contrary, that God prohibits the *wrong*, which is thereby prohibited, and commands the *right*, which becomes thereby a duty. We have two things here: one, the act of obligation or prohibition, which the word of God makes; and, two, the obligatory or forbidden character of an act, which is a property of the act. God is knowing and wise. He knows the good that His command entails. It is on the basis of His knowledge of the good or the evil of the people involved in the

command or the prohibition, or the etchings commanded or prohibited, that He commands or prohibits. To be sure, it is He Who makes an act obligatory or forbidden, but as for the property of the act, it may be present before or without the command.

If you look at the words of the *shar'* and the ends which its rules pursue, you will find three kinds of acts. The first are those which involve some kind of good or evil even before the *shar'* commanded them. We know, for example, that justice leads to the well-being of people, and injustice involves their suffering. Such acts are therefore good or evil (in themselves); their goodness or evil is known even through reason, as well as through the *shar'*, but not in the sense that the *shar'* invests them with a property which they did not have before. However, in affirming an independent property of evil in some act it by no means follows that their doers will be punished in the Hereafter, even if the *shar'* had not come with its verdict.

This is a point on which the extremists among those who believe in the rationality of good and evil have gone wrong. They say that people will be punished for their evil deeds even if no messenger had been sent to them. They go against the statements of the Qur'ān, such as, "We would not punish until We had sent a messenger (to give warning)" (17:15); or "Messengers who gave good news as well as warning that mankind after (the coming) of the messengers should have no plea against God" (14:165); or "Your Lord was not one to destroy a population until He had sent to its center a messenger, rehearsing to them our verses, nor are we going to destroy a population except when its members practice iniquity" (28:59); or "Every time a group is cast therein, it keepers will ask, 'Did no warner come to you?' They will say, 'Yes, indeed, a Warner did come to us, but we rejected him and said, 'God never sent down any (messenger);' you are in nothing but an egregious delusion.' They will further say, 'Had we but listened or used our intelligence we should (now) be among the companions of the blazing fire'" (68:8-10). Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have

recorded that the Prophet (pbuh) said, “No one is more generous in accepting an excuse than Allah. This is why He sends messengers to people who give good tidings and warnings.”¹⁶ There are many more texts on the subject that fully underscore the point that God does not punish people unless He had sent His Message to them. These texts refute the claim of the rationalists that people are punished even if no messenger is sent to them.

The second kind of acts are those which *become* good when the *shar‘* commands them, or *become* evil when it forbids them. They acquire the property of goodness or evil by virtue of the command of the *shar‘*.

The third kind of acts are those which the Law-Giver (Ash-Shāri‘) commands just to see whether people carry out His commands or not; the performance of the act as such is not what is desired. For example, Abraham was told to slaughter his son. When he and his son submitted to the command and Abraham laid his son on the ground, the objective was achieved. Abraham was thereafter given a lamb to sacrifice in place of his son. Another example is the *ḥadīth* that tells of a leper, a bald man and a blind man. When God sent them an angel to beg for charity and only the blind man responded to his request, the angel said, “Keep your money with you. God only intended to test you people. He is pleased with you, and is angry with the two others.”¹⁷ This illustrates that the intention of a particular command may be the command itself and not the thing commanded.

The Mu‘tazilah, did not understand this kind of act or the one mentioned before it. They were wrong in thinking that there are no good or evil acts other than those which are independent of the decree of the *shar‘*. The Ash‘arīs, on the other hand, believed that all the commands of the Sharī‘ah are of the third kind, just for trial, and that they have no property whatsoever before or even after the word of the *shar‘*. Men of knowledge and wisdom (*ḥukamā’*)¹⁸ and Muslims in general recognize these three types of acts. And this is the correct view.

[*Fatāwā* 8:428-436]

(1.5) Knowledge of God and His unity.

People have various views as to how we know God and His unity and what the basis for obligation is in this regard. The best view on this subject is that acts have properties which make them good and obligatory or evil and forbidden. This fact is often known by reason, but God does not punish anyone except after His message has reached him.

Opinions have differed regarding the means of knowing God and His unity and other basic principles of religion. Is it the *shar'* which gives us knowledge about them, and defines our obligations or is it the case that we know them through our reason, while it is the *shar'* which makes them obligatory? Or is it the case that reason is both means of their knowledge and the instrument of their obligation? These are three known views on the subject, and each one is held by various sections among the followers of the founders of the four schools of *fiqh*, Aḥmad and others.

One group is of the view that the source of knowledge as well as the basis of obligation is nothing but the *shar'*. The Salīmīyyah¹⁹ and others such as Shaykh Abū Al-Farāj Al-Maqdīsī²⁰ belong to this group. The followers of Aḥmad and others from the Ahl as-Sunnah have also been reported to hold this view. It is also held by Ibn Dirbās,²¹ Ibn Shukr²² and many other followers of Ash-Shāfi'ī. From the scholars of *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, those who condemn *kalām* generally subscribe to it. This is the issue on which a controversy had flared up between the companions of the theologian Ṣadaqah Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Al-Ḥanbalī²³ and a faction of Aḥmad's followers, as well as between Abū Al-Farāj Ibn Al-Jawzī²⁴ and another faction of the Ḥanbalīs. The former parties contended that the *shar'* is both source of knowledge and the basis of obligation, whereas the latter group

said that the source of knowledge is reason but the basis of obligation is the *shar'*. Al-Āmidī²⁵ has mentioned three views regarding the source of knowledge. One, it is reason alone, independent of Revelation (*as-sam'*), as Ar-Rāzī²⁶ has said; second, it is revelation, that is to say, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah; and third, both of them are sources of ethical knowledge. And it is the last one which Al-Āmidī has preferred, and it is the correct view.

The second view is that the instrument of obligation is the *shar'* alone, even though reason is also a source of knowledge. This is the view of Al-Ash'arī²⁷ and his followers, as well as Qādī Abū Ya'lā,²⁸ Ibn Az-Zaghunī,²⁹ Ibn 'Āqil,³⁰ and others. The third view is that the source of knowledge as well as the instrument of obligation is reason. This is the view of the Mu'tazilah, the Karrāmīyyah and many others from the followers of *a'immah*, such as Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Āmidī, Abū Al-Aṭṭāb³¹ and others. Sections of Māliki, Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī scholars also hold this view; even Abū Ḥanīfah³² is reported to have subscribed to it. It has been noted that the Mu'tazilah, Abū Bakr Ar-Rāzī,^{32a} and Abū Al-Khaṭṭāb have clearly stated that even those who have not received the words of any prophet will be punished on account of their violation of the dictates of reason.

We have mentioned that the most reasonable view on the subject is that acts possess properties which make them good and obligatory, or evil and forbidden, and that is often known by reason. But God does not punish people except after they have received His message, as He has said, "We do not punish people unless we have sent to them a messenger" (17:15). This is a general proclamation from God, and He has not differentiated between one kind of act and the other.

[*Kitāb An-Nubūwwāt* 162-3]

(1.6) The place of *wahī*

Things of the world which are the objects, for example, of medicine, mathematics and commerce are known through reason. But divine things and religious truths are only known from the Prophet. He knows them best and is most competent to expound them. At times he also advances rational arguments for them. We are to take all that he says quite serious, his statements as well as his arguments, and build upon them.

Knowledge is what is demonstrable, and of that what is useful has been conveyed by the prophets. However, there is a part of knowledge which we get from other sources. This concerns the matters of the world, such as the objects of medicine, mathematics, agriculture and commerce. But so far as divine things and religious truths are concerned, the only source of their knowledge is the Prophet. He knows them best, is most eager to preach them to the masses and most competent to formulate and expound them. He is above everyone in knowledge, will and competence - things which are required to accomplish his mission perfectly. Everyone else is deficient in knowledge, has a distorted idea of things, or lacks the urge to preach what he knows either because he is seeking something else, entertains some fears or does not have sufficient power to expound his ideas clearly and forcefully to the conviction of the people.

Sometimes the Prophet advances rational arguments in support of the truths he preaches. The Qur'ān is full of rational arguments and clear proofs regarding divine realities and religious truths. Sometimes the Prophet only states them, for he has already offered clear and convincing proofs to establish the fact that he is a prophet of God bearing a message from Him, that he is telling nothing about God except the truth, and that God has Himself borne witness for him and told people that he is honest and reliable in delivering His message to them. In fact, there are many arguments

to establish that he is the Messenger of God; some of them are rational and verifiable by reason, others are religious and revealed, but the Prophet explained them to people and demonstrated them. Theologians of different affiliations are agreed that the Qur'ān offers rational arguments on religious matters. They often mention them in their theological and exegetical works. They also make use of religious and revealed arguments in various matters; since they have established the veraciousness of the Prophet, he must be believed, they say, in whatever he states.

Knowledge is of three kinds. One is not known except through rational arguments. Concerning this category, the best arguments are those which the Qur'ān has stated and the Prophet has mentioned. Let it be known that the best and the most perfect rational arguments are the ones which are received from the Prophet. I emphasize this fact because many people do not know it. Some people reject outright all rational arguments, since they believe that they have been manufactured by the theologians. Others do not reflect on the Qur'ān, or try to understand the rational and convincing arguments which it offers, because they have somehow developed the idea that the Qur'ān only states truths. They think that one should first ascertain the veracity of a prophet and the authenticity of the words he has said on rational grounds, and then deduce the truth of his statements from the truth of his prophethood.

The other kind of knowledge is that which a non-prophet has no way of knowing except through a prophet; his word alone is the argument for it. This knowledge is concerned with details regarding God, angels, the Throne, Paradise and Hell, as well as details regarding things which the prophet enjoins or forbids. As for as the existence of the Creator and His unity, knowledge, power, will, wisdom, and mercy, these matters can be known through reason. But the arguments and the proofs which the prophet offers in these matters are the most perfect and rational arguments. However, prophetic word is not the only means for

knowing them, even though it does offer certain knowledge. These things are, therefore, known by the rational arguments which the prophet offers as well as by his word, since his veracity has been established by arguments, proofs and miracles.

People have also differed concerning knowledge of the life hereafter and knowledge of good and evil. The majority is of the view that they are known through reason as well as revelation (*as-sam'*). However, those who uphold the rationality of the knowledge of good and evil are more than those who uphold the rationality of the knowledge of the Hereafter. Abū Al-Khaṭṭāb noted that this is the view of most of the jurists and theologians. The other view is that we know about the life hereafter and about good and evil from no other means than the word of the Prophet. This is the view of Al-Ash'arī and his followers, as well as many others from the followers of the *a'immah*, such as Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā, Abū Al-Ma'ālī Al-Juwaynī,³³ Abū Al-Walīd Al-Bājī,³⁴ and so on. However, both groups agree that there are things that are known through reason as well as through the word of the Prophet, such as the issue of whether human acts are created by God or not, or whether we shall see Him in the Hereafter.

What I want to say is that one should take from the Prophet the knowledge of all divine and religious matters, both those that are merely revelational and those that are rational, and base upon it all one's rational arguments, since what he has said is true in principle as well as in detail. Arguments for the veracity of the Prophet establish the truth of his teachings in principle, and the rational arguments that the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* expound demonstrate that in detail.

Again, prophets and messengers are sent first of all to give this very knowledge; they are, therefore, the most knowledgeable on these matters, the most competent to teach them, and the most honest about them. Those who examine what they say and what the others say in such matters find that the truth is with the prophets and that others are mistaken. This is asserted by Ar-Rāzī,³⁵ who is

extremely critical of arguments from tradition and is known to have made the statement that arguments from tradition fail to produce conviction. No other recognized scholar has come out with such a scathing remark.

But it is he who is reported to have said, “I have long pondered theological and philosophical arguments, and have finally reached the conclusion that they do not generate certainty. In comparison to them, the arguments of the Qur’ān are more convincing. Read, for example, the verse, ‘To Him mount up (all) words of purity’ (35:10), or the verse, ‘The most gracious One is firmly established on the Throne’ (20:5), which describe God in positive terms. Read also the verse, ‘There is nothing whatsoever like unto Him’ (42:11), which describes Him in negative terms.” Thereafter, he said, “Whoever goes through the experience I have gone through will reach the same conclusion I have reached.”

Similarly, if you consider those who do not follow the prophets nor have faith in their teachings, you will find them skeptical, perplexed and ignorant of the truth, or ignorant as well as conceited. They are like those about whom the Qur’ān has said, “As for the unbelievers, their deeds are like a mirage in sandy deserts, which the man parched with thirst mistakes for water until, when he comes up to it, he finds it to be nothing. He only finds God who will pay Him his account; and God is swift in taking account. Or their state is like the depths of darkness in a vast, deep ocean overwhelmed with billow topped by billow, topped by (dark) clouds: depths of darkness, one above another. If a man stretch out his hand he can hardly see it, for any to whom God gives not light, there is no light at all.” (24:39-40).

[*Fatāwā* 13:136-141]

(1.7) The Correct Way to Interpret the Qur’ān

The correct way is to explain the Qur’ān through the Qur’ān itself, then through the Sunnah of the Prophet, then with the help of

the comments of the Companions, and then the comments of the rightful Successors. Never should one go against an interpretation on which they all agree. To explain the Qur'ān simply on the basis of one's reason, without knowing all these things, is forbidden.

The best way is to explain the Qur'ān is through the Qur'ān. What the Qur'ān alludes to in one place is explained in another, and what it says in brief on one occasion is elaborated upon on another. But if this does not help you, you should turn to the Sunnah, because the Sunnah explains and elucidates the Qur'ān. Imām 'Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs Ash-Shāfi'ī³⁶ said, "All that the Prophet has said is what he has derived from the Qur'ān." God has said, "We have sent down to you the Book in truth that you may judge between men, as God guides you; so do not be an advocate for those who betray their trust" (4:105); and, "We have sent down to you the message that you may explain clearly to people what has been sent to them, and that they may think over it." (16:44). Again: "We sent down the Book to you for the express purpose that you make clear to them those things in which they differ, and that it should be a guide and mercy to those who believe" (16:64). This is why the Prophet (pbuh) said, "Know that I have been given the Qur'ān and something like it,"³⁷ namely the Sunnah. In fact, the Sunnah, too, was given to him through *waḥī* like the Qur'ān, except that it was not recited to him as the Qur'ān was. Imām Ash-Shāfi'ī and other scholars have advanced a number of arguments in support of this point, but we cannot produce them here.

In order to understand the Qur'ān, you must first look to the Qur'ān itself, If that does not help, then turn to the Sunnah. The Prophet (pbuh) sent Mu'ādh to Yemen and asked him, "How will you judge the cases (that come to you)?" He replied, "I will judge according to the Book of God." "But if you do not get anything there, what will you do?" the Prophet asked. He said, "I will refer to the Sunnah of the Prophet." "But if you do not find it even there,

what will you do?" the Prophet (pbuh) asked again. He replied, "I will exercise my judgment." Hearing this the Prophet (pbuh) patted Mu'ādh on the shoulder and said, "Praise be to God, Who has guided the messenger of His Messenger to what pleases His Messenger."³⁸ This *ḥadīth* has been reported in the *Musnad* and *Sunan* collections of *ḥadīth* with a good *isnad*.

When you do not get any help from the Qur'ān or the Sunnah, turn to the words of the Companions, for they know the Qur'ān better. They witnessed its revelation and passed through the circumstances in which it was revealed, and knew it and understood it fully. This is particularly true of their scholars and leaders, such as the four righteous caliphs and 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd.³⁹ It has been reported that 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd said, "By the One besides Whom there is no god, there is no verse in the Qur'ān about which I do not know in what case and at what place was it revealed. If I were aware that anyone knew the Qur'ān more than I, and I could reach him, I would certainly have gone to see him."⁴⁰

Another great scholar and savant was 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbās,⁴¹ the nephew of the Prophet (pbuh) and commentator of the Qur'ān. He attained that status by virtue of the Prophet's prayer, "O God! Give me knowledge of Islam and teach him the meaning of the Qur'ān."⁴² 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd said, "What a good interpreter of the Qur'ān Ibn 'Abbās is!"

When one does not find the *tafsīr* of the Qur'ān from the Qur'ān or the Sunnah or the words of the Companions, many scholars (*a'immah*) turn to the words of the Successors, such as Mujāhid Ibn Jubayr,⁴³ because he was excellent in *tafsīr*. Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq reported from Abban Ibn Ṣāliḥ that Mujāhid said, "I read the Qur'ān with Ibn 'Abbās three times from the beginning to the end, pausing at every verse and questioning him about it." That is why Sufyān Ath-Thawrī⁴⁴ said, "If you get the *tafsīr* of Mujāhid that is sufficient."

Besides Mujāhid, you can refer to Sa'īd Ibn Jubayr,⁴⁵ Ikramah,⁴⁶ the client (*mawlā*) of Ibn 'Abbās, 'Atā' Ibn Abī Ribah,⁴⁷ Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī,⁴⁸ Masrūq Ibn Al-Ajdā',⁴⁹ Sa'īd Ibn Al-Musayyib,⁵⁰ Abū Al-'Alīyah,⁵¹ Ar-Rubay' Ibn Anas,⁵² Qatādah,⁵³ Aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Muzāḥim,⁵⁴ and other Successors, or their followers, and even those who came after them.

Shu'bah⁵⁵ and others have said, "The words of the Successors (*At-Tābi'ūn*) wield no authority in matters of practical rules (*furū'*), so how can they have authority in *tafsīr*? What he meant is that the words of one Successor have no authority over another Successor who differs from him, and this is true. But when they agree on something, it undoubtedly wields authority. However, if they differ, the view of one will have no authority over others among them, nor over those who came after them. In such cases, one should turn to the language of the Qur'ān or Sunnah, or the Arabic literature in general, or the words of the Companions on that matter.

Tafsīr of the Qur'ān based merely on reason is forbidden (*ḥarām*). The Prophet (pbuh) said, "Whoever talks about the Qur'ān without proper knowledge makes space for himself in Hell."⁵⁶ He also said, "Whoever talks about the Qur'ān merely on the basis of his reason is a sinner, even if what he says is correct."⁵⁷ At-Tirmidhī, who reported this *ḥadīth*, said it is rare (*gharīb*). However, a number of scholars from the Companions and others have been reported to have condemned in the same vein the effort to explain the Qur'ān without knowledge.

If Mujāhid, Qatādah and other scholars like them have explained the Qur'ān, we expect that they would not have said anything about the Qur'ān or commented on its verses without proper knowledge, speaking simply on the basis of their reason. This is supported by various reports about them which say that they never said anything without knowledge and only from their minds. Hence, if one talks about the Qur'ān on the basis of his

reason, he is talking about what he does not know, and is violating the rule he has been asked to follow. Consequently, even if what he says is correct, he sins, because he has not followed the command.

However, those who made *tafsīr* because they knew the verses, their language as well as their legal and religious implications, had nothing to worry about. That is why their comments on the Qur'ān have come down to us. And this does not conflict with the attitude we have described above. They discussed things they knew, and abstained from discussing what they did not know. This is true of everyone: one must not speak about what one does not know. On the other hand, one must speak on what one knows when one is asked about it, for, that, too, is a duty, as God has said, “You must clearly explain it (i.e. the Qur'ān) to the people and never hide it” (3:187). The Prophet (pbuh) has also said, in a *ḥadīth* reported through various channels, “Whoever hides what he knows when asked about it will have a bridle of fire in his mouth on the Day of Judgment.”⁵⁸ Ibn Jarīr has reported through Muḥammad Ibn Bashshār, Mu'ammal, Sufyān and Abū Az-Zanād, that Ibn 'Abbās said, “*Tafsīr* is of four kinds: one, what the Arabs can know from the language; second, what no one can be excused for not knowing; third, what only scholars know; and fourth, what God alone knows.”⁵⁹

[*Fatāwā* 13:363-375]

(1.8) The *Muḥkam* and the *Mutashābih* in the Qur'ān

Muḥkam in the Qur'ān may mean either what has come down from God and has not been mixed with anything extraneous, or the imperative of which has not been abrogated or qualified, or what is not vague or ambiguous. *Mutashābih* is the opposite of *muḥkam* in all these senses. However, it does not mean that we cannot understand or interpret the verses which are *mutashābih* in the third sense, only that part of their meaning is beyond our comprehension, and God has kept some knowledge to himself.

Iḥkām in the Qur'ān is sometimes used in opposition to promptings of Satan. *Muḥkam* according to this usage is that which God has revealed and established by differentiating it from anything with which it may have been confused, or separating it from anything that may have been added to it, for *iḥkām* is to separate, distinguish, differentiate and define something, so that it is clearly determined and identified. *Iḥkām* involves negation as well as affirmation; the former is only a part not the whole of its meaning. *Iḥkām* may sometimes mean to reaffirm a verse in opposition to the claim of its abrogation in the technical sense of revoking an imperative, whether by rescinding the order or qualifying it.

Iḥkām is also used in the context of explication and interruption where it means to determine the real import of the verse by distinguishing it from other meanings which it might be thought to convey. Its opposite, *mutashābih*, would then mean ambiguous. A verse is *mutashābih* if it may mean more than one thing and may be taken to mean any one of them. Ibn Ḥanbāl has said that *muḥkam* is that which does not admit of difference, and *mutashābih* is that which means one thing here and another thing there. Let us note that he has not said that *mutashābih* is that whose meaning and exegesis (*tafsīr wa al-ma'nā*) is not known to anyone except God, for God has only denied that anyone other than He can know the *ta'wīl* except God" (3:7). Aḥmad is perfectly correct, for God has only denied *ta'wīl* on the part of anyone except Him. In reading the verse, the stop is at the end of the word God, as is supported by many arguments; and this is the view of the Companions of the Prophet (pbuh), the majority of their Successors, and the majority of the *ummah*.

It should be noted that God has not denied the understanding and explication of *mutashābih* verses on our part. On the contrary, He has said, "(Here is) a Book which We have sent down full of

blessings, that they may ponder its verses (38:29),” and the Book contains *muḥkam* as well as *mutashābih* verses. Obviously, if we cannot understand the verses of the Book, we cannot contemplate them. God has also said, “Do they not ponder the Qur’ān?” (4:82). This is a general exhortation regarding the entire Book, from which no verse has been excepted. What God and His Prophet (pbuh) condemn is that one should pursue a *mutashābih* verse with a view to create mischief or to find out its *ta’wīl*, or ultimate meaning. They have never condemned those who contemplate its *muḥkam* or *mutashābih* verses and try to understand them and find out what they mean to the extent God wants us to understand them. On the contrary, He has positively commanded this exercise and praised those who engage in it.

[*Fatāwā* 13:274-275]

(1.9) The Meaning of *Ta’wīl*

Ta’wīl in the parlance of the Elders (Salaf) means two things: one, to explicate a passage and determine its meaning, whether such meaning agrees with the stated words of the passage or goes against them; second, is to realize what the words say. If they command something, their ta’wīl is to perform the act which they command; but if they tell of something, their ta’wīl is the happening of the thing told. However, in the language of later writers ta’wīl is to depart from the more apparent meaning of the words and adopt a less apparent meaning for some reason associated with them.

Ta’wīl in the parlance of the later writers, jurists, theologians, traditionists, Ṣūfīs, and others is to leave the more apparent meaning on the basis of some reason associated with that passage. This is the ta’wīl which is referred to in works on the principles of jurisprudence or on legal controversies. When someone says that

this *ḥadīth* or that text is subject to *ta'wīl*, or should be interpreted to mean this and not that, others may charge him with doing *ta'wīl* and ask him to state his reasons for doing it. The one who is doing *ta'wīl* has to satisfy two conditions: first, he has to show that the words may also mean what he is suggesting, and second, he must state a reason for having to depart from the more apparent meaning in favor of his own meaning. This is also the sense in which *ta'wīl* is used in the discussions on divine attributes.

In the parlance of the Elders, however, *ta'wīl* means two things. One is to explicate (*tafsīr*) a passage and elucidate its meaning, whether or not that meaning agrees with the words of the passage. On this understanding, *ta'wīl* would mean very much the same as *tafsīr*, would be a synonym for it. This is, and God knows better, what Mujāhid implies when he says that the scholars know the *ta'wīl* of this or that verse, or when Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr Aṭ-Ṭabarī⁶⁰ writes in his commentary, “Opinions regarding the *ta'wīl* of this word (of God) are as follows...,” or that “the scholars of *ta'wīl* have different opinions regarding this verse.” To be sure, what he means by *ta'wīl* here is the same as *tafsīr*. explication.

The second sense in which the Elders use *ta'wīl*, and which we should count as the third sense of *ta'wīl*, is to refer to the thing itself which is intended by the words. If the words contain a command, *ta'wīl* is carrying out the thing commanded; and if the words contain information, *ta'wīl* is the occurrence of the thing informed.

Ta'wīl in this third sense is a part of the language of the Qur'ān, for example the words of Jacob to his son, Joseph, “Thus will your Lord choose you and teach you the interpretations (*ta'wīl*) of stories and events (*aḥādīth*), and perfect His favor to you” (12:6); and the words of Joseph to his parents when the members of his larger family entered Egypt and he provided a home for them, “‘Enter Egypt (all) in safety if it pleases God.’ And he raised his parents high on the throne (of dignity) and they fell

down in prostration before him. He said: ‘Father, this is the fulfillment (*ta’wīl*) of my vision of old; God has made it come true’” (12:99-100). The *aḥādīth* in Jacob’s statement refer to visions in sleep and their *ta’wīl* means the things they point to, as is clear from Joseph’s words, ““This is the *ta’wīl*; of my vision of old.”” The one versed in *ta’wīl* is the one who foretells them.

In another place God said, “If you differ on anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Messenger, if you do believe in God and the Last Day. That is best and most commendable as *ta’wīl*” (4:59); that is, it will lead to the best and most desirable end. Here *ta’wīl* means the end of their actions of referring the matter to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. On the other hand, *ta’wīl* in the verses quoted earlier from the *sūrah* Joseph is the interpretation (*ta’wīl*) of visions. Similarly, *ta’wīl* in the surahs, the Heights, Jonah, and the Family of ‘Imrān means the interpretation of the Qur’ān.

To sum up, *ta’wīl* is that to which the words are directed, or to which they refer, or to which they point; and obviously the thing to which the words point, or refer or lead (*mustaqqar*) or which they suggest or are shown to suggest is the reality of the thing itself which is what they mean. This is borne out by the way Elders have explained the word *mustaqqar* in the verse, “Every news has its *mustaqqar*” (6:67), that is, its reality. In case the words convey an information, they will point or refer to the thing informed, but when they do not point or refer to anything, they will be void.

On the other hand, if the words contain an imperative they will lead to and end up with the thing commanded, provided it is not already accomplished. However, if the information is about something promised or warned, it will lead to the thing awaited. This is supported by the *ḥadīth* which says that the Prophet (pbuh) recited the verse, “Tell them: He has all the power to send calamities on you from above and below, or to cover you with confusion in party strife, giving you a taste of mutual vengeance -

each from the other” (6:65), and then said this will happen, as its *ta’wīl*, namely the thing it amounts to, has not happened yet.^{60a} Abdullah Ibn Mas‘ūd is reported to have said, “five things have already passed: the wars, the feuds, the smoke, the (splitting of the) moon, and the (revenge against the) Romans (by the Persians).” [Fatāwā 13:288-94]

(1.10) Verses and Qur’ān regarding divine attributes are to be taken at face value.

The Elders have taken the verses and aḥādīth regarding God’s attributes on their ṣāḥir, or face value, refusing, however, to say anything about their nature (kayfīyyah) or to conceive them along human patterns (tashbīh). By ṣāḥir, the apparent meaning, they mean the ṣāḥir which behooves the Creator, not the created; but will we be justified in saying that the ṣāḥir which behooves God is really the ṣāḥir of those verses and aḥādīth? Ibn Taymīyyah has responded to this question and discussed the meaning of ṣāḥir at length.

The person⁶¹ who has made his vow conditional on the belief that the verse, “the Merciful ascended the Throne,” is to be understood on its ṣāḥir, face, as people understand from its words, should know that ṣāḥir is an ambiguous term. As known to the uncorrupted nature of man (*fiṭrah*) and used in Arabic, the religious literature and the parlance of the Elders, ṣāḥir means something other than what it means to many later writers. Now if the one who vowed meant by ṣāḥir something which part of the beings that are contingent or which imply some kind of imperfection on the part of God, such as the idea that God’s *istawā*, settling (on the Throne), is like the settling of one body on another, or the settling down of the soul in bodies, if souls are not included in the category of bodies in their view, he would be guilty

of violating his own vow and would be mistaken. No scholar, as far as I know, upholds this view except the Baṣrī Dāwūd Al-Jawāribī,⁶² Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān Al-Khurāsānī,⁶³ Hishām Ibn Al-Hakam Ar-Rāfiḍī,⁶⁴ if it is correctly reported of them.

We must believe that God is unlike anything else in His essence, attributes, as well as acts, that His difference from things created and His transcendence from any participation in them is greater than what the Gnostics from among His people may have imagined or what anybody may have stated. We must negate of Him every attribute which implies contingency or any other imperfection. Whoever claims about any scholar of the Ahl as-Sunnah that he has conceived of the divine attributes according to the attributes of created beings is either lying or mistaken.

But if the one who vowed meant by *ẓāhir* what is known (*ẓāhir*) to human nature before it is overwhelmed by desires and confused by conflicting opinions, it is the *ẓāhir* that behooves God's majesty and transcendence. It is also the *ẓāhir* of all His names and attributes, such as life, knowledge, power, hearing, seeing, speech, will, love, anger and pleasure, as well as the attributes that have been referred to in the verse, "What has prevented you from prostrating to one whom I have created with my hands" (38:75), or in the *ḥadīth*, "Our Lord descends to the lowest heaven every night."⁶⁵ The *ẓāhir* of these words, when they are used in our case, is an incident or a body, for our beings belong to the same category. But when they refer to God, their apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) is only that which behooves them and suits His exalted self. Words like essence (*dhāt*), existence (*wujūd*), reality (*ḥaqīqah*), sense, even though we know, to be sure, that the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of these words in the divine context, and that they have nothing in common between them which may imply a defect or contingency on the part of God, whether or not they are taken as unequivocal, equivocal or general in their connotation. The same is true of the statements we have in the Qur'ān, such as,

“He has sent it down from His own knowledge” (4:166); “Indeed God is He Who gives (all) sustenance, Lord of Power, Steadfast (forever)” (51:58); “...whom I have created with My hands” (38:75); “The Most Gracious One is firmly established on the Throne” (20:5); and so on. All are in the same category.

Earlier Jahmīs had denied all attributes to God which in our context are incidents, such as knowledge and power, or organs, such as hand and face. The later ones, however, affirmed many attributes which are incidents in our case, such as knowledge and power, and negated others along with those attributes that are organs in our case. Some of them have even gone to the extent of affirming attributes like hand that are bodies in our case.

The Salafis, on the other hand, such as Al-Khaṭṭābī,⁶⁶ Abū Bakr Al-Khaṭīb,⁶⁷ and others have stated that the way of the Elders is to take the verses and the *aḥādīth* of the attributes at face value, and to state at the same time that they neither know their nature, nor conceive of them on human patterns. They do not believe that “hands” means power, or that “hearing” means knowing. As a rule, one’s position on attributes is a corollary of one’s position on the Essence; the former follows the latter completely. And since to affirm the Essence is to affirm something that exists, rather than simply a modality (*kayfiyyah*), the affirmation of attributes should also be the affirmation of an existence rather than only a modality.

Of later writers, those who claim that the Elders did not say that it was the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) which was intended, they should be told, provided they command our respect, that the *ẓāhir* which they did not affirm was the apparent meaning that behooved the created, not the Creator. And undoubtedly this *ẓāhir* is not intended, and anyone who says that it is intended should be declared an infidel (*kāfir*) after the point is fully explained to him.

There are two aspects to the issue here, one linguistic and the other philosophical. As for the latter, there are three views regarding *istawā*. For example, in the verse “The Gracious One is firmly established (*istawā*) on the Throne” (20:5), one is that

God's *istawā* is like the *istawā* of a creature, or something similar, that involves contingency or defect on God's part. This is the view of the *mushabbihah* and the *mujassimah*, the anthropomorphists who conceive of God as a body; and it is absolutely wrong in light of the Qur'ān as well as reason. The second view is that there is no *istawā* in the real sense, nor is there a God on a throne, or a Lord above the heavens. This is the view of another mistaken group, the *Jahmīs*, who negate the divine attributes. This is absolutely wrong also, since it is diametrically opposed to what everyone aware of the prophetic teachings knows of Islam, as well as to the conviction with regard to the Creator inherent in man's nature in which his Lord has created him. Ibn Qutaybah⁶⁸ testifies to this truth when he says that all nations, Arabs and non-Arabs, before Islam and in Islam, believe that God is in the heavens, that is, He is above them.

The third view is that God is established on the Throne in a manner behooving His majesty and glory; He is above the heavens on the Throne, transcending the world, even though He upholds the Throne and the bearers of the Throne. We know what *istawā* is, though we do not know its modality. We must believe in it and consider all questioning about it as *bid'ah*, as has been said by Umm Salamah,⁶⁹ Rabī'ah Ibn Abī 'Abdur-Raḥmān,⁷⁰ and Mālik Ibn Anas.⁷¹ This is the faith of the Muslims, and this is the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of *istawā* in the eyes of Muslims in general whose original nature has not been corrupted by either to negate divine attributes or to anthropomorphize them....

To support this view we have a number of traditions from the Prophet, his Companions, and numerous scholars of the *ummah*, which have come down to us from generation to generation, and which have been recorded in words great and small. Everyone who is versed in the knowledge of the traditions will agree that not a single word is reported from any one of them that goes against this. All of them are united on this point and have one faith... No one has ever said that the apparent meaning of these words is not

intended, or that this verse or that *ḥadīth* should not be taken at face-value... Had this not been the intended (*ẓāhir*) meaning in the eyes of the Muslims, the Prophet (pbuh) and the Elders of the *ummah* would have told the *ummah* that what they understand as the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) is not what is intended.

Know that one leads nowhere and is surely confused who does not go by words, or is not aware that sometimes the meaning of a word or a sentence is determined on the basis of etymology, or its use in common language or in the *sharʿ*, that sometimes the construction of a sentence changes the original meaning of a word, that the linguistic clues and associations call for metaphorical interpretations, and that sometimes the circumstances of the speaker, the addressee, and the subject of the speech act may also affect the meaning. We will talk later about the reasons which help us call a meaning the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) out of the various possible meanings of a word or words, or to interpret them metaphorically. To be sure, if the words do not carry any clues that indicate what the speaker intends to say, and his intention is only to be known through other words mentioned at other places, then the apparent meaning is not intended. A general statement, for example, is qualified on the ground of some unassociated arguments, even a purely rational consideration; however, writers on the principles of jurisprudence differ on the question of whether one should call it the apparent meaning or not.

Generally, those who deny *istawā* and other attributes of the kind have been found on investigation to have understood *istawā* on a human pattern or in a sense which spells contingency or defect on the part of God. Having conceived of *istawā* in this way, they ascribe it to their opponents and take pains in advancing arguments for its refutation. They finally conclude that it can only be understood in the sense of dominion and control, manifestation and illumination, blessing and favor, or supermacy in status and authority.

This reason that one who claims that the apparent meaning

(*ẓāhir*) of *istawā* is the meaning that it has in a human context is wrong in this: Words are of two types. One stands for something simple, as for example, lion, donkey, ocean, dog, etc. When using them we say, “X is the lion of God and the lion of His Prophet,” or when we call one who is a fool a donkey, or the “ocean” one who is a great scholar or an eminent philanthropist, or when we refer to a lion as a dog. In such cases we are using metaphors. If there is also a clue there, it will make the intention more clear. Examples are the words of the Prophet about the horse of Abū Talḥah: “We certainly found it ‘an ocean,’”⁷² or about Khālīd Ibn Al-Walīd, “Indeed Khālīd is one of the swords of God which He has unsheathed on the polytheists,”⁷³ or about ‘Uthmān, “God will put on you a shirt...”⁷⁴ We have a further example in what Ibn ‘Abbās said or is reported to have said, “The Black Stone is the right hand of God on earth, and one who touches it pledges in a sense to God.”^{74a} Here the words have been used in an extended sense, but the intention of the speaker is quite clear. Everyone who hears these words will certainly understand what is meant by them, and his mind will easily get the meaning which is intended and not the one which the words have been coined to convey. That is not merely a possible meaning, but the intended meaning (*nass*), and to interpret the words in this sense is not a sort of *ta’wīl*, which is to take a word in the sense less probable than the one more probable. This is one of the places where people have gone astray. They have erred in thinking that what these words really mean is not their *ẓāhir* meaning and that one cannot dispense with *ta’wīl* in their case.

The second kind of words are those which stand for some relation, pure and simple, like being higher or lower, above or below, etc., or mean something positive that implies a relation, like knowledge and love, capability or incapability, hearing and seeing. Such words mean nothing in isolation; they have a meaning only in relation to the subjects they refer to. This is for two reasons: first, they are never used in isolation; and second, they can be used as

common (attribute) or as a metaphor, even their essence can be identified with the element common to their objects.

The word under discussion, name, *istawā*, has not been used by the Arabs specifically for a man's sitting, for example, on a cot, so that in cases other than that it should be taken as a metaphor. Similarly, the word *'ilm* - 'knowledge,' has not been used specifically by them for what exists in the heart of man and which is either necessary or acquired, so that its use in that context may be called literal and in other contexts metaphorical. On the contrary, it has sometimes been used in an intransitive form, such as in the verse, "When he reached full age and was firmly established (*istawā*) (28:14); and sometimes with the preposition, *ilā*, such as in the verse, "then he *istawā ilā*, turned to the heavens and it had been smoke" (41:11); and sometimes with the preposition *'alā*, both in cases of God and man. There is no reason one should take *istawā* in one case as literal and in the other as a metaphor. It is not correct to ascribe to God's *istawā* the properties that one ascribes to His creatures. He has said, "We made the heavens with (Our) hands" (51:47), or "from among the things which Our hands have finished" (36:71), or "We wrote all things for him on the Tablets..." (7:145).

On the basis of these verses should a Muslim predicate to his Lord the properties that belong to a man as maker, as fashioner, as writer and as worker? Or should he deny to Him the reality of working, making, writing, as they behoove Him and His Holiness? Or should he say that these should not be taken in their apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*)? Or should he say that everyone's work has its own properties? Just as God's essence is not like the essence of His creatures, similarly, His acting, His working, His making and His fashioning are not like man's acting, working, making, and fashioning. "When we say X has made or written" we do not understand what action or reaction these works involve except on the basis of what we know of their doer, X, and not on the basis of these terms alone. These terms stand for some action and make

sense in relation to some particular agent. If you understand this point it will clarify many of the issues which most people do not understand, and show why there has been a lot of confusion in this matter.

[*Fatāwā* 33:175-186]

(1.11) Fundamentals of the religion and the prophetic approach.

The fundamentals of the religion, whether they are matters of belief and confession, or of confession as well as action, such as the one that concerns God's unity, attributes and qadr, or prophethood and the life hereafter, or whether they are arguments for them, have all been stated very clearly by God and His Prophet. However, the issues which theologians have raised, such as the negation of attributes and qadr, or arguments for the contingency of the world, are not part of the principles of the religion. Ibn Taymīyyah has explained the method of the Prophet in defining and arguing the principles of the religion and pointed out the difference that lies between his method and the method of the theologians.

The fundamentals of the religion are either a matter of belief and confession or a matter of confession as well as action. They concern God's unity, attributes and *qadr*, prophethood and the life hereafter, as well as the arguments about them. So far as the principles are concerned, all that people need to know, believe and testify has been clearly and fully explained by Allah and His Prophet. These form the most important part of his mission. The Prophet has taught them in most clear terms and explained them most satisfactorily to the people. They represent the best effort that God has made through His prophets to establish the truth of His religion for mankind. The Book of God which was transmitted, in words and meaning, by the Companions of the Prophet, and

thereafter by the Successors, and the wisdom embodied in the Sunnah of the Prophet, which was also transmitted by them, contains whatever is required or deemed necessary in this regard...

As for the second part, name, the arguments regarding the basic principles, it has not been properly appreciated by many theologians and philosophers. They have thought that scriptural arguments hang upon authority of some statements, hence their validity depends on the veracity of the person who makes those statements. Moreover, to determine the veracity of that person, they have advanced only some rational criteria. This has led them into error. In fact, they have erred in thinking that the arguments of the Qur'ān and Sunnah are merely traditional; on the contrary, they contain all rational required arguments. This is what the Elders of the *ummah* and the *a'immaḥ*, who are known for their knowledge as well as faith, have believed. But these theologians and philosophers have failed to appreciate the arguments.

The Qur'ān has stated precisely and very forcefully the best that these people have to say. It has put them in the form of parables. God has said, "We have pronounced in this Qur'ān every kind of parable for people" (30:58). In fact, parables contain rational arguments, syllogistic as well as analogical, including what they call demonstrative arguments (*burhān*), which are nothing more than syllogistic arguments consisting of established premises, even though *burhān* in Arabic means more than that. The Qur'ān, for example, refers to the two miracles that were given to Moses as *burhān* (28:32).

To explain it further, In theological discussions, it is not justified to employ an analogical argument where the major and the minor terms are similar, nor is it justified to use syllogistic argument where the terms belong to the same class. For, as God has said, "nothing is like Him, (42:11); He cannot be likened with others or put in a proposition beside and on a par with other terms. This explains why the theologians and philosophers are not able to reach any definite conclusion in theological matters by means of

these arguments, or why they often advance contradictory arguments or fail to elect one argument against other and end up in perplexity.

The argument that one should use in this field is the argument of priority (*qiyās awlā*), whether it is a matter of deduction or analogy. The Qur'ān says, "To God applies the highest similitude" (16:60). We know that any perfection which is affirmed of a possible contingent being is free from all defects, and which is something positive rather than negative, should be affirmed of the Necessary Being prior to anything else. Again, every perfection which is free from all defects and which is found in any being created, produced and controlled, has come to it only from its Creator, Lord and Ruler, and should be therefore affirmed of Him in the first place. On the other hand, every imperfection and defect in itself, or to put it other words, every want of perfection which is negated of something created, contingent and possible, should be negated of God prior to anything else. He deserves all the positive excellences more than and prior to any other being, whereas possible and the contingent beings deserve the negative attributes...

I will cite as an example God's description of life hereafter. Since knowledge of its existence is subject to the knowledge of its possibility, since the impossible cannot exist, God has described the possibility of its existence at length. But He does not proceed in this regard as the theologians do; that is to say He does not prove its existence by showing that it is theoretically possible. Theologians say that it is possible because the assertion of its possibility involves nothing impossible. But how do you know, one may ask, that its assertion does not involve any impossibilities, internal or external? Moreover, theoretical possibility is nothing but the absence of the knowledge of impossibility, and we know that the absence of knowledge that something is impossible does not mean that it is really possible. We call something theoretically possible when our mind neither knows that it is really possible nor that it is really possible.

In discussing resurrection, God has not contented Himself with showing its theoretical possibility, for a thing may be impossible not because of something within itself, but for some external reason, even though one may not have thought of it. On the other hand, if we know that something is really possible, it cannot be impossible. And we know that a thing is really possible, either when we know it existing, know something similar to it present in existence, or we know something greater than it to be existing; for the existence of a greater thing is proof that a smaller thing is more likely to exist. Again, when the existence of a thing is proved, God's power to bring it into existence is also proved. On the other hand, mere knowledge of a thing's possibility is no proof that it can also exist if God's power over bringing it into being is not known.

All these points have been stated in the following verses, "Do they not see that God Who created the heavens and earth has power to create the like of them (anew)? Only He has decreed for them a particular term about which there is no doubt at all. But the people that are unjust refuse to believe and persist in denying it." (17:99); "Is not He Who created the heavens and the earth able to create the like thereof? Yes, indeed! He is the supreme, of skill and knowledge infinite"(36:81); "See they not that God, Who created the heavens and the earth, and never wearied with their creation, is able to give life to the dead? Surely He has power over all things" (46:33); "Certainly the creation of the heavens and the earth is a greater matter than the creation of man, yet most people understand not" (40:37). Certainly it is obvious to everyone that the creation of the heavens and the earth is something greater than the creation of man, that it demonstrates greater power, and that in comparison to it the creation of man is much easier, more feasible and less exacting.

Look at the other argument which God has given for resurrection, I mean the argument from the first creation. Read these verses, "It is He Who created first, then He will repeat it, and

that will be much easier for Him” (30:27). He is therefore entitled to say after this, “To Him belongs the loftiest similitude in the heavens and the earth (that you can think of)” (30:27); or, “If you have a doubt about the resurrection, (consider) that He has created you of dust...” (22:5); or “He [man] makes comparisons for us, and forgets his own creation! He says, ‘Who can give life to (dry) bones that are decomposed? Say, He will give them life Who created them for the first time!’” (36:78-9)

The words, “Who can give life to (dry) bones that are decomposed” is an argument in which one premise has not been mentioned, since it is obvious, and the other is a universal negative with which the conclusion has been joined, namely the parable stated earlier, “He makes comparisons for Us, and forgets his own creation. He says, ‘We will give them life to (dry) bones that are decomposed?’” This is a question that implies negation. It says, in other words, that there is none who can revive the bones which have decomposed. Their decomposition means to this objector that they cannot be revived. He thinks that since they have dried up and cooled down, they are less likely to be revived, as life requires heat and water. Furthermore, they have broken down into pieces which have mixed up with other pieces. The essence of this argument is that since the bones have decomposed and since no one can revive any decomposed bones, no one can revive man. But the negative premise which denies revivification is not correct.

God has proved the possibility of resurrection in different ways. Sometimes He has said that He has power over much more difficult things, for example, “He will revive them Who created them for the first time, and created from dust.” He has further said, “He is well versed in every kind of creation” (36:79), so that people know that He is well aware of things into which the bones have decomposed. Therefore He has said, ‘The same who produces for you fire out of the green tree;’ that is, He has done something more wonderful; He has created fire which is hot and dry from what is cold and wet. The distance between the two is far greater,

and it is much easier to combine heat with something which is wet than to combine heat with something which is dry. What is wet is more pliable than what is dry.

He has further said, “Is not He Who created the heavens and the earth able to create the like thereof?” (36:81). This premise is self-evident, which is why it has been expressed in a question which implies that its truth is known to the person who is addressed. God has referred to it at another place, “No question do they bring to you but we reveal to you the truth and the best explanation (thereof)” (25:33). And He has asserted His omnipotence: “Verily, when He intends a thing, His command is “Be,” and it is!” (36:82). On this and other occasions the Qur’ān has stated truths and advanced most convincing arguments in religious matters. This is not the place to go into details. We only want to draw attention to this fact.

Another issue which the Qur’ān has discussed is the issue that God is far above begetting a son, whether one conceives begetting in physical terms or in intellectual categories, as the Christians assert regarding the proceeding from God of the Word, which, as they claim, the Son is in his essence, or as the Sabaeen philosophers conceived the proceeding from the One of the Ten Intelligences and the Nine Spheres, about which they were not sure whether they were substances or incidents. They have sometimes regarded the Intelligences as male and the Spheres as female, and conceived them as fathers and mothers, gods and goddesses. However, their idea that the spheres have their souls is suggested by their circular motion, which is an indication of voluntary movement, though most of them regarded these souls to be incidents rather than substances which exist in themselves.

This comes closer to the belief of the polytheists of Arabia and other countries who ascribe sons and daughters to God. The Qur’ān says, “They make the jinns equal with God, though God did create the jinns, and they falsely attribute to them sons and daughters without knowing anything about them. Praise and glory

be to Him for He is above what they attribute to Him” (6:100); and, “Is it not that they say, from their own invention, that God has begotten children? They are certainly liars” (37:151). They believed that the angels were the daughters of God, as those people believed that Intelligence and the Souls were angels and that they were begotten by God. Contradicting them, God says, “They assign daughters for God. Exalted is He (above that)! And for themselves (they assign sons) whom they like. When one is informed of (the birth of) a female (child) his face darkens and is filled with inward grief. With shame does he hide himself from his people because of the evil news he has had. Shall he retain it with disgrace, or bury it in the dust? And what an evil they decide on! To those who believe not in the Hereafter, applies the similitude of evil. To God applies the highest similitude, and He is exalted in power and full of wisdom...They ascribe to God what they hate (for themselves), and their tongues assert the falsehood that all good things are for them. Without doubt, for them is the Fire, and they will be the first to be hastened on into it!” (16:57-62).

Elsewhere He says, “When news is brought to one of them of (the birth of) what he sets up for (God) the Most Gracious, his face darkens, and he is filled with grief. Is then one brought up among trinkets, and unable to give a clear account in a dispute (to be associated with God)? They make into females the angels who themselves serve God. Did they witness their Creator? Their evidence will be recorded and they will be called to account!” (43:17-19). And, “Have you seen Lat and ‘Uzza, and another, the third (goddess), Manat? What, for you the male sex, and for Him the female? Such would indeed be a division most unfair!”

Thus has God made it clear that He Who is the Creator and the Lord must be exalted above all defects and imperfections. It is strange that one attributes to God what one does not like for himself and hates to have ascribed to him, even though it does happen to him in real life. On the other hand, one does not exalt God above it or negate it of Him, even though He deserves more

than everyone else that any defect of imperfection should not be attributed to Him.

The same is true of God's unity. He says, "He propounds to you a similitude from your own (experience). Do you have partners among those whom your right hands possess, to share as equals in the wealth We have bestowed on you? Do you fear them as you fear each other?" (30:28). In other words, when a human master does not like that his bondsman should be a partner in his property or should be feared as a result as he is, and tries his best not to make him an equal, then how does one make the one created and owned by God a partner to Him, to be called upon and to be worshiped as He is? How wrong were those who in their *hajj* and *'umrah* used to say, "I am here, Lord! There is no partner for You, only one who is your servant and not lord." We can go on citing verse after verse, but we have to stop, for we only want to underline the point that the fundamentals of the religion have been stated in the Qur'ān and Sunnah, and that arguments for them have also been expounded in them in detail.

Many people mention among the principles of religion a lot of things that are simply false; they are never a part of religion, nor are the arguments which have been advanced for them. In this category you may put the doctrine that negates the attributes of God or denies *qadr*, or the argument that deduces the contingency of the world from the contingency of accidents which exist as properties in corporeal beings. To establish the premises of this argument, for example, one must first prove the existence of all the accidents that are properties or at least some of them, such as movement and rest, composition and division. Second, one has to prove that they are contingent by refuting the theory that they emerge out of an latent state, or that they move from one place to another. Third, one has to demonstrate that bodies are either not free from accidents by showing that they admit of them and that they are never without an accident or its opposite, or that they are not without other beings. Fourth, one has to show that a series of

contingent accidents which has no beginning is inconceivable. This last proposition is, further, based on two premises: one, a body is never free from accidents which are its properties, and, two, that whatever is not free from properties which are accidents is a contingent being, for the properties that are accidents are necessarily contingent. Sometimes this is asserted of some properties which are accidents, such as generation, and claimed that what is not free from contingents is also contingent because infinite regression of events is ruled out.

It is obvious that this was not the method which was adopted by the Prophet to prove the existence of the Creator, or the prophethood of the prophets. It is no wonder, therefore, that great theologians like Al-Ash‘arī and others admitted that it was not the way of the prophets and their followers, the Elders of the *ummah* and their *a‘immah*. They have also tried to avoid it and declared that its efficacy as defined and formulated are very difficult to prove. You will see, therefore, that those who rely on this method in theological matters end up with one of the two things: either they eventually realize the defects of their method and discover that their own arguments are no better than the arguments of their opponents who defend, for example, the eternity of the world, and consequently move from one argument to another without sufficient reason, as you see in the case of many of them, or they are forced to take positions that are untenable both on the ground of reason and revelation. Jahm,⁷⁵ for example, had to advocate the cession of Paradise and Hell; Abū Al-Hudhayl⁷⁶ had to suggest the termination of movement on the part of the people of Paradise; Al-Ash‘arī and others like him had to expound the idea that water, air and fire also have a certain taste, color and smell; and a number of others had to claim that all accidents, whether of taste, color or any other kind, do not persist even for two moments. These people had to resort to these ridiculous ideas to counter the objection against their effort to affirm God’s attributes on the ground that bodies are contingent because they have properties which are accidents and

which come into existence one moment and perish the next moment and therefore require that God's attributes must be eternal. However, this theory conflicts with reason and common experience.

For the same reason, many theologians, the Mu'tazilah and others, have negated divine attributes totally or partly. Having once accepted that the existence of attributes proves the contingency of their subject, they are compelled to extend this thesis to God's attributes. But the idea that it is true of all beings without exception is absolutely wrong, for the same reason, too; they propounded the idea that the Qur'ān is created, that God will not be seen in the Hereafter, that He is not on His Throne, and so on. Such are the corollaries that follow from their basic thesis about accidents.

These are the ideas which these people call principles of religion. Certain, they are not the principles of the religion which God has revealed for mankind. To be sure, the religion about which He has said, "Have they partners)in godhead) who have established for them some religion that God has not approve" (42:21), has its principles and rules. As it is used, the term 'principles of religion' (*uṣūl ad-dīn*) is vague. It means different things according to the context and usage. Nevertheless, it is clear that for God, His Prophet and the Believers, principles of religion are only those that come from the Prophet. But for those who have invented a religion without any sanction from God, the principles do not come from the Prophet. Their religion as well as the principles it is comprised of are false.

This may help us understand why the Elders and the *a'immaḥ* denounce *kalām* and its exponents. It is because *kalām* advances fallacious arguments and expounds wrong ideas. However, those who expound the truths which God has stated or suggested, they are people of knowledge and faith. And it is God Who reveals the truth and guides to the right path.

[*Fatāwā* 3: 294-306]

(1.12) Exoteric Knowledge and Esoteric Knowledge

There is no harm in calling some knowledge exoteric (‘ilm az-ẓāhir) and some esoteric (‘ilm al-bāṭin), provided we understand the former in the sense of knowledge of acts that are performed by the body, and the latter in the sense knowledge of ideas, beliefs, and feelings that we have in the heart, or that we understand by the former what most people understand from the language of a text, and by the latter what only the learned but not the common man can understand from it. On either understanding, esoteric knowledge cannot conflict with exoteric knowledge. But the esoteric knowledge which various groups of esoterics (Baṭīnīs), philosophers, mystics and theologians, who have many things in common, talk of sometimes conflicts with exoteric knowledge and is wrong. As for the allusions (ishārāt) of the Ṣūfīs, some may be true, but the support which is adduced for them from a verse may be unjustified; others may be simply false if they go against an established truth. However, the concept of God-inspired knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ladunnī) is true. God does reveal to the heart of His pious friends (awliyā’) what He does not reveal to others. But this knowledge, it must be remembered, is not self-authenticating; it has to be supported by the arguments from the shar‘.

The ḥadīth that the Qur’ān has an inner meaning (bāṭi), and that has another deeper layer of meaning, and so on up to seven layers of inner meanings,⁷⁷ is a controversial ḥadīth; it has not been reported by any knowledgeable authority, nor is it found in any known book of ḥadīth. However, we have a ḥadīth narrated by Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī with an incomplete chain of narrators, omitting either the intervening Companion, or not going beyond him to the Prophet. It says, “Every verse (of the Qur’ān) has an external and an internal meaning, as well as an initial and a final meaning.”⁷⁸ We also hear various expressions like ‘exoteric knowledge and

esoteric knowledge', and exoterics and esoterics'. But these expressions have bothir right and wrong meanings...

By the term *al-bāṭin* one means either the knowledge of internal things, such as ideas and feelings of the heart, and the knowledge of the Unseen (*al-Ghayb*) communicated by the prophets. Or one means the knowledge which most people or the literalists among them are unable to comprehend. As for the first meaning, it is true that there is a knowledge which concerns the acts of the body and another knowledge which concerns the acts of the heart. It is also true that there is knowledge which is acquired through the senses and a knowledge concerning transcendental realities which is not available to the senses. Faith in the true sense is faith in the Unseen as God has said, "This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without doubt for those who fear God, who believe in the Unseen (*al-Ghayb*)" (2:2-3). This faith in *Ghayb* is faith in the basic truths which the prophets have stated regarding god, His names and attributes, angels, Paradise and Hell. In short, it is faith in God, His prophets and the Last Day.

The term *'ilm al-bāṭin* also applies to the knowledge of the things of the heart, such as right and wrong beliefs, good and evil intentions. It applies to the knowledge of God and His love, fear for Him and sincerity in His devotion, trust in Him and expectation from Him, love and hatred towards other things for His sake, resignation to His decrees and submission to His will; it also applies to the knowledge of virtues like generosity, modesty and meekness, or of vice like pride, conceit and vanity. This is esoteric knowledge; for the objects of this knowledge are the internal things of the heart. In contrast, exoteric knowledge is knowledge of visible things which are talked about and discussed. This is what is known from the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the sayings of the Elders and their followers. In fact, most of the verses of the Qur'ān fall into this category. God has revealed the Qur'ān as "a healing for the (diseases) of the heart, and as a guide and mercy for those who believe" (10:57). This knowledge is really the knowledge of

principles of religion; faith in the heart is the basis for confession by the tongue, and the acts of the heart are the basis for the acts of the body...

Esoteric knowledge in the sense of knowledge which most people or some of them are not able to comprehend is of two kinds: One type is opposed to esoteric knowledge, and the other is not. The first which is opposed to esoteric knowledge is untrue. One who claims to have this knowledge or knowledge of something hidden which conflicts with esoteric knowledge is certainly wrong. He is either a deliberate misinterpreter (*mulḥid zindīq*), or a mistaken ignorant. The second kind of esoteric knowledge, may be classed with exoteric knowledge, and may be true or may be false. If it does not conflict with the exoteric knowledge, it cannot be pronounced false. If it is found to be true, it will be accepted; and if it is found to be erroneous, it will be rejected; but if neither is ascertained, one has to suspend judgment.

Examples of the erroneous kind of esoteric knowledge are the beliefs of various esoterics such as Karamathians,⁷⁹ the Ismā‘īlīs,⁸⁰ the Nuṣṣarīyyah,⁸¹ the philosophers who follow them, and the extremists among the mystics and theologians. To be sure, Karamathians are the worst of all of them, for they say that the Qur’ān and Islam have an inner reality which contradicts their outer form. For example, they say that the *ṣalāh* which is obligatory is not the *ṣalāh* that people offer; such *ṣalāh* is meant only for the laity. The real *ṣalāh* is the *ṣalāh* of the elite, which is to know their own doctrines. Similarly, fasting (*sawm*) is to conceal those doctrines from the ordinary men. *Ḥajj* is to visit the sites of their religion. They also say that the Paradise of the elite is the enjoyment of pleasure in this world, whereas their Hell is to observe the rules of the *shar‘* and to toil under its yoke...

Outwardly, the Karamathians are Rawāfiḍ;⁸² internally they are infidels, pure and simple. In general, the Ṣūfīs and the theologians are not Rawāfiḍ who call the Companions transgressors (*fāsiq*) but

not infidels (*kāfir*). Among them, however, there are people who, like Zaydīs,⁸³ exalt ‘Alī over Abū Bakr, or who believe that ‘Alī was more knowledgeable than Abū Bakr in things esoteric, as Al-Ḥarbi⁸⁴ and others do. This later group believes that “‘Alī was better versed in esoteric knowledge, which is the best kind of knowledge, and that Abū Bakr was superior to him only in exoteric knowledge. But this view is diametrically opposed to the view of most established Ṣūfīs and their leaders, who are agreed that Abū Bakr was most knowledgeable in esoteric matters. The scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah wal al-Jamā‘ah are one in the belief that Abū Bakr was most knowledgeable in both matters, exoteric and esoteric. Many people have reported consensus (*ijmā‘* on that point...

Esoteric Ṣūfīs interpret the words “Go to Pharaoh” (79:17) as a command to mind one’s heart, and the words, “God commanded you to slaughter a cow” (2:67) as a command to suppress the (evil) soul. They also consider the words, “take off your pair of shoes” (20:17) as a command to forsake this world and the next. Similarly they interpret “the tree” from which God addressed Moses and “the Holy Valley” where Moses was standing in terms of the feelings of heart one has at the time of enlightenment...

Esoteric philosophers interpret the angels and the devils as faculties of the soul. They say that the blessings or the suffering promised in the Hereafter have been put into figurative language. They refer to the psychological experience of pleasure or pain rather than to external things causing those feelings. Such ideas are also found in the writings of later Ṣūfīs, though nothing of this sort is heard from their earlier leaders...

Later Ṣūfīs, despite their ignorance and disbelief, have claimed that they know more than the Elders of the *ummah*, for example, Ibn ‘Arabi⁸⁵, the author of *Fuṣūṣ*, and many others like him, claim that being is one. They come to this doctrine from the same door, leaving behind all reason and religion. They say that early Ṣūfī masters like Junayd Ibn Muḥammad,⁸⁶ Sahl Ibn ‘Abdullah At-

Tustārī,⁸⁷ and Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Khawwaṣṣ⁸⁸ died without knowing what *tawḥīd* really means. They find fault with Junayd and others like him for differentiating between the Lord and the world. Junayd said, “*Tawḥīd* is to separate the contingent from the Eternal.”⁸⁹ By God, the *tawḥīd* which these people expounded and which identifies the existence of the world with the existence of God is the worst of all false doctrines which the right minded Ṣūfī masters have condemned... They further claim that they say they all know God better than His messengers who receive knowledge from their niche. Hence they feel free to interpret the Qur’ān in the light of their false esoteric ideas. To give some examples, they say that the words “*min mā khaṭīyātihim ughriqū*” (71:25) which means that because of their sins they (the people of Noah) were drowned (in the flood), they interpret to mean that they were immersed in the sea of God’s knowledge. They try to... the word ‘*adhāb*, which means punishment, from the word ‘*udhub* which means sweetness, and then claim that Noah’s words about his people was in fact a praise for them though it appeared pejorative...

Ideas are of two kinds. First those which are opposed to what we definitely know to be true; as such they would be wrong as well as the arguments which are advanced for them, for no argument can prove a wrong thing to be right. The second kind of ideas are those that are true in themselves, but the arguments which people adduce for them from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah may not be backed by the text. These are what they call “allusions” (*ishārāt*). Abdur-Raḥmān’s⁹⁰ book, Secrets of Exegesis (*Ḥaqā’iq at-Tafsīr*) abound in such allusions.

The first kind of ideas are found in the works of the Karamathians and philosophers whose beliefs are different from those of the Muslims. If you accept that God was pleased with the early Muslims and they, too, were pleased with Him, you must accept that whatever goes against their way is wrong. If, for example, you accept that *ṣalāh* is obligatory for everyone who is sane, you must accept that whatever makes it non-obligatory for

any particular person by reinterpreting a text is simply telling a lie. Similarly, if you accept that wine and adultery are forbidden for everyone in his/her senses, you must accept that whoever interprets a text to justify these things on the part of a person is telling a lie.

With regard to the ideas of the second kind, there are many who are confused, because the ideas themselves are true and may be supported by the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The question is only with regard to the particular text which is cited in their support. Ideas of this kind may be further divided into two types, first, those which say that a particular text X means Y. This claim is wrong. For example, one who says that the words, "slaughter a cow" (2:267) means "suppress the evil soul," or that "go to Pharaoh" (77:17) means "mind your heart," or that the first part of the verse (48:29) "those who are with him (the Prophet)" is a reference to Abū Bakr, the next part "are hard on the infidels" is a reference to 'Umar, the third part "kind to each other" is a reference to 'Uthmān, and the fourth part, "you will see them bow and prostrate themselves" is a reference to 'Alī - he is telling nothing but lies in the name of God, either intentionally or unintentionally. The second type of ideas are those which do not claim that X means Y; they only say that Y also follows from X. In other words, it is a kind of inference (*qiyās*). What the jurists call *qiyās*, the Ṣūfīs call *ishārah*, allusion. But these allusions may be right and may be wrong, for example, if anyone takes the verse, "no one shall touch it but those who are clean" (56:79) to refer to the Guarded Tablets or the Holy Qur'ān, and says that just as the guarded Tablets in which the Qur'ān is written is not touched except by those who are clean, similarly its meaning is not grasped except by clean hearts or the hearts of pious men, he will be saying something correct and his inference, too, will be correct...

Ḥaqā'iq at-Tafsīr by Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān As-Sulāmī has all three kinds of ideas. One kind is inauthentic; for example most of the sayings which he has ascribed to *ijmā'* Aṣ-Ṣādiq⁹¹ are not the

words of *ijmā'*, they are the words of Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān himself. Various scholars of tradition have found fault with his reports. That is why, whenever Al-Bayhaqī⁹² relates from him, he goes beyond him to those from whom he has heard. The second kind of tradition is those which have been reported by authentic reports but have some inaccuracies in the report. the third kind of traditions is those which are authentic as well as correct.

Everything which goes against the Qur'ān and the Sunnah is wrong, and all evidence in its support is to be rejected. Similarly, if something agrees with the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, but the text which is said to mean it actually means something else, that too will not be correct. However, if one claims that it follows from the text as an inference or as a lesson (*i'tibār*), that may be right and may be wrong.

As for God-inspired truths (*al-'ilm al-ladunnī*), it is true that God reveals to His friends and pious servants what He does not reveal to others, because they avoid what He disapproves and pursue what He approves. 'Alī alluded to it when he said, "Nothing special is given to me except an insight into His Book that God gives to a servant."⁹³ Another tradition says, "One who acts upon what he knows is given the knowledge of what he does not know."⁹⁴ This may be supported by a number of Qur'ānic verses, such as, "if they had done what they were told, it would have been best for them, and would have gone farthest to strengthen their (faith), And We would have given them from Our presence a great reward, and We would have shown them the Straight Way" (4:66-8). This means that whoever does what he is commanded is guided to the right path... Elsewhere God has said, "For those who follow the guidance, He increases further (the light of) their guidance, and gives them their piety" (47:17).... This also means that one who does what God dislikes is turned away from guidance and knowledge, as He has said, "When they went wrong, God let their hearts go wrong" (61:5)... There are many more verses that can be cited on the subject.

People have three different views on the matter; two are extreme and one is the middle. One group says that abstinence, purification of the heart, and austere practices by themselves lead to knowledge without the assistance of anything else. Another group says that these things have nothing to do with knowledge, which is acquired either with the words and the commands of the *shar‘* or rational arguments. The correct view is the one which is held by the people in the middle, namely that the things which have been mentioned by the first group are some of the most important factors which facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, and even form the condition for the attainment of various kinds of knowledge; but they are not sufficient by themselves. One needs something more: either statements on matters that are not known except through them, or a clear idea of the concepts involved in propositions that belong to the field of necessary knowledge.

As for knowledge of things necessary for salvation in the Hereafter and happiness there, it is not available except through following what the prophets have taught. God has said, “If, as is sure, there comes to you guidance from Me, whoever follows My guidance will not lose his way or fall into misery. But whoever turns away from My message, verily for him is a life narrowed down, and We shall raise him up blind on the Day of Judgment. He will say: ‘My Lord why have you raised me up blind, though I had sight (before)?’ (God) will say: Thus did you, when Our signs came to you, disregard them; so will you this day be disregarded. Thus do We recompense him who transgresses beyond bounds, and believes not in the sign of his Lord” (20:123-7). Elsewhere He has said, “Whoever withdraws himself from remembering the Most Gracious, We appoint for him an evil one to be an intimate companion for him” (43:36). Hence if anyone thinks he can find the Way and acquire faith through knowledge alone, without acting upon that knowledge or through austere practices and abstinence without acquiring knowledge, is surely mistaken.

Further removed from truth than these two groups of people are those who, in order to acquire knowledge, pursue the method of philosophers and the *mutakalimūn*, and neither refer to the Qur'ān and Sunnah nor practice what they know (of *shar'*). No better are those who engage in the austere practices and abstinence on the line of the philosophers and the mystics without referring to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah or checking their practices with the rules (of the *shar'*). The one moves away from correct knowledge and the *shar'*, and the other moves away from correct practice and the *shar'*; thus both of them go astray, far from truth. One is like the Christians, who have lost the truth, and the other is like the Jews who have incurred God's wrath. Some of them are even worse than the Christians and the Jews, I mean the Karamathians, the monists and other misguided philosophers like them.

Some people think that the Prophet has told every group what was best for it. This statement may be understood in two ways. One is that *shar'* caters to the needs of various groups of people. This is true, for the *shar'* does not put the same obligation on the rich and poor, the healthy and the sick, nor does it charge a man with the same duties in prosperity as in adversity, or a woman when she is clean and when she has her period, or a person when he is the ruler and when he is the ruled.... But if this statement means that the *shar'* itself changes, that the Prophet commands one thing to one person and just the opposite to another, or tells one thing to some person and just the contrary to another, this is completely wrong. Some people cite by way of example the case when 'Ā'ishah asked the Prophet whether he had seen his Lord, and he replied in the negative, but when Abū Bakr asked the same question he replied in the positive.⁹⁵ He thus gave one reply, they say, to one person and another to another on the same issue according to their respective situations. This is a lie which the enemies of Islam and the hypocrites have told about the Prophet. How can they attribute such a thing to one who said, "It does not behoove a prophet that he point to something with his eyes against

what he says with his mouth.”⁹⁶ This has been reported by Abū Dāwūd and other compilers of *ḥadīth*. At the time of the conquest of Makkah, the Prophet announced that Ibn Abī Sarh was not to be forgiven. When ‘Uthmān brought him to the Prophet that he might pledge fealty to him, the Prophet turned his face away. He did that twice or thrice and only then allowed him to pledge fealty, saying to the people around him, “Was there no intelligent person among you who could see that I had turned away from this man and get up and kill him?” On that, a person in the audience said, “Why did you not point to me with your eyes, O Prophet?” His reply was, “It does not behoove a Prophet to point stealthily with his eyes.” This is the hallmark of integrity, of correspondence between outer behavior and inner reality, of identity of action with intention, which is diametrically opposed to the practice of the hypocrites who put up on their face the opposite of what they have in their hearts

It was part of his integrity that the Prophet never confided to someone in secret any part of religion which he did not tell others. However, it did happen that when someone asked him about a thing to which he could not give an answer, he said something instead which could benefit the questioner, for example, once a Bedouin Arab asked him about the Day of Judgment, as to when it would come. But nobody other than God knows when it will happen. Therefore instead of addressing the question direct, he asked the Bedouin what preparation he had made for it? The Bedouin said that he had not done much, but he did love God and the Prophet. Thereupon he said, “Everyone there will be with those who he loves”⁹⁷. This was how he would discern the real purpose behind a question and respond to it. He never gave answers which his people could not follow.

As regards the *ḥadīth* of Hudhayfah, it is true that according to a *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* Hudhayfah knew some secrets which others did not know.⁹⁸ That was information about the leading hypocrites, which the Prophet had told him the year the expedition of Tabuk was

undertaken. It has been reported that a group of hypocrites was planning to loosen the saddle of the camel on which the Prophet was to ride so that he might fall and die; but he was informed of it by way of revelation. Hudhayfah was sitting near him at that time, he turned to him and gave him the names of the hypocrites. It has been reported that ‘Umar would not pray over the coffin of anyone unless Hudhayfah also prayed over his coffin. This knowledge which Hudhayfah had was not, it is obvious, a part of religion, nor a matter of the heart as distinguished from the matters of behavior. God has himself stated in His Book a lot about the character and behavior of the hypocrites, particularly in Sūrat At-Tawbah (IX) which exposes them completely.

As for the *ḥadīth* of Abū Hurayrah, it is recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections. Abū Hurayrah says, “I have preserved two bags of *ḥadīth*; the contents of one I have spread among the people, but were I to divulge the contents of the other bag you would cut this throat.”⁹⁹ But this also has nothing to do with inner truths as distinguished from external rules, nor does it refer to the principles of religion. In the other bag of Abū Hurayrah were only *aḥādīth* regarding *malahi* and *fitan*, the former meaning wars between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the latter meaning wars among the Muslims themselves. This is supported by the remark of ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar,¹⁰⁰ “Had Abū Hurayrah said that you would kill your *khalīfah* or that you would do this or that, you would have called him a liar.” Obviously, if information that is not liked by kings and their supporters were divulged, it would have had serious consequences for their governments.

[*Fatāwā* 13:231-256]

(1.13) Misinterpretation of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah

Those who misinterpret the text of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah are of three kinds. Some change the word for the meaning and

reject what the Prophet has said under the impression that it goes against reason. Others just reproduce texts without understanding them and claim that this is the way of the Elders. The third group expounds ideas and claims that they are part of religion, even though they contradict the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

God has divided the People of the Book whom He has condemned into two groups, misinterpreters and ignorant folk. “Do you expect,” He has said, “that they will believe in you, seeing that a group of them would read the word of God and then change it deliberately after they had understood it fully. When they talk to the Believers they say: ‘We are also Believers.’ But when they talk to each other in private they say: ‘Do you tell these people what God has revealed to you, so that they may argue against you in from of your Lord.’ Do you not understand (their aim)? Do they not know that God knows what they conceal and what they reveal? And there are among them illiterates, who follow not the Book but their own desires, and do nothing but conjecture. Then woe to those who write the Book with their own hands, and then say, ‘This is from God’ to traffic with it for a miserable price. Woe to them for what hands write and the gain they make thereby (12:75-9).

Therein is a lesson for those from our own community who follow their own way. The misinterpreters of the text of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah regarding God's attributes, statements, and commands either change the words of the texts or their meaning, and reject what the Prophet has said by denying it outright or negating its meaning. They claim that this is what is demanded by their reason, which they appoint as judge over the revelation.

Others do not do more than state the texts, which they hardly understand. They claim that this is what revelation demands, that it was the practice of the Elders, and that God did not require them to understand those texts. Thus they know nothing of the Book except

wishes, that is, they only recite it, and “they do nothing but conjecture.”

There is a third group, who expound ideas and claim that they are part of religion, that there are texts and rational arguments to support them, and that they are part of God’s religion even though they go against His Book. They are the ones “who write the Book with their hands and then say that it is from God” in one sense or the other.

So think over these verses, how they underline all the three ways of misinterpretation. The words, “do you tell them what God has revealed to you that they may argue against you in front of your Lord,” depict those people who hide texts which others might use against them. Such people even forbid the narration of prophetic *ḥadīth*, and were it possible for them to hide the Qur’ān they would do so. But since they cannot they try to suppress inferences from its texts of ideas which follow from them, and offer people in their place what they have written with their hands, claiming that it is from God.

[*Fatāwā* 14:70-71]

(1.14) Opposition to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah arises from unfounded conjecture or objectionable desires.

Whoever diverges from the Prophet’s path builds on wild conjecture or evil desires, as God has said about those who worshiped Al-Lat and Al-‘Uzza, “They follow nothing but conjectures and their wishes, even though the true guidance has come to them from their Lord” (53:23). His remark about those who believed that the angels are females is, “Those who believe not in the Hereafter name the angels with female names. But they have no knowledge thereof. They follow nothing but conjectures, and conjectures reveal nothing against truth” (53:28).... The importance of the Prophet’s teachings he endorses, on the other hand, in these words: “By the star when it sets, your companion is

neither astray nor being misled. Nor does he say ought of (his own) desire. It is no less than inspiration sent down to him, which the One has taught him Who is mighty in power” (53:1-5)

So whoever opposes the Prophet is only following his conjectures or pursuing his wishes. If he really believes in what he says, and has some argument for it, it would at most be a conjecture which avails nothing of the truth. He may be arguing from either false premises, inauthentic traditions, or inspired words which he may be thinking to have come from God, whereas they have actually come from Satan.

People consider these three things to be sufficient reason to oppose the Sunnah. They put forward a rational argument and consider it to be an apodeictically certain proof, whereas they are wild guesses consisting of vague concepts and obscure ideas which they have not examined and seen which part of them is true or which part is untrue. You will find these things in all rational arguments which have been advanced against the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Their concepts are vague. When you analyze them you see what is true and what is false. This is the case regarding rational arguments.

Those who argue from tradition use a *ḥadīth* which is either a simple lie foisted on the Prophet or which does not prove what those opponents of the Prophet suppose it to prove. The reason may lie in either the transmission of the tradition, the text of the tradition itself or in the inference from it. This is the case regarding all the traditions which the exoterics put forward as arguments.

As for the people of inspiration, ecstasy, vision and audition, some of them, to be sure, have authentic inspirations. Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have reported that the Prophet said, “There were men in the earlier communities who were addressed from above (*al-muḥaddathūn*). if there were such a one in my community it would be ‘Umar.”¹⁰¹ And ‘Umar used to say, “Keep near to the obedient Servants of God, and listen to what they say, for things are revealed to them in their true form.” At-Tirmidhī has reported

through Abū Sa‘īd that the Prophet said, “Beware of the insights of the Believer, for he sees by the light of God” and sighted the verse, “Indeed there are signs in it for those who understand by tokens”¹⁰² (15:75). One of his companions said, “By God, I believe that He puts the truth in their hearts and in their ears.” Al-Bukhārī in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* has recorded from Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet related the words of God, “My servant comes closer to Me through his supererogatory acts till I love him, and when I love him I become his ears by which he hears, his eyes by which he sees, his hands by which he strikes, and his legs by which he walks.”¹⁰³ In another version of the *ḥadīth* the words are “...he hears through Me, sees through Me, strikes through Me, and walks through Me.” God has thus made it clear that the pious hear through God and see through God. People used to say about ‘Umar (raa) that “peace speaks through his tongue.”¹⁰⁴ The Prophet (pbuh) said, “If anyone asks for the post of judge and seeks the help of people for it, he is left to himself, but if he does not ask for it nor seeks people’s help, God appoints for him a human angel who helps him in making correct judgment.”¹⁰⁵

What I want to say is that such things do happen. Inspiration does come from God. Out there are other inspirations also which are thought to have come from Him, though they do not come from Him. People do not differentiate between a true and a false inspiration, just as they do not distinguish between a correct and incorrect argument, rational or traditional. Sometimes they hear a word or see a person who commands something, but that word comes from Satan himself; it is he who addresses them, though they think the person to be a friend (*walī*) of God, or one of the invisible beings (*rijāl al-ghayb*). But invisible beings are from among the jinns, whom they consider to be human. The being whom they see may tell them that he is Khidr or Elijah, or that he is Muḥammad or Abraham or Christ, or that he is Abū Bakr or ‘Umar, or that he is this *shaykh* or that *shaykh* whom they hold in esteem. He may fly them in the air, give them food and drink, or

bring them money which they may consider to be a divine favor, sign, or miracle demonstrating that that being is really an invisible being or an angel, whereas the truth is that he is none other than Satan, who has deceived them. Experiences of this kind often happen, and I personally know of many instances, just as I know many wrong rational and traditional arguments.

These people follow nothing but conjectures which give them no truth at all. Had they not stepped in front of God and His Prophet, and had instead adhered to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah they would have discovered that it was from Satan. Many of these people act upon their feelings, experiences and inclinations without any knowledge, guidance or insight. They pursue only their wishes and conjectures... Similarly, those who follow the voices they hear, the lights they see, or the figures they behold, and do not check them with the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, run after their guesses, which avail nothing.

There is no one better than 'Umar among those who hear voices and receive inspirations. The Prophet said about him, "There had been men in the earlier communities who received words. If there were anyone in my community it would be 'Umar."^{105a} "On many occasions his view was endorsed by God's revelation. But even a person like him was obliged to adhere to the Prophet's teachings and not act upon anything he experienced unless he had checked it with the Prophet. He never put himself ahead of God and His Prophet; on the contrary, he always turned to the Sunnah whenever he found that what came to his heart did not agree with what he knew. Often Abū Bakr explained to him things he could not discern, and he submitted to Abū Bakr's explanations and counsels. This happened, for example, at the time of Ḥudaybiyyah,¹⁰⁶ the day the Prophet died,¹⁰⁷ and the day he argued with Abū Bakr about those who refused to pay *zakāh*,¹⁰⁸ and so on. Again, a woman could get up and refute his view, citing a verse from the Qur'ān, and Umar would submit to it. I am referring to the case of the amount of dowry given to a wife.¹⁰⁹ There are other

instances also. Obviously, no recipient of inspiration, vision and illumination can be better than ‘Umar. He must follow ‘Umar’s way, adhere to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and submit to the teachings of the Prophet, rather than subjecting them to his own experiences.

[*Fatāwā* 13:66-74]

PART II

ISLAMIC

FAITH

2. GOD

(2.1) The Qur'ān and the existence of God.

Knowledge of God's existence is latent in human nature, and is a part of it. The Qur'ān only revives this knowledge and brings it out by pointing to the signs of God's existence and His attributes. In this it differs from the way theologians and the philosophers follow in proving God's existence.

The knowledge that a contingent being needs someone to bring it into existence is part of our natural knowledge. With regard to particular beings, this knowledge is necessary and more self-evident than with regard to universals, for we arrive at the universals only after we have examined the particulars. The same is true of all universal propositions on which most theologians and philosophers base their arguments, such as the whole is greater than the part, that contraries do not exist together or vanish together, that the ones that are equal to something are equal to each other, and so on, for whenever you think of any whole you know that it is greater than its parts, even though you may not have been aware of it as a universal proposition. Everyone knows, for example, that a human body is more than its organs, that a dirham is more than its fractions, that a city is more than its neighborhoods, and that a mountain is more than its parts. The same is true with regard to contraries, their existence and non-existence. Whenever you think of the existence and non existence of anything, you know that it cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, that either it exists or does not exist. You make this judgment about particular things, even though you may not call up in your mind the universal truth regarding contraries, and so on.

Since a general argument is concerned with something general, not particular, the proper way to prove the existence of God is to

point to signs (*ayāt*). This is the way of the Qur'ān, and this is what is inherent in our nature. Even though deductive reasoning is

correct, its utility is limited. And the Qur'ān, whenever it uses deductive reasoning in theological issues, employs the argument of priority (*qiyās al-awlā*) and not the argument that uses common terms, for the defects and imperfections that should be negated of creatures must be negated of the Creator in the first place, and the excellences and perfections free from all defects which are asserted of creatures, such as life, knowledge and power, must be asserted of the Creator before anyone else. All created beings are signs of the Creator. The difference between a sign (*ayah*) and an argument (*qiyās*) is that the sign proves the object itself of which it is the sign. Every created being is a sign and a proof of the Creator Himself, as we have explained at other places.

Human nature knows the Creator without these signs; that knowledge is inherent in it. Had it not known Him before these signs, it could not have known that they are His signs, for they are signs and proofs of God just as a name is a sign of the object named. One must have known the object before one may know the name and know that it is the name of this particular object. Similarly, for a sign to be the proof of an object one must have known the object and known that the said sign is associated with it, and that it necessarily implies its existence. It follows that if the object has not been known it cannot be known that the sign points to it. The knowledge of a relation depends upon the knowledge of the thing which is related as well as the thing to which it is related. However, sometimes one does not know the thing which is related or that it is a sign of the thing to which it is related, but when one imagines it one knows the object it signifies. People know that creatures are the signs and proofs of the Creator; this means that they must have already known the Creator so that they can pronounce that these things are His signs. What we want to underline is that it is this rational and natural method which the

Qur'ān adopts, and which is upheld by reason and revelation, by thought and tradition.

On the other hand, philosophers like Ibn Sīnā¹¹⁰ Ar-Rāzī^{110a} and their followers think that the way to prove the existence of God is to argue from the contingency of the world, to deduce the existence of the Necessary Being from the existence of possible beings. They proceed like this: Existence is either necessary or possible; and in order for the possible to exist there must be a necessary being, hence *the* Necessary Being exists. Ibn Sīnā was the first to formulate this argument; he took some ideas from the theologians and some from the philosophers and combined them in this form. The theologians had divided existence into eternal and contingent. Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, divided it into necessary and possible, for in his view the spheres are not contingent, they are only possible. This distinction was something new; no philosopher before him had ever done that; in fact, leading figures among them considered this distinction to be wrong, and charged him with going against earlier philosophers and all rational thinkers. We have shown elsewhere that eternity and necessity of existence imply each other, that this is the view of all the wise men of the past and present except these people and that there is no disagreement between them on this point. It is common experience that things come into existence after they had not been existing and that they go out of existence after they have existed. It is clear that that which is non-existent or which ceases to exist cannot be the Necessary Being or an eternal everlasting, thing.

If at all these people succeed in proving the existence of the Necessary Being, there is nothing in their argument to show that He is different from the heavens and the spheres. Al-Ghazālī¹¹¹ and others have demonstrated that they have failed in this regard. Their argument that no body can be a necessary being because it is a compound, and that the Necessary Being is not a compound being, is not correct. We have elsewhere advanced a number of arguments and shown that this view is wrong. Various other

thinkers have shown in their own way the falsity of this view. Al-Ghazālī is one of them.

The concept of necessity is very vague since it may mean a number of things. It may mean that which exists in itself and does not vanish; on that meaning, both Essence and the attributes will be necessary. Or it may mean that which exists in itself and by itself; on that meaning only the Essence is necessary and not the attributes. Or it may mean the Originator is the same as the Creator. On this meaning, the Necessary Being will be the Essence qualified with attributes, for the Essence without the attributes cannot create, nor can the attributes without the Essence. This vagueness has led many claimants of gnosis and the enlightenment that follows these people to call the Necessary Being 'Being as such' (*al-wujūd al-muṭlaq*), as we have explained elsewhere.

[*Fatāwā* 1:47-50]

(5.3) The Necessary Being is other than the possible beings.

Being may be taken to mean as such (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), which will comprehend the Necessary Being as well as the possible being. In this sense being is a common universal which does not exist except in mind or in word. Or it may be taken to mean the being which is ascribed to the Necessary or to the possible. Being in this sense is specific to the thing to which it is ascribed. Hence the being of the Creator is other than the being of the world; similarly, the being of Zayd is other than the being of 'Umar, and there is no being which is common to any two things.

Some people think that things which we predicate of the world are only predicated of the Creator as a metaphor including the word 'thing' (*shayy*) itself. This is the opinion of Jahm and the Bāṭinīyyah who agree with him on this point. They refrain from calling God as existing (*mawjūd*) as a thing or by any other name.

Others hold just the opposite view: everything predicated of God is predicated in the real sense, whereas it is predicated of the world as a metaphor. This is the view of Abū Al-‘Abbās An-Nāshī¹¹² from among the Mu‘tazilah.

People in general believe that things are predicated of both God and the world in the real sense, and for most of them they are predicated of both unequivocally in the broadest sense of the term, or equivocally if that is distinguished from the former. The latter is certainly different from special unequivocal predication in which the meanings are similar while the words are cognate. Only a small group of later thinkers have regarded them to be homonymous as against the majority and the most popular thinkers. Ar-Rāzī has attributed this view to Al-Ash‘arī, but it is not correct, for Al-Ash‘arī and for his followers in general, *wujūd*, or being, is a general term divisible into the eternal and the contingent. He, however, believes that the existence of everything is identical with its essence which is the view of all rational people, Muslims as well as non Muslims. Some people such as Al-Āmidī^{112a} have wrongly inferred from this that the term is a homonym. We have discussed this at length elsewhere for everyone to find out the truth.

To one who says that *wujūd* may either refer to the essence or to an attribute over and above the essence we would put the following question: Do you mean by *wujūd* ‘being as such’, which may be eternal and may be possible, or do you mean by it a particular being, whether the Necessary Being or the possible beings.... We have three terms here. When we say the *wujūd* of a man, his self (*dhāt*), essence or reality, it is specific to him, referring to his own self qualified with his own attributes. Similarly when we say the *wujūd* of the Lord, His self, His essence, His reality, they all refer to what is specific to Him, which is His self qualified with His attributes. Hence, in reply to Al-Āmidī’s statement that the term *wujūd* refers either to the essence of God or to an attribute over and above it, we say that if

you mean by the term ‘being as such’, which comprehends both necessary and the possible beings, then it does not refer to something which is specific either to the Necessary or to the possible being; it rather refers to a universal concept only exist in mind or in word. There is nothing out in reality there which is something universal as well as real... However, if you mean by *wujūd* that which refers to both, as in the in the phrase ‘all beings, the necessary and possible’, or ‘being, necessary and possible’, then it refers to what is specific to each, as when we say the being of the necessary and the being of the possible. In short, it either means being as a universal concept which is divisible, or it means a particular being such as the being of the necessary or the being of the possible, or both, as when we say ‘all beings, necessary and possible’, or ‘beings, necessary and possible’, without implying in any case that it is common to both.

Al-Āmidī has said that if *wujūd* refers to the Essence (of God), the divine Essence will be opposed by all other beings. We would point out that *wujūd* as such, which is divisible, does not refer to what is specific to God. But when we take it in the sense of particular beings, it does refer to God; similarly, when we take it in a general sense and say ‘being, necessary and possible,’ it also refers to what is specific to God, even though it is opposed by other beings. It is just like saying ‘the divine self’ and ‘the human self’ since each refers to what is specific to itself, even though the reality of one is opposed to the reality of the other. The word *wujūd* refers to God and to the world in a similar way, even though they are two different realities.

It may be said that since the reality of one being is different from the reality of the other, the word being (*wujūd*) will be a homonym. This, we will say, is a mistake which has given rise to other mistakes. Different realities are called by a general name which refers to them unequivocally or equivocally. For example, the word color applies to black, white, and red, even though they are different colors; similarly, the words attribute, accident, and

concept apply to knowledge, power, life, taste, color, and smell, even though they are different realities. In the same way, the word animal applies to human beings and cattle even though they are different realities. This is all the more true of the word *wujūd*.

Diverse realities may have something common between them which may be referred to by a word such as color. Later on it may be qualified in order to refer to every particular reality. For example, we may say black color or white color. Similarly, we may say the being of God and the being of man, even though we are using a general term which applies to all its particular instances. We say color or colors, animal, accident or being, which apply to everything that comes under them, even though they may be different realities; this is because these terms comprehend them as does any other general term, even though individual realities differ in another sense from these general terms.

If, on the other hand, the term *wujūd* stands, Al-Āmidī says, for an attribute that means one and the same thing in the case of the Necessary and the possible, it will follow that the necessary is possible and the possible is necessary, or else the term has to be treated as a homonym. To this objection we respond in this way. We ask if you mean by the term *wujūd* 'being as such' or a particular being referring to one thing or the other, as when we say the *wujūd* of the necessary or the *wujūd* of the possible. if you take the term in the first sense then we will say that it means one and the same thing, but it will not follow thereby that their *wujūd* is similar. Even if their ideas in mind may be similar, it does not follow that they are similar out there. The only thing that follows is that the term applies to both, just as any other term unequivocal or equivocal. When we say black, it may refer to the blackness of pitch or of ink even though they are not similar; or when we say white or red it may refer to many things which are white or red in various degrees. Similarly, the term living applies to the angels, the people in Paradise, the fly and the mosquito, even though their lives are completely different. If this is the case, how can the *wujūd*

of God or His knowledge or power be like the *wujūd* of the possible or its knowledge or power, even though the word *wujūd* as such or knowledge as such or power as such comprehends them both.

But if Al-Āmidī says that he means a particular being, such as the being of the Necessary or the being of the possible, we will say that what being denotes in one case is different from what it denotes in the other case. That is why it is qualified. We say being of the one or being of the other. This qualification rules out similarity between the two beings, which is by no means necessitated by the commonness of the term, for in this case the difference lies in the term *wujūd* itself, and the qualification through ascription only enforces it, in whatever form we express it, whether ‘the being of the Lord’ or the ‘Necessary Being’, on the one hand, and the being of the object created or ‘the possible being’ on the other.

[*Fatāwā* 20:441-447]

(2.3) God’s existence is identical with His Essence, not something over and above it.

People have differed on the question whether the existence of God is same as His Essence or something over and above it, as well as on the question whether the term existence should be understood unequivocally or equivocally or just as a homonym. Some take existence as a homonym, which rules out its division into the necessary and the possible. This conflicts with the judgment of all rational beings as well as with the obvious truths of reason. But if it is taken as a general concept whether unequivocal or equivocal, it would comprehend all, beings, and would be common to both necessary and possible beings. But this common existence will require something for its differentiation into one existence or the other, which can only be the essence of a particular being; that would in turn require that the existence of a

being should be over and above its essence. This would mean that the existence of the Necessary Being depends upon something other than Himself.

Following Ar-Rāzī and his disciples, people have generally mentioned three views on the same issue of God's existence. One is that existence is a homonym that has nothing common except the word. The second is that the existence of the Necessary Being is over and above His essence. The third is that it is existence as such, which is nothing other than existence devoid of every positive essence.

All these views are wrong and none of them are true. The error arises from the assumption that when we say that existence divides into the Necessary and the possible It follows that there is an existence out there which is in the Necessary as well as in the possible. There is nothing in the two beings which is common between them in reality, except for the word *wujūd* existence, and its idea in mind or in writing. That alone is common between them. As an idea in mind or as a word pronounced or written, *wujūd* is common to both, but as realities out there they have only some kind of resemblance between them. As for one having something of the essence or the attributes of the other, the falsity of that idea would be apparent to anyone who thinks over it. Those who have not realized it yet are those who have not thought it over.

What is true of the term essence (*dhāt*) the thing itself (*'ayn*), the self (*nafs*), the quiddity (*maḥīyyah*) or reality (*ḥaqīqah*) is also true of *wujūd*. Just as reality is divisible into necessary reality and possible reality, and just as quiddity and essence are divisible, similarly *wujūd* is also divisible. And just as by saying that reality or quiddity are divisible into the necessary and the possible it does not follow that the quiddity of the Necessary has something of the quiddity of the possible, saying that *wujūd* is divisible into the Necessary and the possible, does not imply that the *wujūd* of the Necessary should have something of the *wujūd* of the possible. In fact the Necessary Being has neither the existence as such nor the

quiddity as such; its quiddity is identical with its reality and its existence.

As the existence (*wujūd*) of a particular created being out there is identical with its essence (*dhāt*) or reality (*ḥaqīqah*) of God is all the more identical with His existence (*wujūd*) in which nothing else participates, and which is same as His quiddity that exists in itself.

[*Dar' Ta'ārūḍ al-'Aql wa al-Naql* 1:292-3]

(2.4) Are the attributes of God other than His Essence?

God is qualified with attributes which cannot be separated from His self. This means that His attributes are not over and above His essence. However, we can distinguish in thought between them, and say that His attributes are over and above His essence in knowledge, belief and description.

One may ask whether the attributes of God are over and above His essence. The answer is that the Being which is out there is qualified with attributes. There is no divine Essence out there without any attributes; in fact there is not a single essence out there stripped of all attributes. The word *dhāt* is the feminine of *dhū*, which is always used in a construct from. *Dhāt* as such came later on. Originally, people used to say *dhāt 'ilm*, *dhāt qudrah* or *dhāt sam'*, that is, one having knowledge, having power, having hearing, and so on. In the Qur'ān We have, "Fear God and set right *dhāt baynakum* (8:1) that is the ... between you. People say, "She is *dhāt māl* or *dhāt jamāl*, that is she is one that has wealth or one that has beauty. Later on, when people realized that the divine self is *dhāt 'ilm*, *qudrah*, *sam'*, *baṣr*, that it has knowledge, power, hearing and seeing, and came to realize it in opposition to those who negated these attributes, they put the definite article on the word which replaced its use in a construct from. So when we say it means one having something. It follows, therefore, that there

cannot be any *dhāt* which is not a *dhāt* having an attribute such as knowledge, power, etc., neither in language nor in thought.

When the scholars of the *Ahl-al Sunnah* say that *aṣ-ṣifāt zā'idah 'alā al-dhāt* it means that the attributes (*ṣifāt*) are more than (*zā'idah*) what the negators of attributes think of them in relation to the divine Essence (*adh-dhāt*). These negators only affirm an Essence which has no attributes. It is in opposition to them that the *Ahl as-Sunnah* affirm the additional character of the attributes, that they are in addition to divine Essence in our knowledge, belief and statements, not that they are over and above the divine Self, not at all. On the contrary, the divine Self is ever qualified with those attributes which are inseparable from it. Neither are the attributes without the Essence, nor is the Essence without the attributes. For a detailed treatment of the point, see my other writings.

[*Fatāwā* 17:161-162]

(2.5) The way of the Elders with regard to divine attributes.

The way of the Elders with regard to divine attributes is that one should predicate of God all the attributes that He has predicated of Himself or that His Prophet has predicated of Him, without changing their meaning (taḥrīf) or negating them (ta'tīl), as well as without going into their modality (takyīf) or conceiving them on human pattern (tamthīl). Those who do not follow this line are of three categories: ahl at-takhyīl, ahl at-ta'wīl and ahl at-tajhīl.

The best statement on divine attributes is that one should predicate of God what He has predicated of Himself or what His Prophet has predicated of Him, or what the first Muslims have said about Him; never should one go beyond the Qur'ān and the

Sunnah. Imām Aḥmad has said, “One should not attribute to God what He or His Prophet have not attributed to Him, and one should restrict himself to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah”

The practice of the Elders in this regard was to predicate of God what He has predicated of Himself or what His Prophet has predicated of Him, without changing it (*tahrīf*), or negating it (*ta’ṭīl*), or inquiring into its modality (*takyīf*), or conceiving it on human patterns (*tamthīl*). We know that what God has said of Himself is free from ambiguity and obscurity, and that one can find out its meaning in the way one finds out from a statement what its author wants to say. This is all the easier when the author is one who knows more than anyone what he says, and is more competent than any one to express his ideas, to formulate them and state them.

It is also true, on the other hand, that God is unlike anything in His sublime Self which is qualified with attributes and names, as well as in His acts. Similarly it is true that He really has an essence (*dhāt*); that He acts in reality; that He is qualified with real attributes; that there is nothing like unto Him in essence, attributes and acts; that He is absolutely free from anything which implies defect or pertains to contingent beings; and that he possesses all perfections in the highest degree. Contingency does not touch Him because His existence is neither followed by non-existence nor preceded by it. He does not need anyone to bring into existence; He exists necessarily by Himself.

The Elders have avoided both negation and comparison. They neither compare God’s attributes with the attributes of His creatures or His essence with their essence, nor do they negate what He has predicated of Himself or His Prophet has predicated of Him. Hence they do not have to falsify His names and attributes, misunderstand his words by isolating them from their contexts, or distort the meaning of His names and words.

Those who negate God’s attributes and those who compare them with other beings each commit mistakes. The negators first

conceive God's names and attributes on creaturely patterns and then negate those concepts; hence they do both negation and comparison, comparison first and negation next. They liken God's names and attributes to the names and attributes of His creatures, give them the meanings which they have in the context of the creatures, and deny the meanings that they should have as it behooves His majesty. When they say that if God were (*istawā*) on the Throne, He would either be greater than the Throne or smaller than it or equal to it, all of which possibilities must be ruled out. This means that they do not understand by God's being on the Throne any differently from what they understand by one body being on another body, otherwise they would not have drawn those conclusions. The *istawā* which behooves God's majesty and is only for Him does not admit of any of those consequences which are associated with bodies and which must therefore be negated of God. To draw these consequences is like saying that if the world had a maker he would be either a substance or an accident, both of which are ruled out, as there is no being other than these two. Those who draw these consequences, and those who say that if God were on the Throne He would be seated there as a man is seated on a cot or on a boat, since there is no third kind of *istawā*, both compare God's *istawā* with human *istawā* and both negate what God predicates of Himself. The first denies every idea of real *istawā*, and the second affirms nothing other than creaturely *istawā*.

The correct view in this matter is what the best people of this community hold. God is established on the Throne in a manner which behooves the majesty of God and is unique to Him. When we say that God knows everything, that He can do everything, or that He sees everything hears everything, it does not mean that His knowledge and power have the same characteristics which are found in the knowledge and power of creatures. Similarly, when we say that He is established on the Throne it does not mean that His establishment on the Throne has the same characteristics that

are found in the establishment of one object on another object. There is no rule of reason, or no statement in authentic traditions, which may go against this view of the Elders. But this is not the place to go into details and examine the objections raised against it. If you have any objections and really want an answer, it should not be difficult to find.

Those who go against the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the Elders of the *ummah*, and interpret figuratively God's names and attributes, are in a fix; the people who deny the Beatific Vision, for example, claim that reason rules it out and hence they are forced to interpret it figuratively. Similarly, those who deny knowledge or power to God or that His speech is uncreated claim that they are opposed to reason, and that they cannot help interpreting them. Even those who deny the resurrection of the body, or eating and drinking in Paradise make similar claims; and similar reason is also offered by those who deny God's establishment on the Throne, and resort to its interpretation.

To refute all these claims, it is sufficient to point out that these people have no criterion to say what is and what is not contrary to reason. What one claims that reason allows or even deems necessary, the other claims to be contrary to reason. One wonders by which reason should one judge the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. May God be pleased with Imām Mālik for what he said: "Should we discard what Gabriel brought to Muḥammad whenever anyone more versed in argumentation than another comes forward and puts up a claim.

All these claims can be refuted on various grounds. First, we may show that reason does not hold these things to be impossible; second, the texts regarding them do not admit interpretation; third, it is definitely known that the Prophet has taught these things just as it is known that he has taught the five daily prayers, and the fasting during the month of Ramaḍān. Hence, any interpretation that seeks to change the meaning of these things would not be better than the interpretation which the Karmathians and

Bāṭinīyyah give to *ḥajj*, *ṣalāh* and fasting, and many other things which prophethood has taught. Fourth, we may show that reason, clear and indubitable, agrees in principle with what the texts say, although they may have details which it cannot comprehend, and so on and so forth. Even the best minds among these people admit that reason cannot attain certitude in most theological issues.

If this is the case, we must turn to prophethood and submit to what it teaches in these matters. Every Muslim knows that God sent Muḥammad with guidance and the true religion so that he might make it prevail over all religions - and enough is God for a witness - and that the Prophet explained to the people whatever he taught about faith in God and the Last Day which involves faith in the beginning and the end of the world, in creation and resurrection... God has indeed explained through His Prophet all that He has told people regarding faith in Him and the Last Day, which makes what He wants very clear.

Every Muslim also knows that the Prophet knew these matters better than anyone else, that he was more eager than anyone to convey to the *ummah* what he knew, and that he was also more competent than anyone to express his ideas in clear and forceful language. To be sure, he was the most knowledgeable of all created beings in these matters, the best interpreter of these truths, and the greatest well-wisher of the people. He combined in him the best of all knowledge, power and will... His Companions, and their successors who later followed their line, are on the right path. But those who deviated from that path are in the wrong. They are of three types: *ahl at-takhyīl*, *ahl at-ta'wīl* and *ahl at-tajhīl*, that is, the exponents of the theories of imagination, interpretation, or ignorance.

The first group, who expound the theory of imagination, comprise philosophers and theologians, Ṣūfīs and jurists who follow their line. They say that whatever the Prophet has said regarding faith in God and the Last Day is nothing but imaginary pictures of realities which common people find useful. He has

neither told them the truth nor conveyed the reality. These people are further divided into two sections. One section says that the Prophet himself was not aware of the truth; only the philosophers of metaphysics or some persons whom they call saints (*awliyā'*) know them. They believe that some philosophers and saints know God and the Hereafter more than the prophets. This is the belief of the heretics among the philosophers and the Bāṭinīyyah, whether Shi'īs or Ṣūfīs. The other section says that the Prophet knew the truth as it is, but he did not state it clearly; rather, he said what was opposed to truth and asked people to believe in it. This was because the well-being of the common man is associated with beliefs that do not correspond to reality. These people say that a prophet must preach to the people faith in anthropomorphic ideas even though they are wrong and tell them that people in Paradise will eat and drink even though it is incorrect. There is no way to tell the truth to the people except this way which preaches untruth; on it rests their well-being. This is what these people hold about the scriptural texts on faith in God and the life hereafter. (So much about beliefs.) As for deeds, some say similar things about them; that is, the Prophet meant those deeds only for a section of people, not everyone, only for the laity, not the elite. This is the view of the Bāṭinīyyah, who are heretics, Ismā'īlīs and others.

The second group that believes in interpretation says that the Prophet never meant that people should have wrong beliefs. He himself had correct beliefs, but he did not explain them, nor did he suggest them to people. He believed that if they pondered things they would find out the truth by themselves, and if they interpreted the texts they would discover their real meaning and intent. He wanted to test them and see if they would go beyond the apparent meaning of his words and find out the truth that lies behind them. This is the view of the *mutakalimūn*, the Jahmīyyah, the Mu'tazilah and all those who advocate figurative interpretation....

The third group consists of those who expound the theory of ignorance. Among them there are many who claim to follow the

Sunnah and the Elders. They say that the Prophet himself did not know the meaning of the verses revealed concerning divine attributes, nor did Gabriel or anyone else among the earliest Muslims. The same is true, they say, about the *aḥādīth* on attributes. No one knows their real meaning except God. The Prophet himself did not know their meaning, even though he was their author; he uttered them without understanding them.

These people think that what they say follows from the verse, “No one knows their real meaning (*ta’wīl*) except Allah” (3:7), for, as the majority of the Elders say, the period after to this verse is just after the word Allah. This is correct; however, their mistake lies in their failure to distinguish between the *ma’nā wa al-tafsīr*, the meaning and exegesis of a verse, and its interpretation, which God alone knows. They think that the *ta’wīl* in the Qur’ān means same as it means in the language of later writers; this is not correct. *Ta’wīl* has been used in three different senses.

In the language of later writers, *ta’wīl* is to move from the more obvious meaning of a word to a less obvious meaning for some reason associated with the word. This means that what the word apparently conveys would not be, according to their terminology, the *ta’wīl* of the word. They think that *ta’wīl* in the verse referred to above has been used in the sense they understand the word, and that the *ta’wīl* of a text may be opposed to what its words apparently convey, and which is known only to God and no one else.

Ta’wīl is next used in the sense of *tafsīr*, the explanation of a passage whether or not that explanation agrees with the apparent language of the passage. This is the sense which *ta’wīl* has in the terminology of the majority of commentators on the Qur’ān and other writers. The *ta’wīl* of a verse in this sense is known to those who are well-grounded in knowledge. This exegesis is supported by that reading of the verse which puts the stop after (*ar-rāsikhūn fī al-‘ilm*), according to which the verse runs like this: “No one

knows its real meaning (*ta'wīl*) except God and the perfect in knowledge (*ar-rāsikhūn fī al-'ilm*).” This reading has been reported from Ibn ‘Abbās, Mujāhid, Muḥammad Ibn Ijmā’ Ibn Az-Zubayr,¹¹³ Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq,¹¹⁴ Ibn Qutaybah,^{114a} and others. To me, this and the other reading are both correct, each with its own sense, as we have discussed in detail elsewhere. Both readings have been reported from Ibn ‘Abbās, and both are correct.

Finally, *ta'wīl* has also been used in the sense of the reality (*ḥaqīqah*) to which the word turns or leads (*ya'ulū*), whether or not it agrees with them. Thus the *ta'wīl* of the words with which God has described the eating, drinking, and clothing of the people in Paradise, or their living with their spouses, or their resurrection and accounting are the realizations of those realities themselves, rather than their ideas in the mind or their expression in words. This is *ta'wīl* in the language of the Qur’ān, for example; it puts what Joseph said to Jacob in this way, “Father, this is the *ta'wīl* of my dream I had before my Lord made it real” (12:100). At another place the Qur’ān says, “Are they waiting for its *ta'wīl*? When its *ta'wīl* comes those who disregarded it before will say, ‘The messengers of our Lord did indeed bring true (tidings)’” (7:53). This is the *ta'wīl* which no one knows except God.

The *ta'wīl* of divine attributes is that truth about them which God alone knows. It is the truth about their nature, which is unknown to us. Mālik Ibn Anas said about *istawā*, “*Istawā* is known but its nature (*kayfīyyah*) is unknown.” *Istawā* is known in the sense that its meaning is known, that it may be explained (*yufassar*) and translated into another language. This is the *ta'wīl* of *istawā* which the perfect in knowledge know. However, the *ta'wīl* of *istawā* in the sense of the truth about its modality is known only to God.

‘Abdur-Razzāq¹¹⁵ and others have quoted in their commentaries these words of Ibn ‘Abbās: The *tafsīr* (exegesis) of the Qur’ān has four levels: first, that which an Arab can know in

light of his language; second, that which no one can be forgiven for not being aware of; third, that which only the learned can know; and fourth, that which no one knows except God.” Whoever claims to know this last *tafsīr* is a liar, and this is the knowledge which has been denied to human beings in the verse, “No one knows what things pleasing to their eyes have been hidden from them, in reward for what they had been doing” (32:17). The Prophet has reported from God, “I have prepared for my pious servants what no eye has ever seen, no ear has ever heard, and no mind has ever imagined.”¹¹⁶ What is true of the blessings of Paradise is true of resurrection and judgment (*sā’ah*), and other similar things. This is the *ta’wīl* which God alone knows, even though we do know the meaning of the word which He has communicated to us. He has Himself said, “Do they not reflect on the Qur’ān: Are there locks on their hearts?” (47:24), or “Did they not think over the words?” (23:28). God has thus asked us to reflect on the Qur’ān, the whole of the Qur’ān and not only a part, and to understand it.

We have warned in these pages against the principles on which people have based their wrong doctrines about the matters of knowledge and faith which the Prophet taught. Those who say that the Prophet did not know the meaning of the Qur’ān which was revealed to him nor did Gabriel, attribute to him ignorance of revealed truths. They are virtually saying that the Qur’ān offers no guidance, nor does it reveal any truths. These people also deny any role for reason in such matters. In fact, they deny that there is any knowledge of God with the Prophet or with his *ummah*, be it rational or revealed. In more than one respect they have aligned themselves with heretics; they are certainly wrong in attributing ignorance to the Prophet and to the Elders of the *ummah*. Equally wrong are those who change the meaning of the text and misinterpret them.

[*Fatāwā* 5:26-38

(2.6) Objections against affirming attributes of God and their refutation.

First objection: If attributes were to make God perfect, He would be perfect by means of something other than Himself, which would mean that He is imperfect in Himself. The answer to this objection:

Philosophers and other thinkers who have a wrong idea of God say that if God's attributes were to make Him perfect, He would be perfect by means of something other than Himself, which would mean that He is imperfect in Himself. As they imply imperfection on God's part, they claim, He cannot be said to have them.

Answering this objection we would say, as we have pointed out before, that there is a particular perfection only when it exists and exists without any defects. If this is true the objection that God would be imperfect would be correct only when it is meant that He would be imperfect without these attributes. It is just to avoid this conclusion that we have said that He must have attributes of perfection otherwise He would be imperfect.

But if it is meant that God becomes perfect through the attributes he takes up and is not perfect in His essence divested of those attributes we would say that this objection would hold only if we allow that an essence devoid of all attributes can exist out there, or that there can be a being out there perfect in himself but devoid of all attributes. But if any one of these possibilities is ruled out, He cannot be perfect without attributes. What, then, when both possibilities are ruled out? There is no perfect being in existence without attributes. We know of necessity that a being which is not living, knowing, powerful, hearing, seeing or speaking is not more perfect than one who is living, knowing, powerful, hearing, seeing and speaking.

It is evident to our reason that a being devoid of these attributes is certainly not equal to a being qualified with them, not to say

more perfect than it. Our reason clearly pronounces that a being qualified with these attributes is more perfect. We know by necessity that perfection without attributes is inconceivable.

Again, the statement that God would then be perfect by something other than Himself is not correct, for we do not say that God's attributes are other than He. This is what leading Elders like Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl have said. It is also maintained by everyone who affirms God's attributes, such as Ibn Al-Kullāb and others. Some of them have put it in these words: "We do not say that they are not He, or that they are not other than He, nor do we combine the two negatives and say that they are neither one with Him nor other than He." This the way a group of people including Al-Ash'arī have put the matter. I believe that Abū Al-Ḥasan At-Tamīmī¹¹⁷ has also said it, or something very similar to it. Others, like Qāḍī Abū Bakr¹¹⁸ and Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā, allow the use of either negative separately.

The reason we have these different formulations is that the word *ghayr* ('other') is ambiguous. It may mean something different from a thing, or what is not identical with it. When words are used without clarification they may give rise to various misconceptions. To turn to the issue, we would ask if the statement, "God would become perfect through something other Him" means that God would be perfect through something which is different and separate from Him, or does it mean that He would be perfect through an attribute which is part of His essence. If the first meaning is intended, it is certainly ruled out. But if the second is meant it is true, for you cannot have the Essence of God without having an attribute which is part of it. And this would mean perfection not through something different but through oneself.

Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl and other leading affirmers of divine attributes like Ibn Al-Kullāb and others have said that when one says: "Praise be to Allah," or "I invoke Allah and worship Him," or "by Allah," the term Allah means His Essence qualified with

His attributes, which are not addition to the Being, named by His beautiful names.

If you ask: are His attributes over and above His Essence? I would say: If you mean by Essence the Essence divested of attributes which the negators of attributes posit, then the attributes are over and above Essence. But if you mean by Essence the Essence that exists out there, it does not exist except with necessary attributes, and then the attributes are not over and above the Essence qualified with them, even though they are over and above it when divested of them in thought.

[*Fatāwā* 6:95-97]

(2.7) The Second Objection:

If God had attributes which have an existence, He would have to depend upon them, and dependence is a defect. Answer to this objection:

It is objected that if God had attributes which have an existence, He would have to depend upon them, and they would depend upon Him and this would imply God's dependence on something other than Himself. This objection assumes first the possibility of a substance wherein attributes exist, and second of an essence that may not have any attributes. If either of the two possibilities is rejected the objection will not stand. What if both of them are rejected? An essence devoid of all attributes is only a mental concept; it does not exist out there, just as being as such does not exist out there.

The word *dhāt* is the feminine of *dhū*, which is not used except in a construct. People say "X is *dhū* 'ilm wa qudrah," that is, X has knowledge and power; or they say, "*Nafs dhāt* 'ilm wa qudrah," that is, a soul having knowledge and power. Whenever *dhū* or *dhāt* is used in the Qur'ān or in the language of the Arabs, it is used in a construct, for example, "Fear Allah and set right *dhāt baynakum*"

(8:1), that is, set right the relations between yourselves, or ‘God is aware of *dhāt as-sadūr*’ (5:7), things of the heart; or the word of Khubayb (raa), “This is *fi dhāt al-ilāh*” that is, for the sake of God.

But when people started talking about it, they first said, “*dhāt ‘ilm wa qudrah*,” that is, one having knowledge and power. Later on, they detached it from the construct and made it definite, *adh-dhāt*, by adding to it the definite article. It is a new-fangled word, not found in the language of the ancient Arabs. That is why scholars like Abū Al-Faḥ Ibn Barhān,¹¹⁹ Ibn Ad-Dahhān¹²⁰ and others have said that it is not an Arabic word, although others like Qāḍī,¹²¹ Ibn ‘Aqīl^{121a} and others, have defended its Arabic origin.

The truth is that the word is not found in classical Arabic and is newly coined, as many other words such as *al-mawjūd*, the existent; *al-māḥīyyah*, the essence; *al-kayfiyyah*, nature or modality. The word involves the existence of an attribute to which it is ascribed. We say *dhāt ‘ilm*, *dhāt qudrah*, *dhāt kalām*, that is, one having knowledge or having power, or one that speaks. There cannot be a thing which exists out there unqualified by any attributes at all. To imagine such a thing is like imagining an accident existing by itself and not by any object. An accident that exists by itself or an attribute that exists by itself, are impossible. Every object must have some attributes, and every attribute must have some object existing in itself of which it is predicated.

That is why even the opponents admit that they do not know of any object existing in itself which does not have attributes, whether they call it a substance (*jawhar*) or a body (*jism*) or any other name. They admit that the existence of a substance without any attributes is impossible. Hence, if you imagine something that does not have any attributes, you are imagining something which is not known to exist out there or which cannot possibly exist out there. Why then about something which we definitely know is impossible to exist there outside the mind? Like those who deny the existence of divine attributes, the upshot of all that they say is that God does not exist out there and exists only in mind. We can have an idea of

them in mind as we can have ideas of things which are impossible, which neither exist nor can be imagined to exist out there.

Again, if it is possible for God to have attributes, and what is possible for Him is in fact necessary to Him, it means that He cannot be without the attributes of perfection. Hence, to think of Him as an essence without attributes that are essential and necessary to Him is to think of an impossibility. Now, when this idea is ruled out in general and in particular, the objection that God would be dependent on the attributes and they would be dependent on Him can only be raised against those things which may be thought to exist without the existence of the other. Since this is impossible, the objection does not hold.

We may also ask what you mean by dependence? Do you want to say that the divine Essence brings into being the attributes or originates them or vice-versa? Or do you mean that they necessarily imply each other, that is one cannot exist without the other? If you mean the first, i.e. the dependence of an object on its agent, it is ruled out; "God does not bring His attributes into being which are essential to Him, nor is He their agent or doer. To be sure, no act which He does, and no object which His action brings into being is necessary to Him. But His attributes are not the things He does, nor the objects He brings into being; they are part of His essence and necessary to Him.

If you have the second meaning in mind, that is, the mutual implication between God's essence and His attributes is correct, it is like saying that there is nothing that exists by itself which is not also eternal or necessary in itself, or that there is no one knowing and powerful who is not living. Now, if His attributes are necessary to His essence, it will make Him more perfect than when they are not necessary to Him and exists without the attributes of perfection, perfection not being necessary for Him, but only possible, and in that case He would be needing someone else to bring it into being, which would be a defect. Hence, this must be ruled out. It follows, then, that the mutual implication between the

Essence and the attributes of perfection is the consummation of divine perfection.

[*Fatāwā* 6:98-101]

(2.8) The Third Objection.

Attributes are accidents which exist only in a composite body, and a composite being is contingent and dependent. This would imply a defect on the part of God. Refutation of the objection:

It has been said that attributes are accidents, that accidents only exist in a composite body, that whatever is composite is contingent and dependent, hence to affirm attributes is to impute defects to God.

People who affirm the existence of divine attributes have taken three positions on the issue whether the term accident (*‘arḍ*) can be applied to divine attributes. Some deny that they are accidents; they say that they are attributes, not accidents. This is the view of Al-Ash‘arī, and of many scholars of *fiqh* from among the followers of Aḥmad and other masters. Others, like Hishām¹²² and Ibn Karrām,¹²³ call them accidents. A third group neither denies nor affirms that they are accidents; they pursue the same line as they have done in the case of words like “other” (*ghayr*) or “body”...

People have similarly differed regarding the term body (*jism*). In Arabic, *jism* sometimes means *badan* or *jasad* the body of a living being as many scholars of language as Al-Aṣma‘ī,¹²⁴ Abū Zayd,¹²⁵ and others have mentioned. From among the theologians, some mean by that term a composite being, and apply it to atoms in combinations of two, four, six, eight, sixteen or thirty-two, or to a composite of matter and form; others apply it to anything that exists or that exists in itself. Both these groups use the term for particular beings as well as for general things.

Since the term means many things, some of which are correct and others incorrect, it is ambiguous. In such cases we have to

determine the meaning before we can pursue the discussion. We must ask: What do you mean when you say that the attributes are accidents? Do you mean to say that they exist in something, or that they are attributes of something, or the like? Which answer is correct? Or do you mean to say that they are flaws or defects? Or do you mean to say that they appear and disappear and never survive for two moments? If you mean the first, it is correct; if you mean the second, it is ruled out; and if you mean the third, the answer may vary. One who says that accidents do not persist for a second moment while he believes that attributes persist will not call them accidents. But one who says that accidents persist for a second moment does not desist from calling them accidents.

One may say that an accident does not exist except in a body. We say: You believe, on the one hand, that God is living, knowing and powerful, and on the other, that these names apply only to a body, just as those attributes which you call accidents apply to none but a body. Now the plea that you offer for justifying the application of the names can be offered by the affirmers of attributes for attributes themselves. We further ask: What do you mean by saying that these attributes are accidents and that they exist only in a (composite) body? Do you mean by a composite body something which is first divided into parts and then assembles itself, or is assembled by someone, or which is divisible and breakable into parts one part from the other; or which is formed of indivisible atoms; or which consists of matter and form; or which is something that can be pointed to; or which exists in itself; or which is simply existing? If you mean the first, we would not accept that divine attributes, which you call accidents, do not exist except in a body as you understand the term. But if you mean the second, we will not accept that it follows thereby that He is a composite being, for God exists in Himself, and He can be pointed to, in our opinion. Hence we cannot accept this charge.

To those who understand the composite in the senses noted above, such as assembling oneself after being divided, or being

assembled by someone, or being divisible, we say that we do not accept the first premise of the argument, namely that God is a composite being in these senses. But if you mean by the composite that which can be pointed to, or that which exists in itself and is qualified with attributes, we do not accept the second premise (that whatever is composite is contingent or imperfect). You may see now that when the objection is analyzed, one of the premises or both are refuted, and when one of the premises is refuted the whole argument falls apart.

[*Fatāwā* 6:102-104]

(2.9) Knowledge

God's Knowledge of things to come: discussion of various views on the subject.

On the question of God's knowledge of things to come in the future, thinkers who call themselves Muslims are divided into three groups. The first group believes that God knows things to come with an eternal knowledge which is part of His essence. When they come into existence, He does not acquire a new quality or property; there only arises a new relation between His knowledge and the objects. This is the view of a section of scholars who affirm divine attributes: the Kullābīs, the Ash'arīs, and a number of jurists, Şūfīs, and *ahl al-ḥadīth* belonging to the various schools of Aḥmad, Mālik, Ash-Shāfi'ī and Abū Ḥanīfah. It is also the view of a section of the Mu'tazilah and other attribute negators. They, however, state the point a little differently. They say that God knows the things to come, but (when they come into existence) a new relation emerges between the Knower and the objects rather than between His knowledge and the objects. Earlier thinkers debated the issue whether God's knowledge is single or multiple. Al-Ash'arī and most of his followers, as well as Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā

and his followers, and many others hold the first view, whereas Abū Sahl Al- Sa'luklī¹²⁶ holds the second.

The second group of thinkers believes that God does not know things except after they have come into existence. This is the upshot of the view which the Qadarīyyah hold regarding human acts. They say that God does not know of human acts except after they have taken place and that they are not fore-ordained. Happiness or misery in the Hereafter is not something which is pre-determined. These people are the extremists among the Qadarīyyah; they appeared at the time of Ibn 'Umar,¹²⁷ who openly disapproved of their view. Different imāms like Ash-Shāfi'ī and Aḥmad have also issued statements declaring that they are infidels.

The Qadarīyyah in general deny God's foreknowledge and pre-ordainment of human acts which have been commanded or forbidden, and of things contingent upon them, namely happiness or suffering in the Hereafter. Some of them only deny the fore-knowledge of human acts; as for other things, they say that God does ordain them and know them in advance. They say they have to exclude human acts because God's knowledge of them in advance conflicts with His command to do some things and avoid others. This situation, they point out, does not arise with regard to things that are not commanded or forbidden. Others, however, do not make any exception; they say that God knows nothing at all in advance. It is reported that this view was held by 'Āmr Ibn 'Ubayd¹²⁸ and some others; however, another report says that 'Āmr recanted from it later.

The third view is that God knows things before they exist and knows them again with different knowledge when they come into existence. Theologians like Abū Al-Ma'ālī¹²⁹ have noted that Jahm held this view. He believed, they say, in a kind of multiple successive knowledge on God's part. God, he said, knows Himself; in eternity, too, He knew Himself and knew everything else which will come into existence in the future; and when He created the world and the objects of knowledge came into existence, He

produced in Himself different knowledges by which He knew those new, objects. He further said that He has one knowledge after another just as objects happen one after another, knowledge always preceding its object. He has also been reported to have said that these knowledges have no locus, just as the Mu'tazilī thinkers of Baṣrah said that God's will has no locus.

In support of this view Jahm has quoted the words of the Qur'ān *li ya 'lma* (3:166), 'that He may know'. But there is nothing in this phrase to support his view, for while he maintains that God's knowledge precedes the object, the words of the Qur'ān which he has quoted tells that it follows the object. They are therefore completely different things. He has also looked for support in the *ḥadīth* which tells the story of a leper, a bald-headed man and a blind man. The *ḥadīth* contains the words, "It came to God (*bada li Allah*) that He should try them."¹³⁰ But this coming to God is not opposed to His eternal knowledge as some extremist among the Rawāfiḍ think.

Abū Al-Ḥusayn Al-Baṣrī,¹³¹ too, is of the opinion that God's knowledge multiplies itself in His essence as its objects go on coming into existence. Abū Al-Barakāt,¹³² the author of *al mu'tabar* and a leading philosopher, also subscribes to the idea of successive knowledge and will on the part of God. God's divinity, he says, cannot be saved except on this view. Abū 'Abdullah Ar-Rāzī also inclines towards it in his *Al-Maṭālib al-'Alīyyah*¹³³ and other works.

As for hearing, seeing and speech, Al-Ḥārith Al-Muhasibī¹³⁴ says that the Ahl as-Sunnah have different opinions on the question whether they are renewed whenever their objects, heard or seen, come into existence. The view that whenever things come into existence God sees and hears them with His eternal attribute of seeing and hearing is held by Ibn Kullāb and his followers, as well as Al-Ash'arī. The second view, which maintains the eternity of the attribute of knowledge along with the renewal of the acts of

knowing, is held by many groups of thinkers including the Karrāmīs. The third view, which affirms knowledge of things on the part of God before and after their existence is held by the Salīmīyyah such as Abū Al-Ḥasan Ibn Salīm¹³⁵ and Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī.¹³⁶ All these three views have been attributed to the *a'immaḥ* of the Ahl as-Sunnah, like Imām Aḥmad. There are among his followers those who hold the first view, and those who hold the second view, and the Salīmīyyah also count themselves among, his followers.

Like knowledge, concerning will, too, there are three views among those who affirm the attributes. One is that it cannot be anything other than eternal. This is the view of Ibn Kullāb and Al-Ash'arī and their followers. The second is just the opposite, that it cannot be anything other than contingent. This is the view of the Mu'tazilah. However, a section of them says that the locus of God's will is something other than His Self, because He cannot be the locus of contingent events; on the other hand, another section, the Baṣṛīs, say that it exists in God Himself just as speech exists in Him. The third view is that God's will is eternal as well as contingent; this is held by different groups of people such as the Karrāmīs, the *ahl al-ḥadīth*, Ṣūfīs and others. These people hold a similar view with regard to God's speech. They say that God has been qualified with speech in eternity, but He also speaks whenever He wills. This has been clearly stated by many leaders of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* such as Imām Aḥmad and others. However, their followers in later times differed as to what this statement exactly means. Some said that it is the power of speech which is eternal; the Karrāmīs took this position. Others said that the two parts of the statement contradict each other; this is attributed by Abū Bakr 'Abdul-'Azīz¹³⁷ and Abdullah Ibn Ḥamīd¹³⁸ to some followers of Aḥmad.

So far as God's knowledge and fore-ordainment of things or events before their coming into existence is concerned, there are

innumerable statements in the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* as well as in the traditions (of the *Salaf*) that their coming into being has been known to Him in advance. He knows what has happened, what will happen, and how something which has not happened will happen when it happens. God has also told us about it. This point has only been disputed by some extremists from among the Qadarīyyah and others. As for the things to come, the following verses may be cited: “And We appointed the *qiblah* which you were used to only to know those who followed the Messenger from those who would turn on their heels” (2:143); “Do you think that you would enter Heaven without God knowing those of you who fought hard (in His cause) and without knowing who remained steadfast?” (3:142); “Do you think that you shall be left, as though God has not known those among you who strive with might and main, and take none for friends and protectors except Him and His Messenger and (the community of) Believers? And God is well-acquainted with (all) that you do” (9:16); “God will certainly know those who are true from those who are false” (29:3); “God will certainly know those who believe, and as certainly those who are hypocrites” (29:11); and “We shall try you until We know those among you who strive their utmost and persevere in patience; and We shall try your reported (mettle) (47:31).”

[*Jāmi' ar-Rasā'il* 1:177-183]

(2.10) Power

God has power over everything. He had that power in eternity and continues to have it ever since. He can do by His free will whatever He likes. Everything is in His control, that which is destined and will happen, that which exists at present, that which is done by men, and that which He will Himself do, whether His action causes something else, such as creation or provision, or whether it concerns Him alone, such as His ascent or descent.

What is impossible in itself is not some “thing”; hence there is no sense in putting it in His control.

There are many questions regarding God’s power. First, He has stated that “He has power over everything” (2:109,148, 259, 284, etc.). What does that mean? There are three views on the subject. Some say that since the statement is general it includes those things also which are impossible in themselves, as for example, the co-existence of contraries. A group of people, of which Ibn Ḥazm¹³⁹ is one, believes that such things are also within God’s power. Another group says that though the statement is general it is in a sense qualified; the impossible in itself is to be excluded from it, for even though it is some “thing” it can not be placed under His power. Ibn ‘Aṭīyyah¹⁴⁰ and others belong to this group. However, bothse views are wrong. Only the third view, which is the view of most of the thinkers, is right. It says that the impossible in itself is not a thing at all. Whether or not the non-being is a thing, the impossible in itself is not a thing; it cannot exist out there, nor can one imagine it to be existing out there. One has only to think of the co-existence of contraries in the mind and declare that it is impossible to exist out there...

The second question is with regard to non-being. People generally believe that non-being is not a thing and this is right. Some, however, say that a thing is that which exists. In this view, God would not have power except over things which exist, and what He has not created would not be within His power. This is the view of some mistaken people. They say that God cannot have power except over what He wills, and what He does not will is not in His power...

The truth is that the word “thing” (*shayy*) is applied by people both to what exists out there and what is thought of in the mind. Hence what God thinks of and knows will exist is a thing in thought, knowledge and writing, even though it may not be a thing out there. This is supported by the verse, “Verily, when He intends

a thing (*shayy*) His command is ‘Be,’ and it comes into being” (36:82). The word (*shayy*) in the verse refers to both kinds of things; therefore, God has power over everything, that which exists as well as that which the mind may think of as existing if it thinks of its existence. Nothing can be excluded from it, nor included in it....

The third question is whether the statement that God has power over every thing covers also what human beings do and what they do not do. The Mu‘tazilah in general believe that human actions do not come under God’s power. The fourth question is whether the statement extends to God’s own actions. The answer is that it does; it extends to both human and divine actions. There are many verses in the Qur’ān to this effect, for example, “Is not the One Who created the heavens and the earth able to create people like them?” (36:81); “Does He not have power to give life to the dead? (75:40); “We do have power to put together in perfect order the very tips of his finger” (75:4), and so on. As for power over existing things, it has been mentioned in such verses as, “We have created man” (76:9, 90:4, etc.), and “Does he think that none has power over him?” (90:5). ... A *ḥadīth* says that once Ibn Mas‘ūd¹⁴¹ was beating his servant. The Prophet, who happened to see it, said, “God has greater power over you than you have over this man.”¹⁴² This *ḥadīth* underlines three things: one, God has power over the being of man; two, He has more power over man than man has over any of his servants; and three, man also has some power...

The fifth question: The power of God is power to act, and acts are of two kinds: One which has a separate object, and one which does not have. Both kinds have been mentioned in the verse, (He is the One Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and then ascended the Throne” (57:4). Ascent, descent, coming and other acts of the kind are intransitive; they do not have an object; they happen to the subject himself. On the other hand, creation, provision, causing death, giving life, bestowing favor or holding it

back, guiding, supporting, revealing and other such acts require an object

The sixth question is related to the eternal nature of God's power. He has power from eternity, and shall have it for ever and ever. He has power and shall continue to have power over every thing that He likes out of His free will.

He is speaking from eternity, whenever He wills and as He wills. This is the view of the Elders, and the *a'immah* such as Ibn Mubārak¹⁴³ and Aḥmad.

[*Fatāwā* 8:8-30]

(2.11) Will

God's will is of two kinds. One is religious and prescriptive, implying His love and approval. The other creative and determinative, comprehending both good and evil, right and wrong. Whatever evil we have in existence is willed by the creative will of God, is part of His creative words, and is inviolable by anyone, virtuous or wicked. It is not willed by His religious will, nor is it consistent with His religious words. He neither approves of them nor commands them.

The fact is that God's will, as His Book mentions, is of two kinds, one religious and prescriptive, the other creative and determinative. The first has been mentioned in such verses as, "God wills every facility for you; He does not will difficulties for you" (2:185); "He wills to purify you" (5:6); "God wills to make clear to you and to show you the ordinances of those before you, and to turn to you (in mercy), and God is All-knowing and All-wise. God does will to turn to you (in mercy)" (4:26-7). In all these verses "will" implies God's love and approval; it is His religious will. The same will is implied in the verse, "I have only created jinns and men that they may serve Me" (51:-56).

The creative-determinative will is referred to in this verse: “Those whom God wills to guide He opens their breast to Islam; those whom He wills to leave astray He makes their breast close and constricted as if they had to climb up to the skies” (6:125). When Muslims say, “What God wills happens, and what He does not will does not happen,” they mean the creative will of God. Every particle of the universe is the object of His will (*irādah*, *mashī’ah*), and there is nothing there which is not its object, be it good or evil, right or wrong. This will comprehends what is not comprehended by the prescriptive will. The religious will, on the other hand, corresponds to the prescriptive commands, without there being any difference between them.

The distinction which has been made in the connotation of will (*irādah*) is also true in the case of many other words such as command (*amr*), word (*kalimah*), order (*ḥukm*), decree (*qadā*), writing (*kitāb*), raising (*ba’tḥ*), sending (*irsāl*) and so forth. All these words have a creative, determinative sense as well as a religious, prescriptive sense. Creative words are not violable by anyone, be he virtuous or wicked. It is these words which the Prophet invoked for God’s help. “I seek,” he said, “the protection of God’s words, which are bound to happen and which none can violate, neither the virtuous nor the wicked.”¹⁴⁴ And it is this word which God means when He says, “When He wills something He says to it: ‘Be,’ and it comes into being” (36:82). As for religious words, they are from the books that God has revealed. It is this word which the Prophet means when he says, “Whoever fights in order that the word of God may triumph fights for the sake of God,”¹⁴⁵ and which God means when He says, “(Mary) obeyed the words of Her Lord and His books” (66:12).

Amr in the religious sense is used in the verse, “God commands (*ya’muru*) you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are due” (4:58). It is used in the creative sense, in this verse: “Verily, when He wills a thing, His command is, ‘Be’, and it is” (36:82). *Ba’tḥ* in the religious sense is used in the verse, “It is He Who has

sent (*ba'th*) amongst the unlettered a messenger from among them to rehearse to them His verses" (62:2). *Ba'th* is used in the creative sense in the verse, "We sent against you Our servants given to terrible warfare" (17:5). Similarly, *irsāl* in the religious sense is used in the verse, "It is He Who has sent (*arsala*) His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth" (9:33, 48:28, 61:9), and in the creative sense, in the verse, "Do you not see that We have sent (*arsalnā*) the evil ones against the unbelievers to incite them with fury?" (19:83) For a detailed discussion on the subject see our other writings.

Whatever evil there is in the universe is willed by God through His creative will and is the object of His creative word, which is not frustrated by anyone, virtuous or wicked. It is not willed by the religious will of God, nor is it meant by His religious word. He does not will faithlessness from His people, nor does He command them to do any evil. They are certainly disliked by Him; however, they are disliked in a sense different from the sense in which the pain that a Believer suffers at his death is disliked by Him. He dislikes to cause pain to the Believer, yet He wills it since He has decided to take his life, a decision which cannot be avoided, although, this will of His that His servant should die is good for His faithful servant and an act of mercy for him. The Prophet has said in an authentic *ḥadīth* that God does not decree anything for a faithful servant which is not good for him. If it is prosperity and he is thankful to the Lord it brings good to him, but if it is adversity and he bears it patiently, it also brings good to him"¹⁴⁶

As for evil acts, surely God dislikes and hates them. They can only lead to evil consequences, except one repent for them, in which case one may receive God's forgiveness and mercy. Since there is no repentance without a sin, there have been two answers why a sin is decreed for a faithful servant. The first answer is that the *ḥadīth* mentioned above does not refer to evil in the sense of sin, but rather to evil in the sense of a calamity that befalls a person. The second answer is that when one repents of a sin the

mercy which his repentance brings is better for him. Repentance is something good and is very much liked by God. He is very happy when a servant repents of his sin and turns to Him. However, sinful acts of which one does not repent are certainly evil for him. God has decreed everything and ordained it, and there is a higher wisdom in all, as He has said, “He has made everything that He has created most perfect” (32:7). There is, therefore, nothing that He has created which does not have a wise purpose behind it.

[*Fatāwā* 18:132-135]

(2.12) Compliance with both wills of God.

God’s religious will is connected with His ilāhīyyah, divinity, and His creative will is connected with His rubūbīyyah, lordship. So if one heeds only His religious will and not His creative will, he certainly observes His commands and will meet a good end, but he may not have God’s help and protection since he has not attended to His rubūbīyyah. On the other hand, one who minds only the creative will of God may achieve something in this world since he seeks God’s help, but he will get nothing in the Hereafter because he has not served God sincerely.

The Elders, the leading *fuqahā’*, and Muslims in general affirm both creation and rule of God. They affirm that His creative-determinative (*al-khalqīyyah al-qadrīyyah*) will comprehends everything that happens and that His directive-prescriptive (*al-amrīyyah ash-shar’īyyah*) will comprehends all that He loves and approves of for His servants. It consists of all that the prophets have commanded, all that can benefit mankind, guarantee their well-being, secure happiness in the next world, and save them from suffering. This directive-prescriptive will is connected with His *ilāhīyyah*, divinity, which implies His *rubūbīyyah*, lordship, as the creative-determinative will is connected with His *rubūbīyyah*. This is why one who attends to the latter and submits to it and ignores

the former, the directive-prescriptive will, may have a start but will never reach the end; he is bound to be lost. He may achieve something of the world as he will be invoking God's help in view of his perception of God's rule over the world - *rubūbiyyah*, but he will not get anything in the next world, as he does not serve God sincerely. Different groups of *Ṣūfīs* and theologians have fallen into this trap.

On the other hand, whoever is only concerned with God's commands and directions, unmindful of His creative-determinative will, observes the religion and may have a good end, but he soon begins to lose heart and feels forsaken, since he loses sight of the fact that God controls everything and he is completely dependent on Him. Had he been conscious of this fact, he would have put his faith and trust in God and realized that no one has any power other than He. He tries to serve God, but does not seek His help as he should. This is the condition of the *Qadarīyyah* from among the *Mu'tazilah* and others, who say that God is not the Creator of human acts, nor is the universe the product of His will. That is why *Abū Sulaymān Ad-Daranī*¹⁴⁷ said, "The *Qadarīyyah* boast of their actions because they fail to see that it is God Who creates their acts. The *Ahl as-Sunnah* do not suffer from this self-conceit, since they believe that God is the Creator of their acts and that they have to be thankful to Him for it."

The other group seeks God's help, begs for His favor, puts trust in Him, denies that they have any power, and affirms that all power is with God. They, however, do not strive to serve God by carrying out what He has commanded and by shunning what He has forbidden through His prophets. They do not see that God loves to be worshiped and obeyed, that He is pleased when a sinner repents, and that He loves the pious and hates the infidel and the hypocrite. In the end, they may continue in the same direction and may turn out worse than the *Mu'tazilah* and the *Qadarīyyah*, and go out of the bounds of religion altogether, just as hair is removed from flour, a condition not different from that of the polytheists.

Those whom God guides to the right path realize the truth of “You do we worship, and Your help do we seek” (1:4). They know that the act which is not done in order to please God and does not conform to His commands will be rejected. They also know that one whom God does not help will not reach the goal. They therefore bear witness to the truth that there is no god except Allah, serve Him sincerely, and seek His help with faith in His creation and His law, in His ordainment and prescription. They seek His help to serve Him, and they thank Him for that favor. They know that whatever evil befalls them is because of them, even though they are convinced that everything is determined and ordained by God and that He is fully justified in what He does to His servants, and that His creation and commandments both have great wisdom in them.

[*Fatāwā* 17:64-65]

(2.13) Is God’s will one or multiple?

Is the will of God one single, eternal will, or does it renew itself? Ibn Taymīyyah cites different views on the subject and adopts one which says that God has been exercising His will from eternity, and has one will after the other. As a class His will is eternal, but as particular wills He has each at its time.

There are differing views regarding God’s will. Some say that it is a single, eternal will, that what is renewed is its relation with the objects, and that this relation is the same for every object. Furthermore, the divine will does not have a reason to choose anything. This is the view of Ibn Kullāb, Al-Ash‘arī, and their followers.

Most thinkers reject this view as palpably false. Abū Al-Barakāt has said that no reasonable person would believe in it. Certainly it is not the view of the majority of theologians. We can point out a number of things to show that it is false, for example, to

will one thing is not the same as to will another; that will cannot chose one thing rather than another all by itself; that this view does not provide for the factor which is required to bring a particular object into existence at a particular time; that the relation between the will and its objects whose renewal this view asserts as the cause of the object is not something existing, and a non-being does not renew itself. Hence things, in this view, come into existence without any particular cause or reason.

The second view also asserts a single, eternal will, but it differs from the first in saying that with every new creative act a new will comes into being in the divine Essence through His eternal will. This is the view of the Karmathians and a few others. They are nearer to the truth since they posit different wills for different acts, but they are exposed to the same objection as the first group since they, too, assume the existence of things without any contingent cause, or the choice of one thing rather than another without any reason. Moreover, they relate all particular wills to one eternal will and make them choose by themselves without providing for the emergence of any factor which may enable particular wills to choose one thing rather than another.

The third view is that of the Jahmīyyah and the Mu'tazilah, who deny that God has any will. They either negate His will outright or interpret it in terms of His command or act, or like their Baṣrī colleagues, posit a will without a locus. All these different positions are unreasonable.

The fourth view is that God has been willing from eternity with an ever-new will, coming one after the other. As a class, His will is eternal, but as will for a particular thing, He has it at its time. First He conceives or ordains things and records them, then He creates them. Hence, when He ordains them He knows what He will be doing. He wills to do them in the future, rather than do them then and there; and when their time comes He will *will* their doing. The first was a decision (*'ām*) and the second was execution (*qaṣad*).

People have differed on the question whether one should attribute decision (*'azm*) to God. Some, like Qāḍī Abū Bakr¹⁴⁸ (Al-Baḳillānī) and Qāḍī Abu Ya'lā, deny it, while others affirm it. In an authentic *ḥadīth* narrated by Umm Salamah, we have the words, *thumma 'aẓama Allah lī*, 'then God decided for me'. In the introduction to his book, Muslim has noted the words in this form: *fa 'aẓama lī*.¹⁴⁹ Whether you call it *'azm* or not, when God ordains things He knows that He will do them at their times, and He will be doing them at their times. When the time comes, there must be a will for doing a particular action as well as for the action itself, and He must be knowing what He will be doing.

Here again there are two different views on the question whether the knowledge of what He does when He does it is the same as His knowledge previous to doing it, and the same as His knowledge after He has done it. Reason as well as the Qur'ān tells us that it is something more. The phrase *li na'lama*, 'that We may know', has occurred in the Qur'ān a dozen times (2:143; 18:12; 34:21 and so forth)...

Hence, when God wills any particular object, He knows what is there in the object which has led Him to will it. Will only follows knowledge. The fact that a particular object possesses some property for which it is chosen is a matter of knowledge, it is an idea in mind, and not something out there. Those who say that non-being is a thing and mean by it that it is out are wrong. Equally wrong are those who do not affirm anything in knowledge, or say that God has only one will or one knowledge and various objects of knowledge and will have no forms in His mind. These people deny that they are things in knowledge or intention; the former, on the opposite side, assert that they are things existing out there.

These ideas which are the object of God's knowledge and will come into existence after they are non-existent, and come into existence by His will and power, just as all other events come into existence by His will and power. He decides what He will do and

then does it, and He decides one thing rather than another, or a particular thing with some properties rather than with others, on the basis of some criteria which call for a particular decision in His mind. He does not choose except what He Himself wants to choose for some reason calling for that choice, and does not prefer one thing over another except for that reason.

It is not correct to say that God prefers something just because He has the power to do so, for before He chooses a particular thing He did have the power to choose it as well as to choose something else, but since He chose it the power that He had for both will not be sufficient to account for choosing one rather than the other. Nor can His will account for choosing one rather than the other without some reason. One wills one thing out of two things for some reason associated with the willer or the object willed. It is necessary that one be more inclined to the thing one chooses, and there should be something in the object which may tilt him towards it.

The Qur'ān and the Sunnah speak of *qadr*, the pre-ordainment of things before their creation, and that they are recorded in a Book. This establishes the fore-knowledge and pre-ordainment of everything that will happen and removes all misconception on account of which many people have gone astray on the issue of knowledge and will....

There are differing views on the question whether God has multiple knowledge and will, and whether He causes them. But it is quite plain that when there are many things that one wills, you cannot say that knowledge of one thing is knowledge of another, or the will of one object is the will of another object; that would be denying an obvious truth. Again, to distinguish between one knowledge and another, or between one will and another, is not to separate one from the other. Not only that, even different attributes such as the knowledge, power and will which one has are not separate one from the other. The subject of one is the subject of the other, just as taste, color and smell exist in the same orange or any

other fruit. So when we say there are many knowledges and wills it does not follow that one knowledge or will is separate from another in a perceptible manner. They all are members of one class of knowledge or will that exists in the same soul. When one thing is known after another thing the members of the class multiply and increase; you may say, if you like, that the class grows larger. The quantitative increment cannot occur without the qualitative enhancement. We do say “more knowledge” and “greater knowledge”; and the greatness of knowledge is either due to the power of knowledge or the greatness of its objects....

Adding one knowledge to another knowledge or one will to another will, or one power to another power is like adding one body to another body, such as water to water, thereby increasing the volume of the water; but this increase is the increase of one unified quantity, not the increase of a separable quantity like a heap of dirhams. When we say knowledge or will has multiplied it is a statement about an increase in volume, that it has grown larger and greater than it was before, and not that there are more of them in number, separable from each other, as people think.

This is the reason why the Qur’ān uses knowledge as a general term which is not pluralized. It says, “If anyone disputes with you in this matter now after knowledge has come to you...” (3:61). Thus it mentions knowledge as a class. The same is the case with water (*ma’*) which the Qur’ān uses as a class name, and never uses as plural, *miyyah*. It says, “We poured water from the sky” (25:48), and so on. Knowledge has been likened to water. The Prophet (pbuh) has said, “The similitude of the guidance and knowledge which God has sent with me is like that of a torrential rain which falls on a land.¹⁵⁰ God has Himself said, “He sends down water from the skies, and the channels flow, each according to its measure... Thus does God set forth parables” (13:17).

[*Fatāwā* 16:301-312]

(2.14) Does God will sin from His creatures?

God wills sin in the sense that He creates it; He does not will it in the sense that He commands it.

(Ibn Taymīyyah) was asked if God wills sin from His creatures or not? He replied that the word will is ambiguous. It may mean two different things, one that He wills to create something, and the other that He loves something and approves of it as He commands it. If the questioner means to ask whether God loves evil acts, approves of them and commands them, the answer is that He does not will them in this sense, for God does not like evil or approve of ingratitude and faithlessness from His servants, or command vile deeds. On the contrary, (after forbidding them in the Qur'ān) He says, "The evil of all these things is hateful in the sight of your Lord" (17:38). But if the questioner means that sin is a part of the things which He wills and creates, the answer is that God is the Creator of everything, that what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen, and that there is nothing in existence which He does not will.

At some places in the Qur'ān God has said that He wills sin, and at other places that He does not will sin. What He means on the former occasions is that He wills to create sin, and on the latter that He does not command sin, nor does He like or approve of it, for example, "Those whom God wills to guide, He opens their breast to Islam; those whom He wills to leave astray, He makes their breast close and constricted" (6:125). He quotes the words of Noah: "Of no profit will be my counsel to you, much as I like to give you good counsel, if it be that God wills to leave you go astray. He is your Lord!" (11:34). Here will is used in the first sense; for the other sense, read the following verses: "God wills every facility for you; He does not will to put you to difficulty" (2:185); "God wishes (*yurīdu*) to make clear to you and to show you the ways of those before you; and He does wish to turn to you

(in mercy). And God is All-Knowing, All-Wise. God does wish to turn to you, but the wish of those who follow their lusts is that you should turn away from Him, far, far away. God does wish to lighten your (difficulties), for man is created weak” (4:26-28); “God does not wish (*yurīdu*) to place you in difficulty - He wishes to make you clean and to complete His favor to you (5:7); and, “God only wishes (*yurīdu*) to remove abomination from you, members of the family, and to make you pure and spotless” (33:33).

[*Fatāwā* 8:159-160]

(2.15) Wisdom

God is wise and merciful, and has not created the world without a rationale.

God is wise and merciful. He has apprised that He has created the world with a rationale. He has said, “Not without purpose did We create heaven and earth and all between! That has been the thought of the unbelievers” (38:27); “Behold! In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day, there are indeed signs for men of understanding, who celebrate the praises of God, standing, sitting and lying on their sides, and contemplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens and the earth, (and say): ‘Our Lord! not for naught have you created all this’” (3:190); “Nor for (idle) sport did We create the heavens and the earth and all that is between! If it had been our wish to take (just) a pastime, We should surely have taken it from the things nearest to Us, if We would do (such a thing)” (21:16-17); “We created them not except *bi ḥaqq*, in truth. But most of them do not understand” (44:39). The words *bi ḥaqq* in this verse underline the fact that God has a definite purpose in creating the world. He has reiterated this fact in various other verses such as, “It is He Who created the heavens and the earth with truth (*bi ḥaqq*), and the day He says:

‘Be,’ behold, it is” (6:73); and, “We created not the heavens and the earth and all between them but in truth; and the Hour is surely coming. So ignore (their opposition) graciously. Verily your Lord is the Master-Creator, knowing all things” (15:85-86).

[*Fatāwā* 17:95-96]

(2.16) The reason God has created the world partly concerns Him and partly the world.

God has a purpose in all that He has created, which either concerns Him and is dear to Him, or concerns the beings He has created and is a blessing upon them or an act of justice to them from Him.

God has a purpose in all that He has created. He has said, “(This is) the making of God Who makes everything perfect” (27:88); and, “He has made everything which He has created most good” (32:7). To be sure, God does not need the creation. However, there are two aspects to His purpose: one which concerns Him and is dear to Him, and the other which concerns the created beings, and is God’s blessing upon them which they enjoy.

This is true not only in the case of His creations but also in that of His commands. As for the latter, it is plain that He does like them or approve of them. If anyone violates them and then repents, He is happier than we can imagine. As the Prophet has said, “He is happier than one who loses his camel in a desert with all the provisions for his journey on its back, gives up every hope of getting it back, and all of a sudden finds it standing before him.”¹⁵¹ He is also more hurt than any of His created beings when a servant of His does what He has prohibited. But if he subsequently repents and does what He wants, no one is happier than He. Obedience to His command brings happiness in this world and the next; this is what one should take pleasure in. Hence, the things which God has commanded us to do have good consequences which concern both

Him and His people. There is a purpose in them which concerns Him and a blessing which they enjoy.

God has said, “You who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty? (It is) that you believe in God and His Messenger, and that you strive (your utmost) in the cause of God with your property and your persons. That will be best for you if you but knew! He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to Gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity. That is indeed the supreme achievement. And another favor which you do love: help from God and a speedy victory. So give the glad tidings to the Believers” (61:10-13). These verses underline the fact that *jihād* has been commanded in order to secure the well-being of people in this world, the victory of the right over the wrong, and, in ‘*alā*, deliverance from Hell and entrance into Paradise. In the beginning of the *sūrah* from which these verses have been quoted we have the words, “Truly, God loves those who fight in His cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure” (61:4). His love implies that He has a purpose in it before Him, and that it is also a mercy for His people, in the form of blessings in this life and the next. This is the case with all His commands.

In the case of things which God has created there is also some purpose which is related to Him and which is dear to Him, as well as some purpose which is related to His people, which is a blessing for them. When people talk about the purpose of creation and the wisdom behind it everyone does according to his knowledge. Some of their ideas are right, some are wrong, and there are some mysteries which they are not able to unravel.... Broadly speaking, there are three views on the issue, each of which is held by a large section of theologians and supported by many among the followers of the four *a’immah*, Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik, Ash-Shāfi’ī and Aḥmad.

The first view is held by the negators of divine wisdom. They say that to assert a purpose for God is to attribute some want to Him. They believe that He does what He wills for no purpose at

all. They affirm only His power and will, and the fact that He does whatever He wills. Surely they want to glorify Him, but they end by negating His wisdom under the impression that purpose implies want. This is the view of Al-Ash‘arī and his followers, and many others who agree with him like Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, Ibn Al-Zaghūnī,¹⁵² al-Juwaynī,¹⁵³ and Al-Bājī.¹⁵⁴ This view was first expounded by Jahm Ibn Safwan and other determinists who followed him.

Philosophers go a step further. They say that whatever pain we suffer or evil we meet in the world is unavoidable. They believe that this necessarily follows from God’s essence; in fact, all that happens is the necessary unfolding of His essence. But had they instead said that it follows from His will and power and is produced by Him, it would have been correct. They also assert that the evil in the world is outweighed by the good. This is correct, but it would mean that God has created the world with some definite purpose, that creation has its own rationale which must be appreciated rather than discounted. If it is not, the assertion that good outweighs evil will lose its meaning. Hence it is clear that every group has some truth and some untruth. These are the four positions, and the fifth position is the one which is held by the *a’immah*, namely that God has a purpose in whatever He has created, that it is a wise purpose, and that it is a blessing (for the creation).

The second of the three views which the theologians have advanced is that anything which God creates or commands is for the good of His people. It is only for their benefit, simply a favor which He bestows upon them; it has no other purpose at all. This is the view of the Mu‘tazilah and others like them. Some of these people have discussed at length God’s wisdom, have denied His fore-ordainment (*qadr*), and worked out a code of law for their Lord which says what is right and what is wrong for Him. They are the Qadarīyyah. However, some of them affirm (*qadr*) and say that God has a purpose, but they say that it is a mystery. This is the view of Ibn ‘Aqīl¹⁵⁵ and others who affirm *qadr*. They are one with

the Mu'tazilah in affirming purpose which concerns created beings, though they differ from them in upholding *qadr*.

The third group believes that God also has a purpose which concerns Him. But they differ as to exactly what it is. To some, God has created men in order that they may worship Him, praise Him, and glorify Him. He has created some of them for this purpose and they do achieve it. They are those who are faithful. But those who do not achieve it are not created for it. They say that this is the purpose which God wanted to realize, and it is realized. They say that it differs from the purpose which the Mu'tazilah affirm, namely the good of human beings. They point out that God creates people whom He knows will not benefit from creation; they would rather suffer from it. Hence, they claim, the Mu'tazilah land themselves in contradiction. They, on the other hand, affirm a purpose which will happen if God knows that it will happen, namely that the faithful among men will come to know Him, praise Him and glorify Him. This is the case with the faithful. Others whom God creates only suffer from creation for the benefit of others; a small evil is justifiable for a greater good. Rain, for example, is good, since it benefits a lot of people even though it harms a few others. Similarly, the infidels have been created and will be punished so that the faithful may learn a lesson from them and wage war against them. This is the view which has adopted in his which Qāḍī Abū Khāzim Ibn Qāḍī Abū Ya'la¹⁵⁶ has adopted in his book, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, which he composed on the pattern of the book by Muḥammad Ibn Al-Haytham Al-Karrāmī.¹⁵⁷ Those who expound this view say that the words, "I have created the jinns and men only to worship and serve Me" (51:56), refer only to those people who actually worship Him, and those who do not worship Him have not been created for that purpose.

This view which is held by the Karmathians and others like them is certainly better than the view of the Jahmīyyah and the Mu'tazilah, since it affirms a purpose for God and takes the Qur'āniḥ verse in the sense which is supported by a section of

Elders. However, it is not tenable, as it goes against the majority view and conflicts with the real meaning of the verse... for, as the context shows, the verse implies condemnation and reproof of those who do not worship God. He has created them for that purpose and they have failed to achieve it. That is why immediately following the verse He has said, “No sustenance do I require of them, nor do I require that they should feed Me” (51:57). The fact that He has affirmed worship and negated feeding proves that He created them for His worship and did not require from them what human masters require of their slaves, food or drink. This is why right after it He has said, “For the wrongdoers their portion is like unto the portion of their fellows” (51:59), that is, their portion of punishment is like the punishment of the infidels of earlier generations. It is a threat to those men and jinns who do not worship God. That this threat occurs after the verse quoted above is an indication that it is for those who do not worship God....

These people...have realized that the view which the Qadarīyyah hold is wrong, since God creates everything and is their Lord and Master, since what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen, and since nothing exists in His Kingdom except what He wills, and nothing may come into being except with His power, creation and will. In support of this truth a number of arguments can be given from revelation as well as reason. This is the belief of all the Companions, all the *a'immah* of the *ummah*, and all the Muslims. It is the faith of the entire Ahl as-Sunnah.

This is precisely the reason why these people have diverged in the interpretation of the verse and qualified it. They have not been able to combine belief in *qadr* with the belief that God created men in order for them to serve Him but they did not serve Him. So they thought that those whom He created for Hell He did not create for His service. This line is taken by all those who say that God has created people so that the faithful among them should serve and worship Him.

Those who deny the wisdom of God such as Al-Ash‘arī and his followers, Qāḍī Abū Bakr¹⁵⁸ Abū Ya‘lā and others, their basic assumption is that God does not create things with any purpose. He has created men neither for His worship nor for any other object, for them, there is no particle lam that expresses purpose (*lām kay*) any where in the Qur’ān; it only has the *lām* which indicates consequence *lām al-‘āqibah* as in the verse, “The men of the family of Pharaoh picked the babe that (*li*) he may become their enemy and bring grief to them” (28:8)... This view is wrong for many reasons. First, the consequential *lām* does not introduce an action which is intended to produce the consequence that follows from it except by one who is ignorant or who cannot help it. As the saying goes, “They approached death and prepared themselves for destruction.” They knew that this was going to be the end, but they were not able to stop it. God, on the contrary, is All-Powerful and All-Knowing, hence His action cannot be the action of an ignorant or a weak person. Moreover, it is commonly agreed that God has created man for His own worship and service, and that this is what He has willed. But this would not be true if the *lām* in the verse (*li ya‘budūni*) is taken as a consequential *lām*. These people admit that God has created them, willed their actions, and willed reward and punishment for their actions, so whatever happens is the object of His will. But they recoil from saying that He may will a thing for something, since a purposive action, in their view, implies want on the part of the doer. But this is obviously not correct.

[*Fatāwā* 8:35-45]

(2.17) Good and evil.

Good and evil in the sense of blessing and misfortune are from God. Whenever one receives a blessing one should be thankful to God, and when one faces trouble one should bear it patiently and seek God’s forgiveness for one’s sins, for God does reward patience. However, good and evil in the sense of right and wrong

action are from both God and men, and God does not do injustice to anyone.

(Ibn Taymīyyah) was asked about the belief that good is from God and evil is from Satan, that evil is in the hand of man, and that he is free to do it and not to do it as he wills... He replied:

Praise be to God. One should bear in mind two fundamental truths. The first is that God orders us to have faith and to do good deeds, that He loves right action and is pleased with them, that He honors those who do them, rewards them, protects them, is pleased with them, and loves them, and they love Him, and they from His army which shall be victorious. They are the true friends of God, the pious ones, the men of Paradise: Prophets, *ṣiddīqūn* (sincere lovers of truth), *shuhadā* (witnesses, martyres) and *ṣāliḥūn* (the righteous)¹⁵⁹ God prohibits all evil things - disbelief, arrogance and disobedience; He hates them and condemns them and their doers, and will punish them. They are the enemies of God and the Prophet, the friends of Satan, doomed to Hell and wretchedness. They are, however, of different levels. Some of them are disbelievers, arrogant and intransigent; others are disobedient but not infidel or arrogant.

The second truth is that God is the Lord of everything, its Creator and Owner, and there is no lord or creator other than He. What He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen. None has any power or might other than He, and no one can protect anyone against Him. All that is in the universe, be it objects, attributes, movements or events, is created by Him, brought into being by His power and according to His will. Nothing is beyond His power, and there is no one there to share with Him in these matters.... Man is completely dependent on Him for everything; he has to turn to Him for everything and can never dispense with Him for a single moment. None can mislead whomever He guides, and none can guide whomever He leaves astray.

Having stated these two truths, we would now say that when one is inspired to seek guidance from God or His help to obey Him, God helps him and guides him, and this leads to his happiness in this world and the next. But when God forsakes a man who does not worship Him or seek His help, or put trust in Him, he is left to himself, to his own will and power. When this happens Satan takes charge of him, turns him away from the right path and finally lands him in misery in this world and the next. All that exists is determined by Him and produced by Him. No one can avoid what He has destined, no one can cross the line which He has drawn for him in the Guarded Tablet, and no one can challenge His decisions, which are based upon best considerations. Certainly, if He had willed He could have put everyone on the right path; nevertheless, His blessings are a favor from Him, and His chastisements are an act of justice from Him.

One should believe in fore-ordainment and should not use it as an argument against God. To believe in it is to follow the right path, and to use it as an argument against God is to go astray. Faith in fore-ordainment makes man patient and thankful - patient in adversity and thankful in felicity. When one receives a blessing, one should realize that it is from God and be thankful to Him, whether it is a good deed one has done or a good thing one has achieved through one's efforts. For it is God Who makes every good possible for man, and it is He Who rewards him for it; hence, He it is Who is to be praised for everything. On the other hand, when someone faces a trouble which is caused by another person, it is God Who has empowered that person and it is He Who has created his action, and it is He Who has written that trouble for the former. He has said, "No misfortune can happen on earth or in your souls but is recorded in a decree before We bring it into existence. That is truly easy for God. (This is) in order that you may not despair over matters that pass you by, nor exult over favors bestowed upon you" (57:22-3). Elsewhere He has said, "No kind of calamity can occur except by the leave of God. And if

anyone believes in God, (God) guides his heart aright” (64:11). The person referred to in the last part of this verse is one who faces trouble, knows that it comes from God, and submits to His will quietly.

When one commits a sin, one should seek forgiveness and turn to God. Never should one make fore-ordainment an argument against God and say that he has not done it, since it was destined for him. He should admit that he is a sinner, that it is he who has done it, even though it happened as determined and destined by God and willed by Him. Nothing can happen which He does not will, produce or create; nonetheless, it is man who does the forbidden thing, performs the evil deed and wrongs himself, just as it is he who prays, fasts, performs pilgrimage, and carries on *jihād*. It is man who does all these deeds, makes all these movements and earns all these things. And for him is what good he does, and against him is what evil he commits.

God does not command evil and does not approve of faithlessness or misbehavior. He is the Creator of everything, and is its Lord and Ruler. What He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen. None can mislead whomever He guides and none can guide whomever He leaves astray. On the other hand, man wills good as well as evil; he has the power to choose one or the other, as well as the power to do what he chooses, and he is their doer. God is only his Creator, Lord and Controller, since there is no Creator, Lord or Controller other than He. What He wills comes into existence and what He does not will does not

God has affirmed both wills: the will of the Lord and the will of man. He has also stated it clearly that the will of man is subject to the will of the Lord. “This is an admonition,” He has said; “Whosoever will, let him take a (straight) path to his Lord,” and then He added, “but you will not, except if God wills; for God is knowing and Wise” (76:29-30). Elsewhere He has said, “Verily this is no less than a message to (all) the worlds, for (the benefit of) those of you who will to go straight. But you shall not will except

if God wills, the Lord of the Worlds” (81: 27-29). At a third place, He has said, “Wherever you are, death will find you, even if you are in towers built up strong and high! If some good befalls them they say: ‘This is from God.’ But if evil befalls them, they say, ‘This is from you (O Prophet!).’ Say: All things are from God. But what has come to these people that they fail to understand a single thing! Whatever good (O man!) happens to you is from God, but whatever evil happens to you, is from your own self” (4:78-9).... Some people take the good and evil in this verse in the sense of right and wrong deeds, and then suggest different ideas. One says that everything is from God; another says that good is from God and evil is from man. Both are wrong; for good (*ḥasanāt*) and evil (*sa’iyāt*) here refer to good fortune and misfortune as is in the verse, “We tried them with both *ḥasanāt*, prosperity, and *sa’iyāt*, adversity, in order that they might turn (to Us)” (7:168)....

Whoever says that man does not will good or evil is wrong. Similarly, whoever says that he does good or evil without God’s willing it is also wrong. The truth is that he does whatever he chooses to do, good or bad, but at the same time it comes into being by the will of God and His power. We should believe in the first as well as the second, so that we can have faith, on the one hand, in the commands and prohibitions of God and the reward and punishment thereupon, and, on the other, in the fact that everything good or evil is fore-ordained. What befalls us could not miss us, and what misses us could not befall us.

[*Fatāwā* 8: 23-2400]

(2.18) Creation is an attribute of God existing in His Essence.

Creation (khalq) is an act of the Creator, and the created world (makhlūq) is its object; one is different from the other. Creation is an attribute of God which exists in His Essence, and comes into being by His will and power. The same is true of all

other active attributes such as speech, provision, giving life, causing death, etc.

Muslims in general, past and present, believe that *khalq*, creation, is other than the *makhlūq*, the created world; the former is an act of the Creator, and the latter its object. That is why the Prophet would seek refuge in the acts of the Lord and His attributes. He would say, “I seek refuge in Your pleasure against Your displeasure, in Your forgiving against Your punishment, and in You against You. I am unable to celebrate Your praises as it behooves You. You are as You have spoken of Yourself.”¹⁶⁰ Thus he sought refuge in God’s forgiving as well as in His pleasure. One of the arguments of the *a’immah* of the Sunnah, like Aḥmad and others, for the belief that God’s speech is uncreated is that the Prophet has sought refuge in it and said, “If anyone enters a house and seeks the protection of God’s perfect words against the evil of the things He has created, nothing will harm him till he goes out.”¹⁶¹ Similarly, His forgiving and His pleasure are uncreated, that is why the Prophet sought protection in them. One should, however, note that the peace one has in one’s body is created by God, and is a result of His healing.

Since creation is an act of God, and the world is the object of that act, and since He has created the world by His will, it follows that creation is an act that takes place by His will and cannot be predicated of anyone else. Hence His acts exist in His Essence even though they are accomplished by His will and power. Al-Bukhārī has reported that scholars are agreed that *khalq* is different from *makhlūq*; this is also the verdict of reason. Arguments from reason as well as tradition have been advanced to prove that everything other than God is created and contingent, that it comes into being after it was not there, and that only God is eternal without a beginning. He has Himself said, “He has created the heavens and the earth and (all) that is in between them in six days” (25:29, 32:4). Now, when He created the heavens in the

beginning, either He performed an act that brought them into being, or He did not and the world came into being without an act. Again, since He was the Creator before He created the world, and is so at the time of creation and even after the creation, it is inconceivable that He should have chosen to create the world at one time rather than another without any reason accounting for the choice. Again, the existence of a created being without a contingent reason is ruled out by reason. If you say that the eternal will and power makes that choice, we would say that the relation of the eternal will with every moment of time is the same. Therefore, for it to choose one moment rather than another, similar moment without any reason is inconceivable. Hence, for something to exist, there must be a reason demanding its existence. If simply the presence of will and power were sufficient to bring it into existence, it would have existed earlier; for when we have a perfect will and a perfect power, the object cannot lag behind.

Some, like Abū Al-Ḥasan (Al-Ash‘arī) and his followers such as Ibn ‘Aqīl who hold that creation (*khalq*) is the same as the created (*makhlūq*), sometimes argue that if creation were different from the created, it would be either eternal or contingent; in the former case, the object (of creation) would also be eternal, since one implies the other; in the latter case the divine essence would be a locus of contingent things. Moreover, this creation would require another creation, and that still another, and so on *ad infinitum*... This objection has been answered by all the groups, each in its own way. One group, for example, has said that creation (*khalq*) is eternal, even though the created world (*makhlūq*) is contingent. This is the view of a number of followers of the four schools. The majority of the Ḥanafīyyah subscribe to it; they say that if you accept our view that the will is eternal whereas its object is contingent, you should also accept the same about creation as we do.

Another group says that creation (*khalq*) in itself is contingent and does not require another creation; it only happens by the power

of God. You do accept that the world comes into being by His power after it was not there. Now if it is true of a thing separate from God that it happens simply by His power, the one which is associated with Him must happen all the more. This is the answer given by many Karmathians, Hishāmīs¹⁶² and others.

Others say that, supposing that creation requires another prior act, why should you call it impossible? If you say that it implies a regression, we will point out that it does not mean the regression of the doers or the efficient causes. That, to be sure, is impossible and is admitted by all. But here it is a regression of effects or acts, that is, the occurrence of one thing after another, and the claim that it is impossible is disputed.

What the Elders have said is this: God is speaking from eternity as and when He has willed. He has said: "Say: If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write) the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if We added another ocean like it for its aid" (10:109). That is to say, the words of God are endless; and this regression is possible, for it is a regression in the future. Is it not the case that the blessings of Paradise are eternal and will never end; one thing will go on appearing after another forever and ever!

[*Fatāwā* 6:229-232]

(2.19) The Created world

God has been creating from eternity by His will and power. This does not mean, however, that the world is eternal. All that follows from is that the act of creation as a class is eternal. Individual things which are created, are not eternal.

The majority of Muslims believe that *khalq*, creation is other than the *makhlūq*, the created, and that it is an act which exists by God. This is the belief of the Ḥanafīs and most of the Ḥanbalīs; in the end, Qāḍī Abū Ya‘lā subscribed to it. Al-Baghawī¹⁶³ has

mentioned that this is the belief of the Ahl as-Sunnah, and Abū Bakr Al-Kalabādhī¹⁶⁴ has noted in his *At-Ta'arruf li Madhāhib Ahl at-Taṣawwūf* that this is what the Ṣūfīs believe. Al-Bukhārī has claimed consensus of the 'ulamā' on this point in his *Af'āl al-'Ibād*,¹⁶⁵ and Ibn 'Abdul-Barr¹⁶⁶ and many others have ascribed this belief to the Ahl as-Sunnah.

But whether God's act of creation is one and eternal like His will, or whether it is contingent in itself, or whether God is eternally qualified with it when it is taken as a class, all these three views are found among the Muslims; however, they all agree that everything other than God is contingent and created. This is stated by every prophet and it is substantiated by rational arguments. Philosophers have held the view that some created things are co-eternal with God. This is wrong on the ground of revelation as well as reason. We have discussed that point in detail at another place. One may object and say that the view that God has been speaking from eternity by His will entails speech that has no beginning. And if God has been speaking from eternity He must go on speaking forever, with the result that His speech will have no end. This entails the existence of an endless series of contingent events, for every word which is preceded by another word must be contingent; but the existence of an unending series of contingents is inconceivable. This, we would admit, does follow from this view. We do say that God's words have no end. He has Himself said, "Say: If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write) the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it for its aid" (18:109).

However, the objection that an unending series of events is inconceivable is based on the argument which has been developed to prove the contingency of the world and bodies, namely that they are not free from contingent things, and what is not free from contingent things is co-tangent. But it is wrong on both grounds of revelation and reason. It forms the basis of the *kalām* which has

been condemned by the Elders and the *a'immah*, as it lies at the base of the *kalām* which the Jahmīyyah have developed and which negates God's attributes. We have discussed the incoherence of this argument at other places which may be consulted.

However, if one can separate what is right in this argument from what is wrong, one will find that it does prove the contingency of everything other than God, and that it supports the belief of the Elders. These people have merely developed it on wrong lines. They raise the proposition that whatever is inseparable from contingent or possible and hence dependent things is also contingent to a universal proposition, and treat the Creator on the pattern of created things. Others argue that if something admits of one thing, it can never be free from the latter and its opposite at the same time, and raise it to a universal proposition. Mistakes in arguments generally arise from conceiving one thing on the pattern of another thing which is different from it. When you generalize a proposition on the basis of some common element without distinguishing between one category and the other, you end in mistakes. Examples of this are people having said that trade is just like usury" (2:275) or what Iblīs said (in defying God's order to bow down before Adam). In fact, as the Elders have said, Iblīs was the first to use a false argument. Whenever the sun or the moon is worshiped it is done on the basis of some analogy which is put against a revealed text or which is constructed on wrong premises. Every argument which goes against the scriptural text is incorrect. As for the correct argument, it is part of the Balance (*al-mizān*) which God has sent down; it will never contradict any text; on the contrary, it will support the text.

It follows that what is correct in the arguments which philosophers have advanced supports the view of the Elders. The basic point in their argument for the eternity of the world is that God has been active from eternity, and that it is inconceivable that He would have been first inactive and then started acting, or that

He could not have been active in the beginning and became active only afterwards, or that He had no power in the beginning and only acquired it later. But all these propositions only prove the eternity of God's action as a class; they do not prove that any particular object, the spheres or anything else, is eternal.

The view of the scholars of the Sunnah that God is ever acting out of His free will and power, and that action is an essential part of life, is supported by all rational and sound arguments. Moreover, it agrees with what the Elders say that God has been speaking from eternity as and when He has willed, or acting from eternity as and when He has willed. All the arguments which the Kullābīs, the Ash'arīs and the Salīmīs have advanced only prove that God has been speaking from eternity as He has willed. They prove neither the eternity of any speech which He has not willed, nor the eternity of any particular word; they only prove that His speech as a class is eternal. Similarly, all the arguments which the philosophers have produced regarding the eternity of God's activity only prove that He has been doing from eternity what He has willed. They prove neither the eternity of any particular act, nor that of any particular thing done, the heavens or anything else.

The reason both groups have erred is that they could not differentiate between a class and its particular members. One group said that movement as a class or act as a class cannot be eternal, for a series of events without a beginning is inconceivable. On this ground they denied that God would be speaking from eternity or acting from eternity out of His free will. But they did not realize that this would mean that God was at first inactive and then became active, or that He could not at first speak of His will and only spoke afterwards. Some of them such as the Karrāmīs said that God could not speak of His will at first, and could do that only afterwards. Others like the Kullābīs and their followers such as the Ash'arīs and the Salīmīs said that God did not speak of His free will nor was it ever possible for Him to do so.

The philosophers have said what their master, Aristotle, had said before. But all those who say that movement as a class came into existence at some time before which it did not exist fly in the face of reason. They say that it is inconceivable that contingent events as a class should exist without a cause, and consider it to be a piece of necessary knowledge. We submit that it shows only that movement as a class is eternal, and not that the movement of the sphere is eternal. The same is true of time and body. Their argument only proves that movement as a class is eternal and so is its measure, which is time, and its agent, which they call body. But it does not follow that any particular thing is eternal. When it is said that God has been speaking and acting from eternity whatever He has willed, it implies that His act as a class is eternal, as is its measure which is time. The mistake which Aristotle and his followers have made is that they thought that there was no time which was not the measure of the movement of the sphere, and that there was no movement beyond the movement of the sphere nor prior to it. Hence they concluded that the movement of the sphere was eternal.

They are wrong on the grounds of both reason and revelation. They cannot produce any argument to refute the existence of movement above the sphere or before them, and what they say with regard to a fissure in the sphere is quite ridiculous, as we have shown elsewhere. Similarly, their axiom that every movement must have a mover other than the body which is moving is also fallacious; I have also shown that elsewhere.

The point I want to emphasize is that a part of what these so-called rational thinkers, theologians and philosophers have to say agrees in essence with the view of the Elders and the Ahl as-Sunnah who follow the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Only a part of their argument is correct and supports their views, but they have often mixed it with untruth. They are like the People of the Book who have mixed truth with untruth. What is true with them agrees with what the prophet from among the Gentiles has taught, the prophet

whom they find mentioned in their books, the Torah and the Gospel, and it never differs from his teachings. Prophetic ideas never contradict each other, nor do rational arguments, if correct, contradict one another. Similarly, the truths of revelation and the truths of reason do not oppose one another.

[*Fatāwā* 6:2898-302]

(2.20) Speech

The saying of the Elders that God's speech is eternal means that God has been speaking of His free will from eternity, or to put it differently, His speech as a class is eternal. None of them has ever said that a particular speech, whether the Qur'ān or the Torah, is eternal; they have only said that it is uncreated.

The Elders have said, "The Qur'ān is the word of God, revealed and uncreated." They have also said, "God has been speaking from eternity whenever He has so willed." They have made it quite clear that God's word is eternal; that is to say, as a class His word is eternal. Nobody has ever said that any particular word is eternal, nor has anyone said that the Qur'ān is eternal. They have only said that it is God's speech, revealed and uncreated. Since God has spoken the words of the Qur'ān of His own free will, the Qur'ān is His speech, it has come down from Him and is uncreated. Nevertheless it is not eternal and timeless as God, even though He has been speaking from eternity as and when He has willed. Only His speech as a class is eternal.

Aḥmad and other Elders have clearly stated that the Qur'ān is the uncreated word of God. None of them has ever said that God has not spoken of His free will and power, nor has anyone said that a particular speech like the Qur'ān, or the call that He gave to Moses, or any other particular speech is eternal and timeless, without a beginning and without an end, or that particular words or words and sounds are eternal and timeless, without a beginning or

end. No one has ever said any such thing, nor can anyone produce the word of Aḥmad or any other imām in their support. In fact, Aḥmad's statements and the statements of other imāms are clearly against them. They have clearly said that God speaks of His free will and power, and that He has been speaking from eternity as and when He has willed. They have also said that God's speech is uncreated, that it has originated from Him, and that it is not something created or originated from something other than Him. Their statements on these points are well-known, and can be found in various books, such as the *Kitāb as-Sunnah* and other writings of Al-Khallāl.¹⁶⁷ ('Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Ḥātim¹⁶⁸ has compiled the words of Aḥmad and other scholars. Others who have written on the subject are the students of Aḥmad such as his two sons, Ṣāliḥ¹⁶⁹ and Adbullah¹⁷⁰, and Abū Dāwūd As-Sijistānī¹⁷¹ the author of *As-Sunan*, Al-Athram,¹⁷² Al-Marwazī¹⁷³ Abū Zur'ah,¹⁷⁴ Abū Ḥatim,¹⁷⁵ Al-Bukhārī,^{175a} the author of *Aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'Uthmān Ibn Sa'īd Ad-Dārimī,¹⁷⁶ Ibrāhīm Al-Harbī,¹⁷⁷ 'Abdul-Waḥhāb Al-Warrāq,^{177a} 'Abbās Ibn 'Abdul-'Aẓīm Al-Anbārī,¹⁷⁸ Ḥarb Ibn Ismā'il Al-Kirmānī,¹⁷⁹ and countless other scholars, as well as the students of these students such as 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Ḥātim,¹⁸⁰ Abū Bakr Al-Khaṭṭāb,¹⁸¹ Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Banānī Al-Isbahānī,¹⁸² and others. We can also mention the names of various imāms and scholars of *Uṣūl* and *furū'*,¹⁸³ such as Abū 'Īsā At-Tirmidhī,¹⁸⁴ the author of the *Al-Jāmi'*, Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān An-Nasā'ī,¹⁸⁵ and others like them, as well as Abū Muḥammad Ibn Qutaybah,¹⁸⁶ and the like. This is not the place for going into further details.

[*Fatāwā* 12:54, 86-87]

(2.21) Transcendence (*al-‘Ulū*)

God is not inside the world surrounded by different things. He is above the Heavens on the Throne, and transcends the world completely. Nothing is like Him in any respect, in essence, attributes or acts.

Anyone who believes that God is in space, that He is inside the world, surrounded by things and encircled by the Heavens, and that some things are above Him and others beneath Him is wrong and completely mistaken. Similarly if anyone believes that God needs something to carry Him, the Throne or any thing else, he is also wrong and mistaken.... No less mistaken is anyone who conceives of God's attributes on the pattern of the attributes of created beings, and says, for example, that His ascent or descent (*nuzūl*) is like the ascent and descent of His creatures. The Qur'ān and the Sunnah, as well as reason, show that God is unlike any created thing in every respect, that He needs nothing at all, and that He is completely different from created things and transcends them.

One is correct only if he believes like the Elders and the *a'immah* of the *ummah* that the Creator is different from the created, that He is above the heavens on the Throne, altogether different from His creatures, that nothing of His essence is in His creatures, nor anything of them is in His essence, that He transcends the Throne and everything else, and needs nothing of them at all, that, on the contrary, He holds the Throne and its bearers with His power even as He is established on it, that His establishment (*istawā*) is not like the establishment of the creatures, that He has all those names and attributes which He has affirmed of Himself, without there being any likeness between Him and His creatures; and that He is unlike everything in His essence, attributes and acts.

[*Fatāwā* 5:262-263]

(2.22) God's ascent (*istawā*) and descent (*nuzūl*) are real.

God's ascent (istawā) on the Throne, and His descent (nuzūl) to the heavens are both real, just as any other attribute and act, knowledge, speech, power, and so on of His. But this does not mean that His ascent and descent are like the ascent and descent of human beings, even though they are real in both cases. What real means in this context, is explained by Ibn Taymīyyah.

Shaykh al-Islām (Ibn Taymīyyah) was asked about God's words, "The Merciful ascended (*istawā 'alā*) the Throne," and the Prophet's *ḥadīth*, "Our Lord descends (*yanzilu*) to the lowest heaven every night,"^{186a} if this ascent or descent is real or not, and what is meant when it is said that it is real. Does reality here mean that the words are used in the sense they are denoted for, as the scholars of jurisprudence define the term?" And finally what follows from saying that God's attributes are real? The *shaykh* first praised God and then said:

What we say about God's ascent and descent is not different from what we say about all the attributes which God has predicated of Himself in His Book or directed His Prophet to predicate of Him. God has called Himself by certain names and predicated of Himself certain attributes. He has called Himself Living, Knowing, Wise, Powerful, Hearing, Seeing, Forgiving, Merciful, and so on, for example. "If you pronounce the word aloud (or say it silently), verily He knows what is secret and what is yet hidden" (20:7); "They do not compass ought of His knowledge except what He wills. His Throne does extend over the heavens and the earth" (2:255); "God is He Who gives all sustenance, Lord of Power, Steadfast" (51:58); "With power and skill did We construct the firmament" (51:47); "My mercy extends to all things" (7:156); "God is well pleased with them, and they with God" (5:122); "The wrath of God is upon them, and He has cursed them" (48:6); "And to Moses God spoke directly (4:164); "The word of your Lord does

find its fulfillment in truth and in justice” (6:115); “I am with you: I hear and see (everything)” (20:46); “God is One Who hears and sees” (4:134); “God said “Iblīs! What prevents you from prostrating yourself to one whom I have created with my hands?” (38:75); “He will love them, and they will love Him” (5:57); “Will they wait until God comes to them in canopies of clouds (with) angels (in His train)?” (2:210); “Your Lord will come and the angels rank upon rank” (89:22); and so on. What we say with regard to any of these attributes we say with regard to others.

The Elders and the *a’immah* of this *ummah* believe that we should predicate of God what He has predicated of Himself or what His Prophet has predicated of Him, without changing it in any way (*tahrīf*), or draining it of content (*ta’īl*) or saying anything about its modality (*tayīf*) or imagining it on the pattern of anything else (*tamthīl*). It is not correct to negate any attributes of God which He has predicated of Himself, or to liken them to the attributes of the creatures. As He has Himself said, “there is nothing like Him, though He is Hearing and Seeing” (42:11). There is absolutely nothing like Him either in His essence or in His attributes or in His acts...

All those who affirm God’s attributes say that He is really Living, really Knowing, really Powerful, really Hearing, really Seeing, really Willing and really Speaking. Even the Mu’tazilah, who negate God’s attributes, say that God is really speaking, that He is really knowing, and really powerful, as Muslims in general believe. In fact some, like Abū Al-‘Abbās An-Nāshī^{186b} have even said that these attributes are real only in the case of God, whereas in the case of created beings they are no more than metaphors. Their majority is in full agreement on this point with all the theologians who affirm God’s attributes: the Ash‘arīs, the Kullābīs, the Karmathians, the Salīmīs, as well as the followers of the four *a’immah*, the Ḥanafīs, the Mālīkīs, the Shāfī‘īs and the Ḥanbalīs, and the *ahl al-ḥadīth* and the Ṣūfīs, since they say that these attributes are used for God in the real sense, even though they are

also used in the real sense for created beings. They affirm that God does have knowledge, power, hearing, and seeing in the real sense.

Only the esoterics like the Karmathians and the Ismā‘īlīs, or the philosophers who negate divine attributes deny that God has these ... in reality. They say that He is neither living nor not-living, neither knowing nor not-knowing, neither powerful nor not-powerful, neither existing nor not-existing. They and others like them deny that God can have these attributes in the real sense. Some of them even say that these names are to be used only for created beings, not for God, neither really nor metaphorically...

If God’s names and attributes were metaphors such that they should be negated if they are applied to Him without qualification, He cannot be said to be Living, Knowing, Powerful, Hearing or Seeing, or that He loves people and is loved by them, or that He is established on the Throne, and so on. But we definitely know that Islam does not allow negating the names and attributes which God has affirmed of Himself; that would amount to negating the Creator Himself and to equating Him with non-being...

Those who deny that God really has these names and attributes do so either because they do not know what is meant by the word “really” or because they deny or negate what belongs to God, the Lord of the Universe. They think that to predicate them of God is to liken the Creator with the created. But this inference is not correct, for God exists in reality and man exists in reality, but it does not mean that one existence is like another existence. Again, God does have an essence (*dhāt*) in reality and man does have an essence (*dhāt*) in reality but it does not mean that the divine Essence is like the human essence.

Similarly, God has knowledge, hearing and sight in reality, and man has knowledge, hearing and sight, but God’s knowledge, hearing, and sight are not like man’s knowledge, hearing and sight. God speaks in reality, and men speak in reality, but God’s speech is not like human speech. God ascends the Throne in reality, and men ascend a boat in reality, but God’s ascension is not like men’s

ascension, for God does not depend on any thing or need anything, He is completely self-sufficient...

The question has been raised as to what is meant by saying that someone has an attribute in reality. First of all, it means that one uses the attribute in the sense it was first coined to convey. However, it may also mean that it is used in the sense in which it is now commonly used. In jurisprudence the terms “in reality” or “metaphorically” are employed to qualify either the use of a word or an idea; however they are much more common in the context of the former. However, it is not the case that the attributes and the names in question when used without qualification refer to created beings alone, and to God only when they are ascribed to Him. They may refer to God or to created beings when they are ascribed to the one or the other. Knowledge, for example, is sometimes used unqualifiedly, and sometimes in relation to man, as in this Qur’ānic verse: “There is no god but He: that is the witness of God, His angels, and those endued with knowledge standing firm on justice” (3:18), and sometimes in relation to God, as in this verse: “They do not compass aught of His knowledge except as He wills” (2:255). When knowledge is ascribed to created beings, it cannot be applied in that sense to the Creator, for the knowledge of created beings is not like the knowledge of the Creator. Similarly, when it is ascribed to the Creator as in the verse, “He has sent it from His (own) knowledge” (4:166), it cannot be predicated in that sense of created beings, for His knowledge is not like their knowledge.

But when we say knowledge and do not qualify it, it may be divided into the eternal knowledge and the contingent knowledge, for the word knowledge is used in the real sense in both cases. Similarly, existence, when unqualified, may be divided into eternal existence and contingent existence, or necessary existence and possible existence. Likewise, *istawā* when unqualified, may be divided into the *istawā* of the Creator and the *istawā* of the created. The same is true of will, mercy, and love; they may be divided into

the will, mercy, and love of God, and the will, mercy and love of man.

Hence, whoever thinks that we can characterize as real only the human attributes which are created and contingent but not the divine attributes is ignorant. Divine attributes are certainly perfect and worthy of their names. Human attributes do not bear any comparison with them, nor does human essence bear any comparison with the divine essence. How then can one say that human attributes are real or that men are really knowing, hearing and seeing while God's attributes are not real and that they are predicated of Him only metaphorically?

Some people say that these words are equivocal since they are more perfectly realized in one case than in the other. Existence, for example, should be better predicated, they say, of the Necessary Being than the possible, just as whiteness should be better predicated of snow than ivory. The same is true of the other attributes and names of God. He deserves them in a sense no creature does, even though they have something in common with Him. It is this common element which is denoted, they say, by these terms when they are used without referring specifically to anyone. When they are referred to anyone, they are qualified with that reference. When we say existence, quiddity, or essence, they refer to God as well as to created beings, though God deserves them more than the others. However, in either case they are used in the real sense. When we qualify them and say the existence of God or His quiddity or His essence they are specific to God, and the created objects do not share with them, and in that specific sense they are real for God alone. On the other hand, when we say the existence of created objects, their quiddity, or essence, they are specific to them and are also real for them, for example when we say the existence of man, or his quiddity, or his essence, God does not share into them; they are true of man only.

Ignorant people think that the term real is used only in the context of created beings. This is wrong from the points of view of

reason and revelation as well as language. We know as certain that between two existing beings there is something in common as well as something not in common which distinguishes one from the other. The word that denotes what is in common does not denote what is distinctive. It is part of the religion of Islam that God has good names, even though He has called His creatures by them. For example, He has called men hearing, seeing, living, loving, merciful, mighty, king, protector, knowing, wise, generous, etc. But everyone knows that by sharing in these common names, God does not become like His creatures; it only means that there is something in common between Him and His creatures; to be sure, what distinguishes Him from them is far more weighty and important than what He has in common with them.

So far as languages are concerned, this is recognized in every language whether spoken by the Arabs, Romans, Persians, or Turks, Berbers, or any other people. They are all aware that God is more worthy of the names Powerful and Actor than any other being, that He deserves more than any human being the title Mighty, and that He has that quality in reality. The same is true of the other beautiful names....

It is only fools who are deceived by the statement of the theologians that the Arabs coined the word *istawā* for man's mounting on a chair or a boat, or for the resting of the Ark on the mount Jūdī, or for the settling down of any other created object on something else. They have similarly claimed that people have coined the words hearing, seeing, and speaking for those who have eyeballs or brows, ears and lips. They have also said that people have coined the words knowledge, will, and mercy for those who have a certain piece of flesh, the heart. This is all nonsense. The Arabs coined for humans only what they ascribed to them. When they said men hear, see, speak, know, will, love, and have mercy, what was specific to men was only applicable to them. But when they said God hears, sees, speaks, knows, wills, loves, and has mercy, they referred to what was specific to God and had nothing

of what was specific to any created being. Hence those who think that *istawā* is real only when it represents some characteristics of created beings, even though God has used it in His own context, they must be called ignorant, in the light of language, as well as the distinction between reality and metaphor.

[*Fatāwā* 5:194-208]

(2.23) The interpretation of *istawā* and *nuzūl* on symbolic lines is wrong.

The Mu‘tazilah, the Jahmīyyah and the Harūrīyyah¹⁸⁷ interpret the verse, “The Merciful ascended the Throne” (20:5) to mean that He took control of things, managed the affairs and ruled over the world, and that He is not at one place but everywhere. These people deny that God is on His Throne as the people of the truth believe, and understand *istawā* in the sense of rule. But if what they say is true there would have been no reason to mention the Throne outside the earth, as God could very well rule over the world from the earth; He has power over everything...

The view which these people hold is wrong for various reasons. First, none of the Elders from among the Companions or their Successors ever interpreted *istawā* on these lines. There is nothing to that effect in any of the works that have recorded their sayings. Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash‘arī in his book, *Maqalāt, Maqaltāt al-Islāmiyyīn* well as *Al-Ibānah* observes that the first people to interpret symbolically were the Jahmīyyah and the Mu‘tazilah. Second, what *istawā* means was very well known to people. That is why when Rabī‘ah Ibn Abī Abdur-Raḥmān^{187a} and Mālik Ibn Anas were asked about the meaning of the verse, “the Merciful ascended (*istawā*) the Throne” they said *istawā* is known, but its mode is unknown. However, we have to believe in it, remembering that questioning about it is *bid‘ah* unjustified innovation. Obviously they did not mean to say that they only knew what

istawā meant in language, and not what it meant in the verse, for they were specifically asked about its meaning in the verse whether it was in any way like the *istawā* of the people.

Third, since the meaning of *istawā* was known in the language in which the Qur’ān was revealed, what it meant in the Qur’ān was also known. Fourth, if the meaning of *istawā* in the verse were unknown, Rabī‘ah and Mālik would have had no reason to say that its nature was unknown, for one denies knowing the nature of a thing only when one is acquainted with the thing itself. We do say, for example, we believe in God and recognize Him, but we do not know His nature.

Fifth, if *istawā* is taken in the sense of authority, rule or the like, it would extend to everything in the world as does God’s Lordship. The Throne, to be sure, is the greatest object that God has created, but by saying the Lord of the Throne we do not thereby deny that He is the Lord of other things. In the Qur’ān we have, “Say: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens and the Lord of the Great Throne?” (23:86). Something similar we have in the supplication which the Prophet has taught us to say at the time of affliction.¹⁸⁸ If *istawā* is interpreted to mean ‘taking control of’ then one would be perfectly justified in saying that God *istawā ‘alā* ascended the heavens or the air or the waters or the earth or anything else, and not only the Throne, for God’s control extends to everything. The *ummah* is agreed that we should connect *istawā* only with the Throne and not with anything else, which this interpretation allows. We therefore conclude that *istawā* must mean something which can only be related to the Throne, and not to other objects.

Sixth, God has said that “He created the heavens and the earth in six days, and then ascended the Throne” (7:54), and that “His Throne was on the waters” (11:7) before their creation. Al-Bukhārī has recorded a *ḥadīth* on the authority of ‘Imrān Ibn Ḥaṣīn that the Prophet said, “God was there while there was nothing else, and His

Throne was on the waters. He wrote everything in the Register (*adh-dhikr*), and then created the heavens and the earth.”¹⁸⁹ This means that He created the Throne before the heavens and the earth, and that He had been there on it since then. Hence *istawā* on the Throne cannot be in the same sense as *istawā* on any other thing, it must be in some sense specific to the Throne.

Seventh, there is no precedent in language to show that *istawā* means (*istawā ‘alā*), to take control of. Those who take this meaning cite in their support the famous couplet

Then Bishr took control of (*istawā ‘alā*) Iraq,
Without using the sword or shedding any blood.

First, the Arabic origin of this couplet is not established; more than one scholar of language has denied it and said that it has been simply fabricated, and is not at all a part of genuine Arabic literature. Everyone knows that if you cite a *ḥadīth* of the Prophet, you must first ascertain its authenticity. How then can one cite a couplet whose author is not known and whose genuineness is disputed? Abū Al-Muẓaffar¹⁹⁰ has mentioned in his book, *Al-Iḥṣāḥ* that Al-Khalīl¹⁹¹ was asked whether he knew any instance of *istawā* meaning *istawalā*, taking control of. His answer was that it was unknown to the Arabs, and was not to be found in their language. Khalīl, as we know, is an authority (*imām*) on language. His remark that it was unknown to the Arabs refutes the interpretation of *istawā* in the sense of *istawalā*)

Eighth, a number of philologists are of the opinion that one should not use *istawā* in the sense of *istawā ‘alā* except in the case of one who did not have control over any thing in the beginning and only got control over it afterwards. Obviously God is never thwarted by anything, not even by the Throne. Hence *istawā* cannot be used in the sense of *istawā ‘alā* for God. If this is accepted then *istawā* in the phrase, “Bishr *istawā* over Iraq” should be understood as a metaphor. And as a rule no sentence should be interpreted metaphorically unless there is some clue there that

indicates that the speaker means it. This is all the more true of ambiguous words. As for the Qur'ānic verse, there is no indication in it that may suggest that *istawā* should be understood in the sense of *istawā 'alā*....

Ninth, if at all it is established that the said couplet is really a part of Arabic literature, it would not mean that it has come down from the ancient Arabs. Even if that is granted, it would not mean that *istawā* in that sense was also a part of the prophetic language. If the Prophet at all used *istawā*, it should be taken in the sense in which the Qur'ān and the Sunnah commonly use it. It is in this sense rather than any other that *istawā* in the verse must be taken. [Fatāwā 5:143-47]

(2.24) The meaning of the words “God is with us.”

God is with us in reality, and he is on the Throne in reality. Discussion of the point, and reconciliation between His being with us and being above the world.

God is really with (*ma'a*) us, and He is also really on the Throne. He has Himself put the two together, “He it is who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and then ascended the Throne. He knows what enters within the earth and what comes forth out of it, what comes down from heaven and what rises up to it. He is with you wheresoever you may be. And God is aware with all that you do” (57:4). Thus has He informed that He is above the Throne, that He knows everything, and that He is with us wherever we are. In the same vein the Prophet has said in a famous *ḥadīth*, “God is above everything, and He knows how you are doing.”¹⁹²

When the word *ma'a* “with,” is used without any qualification, it conveys just the sense of co-existence without implying that one thing touches the other, or that it is on the right or the left. But when it is qualified in some sense say, it conveys co-existence in that sense. We say, “We were walking and the moon or the star

was with us. We sometimes say, “A is with us” when we have it with us even though it is on our head. Hence God is with His creatures in reality, and He is on His Throne in reality.

Ma‘īyyah (“being with”) may however, mean different things in different contexts. When God says, “He knows what enters within the earth and what comes forth out of it...He is with (*ma‘a*) you wheresoever you may be, what He means by *ma‘īyyah* here is that He knows you, sees you, looks after you, and is aware of you. This is what the Elders mean by saying, “He is with us with His knowledge.” And this is what the words of the Qur’ān apparently as well as in reality mean.

The same is true of the words, “There is not a secret consultation between three but He makes the fourth of them, nor between five but He makes the sixth, nor between fewer nor more but He is with them wheresoever they be” (58:7). And when the Prophet said to his companion in the cave “Have no fear, for God is with (*ma‘a*) us” (9:40), it was also true at face value. The context shows that *ma‘īyyah* here is *ma‘īyyah* of knowledge, help and support. Similarly in the words, “Verily God is with those who restrain themselves and those who do good” (16:128) and in the words “Fear not; for I am with you: I hear and see” (20:46) *ma‘īyyah* is to be taken conveying the sense of support and protection.

We often observe that when someone who scares a child approaches him, the child gets frightened and begins to weep. His father, looking at him from the top of the roof consoles him saying, “Don’t fear; I am with you, I am here.” He reminds the child of his being with (*ma‘īyyah*) him, which is sufficient to protect him from anything unpleasant. The father, as you see, distinguishes between “being with” the child and its consequence. Often the consequence is included in the meaning of *ma‘īyyah* thus causing variation in its meaning.

Ma‘īyyah has been mentioned in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah at various places, and at every place it conveys something different.

However, whether you say that its meaning varies from place to place, or that it has something common in all its uses, even though it has something distinctive on every occasion, it does not mean that God is there in touch with a created being, so that one might charge us that we have diverged from the face meaning of the word.

[*Fatāwā* 5:103-104]

(2.25) God's being with us and being above the world.

The Elders believe that God is above the heavens on His Throne, and that He is different from the world and the world is different from Him. On the other hand, they also believe that He is with every human being with His knowledge, and with prophets and friends with His help, support and all-sufficient might. He is also there close to the latter people, responding to their call and granting their prayers.

At various places in His book as well as through His prophets, God has made it repeatedly clear that He is above the world and that He is established on His Throne. On the former point, there are a number of verses in the Qur'ān, which, according to a great scholar of the Shāfi'ī school, are more than a thousand; they all underline that God is above the world, as He is above the human beings... On the other hand, He has also referred to His presence (*ma'īyyah*) and nearness (*qurb*). Presence is of two kinds, general and particular. The first is referred in the verse "He is with you wheresoever you are" (57:4), and the second is referred in the verse, "Verily God is with those who avoid evil, and those who do good" (16:128). As for nearness, it is referred to in the verses, "I am close (to you)" (2:186); "We are nearer to you than your jugular vein" (50:16); and, "We are nearer to him than you" (56:85).

People are divided into four groups on the question as to what these verses mean. The Jahmīyyah, who negate God's attributes, say that He is neither in the world nor outside it, neither above it nor beneath it. They neither affirm His transcendence (*'ulū*) nor His aboveness (*fawqīyyah*); they explain away every verse and declare God to be unknowable. Every group that has come out with unorthodox ideas cites one text or the other; this is true of the Khawārij, the Shi'īs, the Qadarīyyah, the Rāfiḍah and the Murji'ah. But the Jahmīyyah have no texts to cite, and no word in support of their negation of God's attributes...

The second group says that God Himself is present everywhere. We have in this group the Najjārīs and many from the Jahmīs, whether devotees, mystics or common people. They say that God is one with the world. Like the people of the Unity of Being, who say that Being is one, they believe in God's indwelling (*ḥulūl*) and union (*ittiḥād*) with the world. They argue from the verses which speak of God's presence and His nearness, and explain away those which speak of His transcendence and His ascension on the Throne. But the verses which they cite in their support go against them, for God's presence (*ma'īyyah*) has mostly been associated with the prophets or the saints, while according to them He is everywhere.

There are many verses that refute their view, for example, "Everyone in the heaven and the earth glorifies God, and He is Dominant and Wise" (57:1). Since everything in the heavens and the earth glorifies God, and the glorifier has to be other than the Glorified, the world is other than God. The next verse says, "The kingdom of the heavens is His" (57:2), which simply means that God is the ruler of the world. The third verse says, "He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden, and He knows everything" (57:3). Referring to this verse, the Prophet said in a *ḥadīth* which is authentic, "You are the First, there is nothing before You; You are the Last, there is nothing after You; You are the Manifest and Dominant (*Aẓ-Zāhīr*), there is nothing above

You; You are the Hidden, there is nothing below You.”¹⁹³ That is to say, if He is the First, there be something there that comes after Him; if He is the Last there must be something there that goes before Him; if He is the Manifest and Dominant and nothing is above Him, there must be something there He dominates; and if He is Hidden and nothing is below Him, there must be something there which is not below Him....

Ma'īyyah (being with) does not imply intermingling or intermixing, nor does the word *qurb* imply that. Only the exponents of *ḥulūl* say that God dwells in the jugular vein, as He dwells in everything. This is sheer blasphemy and ignorance.

The third group says that God is on the Throne as well as everywhere. They claim that they believe in both kinds of texts, without interpreting any one on symbolic lines. Al-Ash'arī has mentioned this view and its exponents in his *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*. It is found in the writings of the Salīmīyyah and the Šūfīs, as it is found in the works of Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī,¹⁹⁴ Ibn Barrajan¹⁹⁵ and others.... In comparison to the others, this group is closer to the texts of the Qur'ān and less opposed to them. Whereas the first group does not hold to any text and opposes all, and the second ignores many clear and unequivocal texts and holds only to a few ambiguous ones, the third group claims that they hold to all the texts; however, they are not quite correct.

Whoever says that God Himself is present at every place opposes the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, the consensus of the Elders of the *ummah*, and other *a'immah*... He also goes against the knowledge God has endowed man with, against reason, and many other bits of evidence. The third group, on the other hand, is also guilty of contradictory statements. On the one hand, they affirm that God is above the Throne; on the other, they assert that the relation of the Throne with God is like that of the heart of a Gnostic with God. This is the view of Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī and others. But it is obvious that the heart of the gnostic has nothing of God except knowledge and faith in Him and what follows from

them. So when they liken the Throne with the heart of the Gnostic they contradict their own statement that God is above the Throne. Moreover, their saying that God Himself enters the heart of the Gnostic amounts to the belief in His indwelling (*ḥulūl*).

A section of the Ṣūfīs believes in *ḥulūl*. The author of the *Manāzil as-Sā'irīn*¹⁹⁶ is one of them; what he has said in the chapter of *Tawḥīd* at the end of his book is a kind of *ḥulūl*. Great Ṣūfīs have been very cautious on such points. For example, once when Junayd was asked about *tawḥīd*, he replied, "It is the separation of the contingent from the Eternal." He thus made it clear that a strict monotheist has to differentiate between the Eternal Creator and the contingent world; he should never mix one with the other. But what these people say about the gnostics is similar to what the Christians say about Christ and the Shi'īs about their imāms. Many Ṣūfīs who believe in *ḥulūl* and follow Satan object to what Junayd and other great gnostics who strictly adhere to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah have said in denying *ḥulūl* and affirming God's commands and prohibitions. They say that the latter have not attained the knowledge of reality as they and other *ḥulūlīs* and disciples of Iblīs have attained.

The fourth group consists of the *Salaf* and the leaders of the *ummah* - leaders in knowledge as well as religion, scholars and devotees. They believe in whatever there is in the Qur'ān and Sunnah and affirm it, without altering, in the least, the meaning of any word. They say that God is above the heavens, that He is on His Throne, that He exists separately from the world He has created, and that the world exists separately from Him. They also affirm that He is present for all His creatures with His knowledge, and to His prophets and friends with His help and support and is sufficient for them, He is close to them and responds their call.

As evidence one can cite verse 58:7, which speaks of God's presence at all secret consultations, as well as the words of the Prophet: "Lord! You are (our) Companion during the journey, and (behind us) over our family."¹⁹⁷ Hence God is with the traveler on

his journey and with his family at his home. But this does not mean that His being touches the beings of the others. “Being with” in this context means the same as in the verse, “Muḥammad, the messenger of God and those who are with (*ma‘ā*) him” (48:29). that is, they are with him in faith. It is certainly not the case that their beings are in his being. They are only his companions. The same meaning is intended in the verse, “They are with the Believers” (4:146), that is to say they are one with the Believers in faith and in supporting each other. God knows men and is with them wherever they are. His knowledge of them is a consequence of His presence with them. A woman has said of her husband, “My husband has a long scabbard (*ṭawīl an-najād*), a heap of ashes (*‘azīm ar-ramād*), and lives in a house close to anyone who visits.” All she has said is true, for she refers to the ideas which are associated with these things: He is tall in stature, generous in offering meat cooked on fire, and quick to entertain any visitor.

[*Fatāwā* 5: 226-232]

(2.26) Nearness (*Qurb*)

The meaning of man coming near to God and God coming near to man explained.

Man draws near to God through knowledge and the works that he performs. This comes out in the following verses and *ḥadīth*; “Bow down in adoration and bring yourself closer (to God)” (96:19). “Fear God and find out means to reach Him” (5:35). “They are those who call (God) and find out means to their Lord” (17:57). “If he is among the nearest ones...(56:88). The same is meant by the words the Prophet has quoted of God, “When one comes a span closer to Me, I go an arms length closer to him,¹⁹⁸ or the words, “the best that My servant can do to come close to Me is to perform the duties I have obligated on him. And he comes closer to Me through supererogatory acts, till I love him...”¹⁹⁹ The same is

implied in the word *qurbān* in the verse, “When they two offered a sacrifice (*qurbān*), We accepted only from one of them,” (5:27), and in the verse, “till he brings a sacrifice (*qurbān*) which the fire consumes” (3:183).

Qurb implies movement on the part of man from one state to another, but this may or may not be accompanied by movement of his soul or his self. If it moves at all, it may move towards either the divine Self or any other thing. If it moves towards God, the question remains as to what God’s coming close to man, drawing near or coming, means. It may mean either a reward from Him bestowed on man for his coming close to God, or that He takes the initiative and comes down to the nearest heaven. The first line is taken by the philosophers. They say that the soul is neither inside the body nor outside it; nor can we say that it moves or does not move. Some people in the *ummah* follow them on this point. They say that one comes near to God in the sense that one purifies oneself from evils and vices and adorns oneself with noble virtues, so that one comes close to God in the sense of imitating Him in some inner qualities. They say that philosophy is to imitate God as much as is possible. As for the movement of the soul, they simply rule it out. They explain the nearness (*qurb*) of the angels along the same lines.

They are correct in what they say about the purification of the soul from evils and its embellishment with virtues. But they are wrong in denying that it may mean something more. The most that they allow is that you visit objects which radiate a blessing from God, such as mosques, heavens, and saints. To them the ascension (*mi‘rāj*) of the Prophet means nothing more than the revelation of truths about the universe. This is the view of Ibn Sīnā and those who follow him, like ‘Ayn al-Quḍāt²⁰⁰ and Ibn Al-Khatīb,²⁰¹ as the latter has stated in his *Al-Maṭālib al-‘Alīyyah*.

The second view on this issue is taken by the theologians. They claim that God is not on the Throne, that the Throne and the Footstool stand with Him in the same relation, that He is neither

inside the world nor outside it. They allow for only the movement of human beings and the angels; they say that the statement that a person comes nearer to God means nothing more than that he moves from one holy place to another which God has blessed: the heavens, the bearers of the Throne, and Paradise. They interpret the ascension of the Prophet on similar lines. Thus they are one with the philosophers with regard to the movement of the body to blessed places and offering prayers there. They only differ with regard to the movement of the soul. The first group affirms the movement of the soul in the sense of a transformation of state, not of movement from one place to another. The second group agrees that both body and the soul can move to places where one may attain enlightenment on God, such as the heavens, mosques, saints of God, and the places that manifest God's names and signs.

The third view is held by the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah. They say that God is on the Throne, that the bearers of the Throne are closer to Him than anyone else, that the angels of the farthest heaven are closer to Him than those of the second heaven, that in ascending to the heavens the Prophet went nearer to His Lord, that his ascension was to God and not to any of His created beings, and that the soul of a person praying to God draws near to Him while he prostrates himself (on the ground) even though he has put his head on the ground. This is the purport of various verses of the Qur'ān.

Does God come closer to man as a result of the latter going near to Him, just as a fixed object such as a house, a wall or a hill comes nearer to a person who goes towards it? Or does it involve some action on the part of God? Does He also move towards a person when the latter moves towards Him, one action in response to the other? On this question there are two views among the Ahl as-Sunnah corresponding to the two positions that they have among themselves on the issue of the active attributes of God like descent (*nuzūl*)....

Tradition says that God comes near to His chosen people and appears to their hearts. For example, Aḥmad has noted in his *Kitāb Az-Zuhd*²⁰² that Moses invoked God and said, “Lord, where can I reach you? The answer was, “Near weak souls who humble themselves for Me. I come a span nearer to them every day; otherwise, they would have burned.” Philosophers and the Jahmīyyah have taken this “nearness” in the sense of God’s manifestation or appearance to the heart of His servants. They understand “coming close” as imagery.

The philosophers do not believe in the movement of the soul; the Jahmīyyah admit that it does move towards a higher place, and the Ahl as-Sunnah affirm God’s appearance and manifestation as well as man’s coming near to God. However, on the issue of God coming near to man they have two different views, which I have discussed elsewhere. Theologians who negate God’s attributes would interpret His coming and descent in the sense of manifestation and appearance to His servant when the veils on the latter’s eyes that prevent him from seeing God are removed. His case is like that of a blind man who regains his sight, and on seeing the sun and the moon says, “The sun and the moon have come to me.” This is the view of the philosophers, the Mu’tazilah, and the Asha’irah who negate divine attributes. However, the Asha’irah, as against the Mu’tazilah, affirm the Beatific Vision, though there are people among them who come very close to the Mu’tazilah in what they say.

According to the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā’ah whether belonging to the *Salaf*, the *ahl al-ḥadīth*, or the people of different disciplines, jurists, Ṣūfīs, theologians or common men, God’s descent or coming may happen as a result of man’s moving, approaching, or coming near to Him. But it is certainly more than enlightenment on the part of man, for enlightenment is only a kind of knowledge, whereas for them it is knowledge as well as action. The Asha’irah and other like-minded theologians do not deny movement as such on the part of man; that is a reality. What they

deny is man's movement towards God, as we have said earlier. Some of them have likened the coming of God to the coming of what is certain in the verse, "Serve your Lord until there comes to you that which is certain" (15:99), that is to say, death and things which will follow it.

[*Fatāwā* 6:5-91]

(2.27) Beatific Vision

The Salaf believe that the Faithful will see God in the next life, though no one has ever seen or shall ever see Him in this life. Only some Ṣūfīs claim that they have seen God with their own eyes in this life. But this is not correct; what they see is something inside themselves and not someone out there.

(a) The *Salaf* and the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah* are agreed that the Believers will see God with their eyes in the next life, but no one can see Him with his or her eyes in this life. They differ only with regard to the Prophet, whether he ever saw Him or not. In a *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* he is reported to have said, "None of you will ever see God before his death."²⁰³ Those who say that saints (*awliyā'*) and others may see God with their eyes in this world are mistaken; they go against the verdict of the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the *ummah*. Some have even claimed superiority over Moses. Such people shall be asked to repent. If they do, they will be left alone, otherwise they will be killed. [*Fatāwā* 6:512]

(b) This is a place where a number of Ṣūfīs have gone wrong. They actually see something in their heart, but claim that it is out there. Some of the earlier as well as later Ṣūfīs have claimed that they see God with their eyes. What actually happens is that when their heart is occupied with knowledge, *dhikr*, and love, they are lost in the vision they have in their heart and forget everything else. They attain self-annihilation, and begin to think that they actually see God with their eyes, though what they see is nothing

out there but what is only in their hearts. They are just led to think that they see God with their eyes out there....

Some of them have said that Moses saw God with his eyes, that the mountain veiled him at first, but later on when God sent it crumbling into pieces he was able to see Him. This is found in the writings of Abū Ṭālib (Al-Makkī) and the like. Others identify the seer with the seen (God); they talk of union and say that Moses forgot himself so completely that the seer became one with the Seen. Hence, to them Moses did not see God, rather God saw Himself in Himself. They claim the same for themselves.

The claim of union or indwelling (*ḥulūl*) is wrong. To those who believe in it, it is only a matter of inner experience of the heart rather than something existing out there, and amounts to what the Christians believe about Christ. They do not say that anyone has seen the unseen Divinity appearing in a human body.

Such claims are quite common in the writings of the Ṣūfīs. They experience many things in the heart and wrongly imagine that they happen out there. A similar mistake is committed by the philosophers and various other thinkers when they first form in their minds ideas of things, like universals and immaterial realities, and then imagine that they exist out there, whereas the fact is that they exist only in their minds. That is why Abū Al-Qāsim As-Suhaylī²⁰⁴ and others have sought refuge in God from the ratiocination of the philosophers and the imagination of the Ṣūfīs as their writings are full of contradictory statements.

Ṣūfīs like Ibn ‘Arabī and others who combine erroneous philosophical ideas with mystical fancies are farthest removed from truth. That is why Junayd, the leader of the Ṣūfī community, a true imām and one who was fully aware of the experiences Ṣūfīs have, said that *tawḥīd* is to separate the Eternal from the contingent.²⁰⁵ He clearly distinguished between the contingent and the Eternal so that people should not fall into the error of *ḥulūl* or union (*itiḥād*). When heretics like Ibn ‘Arabī appeared, they objected to the words of Junayd since they contradicted their

doctrines. Junayd and Ṣūfīs like him are exponents of truth (*a'immaḥ al-hudā*), and those who oppose them are grossly mistaken. Many Ṣūfīs besides Junayd have also discussed things which they experience in their *sulūk* or the lights and other things which they perceive, and have warned against identifying these things with God. [*Fatāwā* 5:489-921]

(2.28) Did the Prophet see God in his lifetime?

The correct view on this issue is that Muḥammad (peace and blessings of God be upon him) did not see his Lord with his eyes; he only saw Him with his heart.

The words which Ibn Abbās is reported in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections of *ḥadīth* to have said are, “Muḥammad saw his Lord with his heart twice.”²⁰⁶ ‘Ā’ishah, on the other hand, is reported to have denied that he ever saw the Lord.²⁰⁷ Some of the scholars who have discussed these *aḥādīth* have tried to reconcile one with the other. They say that ‘Ā’ishah only denied that the Prophet saw the Lord with his eyes; Ibn ‘Abbās affirmed, on the other hand, that he saw Him with his heart. The words that are reported of Ibn Abbās are qualified as well as unqualified. He sometimes says, “Muḥammad saw his Lord,” and sometimes, “Muḥammad saw Him.”²⁰⁸ But he has not been reported to have ever said in so many words that he saw God with his eyes.

Likewise, Imām Aḥmad sometimes only affirms that the Prophet saw God without specifying its nature, and sometimes that he saw God by his heart. No one has mentioned that he heard him saying that the Prophet saw God with his eyes. A section of his followers who heard him affirming the vision without specifying its nature took it in the sense of visual perception, just as some people who heard Ibn Abbās affirming the vision without specifying its mode took it in the sense of seeing with the eyes.

There is nothing to prove that the Prophet saw God with his eyes. No companion had ever said that, nor is there anything in the Qur'ān or the Sunnah which may suggest it. In fact, authentic texts negate rather than affirm it, for example, Muslim has reported that Abū Dharr asked the Prophet, "Did you see the Lord?" and he replied, "Light! How could I have seen Him."²⁰⁹ In the Qur'ān we have, "Glory to (God) Who did take His servant for a journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless in order that We might show him some of Our signs" (17:1). Had the Prophet seen God with his eyes on that occasion, God would have mentioned it at this place. In another verse we have, "Would you then dispute with him regarding what he saw... Indeed he did see the greatest signs of his Lord" (53:12,18). Had he seen God with his eyes, this was the place to mention it.

Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim record in their *Ṣaḥīḥs* that, in commenting on the verse, "We granted the vision which We showed you just as a trial for men" (17:60), Ibn Abbās said, "It was a vision the Prophet saw with his eyes the night he was taken on a journey."²¹⁰ But it was a vision of the signs; for when he informed people what he saw with his eyes the night of Ascension, they wondered at it; some did testify to it but others belied it. The Prophet did not say that he saw God with his eyes, nor is there anything to that effect in the authentic reports of the Ascension recorded in *ḥadīth* collections. Had it really happened it would surely have been mentioned in these reports.

The Qur'ān and the Sunnah clearly say, and the consensus of the Elders of the *ummah* definitely states, that no one can see the Lord with his eyes in this life. Only a few people have made an exception in the case of the Prophet. As for seeing God in the next life, there is complete agreement that the Believers will see Him with their eyes just as they see the sun and the moon.²¹¹

[*Fatāwā* 6:509-10]

(2.29) The hand of God

The Elders believe that the ẓāhirī , the apparent meanings of the verses that refer to the hand, sight and hearing of God, is what they really mean. However, this apparent meaning is one that behooves God, the Almighty, and not what behooves created beings. Commenting on this position, Ibn Taymīyyah has explained the meaning of the words, az-ẓāhir , al-ḥaqīqah (the real meaning), and al-majaz (the metaphorical meaning), and defended the belief of the Elders regarding God's hands.

The belief of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* who are the Elders of the first three centuries, as well as of those who follow their line from among the people of later ages, is that these *ahādīth* should be taken at face value, should be believed and accepted, and should not be interpreted in a way that leads either to their negation (*ta'ṭīl*) or literalization (*takyīf*) amounting to anthropomorphization (*tamthīl*). A number of writers including Al-Khaṭṭābī^{211a} have noted that the Elders are agreed that these verses are to be taken on their face (*ẓāhir*) without saying anything about the nature (*kayfīyyah*) of the things they assert or anthropomorphizing them. The position one takes on God's attributes is subject to the position one takes on His essence; the former follows from the latter and is in agreement with it. Since to affirm the essence of God is to affirm an existence and not merely a quality, to affirm His attribute is to affirm some thing existing and not merely a quality. This is why we say that God has a hand and that He has hearing; we never say that hand means power or that hearing means knowing.

Some people claim that the Elders did not believe that the *ẓāhir* of these verses was meant. This claim is wrong in words as well as meaning, or at least in meaning if not in words. *ẓāhir* is an ambiguous term, it may be taken in two different senses. It may be said that in *ẓāhir* the hand of God is an organ like a human organ,

that His anger entails the boiling of His blood for taking revenge, that His being in the heavens is like water being in a pot. In this view of *ẓāhir*, if any one says that these meanings are not intended, that God's attributes should not be understood in this way, that verses and *aḥādīth* should not be taken on their *ẓāhir* in this sense, he is right. The Ahl as-Sunnah are one on the point that there is nothing like God in His essence, attributes and acts. In fact, most of the Ahl as-Sunnah whether they belong to our school or not, call infidels those who anthropomorphize God (*al-mushabbīyyah*) or attribute to Him the qualities of a physical body (*al-mujassimah*). Whoever takes *ẓāhir* in this sense is wrong. He is even worse, for he is saying that such is the *ẓāhir* of the verses and the *aḥādīth* on divine attributes. He is certainly not correct in attributing this to the Elders.

The *ẓāhir* of a passage is what comes to the mind of an unbiased person knowing the language of the passage when he reads it. Sometimes this *ẓāhir* meaning comes to him simply from the passage itself and sometimes from its context. The meanings which have been noted above and which are inadmissible for God never come to the mind of any believer. For him, the hand of God is just like His knowledge, His power or His essence... No one from the Ahl-as-Sunnah has said that when we say that God has knowledge, power, sight and hearing their *ẓāhir* is not meant, or ever understood these attributes on the pattern of our attributes. Likewise, it cannot be said that the *ẓāhir* of the hand or face is not meant for there is no reason to differentiate between our body and any attribute of our body.

In the second sense of *ẓāhir*, the *ẓāhir* of these attributes is what behooves God. They stand to His sublime essence just as the attributes of any other being stand to its essence. Knowledge is an essential attribute of a being which is knowing and has its own characteristics. The same is the case with the face. We cannot say that God does not need these attributes, for they are necessary and essential to His being. God, Who is the object of worship and

obedience must have all these attributes. The same is true of His actions. We know that to create is to produce the universe from non-being, even though we do not say anything about the modality of creation since it is unlike our actions. Our actions are governed by our needs, and God is above all needs; He is Self-sufficient and All-Perfect. His being is known to us in outline, even though His essence is unlike the essence of created beings. What He is in His essence is known to none except Him; no one can form any idea of it. This is what comes to our mind when we speak of God's attributes, and it is in this sense that they should be understood.

The Believer knows what these attributes mean or imply, and this is what is required of him. He knows that God has power over everything, that He knows everything, that the whole earth will be in His grip on the Day of Judgment, that the heavens will be in His right hand all rolled up, that the Believers will be looking at the face of their Creator in Paradise and will enjoy it more than any other thing they could have, and so on. He also knows that he has a Lord, a Creator and a God, even though he does not know the real nature of any one. In fact, all knowledge that man has is like this, he knows things of this world only in some of their respects, not in their true nature, even his own self he knows in the same way....

When God mentions any one of His attributes, when His Prophet mentions one, or when those from among the Believers who have the correct faith mention one, before one turns away from the apparent meaning of that attribute, which is its real meaning, and interprets it in an esoteric sense opposite to its apparent meaning or in a metaphorical sense contrary to its real sense, one must ascertain the following four things.

First, if the word concerned has been used in a metaphorical sense. Since the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are in Arabic and the Elders expressed themselves in that language, nothing that is found in any of these sources can be taken in a sense that goes against the usage of the Arabs or violates the rules common to all the languages of mankind. It is necessary, therefore, that the word

concerned has really been used in the metaphorical sense; otherwise any pretender could interpret any word in any way he likes, even if there is no justification for it in the language.

Second, there must be some justification for leaving the real meaning of the word and taking it in a metaphorical sense. If a word is used on one occasion in its real sense, and on another occasion in a metaphorical sense, you are not justified in taking it in the metaphorical sense without giving any reason for it. This is commonly agreed. Hence, if anyone wants to depart from the real meaning of a word and take it in a metaphorical sense he must cite a reason for doing so.

Third, the reason which is offered must be incontrovertible. Otherwise, if an argument is advanced on the basis of the Qur'ān or the Faith which shows that the real meaning is what is intended, departure from it cannot be justified; and if this argument consists in citing a clear and unequivocal text, departure from it cannot be allowed. But if it is just the apparent meaning of the text, one must offer a reason for preferring the metaphorical meaning.

Fourth, if the Prophet (pbuh) states something and means something other than what his words apparently convey, he must have made it clear that he did not intend the real meaning, but rather he intended the metaphorical meaning, no matter whether he defined it or not. This is particularly necessary in statements which concern faith and knowledge rather than practice.... He must also have put in some clues that bar his people from taking his words in the apparent sense. However, the clue may be something rational, as we have in the verse, "She was given something out of everything" (27:23); everyone knows that what is meant is that she (the Queen of Sheba) was given something from everything which persons in her position usually have. Similarly, the verse, "He is the Creator of everything" (13:16, 39:62), everyone who hears these words knows that the Creator Himself is not included in "everything". The clue may also be contextual. There may be something in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah itself which leads one to

take the text in a non-apparent sense. The Prophet cannot have left the people to find out for themselves a secret clue which only a few can discover, be it rational or textual, for if he stated something meaningful, repeated it time and again, addressed it to each and every person, intelligent and unintelligent, perceptive and non-perceptive, asked them to understand it or reflect upon its ideas and their implications, and then wanted them not to believe in its apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) because of some secret reason which only a few can discover, and then inform that he did not mean the *ẓāhir* - that would be misleading the people and confusing them, and the Prophet would have failed in his mission of guiding people and expounding the truth.... One cannot imagine that, particularly when his words tell clearly that he means the apparent rather than the non-apparent meaning, and when the alleged hidden reason for taking the non-apparent meaning is imaginary rather than real....

I will take one of the attributes, the hand (*yad*), as an example and discuss it in detail; you can understand other attributes in the same way. God has said, "The Jews say, 'God's hand is tied up.' Be their hands tied up, and be they accursed for the (blasphemy) they utter. No, both His hands are widely stretched. He gives and spends as He pleases" (5:677). Addressing Satan, He said, "Iblīs! What prevents you from prostrating yourself to one whom I have created with My hands?" (38:175). At other places, He has said, "No just estimate have they made of God such as is due to Him. On the Day of Judgment the whole of the earth will be but His handful, and the heavens will be rolled up in His right hand" (39:67); "Blessed be He in Whose hands rests all the dominion" (67:1); "In Your hand is all good; verily You have power over all things" (3:26); "Do they not see that it is We Who have created for them, among the things which Our hands have fashioned, cattle which are in their possession?" (36:71). In *aḥādīth* of the Prophet, too, there are many references to the hand of God.

The burden of all these texts is that God has two hands unique to Him and essential to Him, but behooving His greatness; He created man with His hands but not the angels or Satan; He holds the earth in His grip, and will hold the heavens rolled up in his right hand; His two hands are outstretched; their outstretching means that He is busy giving out from His blessings, for one does such things by stretching one's hands, and withdraws from them by closing them or putting them in one's pocket. When we say that the hands of X are outstretched we mean real hands, and that they are engaged in giving out things. God says, "Do not put your hands tied with your neck, nor stretch them too much" (17:29). And people often say, "X is tight-fisted (*ja'd al-banān*)," and X is open-handed (*sabit al-banān*)."

If the objector says that God does not have hands of the kind creatures have, and that His hands are not organs one strikes with, it is true. But if he says that he does not have hands in any sense not reducible to His seven attributes, he is mistaken. Such a person usually attempts the following things. First, he says that people often use *yad* in the sense of blessing or gift, just as they refer to a thing by its cause, for example, they refer to rain by the word "*samā*" (sky), for similar reasons, people say X has given a hand to Y; and Abū Ṭālib said the following couplet when he once lost his nephew Muḥammad (pbuh)

My Lord! bring back my horse-rider, Muḥammad,
Bring him back, and give me a hand.

And 'Urwah Ibn Mas'ūd²¹² said to Abū Bakr²¹³ at the time of Hudaybiyyah, "Had you not given me a hand which I could not return, I would have given you a fitting reply.

Hand is also used for power on the pattern of calling a thing by the name of its agent, for power is generated by the hand. People say "X has his hand in this matter" or that. Ziyād²¹⁴ is reported to have said to Mu'āwīyah,²¹⁵ "I control Iraq with one hand and keep

the other hand free.” What he meant is that he expends only half his power in ruling Iraq. The same idea is involved in the verse, “In whose hands is the marriage-tie” (2:237), meaning “who has power to make the contract of marriage.”

An action is also sometimes referred to as the hand of a person instead of the person himself. Since most acts are performed by the hand, to refer to them as the hand is to refer them to the person himself. The Qur’ān says, “God has heard the taunt of those who say, ‘Truly God is indigent and we are rich!’ We shall certainly record their words and their act of slaying the prophets in defiance of right, and We shall say, Taste you the penalty of the scorching Fire. This is because of the (unrighteous deeds) which your hands sent on before you” (3:181-2). That is to say, the deeds which you sent on; for the words that one utters is action one does....

In reply, I will say that we do not deny these uses that we have in the Arabic in which the Qur’ān was revealed. Those who interpret God’s attributes metaphorically change the meaning of the texts, and commit blasphemy with regard to His names and interpret wrongly His words, “His hands are outstretched” (5:64), and “one whom I have created with My hands” (38:75). They say that hand in these verses means either blessings in this life or the next or it means power. Hand is a symbol for charity; it does not require that there be a real hand there; in fact, it has replaced the word charity in the common language. The phrase, “whom I have created with My hands,” only means “one whom God has created”; it does not at all imply that He has any hands in reality.... This is the way they interpret these words.

The first thing that I would say in this regard is that hand is used in this verse in the dual (*yadayn*), and *yad* in the dual is not used in the sense of favor or power. Arabs do use the singular form in place of the plural; in the Qur’ān we have “Verily man (*al-insān*) is in loss” (103:2). Similarly they use the plural form in place of the singular; for example, “men (*an-nās*) said to them: a great army is gathering” (3:173). They also use the plural in place

of the dual, for example, “your hearts (*qulubukuna*) are indeed so inclined” (66:4). But they never use the singular for the dual or the dual for the singular. It is not permissible to say that you have a man (*rajul*) with you when you actually want to say that you have two men (*rajulayn*) with you, nor is it permissible to say that you have two men (*rajulayn*) with you when you actually want to say that you have one man (*rajul*) with you.... So the words, “whom I have created with My two hands” cannot be taken to mean, “whom I have created with My power”; power is a single attribute and cannot be referred to with a dual word. Nor can the words be taken to mean favor; God’s favors are innumerable, and as such they cannot be referred to by a dual word.

These words also cannot be taken to mean “whom I have created.” For if that had been the case, the act would have referred to the hand as its subject, for only when something refers to the hand as the subject may it mean referring to the agent himself, as we have in the verse, “because of (the deeds) which your two hands have sent forth” (22:10), or “because of what your hands have sent on” (3:182), or “among the things which Our hands have fashioned” (36:71). But when the act refers to the agent as its subject and hand is mentioned along with the preposition *bi*, as in the verse, “whom I have created with My hands” (38:75), it only means that the act has been done by means of the hands. That is why it is not allowed for one who has spoken something or walked somewhere to say that he has done (*fa‘ala*) it with his hands. One can, however, say that this is what his hands have done, for the word *fa‘ala* only means “he did”; so when you do not want to say that you did something with your hands, the addition of the words “with the hands” is unnecessary and meaningless. You will not find any Arab, or non-Arab who knows his language, saying, “I did it with my hands” or “someone did it with his hands” except when he or the other person really wants to say that he has done the act with his hands. It would not be correct to say either that they do

not have hands or that even though they have hands the act was not done with their hands.

I hope that after this clarification it will be easy to distinguish between places where a word is used in its real sense and where it is used in a metaphorical sense. It will also be clear that the verses mentioned above cannot be interpreted in a metaphorical sense in the light of the language itself....

The second thing that I would say is that sometimes the word *yad* may mean a real hand and sometimes a blessing or power, and sometimes it may also allude to an action. Having admitted that, I would ask the question: What is the justification for taking *yad* in the verse under discussion in a non-real sense? If your reason is that *yad* refers to a part of the body, and therefore cannot be attributed to God, I will say that surely hand and things like it should not be attributed to God if His hand belonged to the genus of the hands creatures have; this is absolutely right. But it does not rule out that God should not have hands that behoove Him or should not have those perfections which He deserves. There is nothing which reason knows of or revelation tells us that may declare it impossible. If this is the case, why should we not take the word in its real sense, and why should we interpret it metaphorically?

The third thing I would like to say to the person who interprets *yad* in a non-real sense is this: Can you point out any word in the Book of God, in the Sunnah of the Prophet, or in the sayings of any imām of the Muslims, which says that *yad* should not be taken in its apparent sense (*ẓāhir*) or that its apparent sense is not intended? Is there any verse in the Book of God that explicitly or implicitly denies attributing hands to God? The most that interpreters of *yad* on metaphorical lines cite is the verse, "Say: He Allah is one" (112:1), or "There is nothing like Him at all" (42:11), or "Do you know anyone who is worthy of the same name as He" (19:65). But these verses only deny reducing God to an organism (*tajsīm*) or anthropomorphizing Him (*tashbih*); they do not deny attributing

hands to Him which behoove His majesty. There is nothing in the Qur'ān that negates it. I would also ask if there is anything that reason knows of which categorically says that God cannot have any hands whether they behoove Him or not. Is there anything which reason may advance against God's hands or negate it by implication? Now, if there is nothing in revelation or in reason which rules out attributing a hand to God, the assumption that there is something that goes against it is purely subjective, a mere fancy....

On the other hand, I would, fourth, cite arguments clear and categorical that God has hands in reality. One is the verse which says that God honored Adam in that He created Him with His hands, a fact which made the angels prostrate themselves before him and refrain from asserting their superiority over him. If the verse only meant that God created Adam with His power, or that creation was an act of favor from God, or that it simply meant He created Adam, there was no honor in it, for that is also the case with the angels, with Iblīs, and with everything else.

One might say that things are ascribed to God to underline their dignity, as when we say "the camel of God" or "the house of God." I will say that you cannot affirm this dignity unless there is something in that object which is not found in others. If there were nothing distinctive in "the camel of God" and "the house of God" which distinguishes them from other camels or houses, they would not have been ascribed to God. The fact is that they have been really ascribed to God. It has been said that God created Adam with His hands, which only means that He created Adam with His hands whereas he has created others by saying, "Be," and they came into being, as has been stated in various traditions.

When you say "the government is in his hands" or "his hands have done this or that" you say two things: one, he has hands, and, two, the dominion is his or the action is his. In the case of the latter sentence, often some liberty is taken, but regarding the former it is never said except when the person concerned has hands in reality.

Obviously no one says “the hands of desire” or “the hands of water”. I do admit that the expression “the government is in his hands” may mean that it is in his power. But one never uses that expression except in the case of one who really has hands.

The difference between the verse, “whom I created with My hands” (38:75) and the verse, “out of what Our hands have done” is twofold: One, in the first case God has ascribed the action to Himself and made it clear that He has created it with His hands, whereas in the second He has ascribed the action to His hands. The other difference is that in Arabic one uses the plural form for the dual only when one is sure that it would not create any confusion, for example, the Qur’ān says “As to the thief, male or female, cut off their hands (*aydiyyahumā*) (5:41), that is, their two hands (*yaday humā*), or “the hearts (*qulūb*) of you (two) are indeed so inclined” (66:4), that is, the two hearts of you two. In the same way God has said “From what Our hands (*aydinā*) have done (36:71).

As for the *ḥadīth* there are many examples in them, for example, “Those who practice justice shall be with God on platforms of light on the right hand of the Merciful, though both hands of His are right. They are the ones observe justice in their judgments, in the people they rule, and in the affairs they manage.”²¹⁶ And, “At the time God created the universe, He wrote down with His own hands thus making obligatory on Himself: ‘My mercy shall dominate over My wrath.’”²¹⁷

[*Fatāwā* 6:355-372]

(2.30) The meaning of the verse, “The Day when a shin shall be laid bare” (68:42)

The Companions of the Prophet have not differed in their interpretation of the verses that speak of God’s attributes. I have read the comments they have made on these verses and I have studied the *aḥādīth*²¹⁸ they have narrated. I have also gone through more than a hundred commentaries on these verses in various

books, large and small, but I have not come across up to this time any statement whatsoever by any Companion in which he interprets any verse or *ḥadīth* speaking of God's attributes in a way different from what is commonly understood from them. On the contrary, we have innumerable statements in which they confirm the common understanding and underscore the apparent meaning in opposition to what later writers have said regarding them. There are also many things of interest in traditions they have narrated or the words which have come down from them.

I have not found them differing on anything except on a verse like, "the Day when a shin shall be laid bare" (68:42). Ibn 'Abbās and some other Companions have been reported to have said that it refers to the hardship to which God will expose people in 'alā. On the other hand, Abū Sa'īd and some others with him have taken the shin to be one of the attributes of God in view of the *ḥadīth* which Abū Sa'īd has himself reported and which is recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections.^{218a}

From the language of the Qur'ān, however, it does not appear that it is one of the attributes of God, for the verse, "the Day when a shin (*sāq*) will be laid bare) mentions shin as an indefinite noun, and does not ascribe it to God. It does not say, "the shin of God." Since shin has not been ascribed to God, it cannot be counted as a divine attribute without giving further reason. Hence Ibn Abbās' interpretation of the shin cannot be taken as a misinterpretation (*ta'wīl*), for (*ta'wīl*) is to understand a verse in a sense different from what it means and what people commonly understand by it. Many people take a word in a sense it does not mean, and claim that it is the correct interpretation. This is wrong on two grounds that we have discussed time and again.²¹⁹

[*Fatāwā* 6:394-5]

(2.31) The meaning of the saying of the Prophet, “I feel the breath of the Merciful coming from Yemen,” and the saying of a Companion, “The Black Stone is the right hand of God on earth.”

Ibn Taymīyyah was asked about the words ascribed to the Prophet (pbuh), “The Black Stone is the right hand of God on earth,”²²⁰ and “I feel the breath of the Merciful coming from Yemen.”²²¹ ... He replied that the first *ḥadīth* has been reported from the Prophet through an unreliable chain of narrators. It is commonly believed to be a statement of Ibn ‘Abbās. His words are, “The Black Stone is the right hand of God on earth; whoever touches it or kisses it it is as if he shakes hands with God and kisses His right hand.” Anyone who reflects on these words a little will have no difficulty in figuring out what they mean; only those who do not think them over will not understand them. Ibn ‘Abbās has said, “the right hand of God on earth.” This is a qualified statement. He has not said that the Black stone is the right hand of God without any qualification. He has added the qualifying words, “on earth” and obviously that makes the thing different.

Ibn ‘Abbās has further said, “Whoever touches it or kisses it it is *as if* he shakes hands with God or kisses His right hand.” And we know that a thing is not same as the thing to which it is likened. This proves beyond doubt that one who touches the Black stone does not shake hands with God, rather he is *like* one who shakes hands with Him. Thus both first part of the *ḥadīth* and the last part show that the Black Stone is not an attribute of God, as every sensible person knows. The *ḥadīth* only states that, just as God has made a house for people to go round, He has also put there a thing for them to touch, so that they may take it as kissing the hand of great people. We know that kissing brings the visitor nearer to the person whose hand he kisses, and is a form of respect he pays to him. God and His Prophet never speak in language which is misleading; they do not fail to indicate what people should not

believe. The words of this *ḥadīth* are clear enough to negate any kind of anthropomorphism.

As for the second *ḥadīth*, the words “coming from Yemen” are sufficient to indicate what it actually means. Obviously Yemen has no special relation to God’s attributes; this is clear to everyone. What the *ḥadīth* means is that from Yemen there will come people whom God will love and who will love Him, people about whom He has said, “If anyone from among you turns back from his Faith, God will produce a people whom He will love as they will love Him” (5:57).

It has been reported that when this verse was revealed, the Prophet was asked about them. He said that the people (God has said to produce) are those of the tribe of Abū Mūsā Al-Ash‘arī.²²² This has been indicated in some other authentic *aḥādīth*, such as, “The people of Yemen coming to you have a noble and loving heart. The Faith is Yemeni, as is wisdom Yemeni.”²²³ They fought the people who had apostatized after the Prophet to their former faith, and conquered countries with their swords. God removed through them the calamities which had befallen the faithful. Some people think that these *aḥādīth* refer to ‘Uways (Al-Qarānī;²²⁴ but this is far from being correct.

[*Fatāwā* 6:397-8]

3. *TAWHĪD*: AFFIRMING GOD'S UNITY

(3.1) Affirming the unity of Lordship (*tawhīd ar-rubūbiyyah*) and the unity of Godhead (*tawhīd al-ilāhīyyah*)

Tawhīd ar-rubūbiyyah is to believe and affirm that Allah is the Lord, the Creator and Ruler of all there is. This is the tawhīd which the theologians try to establish, well as the one whose perception (in experience) various groups of Ṣūfīs set as their goal. But this tawhīd will not qualify anyone as Muslim, not to say a friend (walī) of God, unless he also affirms the unity of Godhead (tawhīd al-ilāhīyyah), that is to say, unless he witnesses that no one is worthy of ‘ibādah, worship and absolute obedience other than Allah, and that Muḥammad (pbuh) is His messenger. He must also believe in whatever the Prophet says and submit to whatever he commands. Tawhīd is not perfect unless one refuses to anyone any share into the rights that are due to Allah alone such as worship, service, trust, fear and submission.

Most theologians who expound on *tawhīd* in their theological works divide *tawhīd* into three kinds: *tawhīd* of the essence, that God is one in His essence without a second; *tawhīd* of attributes, that He is unique in His attributes and there is nothing like Him in any respect; and *tawhīd* of deeds, that He is singular in His deeds and has absolutely no partners.

Of these, the most important *tawhīd* in their eyes is the third one, the *tawhīd* of deeds, which they take to mean that the Creator of the world is one. They advance a variety of arguments for it, such as the argument from exclusion; they think it is the ultimate goal. They believe that this is what the words, “there is no *ilāh* except Allah” mean. They even interpret *ilāh* as one who has power to create. Everyone knows that the polytheists of Arabia to whom Muḥammad (pbuh) was first sent did not oppose him on this

count. They rather testified that Allah is the Creator of all there is; they even believed in the fore-ordainment of things. But in spite of that they were polytheists.

The same is true for the *tawhīd* of attributes, that there is none like Allah in His attributes. No one among the peoples of the world has ever affirmed another being eternal like Allah, whether he has considered him an active or an inactive partner. In fact, whenever someone has likened anyone to Him, he has only affirmed likeness in one respect or another. In fact, reason rules it out that any created being can share in all the attributes of the Creator, whether those that He necessarily has, or those He may have. That would require a combination of contradicting principles.

The case of the third *tawhīd* namely the *tawhīd* of essence, is no different. They affirm that God is one, that none shares in His essence, and that He is indivisible. This is true. The Qur'ān itself has said, "Say: He is Allah, One and Only; God, the Eternal. He neither begets nor is He begotten; and there is none like Him" (112:1-4). It follows that He is above parts and divisions, and that He is not a composite being made of elements. In this they are correct. But with this truth they combine some ideas which are wrong, such as that He is not above the Throne, or that He is so unlike the created beings that He has no real attributes. This is their *tawhīd*....

Let it be known that *ilāh* does not mean one who has power to create, as various leading theologians believe. They equate *ilāhīyyah* with the power to create, and believe that one who simply affirms that Allah alone has power to create witnesses truly that there is no *ilāh* except Allah. They are not correct; for the polytheists (of Arabia) did affirm it; nevertheless they were called polytheists, as we have said before. *Ilāh* is one who deserves to be worshiped and obeyed; the word is to be taken in the sense of *ma'lah* rather than *alih*. *Tawhīd* is to worship and serve Allah alone without associating anyone else with Him, and *shirk* is to associate another god with Allah.

It is now clear that the most that these thinkers who believe in fore-ordainment and count themselves among the Ahl as-Sunnah affirm is only the *tawḥīd ar-rubūbiyyah*, that Allah is the Creator-Lord of all things. Their position is no different from that of the polytheists (of pre-Islamic Arabia) who did affirm these things yet were nevertheless called polytheists

Similarly, the *tawḥīd* which a number of Ṣūfī sects who call themselves “people of gnosis, truth and unity” expound is nothing but a perception (*shuhūd*) in experience of this *tawḥīd*. It is a vision of the truth that Allah alone is the Lord, the Master and the Creator of all that there is. It is a vision in which the gnostic loses his own being in the being of God, the perception of his own self in the perception of God, and the knowledge of his own being in the knowledge of God. It is the experience of self-annihilation caused by the realization of the unity of Lordship (*tawḥīd ar-rubūbiyyah*), an experience in which everything contingent vanishes and the Eternal alone exists. This is the final goal for these Ṣūfīs beyond which they can visualize no other goal. But this is nothing but the realization in experience (*taḥqīq*) of the *tawḥīd* in which the polytheists of Arabia also believed. No one who believes in this *tawḥīd* alone is qualified even to be a Muslim, much less a friend (*walī*) of God, or most dear to Him...

This is a great truth; every Muslim must know it. What distinguishes the Believer from the non-believer is faith in the fundamental principle of Islam, faith in the unity of God and the prophethood of Muḥammad, that there is no god but Allah, and that Muḥammad is His Messenger. Many people have come up short on both counts or one of them, even though they think they have experienced *tawḥīd* and realized the truth. They must know that a polytheist who affirms that Allah is the Lord of all there is, its Master and Creator, will not be saved from God’s punishment if he does not affirm that there is no god (*ilāh*) other than He, that none but He is to be worshiped and served, and that Muḥammad is

His Messenger, and if he does not also believe in whatever the Prophet said and carry out whatever he commanded. I will explain these two principles further.

The first principle is the affirmation of the unity of Godhead (*tawḥīd al-ilahīyyah*). God has said of the polytheists that they posit intermediaries between themselves and God and call upon them in the belief that they will intercede on their behalf with God even without His permission: “They serve, besides God, things that hurt them not, nor profit them; and they say, ‘These are our intercessors with God.’ Say: Do you indeed inform God of something He knows not, in the heavens or on earth! Glory to Him! And far is He above the partners they ascribe (to Him)” (10:18). This means that those who hold these beings to be intercessors are polytheists in the eyes of God... He has also said, “Call on those, besides Him, whom you fancy. They have neither the power to remove your troubles from you nor to change them. Those whom they call upon do desire (for themselves) means of access to their Lord, even those among them who are closest (to Him). They hope for His mercy and fear His wrath, for the wrath of your Lord is something to beware of” (17:56-7). Commenting on this verse a number of Elders have said that as people worshiped Ezra, Christ, and angels, God revealed these verses and told them that even the angels and prophets sought to get closer to Allah, prayed for His mercy, and feared His punishment.

True *tawḥīd* is to know that God has many rights over us in which no created being has any share: He alone is to be worshiped, trusted, feared, revered, and obeyed without any condition. This has been stated in the Qur’ān at many places, such as, “Take not with God another object of worship, or you (O man!) will sit in disgrace and destitution” (17:22); “Verily it is He Who has revealed the Book to you setting forth the truth; so serve God offering Him sincere devotion” (39:2); “Say: Verily, I am commanded to serve God with sincere devotion” (39:11)...

With regard to trust, God has said, “In God put your trust if you have faith” (5:26); “And in God let all men of faith put their trust” (14:11); “Say: Sufficient is God for me! In Him trust those who put their trust” (39:38); “If only they had been content with what God and His Messenger gave them, and had said, ‘Sufficient for us is God; He will soon give us of His bounty and (will cause) His Messenger (to give us, too);’ verily to God do we turn with hope (that would have been the correct course)” (9:59)....

With regard to fear, reverence and piety, He has said, “And those who obey God and His Messenger fear God, avoid His displeasure and obey Him; they will triumph (in the end)” (24:52). He has thus demanded obedience to Himself and His Prophet, but reserved fear, reverence, and piety for Himself alone. Noah has reiterated the same truth in these words, “My people! I am to you a warner, clear and open, that you should worship God, fear Him, and obey me” (71:3). He thus reserved worship and piety for God alone. At another place God has said, “So fear not men; fear Me” (5:47); “Do not be afraid of them, but fear Me, if you have faith” (3:175)....

The Prophet said the same things in his own words, for example once in a sermon he said, “Whoever obeys God and His Messenger is on the right path, but whoever disobeys Him harms himself only, and does not harm God.”²²⁵ On another occasion, he said, “Don’t say, ‘If God and the Prophet will this.’ Say ‘If God wills,’ and then, ‘if Muḥammad wills.’”²²⁶ He has thus joined his name with the name of God in obedience with the conjunction “and” (*wāw*), but in the case of will he has directed that his name be mentioned after mentioning God’s name using the conjunction “then” (*thumma*). This is because obedience to the Prophet is obedience to God, and whoever obeys him obeys God; moreover, to obey God there is only one way - to obey the Prophet. This is not the case with will, for the will of any created being is not the will of God, nor does God’s will imply the will of any of his creatures. What God wills happens, even though none of His

creatures may will it, and what His creatures will does not happen unless He wills it.

The second principle of the Faith concerns things that are due the Prophet. We are to believe in him, obey him, please him, love him, submit to his rulings, and so on.... God has made these things clear in various statements such as, “He who obeys the Messenger obeys God” (4:80); “It is more fitting that they should please God and His Messenger” (9:62); “say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your spouses, or your kindred, (or) the wealth that you have acquired, or the trade in which you fear decline, or the dwellings in which you delight are dearer to you than God or His Messenger, or striving in His cause, then wait until God brings about His decision” (9:24); “But no, by your Lord, they can have no (real) faith until they make you judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance against your decisions, but submit to it absolutely” (4:65); “Say: If you do love God, follow me; God will love you” (3:31); and so on.

[*Fatāwā* 3:98-110]

(3.2) Faith in God’s *qadr* and His *shar‘*.

We must believe in God’s creation and fore- ordainment, as well as in His command and prescription. There is no contradiction between the two. Those who believe in His commands but deny His fore-ordainment, or those who believe in His fore-ordainment and deny His commands, or think that one contradicts the other, are wrong.

Everyone knows that we must believe in God’s creation as well as command, in His fore-ordainment as well as prescription. People who have gone wrong on the issue of fore-ordainment (*qadr*) are divided into three groups: those who take the line of take the line of the Magians (*mujūsīyyah*), those who take the line of the polytheists (*mushrikīyyah*), and those who follow the Devil

(*Iblīsīyyah*). The *mujūsīyyah* are those who deny God's fore-ordainment and believe only in His commands. The extremists among them even deny God's fore-knowing and fore-writing. However, the moderates among them only deny that God wills everything or creates and ordains everything. They are the Mu'tazilah and those who agree with them.

The *mushrikīyyah* believe in fore-ordainment but they oppose it to God's command and prohibition. God has referred to them in these words, "Those who give partners (to God) say: If God has wished we should not have given partners to Him, nor would our fathers, nor should we have had anything forbidden" (6:148). Hence those who negate His commands on account of His fore-ordainment belong to this group. A number of Ṣūfīs who claim to have realized the truth (*al-ḥaqīqah*) fall into this group.

The third group, the *Iblīsīyyah*, affirm both truths but hold that one contradicts the other and find fault with God's wisdom and justice as did Satan their leader at first. Writers on the history of doctrines (in Islam) have listed all these views. These views have also been held by the People of the Book and many others who have gone astray.

The people of right guidance and happiness (in the Hereafter), on the opposite side, believe in both truths sincerely. They believe that God is the Creator of everything and its Lord and Ruler, that what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen, that everything is in His power, and that He knows everything and has written them down in a clear Book. This is affirming God's knowledge, power, will, unity, and lordship, as well as His creation, rule, and ownership - truths that are the essential parts of faith. Along with this they also affirm causality (in nature), and never deny that God has made one thing the cause of another thing. They affirm what God has affirmed in various statements, such as, "When they have carried the heavy-laden clouds, we drive them to a land that is dead, make rain to descend thereon, and produce every kind of harvest therewith" (7:57); "With it God guides all

who seek His good pleasure to ways of peace and safety” (5:16); and, “By it He causes many to stray, and many He leads to the right path” (2:26). He thus made it absolutely clear that He acts through causes.

Those who say that God does not act through (*bi*) causes, but only in their presence (*‘ind*), run in the face of the Qur’ān, and deny that things have a power and a specific nature which God has given them. They deny that God has given in animals and in men some powers with which they work. Equally mistaken are those who consider human power to be creative, attribute the work of God to one who is not God, and commit *shirk*. They are mistaken because there is no cause which does not need another cause in order to produce an effect; moreover there are also factors which prevent its happening unless God removes them. Hence there is nothing in the world which can produce anything by itself except God. He has said, “Of everything We have created pairs, that you may receive instruction. (51:49); that is to say, that you may know that the Creator of the pairs is one...

The point I want to make is that one must believe in the fore-ordainment (*taqdīr*) of things; for without that the affirmation of God’s unity (*tawhīd*) is not complete. Ibn ‘Abbās has rightly said, “To affirm fore-ordainment (*taqdīr*) is to perfect *tawhīd*, and one who affirms God’s unity and upholds His fore-ordainment completes His *tawhīd*. But if one affirms unity and denies fore-ordainment one impairs one’s *tawhīd*.”

One must also believe in the *shar‘*, in the commands and prohibitions, rewards and punishments which God has conveyed through His messengers, and expounded in His Books. To live our lives properly we need the *shar‘*. We have to secure what is useful and avoid what is harmful, and it is the *shar‘* which tells what is useful and what is harmful. The *shar‘* is God’s justice among His creatures, and the light He has provided for His servants. There can be no human society without a *shar‘*, a code that tells them what to do and what not to do....

A part of the *shar'* some people know from their own nature, just as they know that they will benefit from eating food or drinking water, or just as they know some necessary truths from their reason. Others know them from arguments which their reason works out; still others know them only from the teachings of the messengers and their statements and instructions. People have debated the issue of how we know what acts are good and what acts are bad. Do we know them through reason, or is it that they do not possess anything like goodness or evil which we may discover through our reason? We have discussed this issue at length elsewhere and pointed out the causes that have led people to different views. We will state the matter here only briefly.

Everyone agrees that we know by our reason things that please or displease us. Actionss that lead to things which we like or which give us pleasure or those that lead to things which we dislike or which cause us pain, are known sometimes through reason, sometimes through the *shar'*, and sometimes through both of them. But a detailed knowledge of these things, or of the consequences of our acts in the life to come, whether happiness or misery, are known only through the *shar'*. Hence the details which the messengers of God have given regarding matters on the Day of Judgment or regarding the code of life cannot be known through reason, just as the details about the names and attributes of God which they have conveyed cannot be known through reason, even though we can have some idea of them on the basis of reason.

[*Fatāwā* 3:111-115]

(3.2) The error of the theologians and the Ṣūfīs regarding *tawḥīd*.

To formulate the doctrine of God's unity (tawḥīd) in a way which negates His attributes and names, as many theologians do, or to reduce it to the unity of the Creator-Lord (tawḥīd ar-

rubūbiyyah) which Ṣūfīs do and which they call tawḥīd al-af'āl, are both wrong.

Various groups who indulge in speculative theology or engage in devotions and spiritual practices have developed wrong notions of *tawḥīd* and altered its meaning. One group that loves to call itself “the people of *tawḥīd*” thinks that to affirm God’s unity, they have to negate His attributes and even His names. In fact, they only affirm a bare essence stripped of all attributes, a being without any qualities. But both reason and revelation clearly pronounce that such a being exists nowhere except in mind. They think that if you affirm God’s attributes you make Him a composite being, which in their view reason can never allow. I have discussed this point elsewhere, and shown that these people simply ignorant and have been misled by the notion of universals.

The other group thinks that *tawḥīd* is to affirm the unity of *rubūbiyyah*, that God creates everything and performs every act. They give it the name *tawḥīd al-af'āl*, affirming the unity of acts. Some theologians have advanced arguments in its support. They have said that we cannot say that acts are performed jointly (by God and men), for that would be impairing God’s omnipotence and perfection; nor can we say that both can perform the act, each one independently of the other, for that (in the case of man) is unthinkable. By arguments like this they think they have established *tawḥīd* and affirmed that there is no god (*ilāh*) other than Allah, and that divinity (*ilāhiyyah*) means nothing but the power to originate and so on. Hence, once it is established that no one other than God has the power to originate and that none participates with Him in creation, they feel satisfied that they have borne witness to the truth that there is no god except Allah. But they do not know that the pagans of Arabia did also believe in this *tawḥīd*. God has emphasized it in these words, “If you ask them who is that created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly say, ‘Allah’” (31:25); “Ask them: To whom belong the earth and

all beings therein? (Say) if you know! They will say, 'To God!' Say: Yet will you not receive admonition? Ask: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens, and the Lord of the Throne Supreme? They will say, 'They belong to Allah.' Say, Will you not then be filled with awe? Ask (them): Who is it in whose hands is the governance of all things, who protects (all) but is not protected (by any)? (Tell me) if you know. They will say, '(It belongs) to Allah.' Say, Then how are you deluded? (23:105). Commenting on the previous verse Ibn 'Abbās said, "If you ask them who has created the heavens and the earth they will say, 'Allah.' But even then they worship other deities."

This *tawhīd* is only a part of the *tawhīd* which is required of us, not the whole of it. By affirming this part on, no one can rise above *shirk*, the most heinous sin that God will not condone. One must also devote all worship and obedience to Allah, must serve none except Him, and must serve Him the way He has ordained. Only then shall one be sincerely dedicating one's religion to Allah.

Ilāh means *ma'luh*, the object of love and devotion, whom one worships and serves. That Allah is *ilāh* means that He is qualified with all the attributes of perfection. Hence none can be God, the object of worship and love in himself, except He. This means that any act that is not done to please him Him is null and void. In fact, the root of all evil and disorder is worship and love of beings other than God. This has been stated by God Himself: "If there were in the heavens and the earth other gods besides Allah there would have been confusion and disorder in both" (21:22)....

Those who expound *tawhīd* in mystical terms hold the realization of the oneness of the Creator-Lord (*tawhīd ar-rubūbiyyah*) as their goal, and absorption into it as the ultimate end. They think that when you attain it you are no longer required to differentiate between the good and the evil. This leads them to the negation of the commands and prohibitions of the *shar'* as well as the rewards and punishments thereon. They fail to distinguish between the creative will of God, which encompasses everything,

and His love and pleasure, which only obedience to His Command merits; they fail to distinguish between God's creative words, which encompass everything and which no one, pious or wicked, can frustrate, and His prescriptive words, which only the prophets and the friends of God carry out in full.

It is necessary, therefore, that one not only perceive the *rubūbiyyah* of God, which encompasses the Believer and the non-believer, the obedient and the disobedient alike, but also observe His *ilāhiyyah*, which only the Believers who worship and serve Him and follow the messengers He sends observe.... Let everyone realize that whoever does not distinguish between God's friends and God's enemies, or between things He has commanded and things He has forbidden, or between faith and unfaith, obedience and disobedience, good and evil, the approved and the disapproved, even though each one is brought into being by His power, will and creation, he follows a religion in no sense different from the religion of the pagans of Arabia who said, "If God had wished, we would not have given partners to Him, nor would our fathers; nor would we have had any taboos." (6:148).

[*Iqtiḍā aṣ-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm* 459-61]

(3.3) Refutation of the monism of Ibn 'Arabī, Al-Qūnawī and Al-Tilimsānī.

The essence of their monism (at-tawḥīd al-wujūdī) is that the existence of God is one with the existence of the universe. From this it follows that there is neither a creator nor anything created, that none but God is the object of worship in whatever is worshiped since He has a presence (wajh) in everything, and that the call of the prophets to worship and serve no one except Allah is nothing but a trick which they play on their people. This is absolutely wrong; no early Ṣūfī had ever subscribed to it before.

These people have misconstrued the *tawḥīd* which God has

expounded in His books and sent down at the hands of His prophets. They have identified it with union (*ittihād*) and mislead people by calling it *tawhīd*. In fact, they have denied any Maker or Creator. In the beginning, I was very much impressed by Ibn ‘Arabī²²⁷ and held him in great esteem as I had found many of his discussions in the *Futūḥāt*, *Al-Kunh*, *Al-Muḥkam al-Marbūt*, *Ad-Durrat al-Fākhira*, *Maṭāli‘ an-Nujūm* and other such works very illuminating and useful. I was not aware at that time of his esoteric ideas as I had not read the *Fuṣūṣ* and other like works. I used to sit with friends and discuss things so that we could find out the truth and follow it. We tried hard to know the essence of the *ṭarīqah*. When things became clear, we knew what we had to do. Then there came a number of leading Ṣūfīs from the East, and people began to question us about the Way and the faith of Islam, on the one hand, and about the lives and experiences of these people, on the other. We had no choice except to tell the truth about them...’

Both union (*ittihād*) and incarnation (*ḥulūl*) have been either confined to a particular person or extended to the whole world. Examples of particularized union and incarnation (*ittihād* and *ḥulūl al-mu‘ayyan*) are the beliefs which Christians hold about Jesus, or extremist Shi‘īs hold about their imāms, and ignorant Ṣūfīs about their preceptors. It is conceived either as a union on the pattern of water mixing with milk, as the Jacobites from among the Sudanese, Ethiopians and Copts believe, or as a form of incarnation, as the Nestorians believe, or as a kind of partial union in some respect or the other as the Catholics believe. As for universal incarnation (*al-ḥulūl al-muṭlaq*), or the doctrine that the divine Self dwells in everything, it is reported of the earliest Jahmiyyah by the Ahl as-Sunnah and the Elders, who called them infidels on that ground.

But the universal union (*al-ittihād al-‘āmm*) which these people (Ibn ‘Arabī, Al-Qunāwī, Al-Tilimsānī and the like) have expounded was not set forth by anyone before them except

Pharaoh (of Moses) and the Karamathians who denied the existence of a Maker. The essence of their belief is that God is one with the world, that the existence of God, the Creator of the heaven and the earth, is identical with the existence of the created world. Hence they cannot think that creates anything other than Him, nor that He is the Lord of the Worlds, nor that he is sufficient in Himself and everything else depends upon Him. This much is agreed upon by all the monists; in detail, however, they have taken three different lines, which most leading Ṣūfīs fail to distinguish as these doctrines are quite abstruse.

The first view

The line that Ibn ‘Arabī has taken is that the essence of all things, living and non-living, even their movements and rests are there in a state of existence, eternal and unending before they come into existence. They emerge into existence when the divine existence flows into them. Hence their existence is the existence of God, even though their essences are different from the divine essence. Subsistence is different from existence, but what emerges in existence is what is there in existence. Ibn ‘Arabī and those who follow him in this regard say that God does not give anything to anyone. He neither makes anyone rich and happy, nor poor and wretched. It is only His existence that flows to these essences already shaped in one form or the other. Hence one should not praise or condemn except oneself. This is the truth of fore-ordainment. God knows things by perceiving their essences existing in their pre-existential state, outside His own essence. They say that God has no power to effect any change even in a particle, that they themselves know things in the same way as God knows them, both knowledges proceeding from the same source. They claim that they can excel the Seal of the Prophets in some respects, since they receive ideas from the same source from which the Angel receives and delivers them to the prophets.

They say that they worship none other than God, that none other than God is ever worshiped, that those who worship idols

worship none but Him. His words, “*qaḍā rabbuka an lā ta‘budū illā iyyāhu*,” which means ‘your Lord has ruled that you *should* not worship any except Him’ (17:23), they take to mean that you *would* not worship any except Him, taking the ruling not as a imperative but as an existential decree. Hence, for them, whenever anything is worshiped it is God Himself in that thing who is worshiped, for when God decrees anything, they argue, it necessarily happens.

They say that calling people to God (by the prophets) is only playing a trick on them, for God is never absent from them that they are to be reminded of Him. When the people of Noah said to their brethren, “Abandon not your gods, abandon not Wadd nor Suwā’...” (71:23), they said so because they feared that if they abandoned them they would abandon God to the extent they abandoned them, for God has a presence (*wajh*) in everything which is worshiped; this is admitted by those who know it, and denied by those who are ignorant of it. Difference or multiplicity which is there in the world is like the difference and multiplicity of organs in an organic body, or of faculties in the soul. Gnostics know who is worshiped and in what forms He appears and is worshiped. The ignorant says, “This is a stone; that is a plant.” But the Gnostic says, “This is a form wherein God is manifested, and hence it commands our respect.” However, it is not the only form wherein He is manifested; there are other forms, too. The error of the Christians lies in that they limit God’s manifestation to one particular being, and the error of the idol worshipers lies in that they limit it to some forms and leave out the others. The Gnostic worships and serves all forms.”²²⁸

God also worships and serves all things, because they are food for His names and attributes, just as He is food for their existence. He needs them and they need Him; He is thus on intimate terms with everything.²²⁹ In the view of these people, divine names are merely relations between existence and existence, yet they are not sheer non-beings.²³⁰ They wonder about God’s name Al-‘Alī, the

Transcendent, for they say that there is nothing in existence except Him; He cannot therefore be said to transcend anything; there is nothing there except Him;²³¹ As bearing different names, things are contingent in themselves, however they are transcendent, and in that respect, they are one with God. Hence God marries none other than Himself, and slaughters none other than Himself; He is the One Who speaks as well as the One Who hears.²³²

They say that Moses scolded Aaron because the latter was so short-sighted and narrow-minded that he forbade the Israelites to worship the calf.²³³ Moses, on the contrary, had a broader vision and a larger heart; he knew that the Israelites did not worship anything other than God. The greatest thing one can possibly worship is one's own desires; for one who takes his desires as his god does not worship except God. Pharaoh, in the view of these people, was one of the greatest gnostics of God,²³⁴ for he claimed, "I am your Lord, Most High" (79:24), and "I do not know any god for you except myself" (28:38), a claim which was wholeheartedly supported by the magicians.

To ascertain the truth about the doctrine of these people, I talked to some learned men among them, and said that the essence of what they said was not different from what Pharaoh had said earlier, namely that there was nothing like a creator or a maker of the world. Hearing this, one of them said that a number of their great men had admitted it explicitly and confessed that they did not differ from Pharaoh on that point.

All what I have mentioned above has been expounded by the author of the *Fuṣūṣ*. God knows better on what faith he died; may He forgive all the Muslims and all the faithful, men and women, living and dead. "Our Lord, Forgive us and our brethren who came before us into the Faith, and leave not, in our hearts, rancor against those who have believed. Our Lord, You are indeed Full of Kindness, Most Merciful" (59:107).

What I want to say is that every Muslim who reads the *Fuṣūṣ* - which its author claims was inspired by the Prophet - and

understands it will surely pronounce that all the prophets and messengers of God, all His pious friends, even all Jews, Christians and Sabaeans, will certainly dissociate themselves from each and every view I have mentioned above and attribute to them.

We know that even the polytheists who worship idols and the People of the Book who deny Islam affirm that there is a Creator Who conceives, makes and brings into being the heavens and the earth, and creates light and darkness, that He is their Lord and the Lord of their ancestors, Lord of the East and Lord of the West. None of them has ever said that God is one with the world, or one with the things that are created, as these people claim. They even go a step further and say that if we imagine the heavens and the earth to vanish, God will also vanish with them.

Their doctrine is based upon two propositions. One that the not-yet-existent (*al-ma'dūm*) is something which exists in pre-existence (*al-'adam*) as many Mu'tazilah and Rāfiḍah believe. This is wrong rationally as well as in the light of the Qur'ān, Sunnah and the consensus of the scholars. Many theologians like Qāḍī Abū Bakr have pronounced them infidels (*kāfir*) on this account. Their error is due to their failure to distinguish between God's idea of things before they come into existence as He has written them down in the Mother of Books, the Preserved Tablet, and between their existence outside the mind of God. The Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah believe that God writes down in the Preserved Tablet the measure of all things before He brings them into existence. Hence they distinguish between mental existence and external existence. Look at these verses of the Qur'ān which were first revealed to the Prophet: "Read in the name of your Lord and Cherisher who created, created man out of a mere clot of congealed blood. Read! And your Lord is Most Bountiful. He taught (the use of) the pen, taught man who what he knew not" (96:1-5). They refer to all four levels of being real existence (*al-wujūd al-'aynī*) created by God, the being in writing (*al-wujūd al-lafẓī*), which leads to the being in mind (*al-wujūd al-'ilmī*). God

has clearly stated in these verses that He has taught man, and taught him through the pen, which involves the three levels of being.

The proposition that the not-yet-existent is something that exists in itself outside the knowledge of God is false, and its falsity can be easily demonstrated. In Islam it was first expounded some four hundred years ago, and Ibn Arabī agreed with it and made it a basic proposition of his philosophy.

The second basic proposition of Ibn Arabī's philosophy is that the existence of things, contingent and created, is one with the existence of the Creator, neither different from nor other than the latter. This was a new proposition which he propounded, none of the earlier scholars or Ṣūfī saints had ever suggested it. All the monists (*ittihādīyyah*) who came after him reiterated this proposition. However, of all of them he is closest to Islam, as he has also many good things to say, for example, he distinguishes between the Real and its manifestations, and this provides room for God's commands and prohibitions, affirms the Sharī'ah as it is, and emphasizes in *sulūk* the observance of morality and adherence to prescribed forms of worship. That is why many people follow his teachings in their *sulūk* and benefit from them, even though they may not understand his real ideas. Only those who understand them as he expounds them realize their truth.

The second view

Ibn Arabī's disciple, Aṣ-Ṣadr Ar-Rūmī,²³⁵ a so-called philosopher, was comparatively more removed from the Sharī'ah and Islam. That is why At-Tilimsānī,²³⁶ the profligate (*fājir*) strangely enough called "pious", used to say, "My earlier master was a fickle-minded philosopher, and the latter one was a philosopher with unsettled ideas." He was referring to Aṣ-Ṣadr Ar-Rūmī, since he had studied with him, and had not seen Ibn 'Arabī. In his *Miftāḥ Ghayb al-Jam' wa al-Wujūd* and other works (Ṣadr ad-Dīn) says that God is both being as such and a particular being.

He distinguishes likewise between an animal as such and particular animals, and between body as such and particular bodies. But anything as such does not exist out there; it exists only as an individual. Hence the consequence of his doctrine is that God has no existence, no essence or existence of His own; His being is identical with the being of created things. That is why he and his master say that God cannot and will not be seen or that he does not really have any name or attributes. They clearly say that the dog, the pig, urine and stool are one with Him in existence. May He be exalted from these blasphemies.

The third view

At-Tilimsānī, the profligate, is the worst of all the monists; he is deeper in misbelief (*kufr*) than others; he differentiates neither between existence and existence, as Ibn ‘Arabī did, nor between the universal and particular, as Ar-Rūmī did. For him, there is no other or different being in any sense; one perceives the other long as one has a veil on one’s eyes. The moment it is removed he sees that there is no “other,” and realizes the truth.

This is why he legalizes all forbidden things. Many a reliable person has reported him saying, “Daughters, mothers or any other women are just the same for us. It is those who are veiled who say that this one or that one is forbidden. We would say to these people that they are forbidden only to you.” He used to say, “The Qur’ān is full of *shirk*; there is absolutely no *tawhīd* there; one can find *tawhīd* only in our books.” He has also said that he does not stick to one *sharī‘ah*. When he was more considerate, he used to say, “The Qur’ān takes you to Paradise; our books take you to God.” He has explained God’s names in the light of the philosophy he has worked out.

At-Tilimsānī was a poet and had published a collection of poems, which seen from the point of view of art are very fine. But as the saying goes, they are like bacon in a silver pot. He wrote a creed for the Nuṣayrīyyah, who believed that God is like an ocean and the things of the world are like its waves.

Ibn Sab'īn and other monists

As for Ibn Sab'īn²³⁷ he expounded in his *Al-Budū* and *Al-Iḥāṭah* the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, that there is no being other than God. Ibn Al-Fārid,²³⁸ too, sets forth the same doctrine in the last part of his ode on *sulūk*, though he is not so explicit as At-Tilimsānī, Ar-Rūmī or Ibn 'Arabī. He is nearer to At-Tilimsānī than the others. Anyway, I have not seen any monist proclaiming *kufr* as loudly as At-Tilimsānī or the one called Al-Balyānī,²³⁹ from among the Ṣūfīs of Shirāz. I will quote here some couplets of At-Tilimsānī:

There is a sign for Him in everything
Which tells that it is one with Him.
You are not other than the world, but one with it.
This profound truth he understands who experiences it.
My hand enjoys when it moves on my body,
For in reality I am not other than you.
Why does your camel not take rest!
How long will your shadow continue to move!
You will soon know that your journey was to none
Except to yourself when you reach the end.
All things are on the same level;
One is not for praise, nor the other for blame.
It is only the custom, or one's nature
Or the Law-giver that make these distinctions.
My admonisher! You forbid me and command me!
But ecstasy is the best forbidding and commander.
If I obey you and defy ecstasy I shall turn blind
To realities I perceive and engage in superstitions revealed.
When you realize the truth, the thing you enjoin,
You will find one with what you forbid.
What is the ocean except its waves and nothing else,
Even though the multiplicity of things has made them different.

Ad infinitum. As for prose pieces expounding these ideas, they are beyond count. Ignorant people think that these people are the leaders of Islam, the torch-bearers of truth, for whom the *ummah* has nothing but praise, who belong to the category of people like

Sa'īd Ibn Al-Musayyib,²⁴⁰ Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī, 'Umar Ibn 'Abdul-
 'Azīz,²⁴¹ Mālik Ibn Anas,²⁴² Al-Awzā'ī,²⁴³ Ibrāhīm Ibn Adham,²⁴⁴
 Sufyān Ath-Thawrī,²⁴⁵ al-Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyād,²⁴⁶ Ma'rūf Al-Karkhī,²⁴⁷
 Ash-Shāfi'ī,²⁴⁸ Abū Sulaymān,²⁴⁹ Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl,²⁵⁰ Bishr
 Al-Ḥāfi,²⁵¹ 'Abdullah Ibn Al-Mubārak,²⁵² Shaqīq Al-Balkhī,²⁵³ and
 many others from the predecessors; and al-Junayd Ibn Muḥammad
 Al-Qawārīrī,²⁵⁴ Sahl Ibn 'Abdullah At-Tustārī,²⁵⁵ 'Amr Ibn Uthmān
 Al-Makkī,²⁵⁶ as well as Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī,²⁵⁷ 'Abdul-Qādir Al-
 Jīlānī,²⁵⁸ Shaykh Adīy,²⁵⁹ Shaykh Abū Al-Bayān,²⁶⁰ Shaykh Abū
 Madyan,²⁶¹ Shaykh 'Aqīl,²⁶² Shaykh Abū Al-Wafā',²⁶³ Shaykh
 Raslān,²⁶⁴ Shaykh Abdur-Raḥīm,²⁶⁵ Shaykh 'Abdullah
 Al-Yunīnī,²⁶⁶ Shaykh Al-Qurashī,²⁶⁷ and others like them from
 among the successors who came from various places - Hijāz, the
 Levant, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, and Khurāsān. With one word they
 all denounce these people as *kāfir* as well as those who are a little
 better than they. They are agreed that God is not one with the
 world, nor a part or an attribute of it, that He exists in Himself
 independently of the world, completely separate from and
 transcending the creation, that this is what the four heavenly books
 – the Torah, the Gospel, the Psalms and the Qur'ān – teach, that
 this is the Faith on which God has created man, and that this is
 what their reason upholds.

I always think that the emergence of people like these is one of
 the major reasons why the Tartars wrought the devastation they
 wrought or why the Sharī'ah has disappeared. I also think that
 these people are the forerunners of the Anti-Christ, the blind of one
 eye, the fraud who would claim that he is God, just as they identify
 everything with God, big or small. For the author of the *Fuṣūṣ*,
 some forms of God's manifestation or appearance are higher than
 others because their essences in pre-existence are higher than the
 essences of the others. Ar-Rūmī would put the thing in a different
 way; he would say that some individuals are greater than others,
 just as some members within a universal category are greater than

others. The rest would say that everything is part of God, though some parts are bigger than others.

The Anti-Christ in the eyes of these people is one of the greatest gnostics of God, like Pharaoh (of Moses), and a greater person than all the prophets except Muḥammad, Abraham, Moses and Jesus, peace be upon them. Moses fought against Pharaoh

since he claimed lordship (*rubūbiyyah*) for himself, and God will give victory to the real Christ, who was deified even though he never claimed divinity for himself, over the false Christ who will claim that he is God. It is because of this claim he made that some people have doubted whether the *ḥadīth* in which the Prophet has said that the Anti-Christ will be blind of one eye,²⁶⁸ or the *ḥadīth* in which he has told us that we would not see our Lord until we die,²⁶⁹ are true. Ibn Al-Khatīb,²⁷⁰ for example, has denied that the Prophet ever said such things; he says that the signs associated with the Anti-Christ demonstrating his mortality are too clear to need any further sign, such as blindness in an eye.

Now that we have learned the ideas of these monists and seen how the Christians and the incarnationists have fallen into this error, we can appreciate why the Prophet pointed out to his people that the Anti-Christ will be blind of one eye. The Prophet was a blessing for all the peoples, those who were present in his time and those who would come afterwards. Since many people believed that God could appear as a human being, or that He was one with a particular human being, the Prophet argued from the fact that the Anti-Christ would be blind in one eye that he could not be God. A very good friend of mine was inclined towards monism in the beginning but recanted from it afterwards. He once mentioned this *ḥadīth* to me, and I explained to him at length what it really meant.

Another person came to me claiming that he was “the seal of the saints,” and that when Al-Hallaj said, “I am God,” it was God Who spoke through his mouth, just as a jinn speaks through the mouth of the person who is under his influence. He also said that when the Companions of the Prophet heard the words of God from

the mouth of the Prophet the case was the same. I pointed out that if the case had been as he said, the Companions would have been in the position of Moses son of ‘Imrān, and the person whom they refer to would be greater than Moses, because Moses heard God’s words coming from the bush while these people hear it from a living jinn. This is what a section of the monists believe. Most of them are ignorant people; they cannot differentiate between the absolute universal identity (between God and the world) which At-Tilimsānī the profligate and his followers expound, and the limited particular identity in which the Christians and the extremists among the Shi‘is believe. The Elders of the *ummah* and its leading *a’immah* consider the faithlessness of the Jahmīyyah more perverse than that of the Jews; this is the opinion of ‘Abdullah Ibn Al-Mubārak, Al-Bukhārī and others. However, the Jahmīyyah have only alluded to and never explicitly stated that God is in a particular space. In comparison to them, these monists are much worse infidels and certainly more wretched. The Elders of the *a’immah* were, to be sure, better aware of Islam and its ideas, but many people do not realize the significance of their condemnation of the Jahmīyyah unless they contemplate it properly with guidance from above. The Elders came to know of their secret doctrines and denounced them.

Some people have observed that the theologians among the Jahmīyyah worship nothing, and the devotees among them worship everything. This is because their theologians have no urge for worship and devotion, since they describe their Lord in negative terms and attribute to Him the characteristics of the dead. Their devotees, on the other hand, have an urge for worship and devotion which can only be satisfied when it is directed towards some existing rather than non-existing being. They are therefore led to worship created beings, whether it is the universal being or any particular one, the sun, the moon, a person, an idol, etc. With their philosophy the monists justify all forms of *shirk* and fail to affirm God’s unity. They only affirm what is common between God and

the world, and elevate created beings to the level of divinity. This is the reason why, as a reliable person said to me, Ibn Sabʿīn wanted to migrate to India. The Islamic world, he complained, could not accommodate him; India, on the other hand, was the land of polytheists who worshiped everything including trees and animals.

This is what monism is. I know some people who delve into philosophy and *kalām* and engage in spiritual practices on the *ṭarīqah* of these monists. When they describe God they say that He is not this, not that. They say that He is not the Lord of the World, contrary to what Muslims believe, and negate the attributes which the prophets predicate of Him. When any of them has a mystical experience or ecstasy, he deifies himself on the lines of the monists. He says, “God is all that exists. When he is asked, “How does your description of God in negative terms stand with this affirmation? he replies, “This is what my experience and ecstasy say.” We would say to this misguided person: When any mystical or ecstatic experience does not agree with the Faith, either one or both of them are false. Experiences and ecstasies come out of ideas and beliefs; since knowledge and feeling involve each other, your love, ecstasy and experience will be commensurate to your knowledge and insight.

Had these people followed the way of the prophets and messengers (peace be upon them) who taught the worship of one God without associating anyone with Him, and described Him in terms He has described Himself, and had they followed the method that the first Elders followed, they would have moved on the right path and attained conviction and peace of heart. The truth, as some have said, is that the messengers of God described Him in positive terms in detail and in negative terms in brief. The Sabaeans, who negate divine attributes, on the contrary, describe Him in negative terms at length and in positive terms very briefly. Look at the Qurʾān; it abounds in positive statements such as, “God knows all things” (2:231); “He has power over everything” (2:20); “He is

Hearing and Seeing” (58:1); and, “He encompasses everything in knowledge and mercy” (40:7). But when it describes Him in negative terms, it only says, “There is nothing like Him” (41:11); “There is none equal to Him” (112:4); “Do you know of any who is worthy of the same names as He” (19:65); “Glory to your Lord! the Lord of Honor and Power! (He is free) from what they ascribe (to Him! And peace be upon the messengers! (37:180).

[*Majmū‘at ar-Rasā’il wa al-Masā’il* 1:171-183]

(3.5) The doctrine of one actor is wrong, and no one can excuse himself on the ground of fore-ordainment.

Fore-ordainment provides no justification or excuse for anyone. A number of Ṣūfīs who are held in great esteem perceive the fore-ordainment of things, and are occupied with it to the negligence of God’s commands and prohibitions; they generally go astray. Similarly, those who say that there is only one being, or that there is only one actor, and human actions are in reality the actions of God, are greatly mistaken. Ibn Taymīyyah refutes the arguments which these people adduce from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah in their support.

Fore-ordainment provides no justification or excuse for anyone. it is to be believed and not to be offered as an excuse. He who argues from it in support of his evil acts is wrong on the ground of reason as well as revelation. If it were an excuse for an evil deed no one would be blamed for any misdeed, punished for any crime, or avenged for any wrong. It would also mean that if the person who seeks justification for his acts in fore-ordainment is to suffer any wrong in his body, honor, family or property at the hands of any other, he should not blame him, be angry with him, or take revenge on him. Obviously no one will like that or allow that. It is wrong from the point of view of reason as well as the *shar‘*.

If people were to be excused on the ground of fore-ordainment, Iblīs should not have been condemned nor should Pharaoh, the people of Noah, ‘Ād, Thamūd, and others who denied faith and have been punished. Nor should *jihād* against the infidels be instituted, nor sentences carried out, nor thieves amputated, nor adulterers stoned or lashed, nor murderers hanged, nor any violation of law punished.

Since men know from their nature and reason that the argument from fore-ordainment is wrong, no people in any age or country has ever upheld it. No person worthy of mention has ever endorsed it. The reason is obvious. Neither peace nor happiness in this world or the next can be established on this ground. No two men can live together for an hour if they do not follow any code. The Code of Law that God has given is His light on the earth, and His justice for His people...

People make fore-ordainment an excuse when they pursue evil desires, or when under the influence of passions, feelings and past associations they indulge in actions in which they see no good or which they cannot justify. the pagans of Arabia said “If God had wished, we would not have associated anyone with Him, nor would our forefathers; nor should we have proclaimed anything forbidden.” Commenting on this God has said, “So did their ancestors argue falsely, until they tasted our wrath. Say: Have you any knowledge? If so, produce it before us. You follow nothing but conjecture. You do nothing but lie. Say: With God is the argument that reaches home. If it has been His will, He could indeed have guided you all” (6:148-9)...

Had fore-ordainment provided any argument, the Prophet and his companions would have made use of it. Since whatever was happening in the world was preordained not only the wicked but also the righteous could argue from it, had the argument been really correct. What happened is that everyone was pursuing whatever part of his religion he thought was true, although he was

pursuing nothing but conjecture. He had no knowledge and was only running after guesses.

As for the *ḥadīth* that Moses complained to Adam that he led himself and his people out of Paradise and that Adam pleaded that he was not to be blamed, for God had decided on that destiny forty years in advance, defeating Moses in argument,²⁷¹ the truth is that Adam did not justify his violation of God's command on the grounds that it was pre-ordained, nor did Moses ever refer to Adam's violation when he talked to him. How could Adam or Moses refer to something which even an ordinary Muslim would not refer to? Adam repented for what he had done and God accepted his repentance, and put him on the right path. And Moses knew his Lord too well to rebuke even an ordinary person who does wrong and then repents, not to speak of one who was a prophet. Adam, too, knew that if fore-ordainment had been an excuse he would not have to repent or go out of Paradise. Had fore-ordainment been an argument it would have been so also for Iblīs and others. Moses likewise knew that if fore-ordainment were an argument, Pharaoh would not have been drowned, nor would the Children of Israel have been chastised with thunder and other things. How could Moses use that argument when he himself had once said, 'My Lord! I have indeed wronged myself. Do you then forgive me!' (and) He forgave him" (28:16). On another occasion he said, "You are our Protector; so forgive us and give us Your mercy; for You are the best of those who forgive" (7:55).

The reason Moses blamed Adam was that people had to suffer since Adam had eaten from the forbidden tree. That is why he asked, "Why did you take us and yourself out of Paradise?" The blame for inviting the suffering that human beings must experience is something different, and the blame for committing a sin by violating God's command is something different. If a man does something which lands him in poverty and subjects his family to suffering, prompting them to blame him for it, this cannot be taken to mean that they blame him for committing a sin.

Human beings are required to be patient in what is ordained, do what is commanded, and seek forgiveness when they sin. God has said, “Patiently then persevere, for the promise of God is true; and ask forgiveness for your faults.” (40:55); and, “No kind of calamity can occur except by the leave of God, and if anyone believes in God He guides his heart aright” (64:11). These verses, the Elders have pointed out, refer to those people who believe that whatever befalls them is from God, and bear it with calm and patience. Those who find an excuse in fore-ordainment and neglect their duties or complain about what is ordained violate faith and religion and join the ranks of the heretics and hypocrites. This is what those people come to who argue from fore-ordainment.

Many of those who claim to be *Ṣūfīs* and command great respect perceive the fore-ordainment of things, and occupy themselves with it to the negligence of God’s commands and prohibitions. When they fail in their duties or indulge in forbidden things they justify themselves on the ground of fore-ordainment. This is a most serious mistake. Those who take this course and persist in it are worse than the Jews and Christians. However, most of them contradict themselves and do not pursue the line very far.

One of the contradictory ideas is that Adam was secretly asked to eat, and therefore he ate (from the tree). The other is that since *Iblīs* was not sincere in his commitment to *tawhīd* he was asked to bow down to Adam; but when he saw that Adam was an “other” he did not prostrate, whereupon God punished him and said, “Get out of Paradise” (7:18). These ideas are plainly devilish, sheer lies against Adam and *Iblīs*. Adam did confess that he had committed a sin and that he had wronged himself, and he consequently repented of it. He did not say that God was not fair to him, or that He had commanded him in secret to eat. The Qur’ān says, “Then Adam received words (of guidance) from his Lord, Who accepted his repentance, for, verily, He alone is the Acceptor of Repentance, the Dispenser of Grace” (2:37). Or “They (Adam and Eve) said: ‘Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves. If You forgive us not and

bestow not upon us Your mercy, we shall certainly be lost” (7:23). Iblīs, on the other hand, persisted in his folly and tried to justify himself on grounds of fore-ordainment. He said, “My Lord! Because You have put me in the wrong, I will make wrong appear fair to them on earth, and I will guide them into error” (15: 39).

As for the idea that Iblīs saw an “other”, and hence did not bow down to him, it is far worse than the first. It is only a monistic interpretation of the event, and a sheer lie against Iblīs. He did not refuse to bow down because Adam was an “other”; his plea was, “I am better than he. You did create me from fire, and him from clay” (7:12). Again, the angels were not commanded to bow down to Adam because Adam was not an “other”. No, the angels and Adam were altogether different beings and their difference was something quite apparent. The Qur’ān says, “He taught Adam the name of all things, then he placed them before the angels, and said: Tell me the name of these if you are right! They said, ‘Glory to You, of knowledge we have nothing save what You have taught us. In truth it is You Who are Perfect in Knowledge and Wisdom’” (2:32-2). The angels and Adam confessed that God was other than they and that they were other than He; that is why they prayed to Him as a servant prays to his Lord. Adam said, “Our Lord! We have indeed wronged ourselves...,” and the angels said, “We have no knowledge save what You have taught us;” or, “Our Lord! Your reach is over all things, in Mercy and Knowledge. Forgive, then, those who turn in repentance and follow Your path; and save them from the penalty of the blazing fire” (40:7)....

The idea that verses like, “Not for You is the decision” (3:128); or “When You threw (a handful of dust) it was not You who threw but God who threw” (8:17); or, “Verily those who plight their fealty to you do no less than plight their fealty to God: The hand of God is over their hands” (48:10; underline the Prophet’s identity with God, is only a monistic interpretation of these verses. The claim that the words “not for you is the decision” simply meant

that the Prophet's act was the act of God) since they negate any difference between the two, is sheer folly.

First, these words are part of the verse which runs like this: "No help can come except from God, the Almighty the Wise. He might cut off a part of the unbelievers or put them to humiliation so that they withdraw in frustration. Not for you is the decision whether He turns in mercy to them or punishes them; for they are indeed wrong-doers" (3:126-8). As reported in an authentic *ḥadīth*,²⁷² the background of these verses is that the Prophet prayed against a group of infidels and cursed them in the *qunūt* prayer for some time. But when these verses came down he stopped praying against them. He realized that it was only for God to decide about them, and that he had absolutely no say in the decision. If God willed He would destroy a part of the infidels, or subject them to defeat and cause them heavy losses. If He willed, He would forgive them, or if He willed He would punish them. He had said elsewhere, "Say: I have no power over any good or harm to myself except as God wills. Had I knowledge of the Unseen, I would have multiplied all good, and no evil would have touched us" (17:78; or, "They say: 'If we had had anything to do with this affair we should not have been in the slaughter here.' Therefore the Prophet is directed, Say you: 'Indeed the decision is wholly God's'" (3:154).

Second, the verse, "You did not throw when you threw, but God threw it," does not mean that the Prophet's act was not his act but God's act, as these misguided people suggest, for were it so, it would be true of every act. Whenever any person walks we should say that he does not walk, rather it is God Who walks, or when anyone rides a horse we should say that it is not he but God Who rides, or when anyone speaks we should say that it is not he but God Who speaks. We should say the same thing about anyone who eats, drinks, fasts and prays. Not only that, we should also say in the case of an unbeliever that it is not he but God Who disbelieves, or of a liar that it is not he but God Who lies. Obviously, if anyone

says so, he is definitely an infidel who has lost his reason as well as faith.

What the verse actually means is that during the battle of Badr when the Prophet threw a handful of dust at the enemy and said, “May the faces of these people be disfigured,”^{273a} it was not in his power to hit the face of everyone with the dust. Only God could do that with His power. His words simply mean that the Prophet did not hit them when he threw the dust, rather it was God Who hit them. The throw which is affirmed of the Prophet is different from the throw which is denied of him; otherwise the verse would be contradicting itself. What has been denied of him is hitting the faces with the dust, and what has been affirmed of him is throwing the dust. Similarly, when he shot an arrow at the enemy it was God Who caused it to reach them by His power in a miraculous way.

Third, if the verse is taken to mean that God is the Creator of human acts, it is correct. Abraham earlier said, “Our Lord! Make of us Muslims bowing to Your (Will)” (2:128). Hence it is God Who makes someone submit to Him. But from this it does not follow that God and the servant are one, or that the being of God is the being of man, or that God enters into him. The saying that God is the Creator of human acts is true, but the saying that the Creator enters into the creation, or His existence is the existence of the world is wrong. These people move on from the unity of Lordship to incarnation and identity, which is sheer error and blasphemy.

Fourth, the verse, “those who plight their fealty to you only plight their fealty to Allah” (48:10), does not at all imply that the Prophet and God are one. It only means that since he is the Messenger of God and the conveyor of His commands, whoever plights his fealty to him plights his fealty to Allah, just as whoever obeys him obeys God. It does not at all imply that he is God. The Prophet commands only what God asked him to command. Hence, when one obeys his commands one obeys God. He said, “Whoever obeys me obeys God, and whoever obeys my governor obeys me; and whoever disobeys me disobeys God, and whoever disobeys my

governor disobeys me.”²⁷³ It is plain that he and his governor are not one.

If anyone infers from the verse that an act of the Prophet is an act of God or that God has entered into him, or any other thing like that, he is not only a fool but also guilty of faithlessness and blasphemy. Besides, he robs the Prophet of his honor and position and brings him down to (the level of) an ordinary person or thing, for if the verse meant that God is the One Who does the Prophet’s deed it is no honor for the Prophet, for God would be equally doing a deed anyone else does. It would follow, then, that whoever plighted his fealty to Abū Jahl plighted fealty to Allah, or whoever plighted his fealty to Musaylimah (the liar) plighted fealty to Allah, or whoever plighted his fealty to the leaders of the Quraysh and other tribes which participated in the battle of the Ditch plighted fealty to Allah. It would also follow that whoever plights fealty is God, or that it is God Who plights fealty to God, for as He has created one He has created the other. This is what follows from the doctrine of incarnation, unity and identity, because if it is true of one it is true of another. This is exactly what leading incarnationists and monists have explicitly said. When they have been asked to fight the enemies of God, they have said, “Should we fight God?” or “Can we fight God?” We have heard words like these from their leaders, and told them that they are absolutely mistaken....

As for the verse, “Verily those who plight their fealty to you plight their fealty to Allah, the hand of God is over their hands” (48:10), we know that the hand of the Prophet was with the hands of the people who plighted their fealty to him, that they were giving their hand in his hand in plighting their fealty. But when the verse says that God’s hand was over their hands, it means, first, that it was not the hand of the Prophet (pbuh); however, since the Prophet was God’s servant and messenger, he took the pledge on behalf of God. Hence the people who plighted fealty to him plighted fealty to Allah, who had sent him and asked him to take

the pledge. Don't you know that when a person whom you appoint as your agent takes a pledge, it is in fact you who take the pledge? Similarly, when a deputy concludes a pact with some people it is regarded as a pact with the authority who appoints him as his assistant.

[*Fatāwā* 2:323-334]

4. **SHIRK: ASSOCIATING OTHERS WITH GOD**

4.1 The root cause of *shirk*

Shirk appears mainly in peoples who do not have any heavenly book to guide them.

The root cause of *shirk* in polytheistic nations is that they do not possess any revealed book; on the other hand, the main reason for people to believe in one God is that they have a revealed book. This is because people need revelation in order to mold and perfect themselves according to their primordial nature (*fiṭrah*). This is also the reason why God launched mankind on the earth with a prophet. The Qur'ān says, "God taught Adam all the names" (2:31). Therefore, those who deviated from the prophetic path fell into *shirk*. Non-believers who do not have any Book are generally polytheists. Their *shirk* is primarily due to the fact that they have no faith in prophets, about whom God says, "We did send among every people a messenger (with the message): 'Serve God, and escape the evil.'" (16:36).

In the beginning human society was free from *shirk*. Adam and his children, who followed his religion believed in one God, for they adhered to the prophetic teachings. God has said, "Mankind was but one nation, thereafter they differed" (10:19). Between Adam and Noah ten generations passed; the religion of all of them was Islam. When they moved away from the prophetic *sharī'ah* they fell into *shirk*. The reverse was not the case; they did not move away from the prophetic religion because they fell into *shirk*, for Adam had taught them to believe and practice what God commanded him to do. God said to him, "And if, as is sure, there comes to you guidance from Me, whosoever follows My guidance, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. But those who reject faith and belie Our signs shall be companions of the Fire. They shall abide therein" (2:38-9). On another occasion He said,

“Whosoever follows My guidance will not lose his way, nor fall into misery. But whosoever moves away from My message, verily for him is a life narrowed down, and We shall raise him up blind on the Day of Judgment. He will say: ‘My Lord! Why have You raised me up blind while I had sight (before)?’ (God) will say: Thus did you, when Our signs came unto you, disregard them so will you this day be disregarded” (2:123-6).

These words which God addressed to Adam, when He brought them down on earth, show that He wanted them to follow the guidance which He would be sending to them and which constitutes the message He would be revealing to His prophets. They also mean that those who move away from it or reject it will suffer a grievous penalty on the Day of Judgment, and their life in the world, in the grave, and in the Hereafter will be miserable, grievous and painful. On the other hand, those who will believe in His message and do good deeds will enjoy a life of peace and joy.

Whoever follows the prophetic teaching does not fall into *shirk*, for all the prophets taught *tawhīd* just as they were taught. God has said, “Not a messenger did we send before you without this revelation sent by Us to him that there is no god but I; therefore worship and serve Me (alone)” (21:25). He has thus made it clear that He will send every messenger with *tawhīd*. In another verse He has said, “You question Our messengers whom We sent before you: Did We appoint any deities other than (God) Most Gracious to be worshiped?” (43:45). This makes it absolutely clear that God never commanded *shirk*. These two verses, as well as many others, underline the truth that God has commanded His messengers nothing but *tawhīd*, that He has forbidden *shirk* completely, and that when He sent Adam down to earth, He commanded him and his children to follow what He would be revealing to His prophets. It follows that humans indulged in *shirk* because they deviated from the teachings of the prophets and messengers regarding the belief in one God and devotion to Him alone. The reverse is not the case, that they rejected the teaching of

the prophets because they indulged in *shirk*. *Shirk* and rejection of prophethood go together; when you have one you have the other.

[*Fatāwā* 20:105-7]

(4.2) Forms of *shirk*

Shirk in Divinity (ilāhīyyah), shirk in Lordship (rubūbīyyah), and shirk hidden and subtle.

The *shirk* for which one is declared an unbeliever (*kāfir*) is of two kinds: *shirk in ilāhīyyah* and *shirk rubūbīyyah*. *shirk in ilāhīyyah* is to associate someone else with God in worship, love, fear, hope and prayer for forgiveness. This is the *shirk* which God will not forgive till one recants from it. He has said, “Say to the unbelievers, if (now) they desist (from unbelief), what they have done in the past will be forgiven them” (8:38). It is because of this *shirk* of the pagans of Arabia that the Prophet declared war against them. He fought them because they had made partners in divinity (*ilāhīyyah*). The Qur’ān says, “Yet there are men who take (for worship) others besides God, as equal (with God), loving them as they should love God. But those of faith are overflowing in their love for God” (2:165); “Those who take protectors other than God (say): ‘We only serve them in order that they may bring us nearer to God’” (39:3; “The associationists say: ‘Has (this Prophet) made (all) the gods into one God?’ Truly this is something strange” (38:5).

The prophet questioned Ḥaṣīn, “How many (gods) do you worship?” He replied “Six on the earth, and one in the heavens.” He then asked “Who is the one whom you worship because you expect his favor or fear his wrath?” He said, “The one who is in the heavens. Thereupon the Prophet said, “Would you not then submit (to one God only) so that I teach you some words. Ḥaṣīn submitted to Islam and the Prophet taught him to say, “My Lord, give me guidance, and guard me against the evils of my soul.”²⁷⁴

As for *rubūbiyyah*, the pagans of Arabia believed that Allah is the Cherisher Lord (Ar-Rabb). The Qur'ān says, "if you ask them who it is who created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly say: 'Allah.' Say: To whom belong the earth and all the beings therein? (Tell me) if you know. They will say: 'To God!' Say: Will you not then receive admonition? Say: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens, and the Lord of the Throne Supreme? They will say: '(They belong to) God.' Say: Will you not then be filled with awe? Say: Who is it in whose hands is the governance of all things, who protects (all), but is not protected (of any)? Tell (me) if you know. They will say: 'It belongs to God.' Say: Then how are you deluded?" (23:84-9). None of them ever believed that it was the idols who sent down rain, fed the people, or governed the world. Their *shirk*, as I have said above, was that they had set up personalities like God whom they loved just as they loved God. This implies that whoever loves anything other than God just as he loves God he is guilty of *shirk*. God has referred to this in these words: "They will say then in their mutual bickering: 'By God, we were, to be sure, in manifest error when we held you as equals with the Lord of the Worlds'" (26:96-8). The same is true of one who fears another as he should fear God, or pins his hopes on someone as he should pin hopes on God, and so on.

The second kind of *shirk* is *shirk* in *rubūbiyyah*. God is the Owner and the Ruler; it is He Who gives and takes, causes suffering and gives happiness, elevates and degrades, honors and humiliates. Hence, whoever associates anyone with Him in any of these things commits *shirk* in His *rubūbiyyah*. He can save himself from this *shirk* only if he first turns to God, his real benefactor, and thanks Him for the good he receives, and then turns to the person through whom he receives and thanks him. The Prophet has said, "If someone does good to you, do him a similar good. When you have nothing to give in return, then pray for him till you feel that you have paid him back."²⁷⁵ All good comes from God, as He has said, "You have no good thing but it is from God" (16:53); and,

“Of the bounties of your Lord We bestow freely on all, these as well as those” (17:20). God is in reality the bestower of every good. It is He Who creates all provisions and allots them, and it is He Who makes them available to whom He wills. He is also the real benefactor, for He moves the heart of one who gives. He is the First and He is the Last.

This was endorsed by the Prophet when he said to Ibn ‘Abbās, “Know that if all the people gathered together to do any good to you they would not be able to do except what God has written for you; and if they all combined to cause you harm they would not be able to cause except what God has written for you. The pens have been withdrawn and the pages have dried up.”²⁷⁶ At-Tirmidhī, who recorded the *ḥadīth* said that it is a *ṣaḥīḥ* (authentic) *ḥadīth*. This means that the one who really causes good or evil is God. The same is true of all the things that we have mentioned explaining *rubūbiyyah*.

Those who believe in this and live it are free from servility to any created being like them; they stop looking towards anyone else and showering on him praise or blame. Their witness to God’s unity is sincere and their faith in His Lordship strong; they have peace of mind and tranquility of heart. For him who trusts God, God is sufficient for him. That is why Fuḍayl Ibn ‘Iyāḍ²⁷⁷ has said, “One who knows people is at peace.” In other words, he knows that they can neither do him any good nor cause him any harm.

As for the subtle *shirk*, it is very difficult for people to free themselves from it completely. It is difficult, for example, not to love anyone along with God. Let me make it clear here that if you love anyone for the sake of God as you love any prophet, any righteous person or as you love good deeds, this love is not *shirk*, for this love is part of your love for God. To love God is to love all that He loves, and hate all that He hates. When you love God truly you do not do anything against His will; you fail in this duty when your love for God is not perfect. This is what God has Himself said: “Say: If you do love God, follow me; God will love you and

forgive your sins” (3:31). Obviously we are not discussing here the love which is for the sake of God. The love that involves a subtle *shirk* is the love which is for the sake of other beings or things. This love is undoubtedly a defect in your love for God. When your love for God becomes perfect, you love none other than Him. This, however, does not bar you from loving the prophets and other persons mentioned above; in fact, that is part of your love for God. The touchstone of true love of God is this: the stronger your love for God, the fewer and the less important are the things that you love besides; conversely, the weaker your love for God, the greater in number and importance become the objects you love.

Similar is the case with fear, hope and other virtues. When your fear of God becomes perfect, you fear none other than Him. God has Himself said, “Those who preach the messages of God and fear Him, and fear none but God” (33:39). But when you fear God less, you fear created beings more. Your fear of other beings is inversely proportional to your fear of God. The same is true of hope and other virtues. This is the subtle *shirk* from which none is free except those whom God may save. A *ḥadīth* says that *shirk* in this *ummah* is more subtle than the movement of the ants.²⁷⁸

The way out of these difficulties is to turn sincerely to Allah. He has said, “Whoever expects to meet his Lord let him work righteousness, and admit no one as partner in the worship and service to his Lord” (18:110). And no one turns to God in all sincerity without cultivating disinterestedness (*zuhud*) in things, and no one attains disinterestedness without cultivating piety (*taqwā*) which is to submit oneself to God’s commands and prohibitions.

[*Fatāwā* 1:91-4]

(4.3) Calling upon anyone other than God is *shirk*.

To call upon any being other than God, be he a prophet or a saint, living or dead, or to prostrate before him or before his grave, even towards his grave, is shirk.

Ṣūfī saints whom people follow are like imāms in the *ṣalāh* who lead the *ṣalāh* whereas others offer *ṣalāh* behind them. Or they are like the guides in *ḥajj* who take people to the House of God, perform *ḥajj* with them, and guide them in various rites. They have absolutely no share in divinity (*ilahīyyah*). Those who give them a share in divinity are guilty of *shirk*, like the Christians, whom God has castigated in these words, “They take their priests and their anchorites to be their lords in derogation of God, and (they take as their lord) Christ the son of Mary; yet they were commanded to worship but one God: There is no god but He. Praise and glory to Him; (far is He) from having the partners they associate (with Him)” (9:31). Peace and blessings be upon Noah who so clearly said of himself, “I do not say that I have the treasures of God, nor that I know what is hidden, nor that I am an angel” (11:31). In almost the same words Muḥammad (pbuh) has explained his own position, at the command of God (6:50).

In the presence of these statements, no one should call upon any saint, dead or absent, even upon a prophet in his absence or after his death. He should never say to anyone, “Master, I am under your care,” or “in your protection,” “I beseech you,” or “I take shelter in you.” Nor should he say when he blunders, “O Muḥammad,” “O ‘Ayl,” O Lady Nafīṣah,²⁷⁹ O Shaykh Aḥmad,²⁸⁰ “O Shaykh Adīy,²⁸¹ O Shaykh ‘Abdul-Qādir.²⁸² He should not utter a word that means calling someone, dead or absent, or begging something of him, or seeking his protection or help. These are the acts that the pagans and the polytheists used to indulge in.

We know that Muḥammad (pbuh) is the best of the creation. But even so ‘Umar did not seek his mediation (after his death). He rather requested his uncle ‘Abbās to pray for rain. He said, “God, when we did not have rain in the time of the Prophet we prayed to

You through him, and You would give us rain. Now we pray to You through the uncle of our Prophet, give us rain.” And they were given rain.²⁸³ Al-Bukhārī has recorded this *ḥadīth* in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. During the lifetime of the Prophet people prayed to God through him and asked him to intercede for them, just as they will ask him to intercede for them with God on the Day of Judgment, and he will do that with God’s permission. Don’t you know that God has said, “Who is there who can intercede with him except after His permission” (2:255); or, “Say: Call upon other (gods) whom you fancy besides God. They have no power, not even the weight of an atom in the heavens or on the earth. No (sort of) share have they therein; nor is any of them a helper to God. No intercession can avail in His presence, except for those for whom He has granted permission” (34:22). Thus God has made it perfectly clear that He has no one to share in His rule and no partner or assistant. He has also made it clear that He will not allow any intercession without His permission.

On the Day of Judgment people will approach Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus, one after the other beseeching them to intercede for them with God, but no one of these honorable personalities will intercede. In the end they will come to Muḥammad (pbuh) who will approach God, offer praises and fall before Him in prostration. Then God will give him permission to intercede, and he will intercede²⁸⁴ When this is the case with the best of creation what do you think of others?

After the Prophet died, people neither called upon him nor sought his help. They did not ask him for anything, either at his grave or away from it. They did not even offer prayer near his grave or near the grave of anyone else. They only prayed for him, invoked God’s blessings on him, obeyed his instructions, followed his Shari‘ah, and did what God had asked them to do to Him, to His Prophet and to His faithful servants. The Prophet had instructed them, “Do not exalt me as the Christians exalted Jesus son of Mary. I am simply a servant of God, so call me the Servant

of God and the Messenger of God.”²⁸⁵ Praying to God he once said, “Lord! Let not my grave be taken as an idol and worshiped.”²⁸⁶ To his people, he instructed, “Do not make my grave a place for your festivities. Send me your *salām* and invoke God’s blessings on me from wherever you are; it will reach me.”²⁸⁷ He warned them against following the example of the Jews and Christians in these words: “God has cursed the Jews and the Christians who offered prayers at the graves of their prophets.”²⁸⁸ When a person said to him, “Just as God and you will,” he scolded him, saying, “You have made me equal to God! Just say, ‘As God wills.’”²⁸⁹ On another occasion he said, “Don’t say, ‘As God and Muhammed will.’ Instead, say, ‘As God wills,’ and then ‘as Muḥammad wills’.”²⁹⁰

Aḥmad has recorded a *ḥadīth* that once when Mu‘ādh Ibn Jabāl bowed down before him, the Prophet said, “What is this, Mu‘ādh?” Mu‘ādh said, “Messenger of God, I saw people bowing down to their bishops in Syria. They claimed that it was the teaching of their prophets.” The prophet said, “Mu‘ādh, had I commanded prostration to anyone, I would have commanded women to bow down to their husbands, since they owe them a great deal.”²⁹¹ On another occasion, he asked Mu‘ādh, “If you happen to pass by my grave would you bow down?” He said, “No.” Thereupon the Prophet said, “So, prostration is for none except God.”²⁹² These are exactly the words that he said, or almost the same.

Now, if prostration is not to be offered to the Messenger of God, alive or dead, or to his grave, how can it be offered to anybody else? The *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections contain the *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said, “Do not sit on graves, or offer *ṣalāh* towards them.”²⁹³ He definitely forbade *ṣalāh* towards a grave, just as he forbade prayer at it. That is why when people put his grave inside the Mosque the time they enlarged the Mosque, they put it on one side so that no one would face it during the *ṣalāh*. If this is the case with the grave of the Prophet, what to say of prostrating to any other grave, whosoever it may be.

[*Fatāwā* 11:499-502]

(4.4) Satan impersonates the person whom one calls upon.

When one calls upon a being other than God, Satan appears in the form of that being and immerses the supplicant deeper still into shirk.

One is guilty of a kind of *shirk* when one calls upon anyone other than God, dead or absent, and seeks his help in danger, illness, or hunger, as for example when one addresses him by his name when he is absent or dead and rotting, seeks his protection or blessing or help as one seeks from God. This is a form of *shirk* which God and His Prophet have clearly forbidden, as is known to every Muslim.

Sometimes Satan appears to a person when he invokes someone other than God in the form of the person he invokes. The one who invokes believes him to be the saint he invoked, or an angel in his form. But it is Satan who impersonates him and immerses the supplicant deeper into error. When the pagans of Arabia worshiped their idols, the evil ones spoke to them and appeared to them and gave them information about various things unknown. As that information contained a part that was false and untrue it indicated that the informers were the evil ones. God has said, “Shall I inform you (people,) on whom it is that the evil ones descend? They descend on every lying and wicked person” (26:221-2). This often happens with the pagans of India, Turkey and Ethiopia. Some so-called Muslims who follow in their footsteps claim that they have power to transform dust and various other things by using blood, saffron and laudanum, and that they can demonstrate it to anyone. Some enter into fire and eat snakes; others blow upon people and make them sick or cause them to die.

These things happen when they engage in acts that are commanded by Satan, such as listening to evil music or clapping hands. Those who perform these things as rites believe that they are greatly stirring and moving. Often on these occasions they quiver and tremble and give out shrieks. At this time the evil ones descend upon them, just as Satan enters the body of a possessed person. They foam at the mouth just as one does in an epileptic seizure and shout and shriek aloud, which is nothing but the shriek of Satan from their mouths. That is why one does not know what is going on with him until he becomes normal. Satan also speaks through the mouths of these people in a language unknown to them. Sometimes, persuaded by Satan, they enter into fire. You can see this in the Christians of the West and other people whom Satan has misled.

The people who indulge in unjustified innovations and act against the Qur'ān and the Sunnah cannot be credited with experiences with which God blesses the righteous. Miracles with which pious men are graced are given to the friends of God who fear Him and obey Him. God has said, "Behold! Verily on the friends of God there is no fear, nor shall they grieve, those who believe and keep themselves away from displeasing Him" (10:62). They are the people who seek God's nearness by doing obligatory duties which God has placed on them, as well as supererogatory works to which He has called them.

[*Fatāwā* 11:663-5]

(4.5) To make offerings (*nadhar*) to the dead is *shirk*.

To make offerings (*nadhar*) to the dead, be he a prophet or a saint or anybody else, or to their graves, or to those who look after them or visit them, is *shirk* offering and a sin against God. It matters little whether you offer any money or anything in kind. This is like the offerings that people make to churches and temples or to anchorites in cloisters. It has been authentically reported that

the Prophet said, “If one vows to carry out the will of God one should do it; but if one vows to violate His will one must not do it.”²⁹⁴ Scholars are agreed that one must not fulfill a vow that involves disobedience to God. But on whether one should atone for default in such a case, opinions differ. Some scholars think that one should atone for the default, but this is considered necessary only in case one has vowed to God. But if one has vowed to anyone else, he will be in a way swearing in the name of someone other than God, which is *shirk*. He must repent of it and seek God’s forgiveness; he should not fulfill the vow, nor should he atone for it. However, if he has given something in charity to the poor or to people in debt, he may be rewarded for it by God.

In principle, *nadhar* has been discouraged. It is reported in an authentic *ḥadīth* that the Prophet disapproved of making vows (*nadhar*), saying, “It does not produce any good, except that it takes money from the pocket of a miser.”²⁹⁵ However, when one vows to do something which means obeying rather than defying the will of God, such as offering *ṣalāh*, giving charity, fasting, making *ḥajj*, etc, one should fulfill that vow.

[*Fatāwā* 11:504-5]

(4.6) To swear by anyone other than God, whether an angel, a prophet, a saint, or a king, is *shirk*.

As for swearing in the name of any being other than God, whoever he may be - an angel, a prophet, a *Ṣūfī* sheikh, or a king, it is strictly prohibited and the oath is null and void. There is consensus of opinion on this issue among eminent scholars. They have only differed with regard to swearing in the name of Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh). However, the majority view is that all oaths made in the name of anyone other than God, including the Prophet, are null and void. The Prophet himself has said, “When you swear, swear by Allah or keep silent;”²⁹⁶ and, “Whoever swears by anyone other than God commits *shirk*.”²⁹⁷ Hence if you swear by your

sheikh, by his grave, by his life, by his rights on God, or if you swear by a king, by the favors bestowed by a king, or by your sword, or by the Ka‘bah, or by your father, or his grave, all these are wrong and forbidden, and your oath will not be valid. On this there is complete agreement among the Muslims.

[*Fatāwā* 11:506]

(4.7) Closing the doors to *shirk*.

Shirk originated with the worship of pious people or their statues. The Prophet closed this door when he forbade offering prayers at the graves of prophets and pious men.

Shirk in the world began with the worship of pious men and their statues. Another cause of *shirk* was the worship of heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon, and other stars; statues of these bodies were carved out and worshiped. The *shirk* of the people of Abraham was of this kind and partly of the other kind. The third cause of *shirk* was the worship of angels and jinns; they, too, were represented in statues. To be sure, statues are not worshiped for their own sake; they are worshiped for other reasons. In the case of the Arabs, the main reason for their *shirk* was the first, although other factors also contributed to its growth.

The man who first changed the religion of Abraham (pbuh) was ‘Āmr Ibn Luhayy.²⁹⁸ He visited Syria and saw that people at Balqa prayed to idols to avert evil and secure good. Returning to Makkah, he introduced the same practice. This was the time when the tribe of Khuza‘ah ruled Makkah, that is to say, before the Quraysh supplanted them. ‘Āmr was the head of the Khuza‘ah. We have a *ḥadīth* in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that the Prophet said, “I saw ‘Āmr Ibn Luhayy Ibn Jam‘ah Ibn Khundaf crawling on his belly in the Fire.”²⁹⁹ Luhayy was the one who introduced changes in the religion of Abraham. He let loose, for example, a she-camel for free pasture, or set free one whose ears were slit. Among the

people of Noah *shirk* spread in the same way; it began with the worship of the holy men of the community. Satan incites people to take sometimes one way and sometimes the other way. However, the worship of holy men is the most common way, for people know them very well, see that their prayers are answered, and enjoy their blessings. When they die they visit their graves and pray at them; sometimes they beg from them, and sometimes they beg from God, and sometimes they offer *ṣalāh* near their graves under the impression that it is better to offer *ṣalāh* and pray for one's needs near their graves rather than in the mosques or at home.

Since this is the door from which *shirk* has entered various communities the Prophet set out to close it, as he closed many other doors, such as the worship of stars. Muslim has recorded the *ḥadīth* that five days before his death the Prophet addressed the people and said, "People before you used to say prayers at graves. Beware, do not turn graves into mosques; I forbid it absolutely."³⁰⁰ Both Muslim and Al-Bukhārī have recorded that once when it was mentioned to the Prophet that churches in Ethiopia were extremely beautiful and exquisitely adorned with pictures (on the walls), he said, "People there used to build mosques near the graves of their holy men and draw figures (on the walls). To be sure, they will be among the most wretched people on the Day of Judgment."³⁰¹ They have also reported that on his deathbed the Prophet said, "God has cursed the Jews and the Christians who have turned the graves of their prophets into mosques. You must keep away from what they have done."³⁰² Commenting on this *ḥadīth*, 'Ā'ishah said, "Had the Prophet not warned people in this way, they would have opened his grave to the people. But they did not do that because they feared that people might turn it into a mosque."³⁰³ Aḥmad in his *Musnad* and Abū Hatim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* have also recorded these words of the Prophet: "The worst people on earth are those who will see the Hour (of Judgment) coming and will be offering prayers at graves."³⁰⁴ Abū Dāwūd has recorded in his *Sunan* that

the Prophet warned, “Do not hold any festive function at my grave; send your blessings to me from where you are, for your blessings will be conveyed to me.”³⁰⁵ Mālik has recorded in his *Muwattʿā* this prayer of the Prophet: “Lord! Let not my grave be turned into an object of worship. Surely your wrath falls on the people who turn the graves of their prophets into a place of worship.”³⁰⁶

Muslim has recorded that Abū Al-Hayyāj Al-Asadī said that ‘Alī Ibn Abi Ṭālib (raa) once asked him whether he could send him on a mission like the one the Prophet had sent him earlier. And then he commanded him to level all the graves which he would come across, and knock down all statues that he would find. He also commanded him to erase the pictures of dead people and remove the images that were set up on their graves.³⁰⁷ Both are causes of *shirk*. It is reported that once on a journey ‘Umar passed by a place which people used to visit and offer *ṣalāh*. He inquired about it, and was told that it was the place where the Prophet once offered some prayers. Thereupon ‘Umar said, “People before you were annihilated for acts like this; they offered prayers to things associated with their prophets. When the time for *ṣalāh* comes here, make that *ṣalāh* here; otherwise move on.”³⁰⁸ He also came to know that people were visiting the tree where the Companions of the Prophet had pledged their fealty (at the time of Ḥudaybiyyah). He commanded it to be cut down.³⁰⁹ Abū Mūsā³¹⁰ wrote to him that people had discovered the grave of the prophet Daniel at Tustar. It had a book which told of future events and what would happen to the Muslims; it foretold that they would have a draught and come to the grave and open it up and get rain. ‘Umar commanded him to dig thirteen graves at daytime and bury the remains of that grave in one of them at night so that people might be saved from a great evil.

To sum up: God and His Prophet prohibited praying towards graves, even if no mosque is built on them. That act is certainly a greater evil. That is why scholars have not allowed the construction of mosques over graves, and have commanded them

to be dismantled if they are constructed. They have also said that if a body had been buried in a grave inside a mosque and a long period had lapsed, the grave must be leveled so that it may not be recognized. If any signs remain, *shirk* may raise its head any time. The land where we have the Prophet's Mosque now had a graveyard earlier where pagans would bury their dead. There were also some date trees and ruins there. When the Prophet wanted to build the mosque, he had the graves removed, the trees cut down, and the ruined structures leveled. Only then did he build the mosque on that ground

Neither the Companions nor their successors built a mosque on the grave of any prophet or holy man, nor did they build any tomb or shrine there. Nor did they put up anything on any place associated with any prophet, where he might have spent some time, or done any thing. They never thought of building any mosque on the relics of the prophets or holy men. The majority of them never made it a point to visit a place which the Prophet did not deliberately choose to encamp or offer *ṣalāh* and had done so just incidentally. In fact, leading personalities among them, such as 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb and others, would stop people from visiting those places and offering *ṣalāh* there where the Prophet had prayed incidentally and not deliberately. It is of course reported of Ibn 'Umar³¹¹ that he would deliberately take the way the Prophet had walked or ridden on his journeys, stop at the places where he had stopped, offer *ṣalāh* where he had offered *ṣalāh*, even though he knew that the Prophet did not do so deliberately but just incidentally. Ibn 'Umar would do that as he tried to imitate the Prophet as closely as he could. However, his father, the other three rightly-guided caliphs, the rest of the ten Companions promised Paradise, and many others like Ibn Mas'ūd,³¹² Mu'ādh Ibn Jabal,³¹³ and Ubayy Ibn Ka'b³¹⁴ would not do what Ibn 'Umar used to do. And the practice of the majority of the Companions is right.

The reason is clear. To follow the Prophet means to do as he did, in the way he did, and because he did it. If he planned to offer

ṣalāh or perform any rite at a particular place, offering or performing that rite at that place would be following him. But if he did not plan to do any such thing at a particular place, for us to plan on doing it there would be opposing rather than following him.

[*Fatāwā* 17:460-467]

5. PROPHET AND PROPHECY

(5.1) The meaning of *nabī* and *rasūl*

A nabī - prophet - is one to whom God reveals a message to communicate to his people. If he is sent to a people who are non-believers and pagans he is a rasūl - messenger. but if he is sent to those who have faith already, he is a nabī. It is not necessary that a rasūl be given a new sharī'ah - code.

A *nabī*, prophet, is one to whom God communicates a message, and he communicates that message to the people. If he is sent to those who are opposed to the religion of God that he may give them His message, he is *rasūl*, a Messenger. But if the people already follow a *sharī'ah* given earlier, and he is not sent with a particular message to anyone, he is a *nabī*, not a *rasūl*. God has said, "We never sent a *rasūl* or a *nabī* before you, but when he formed a desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire..." (22:52). Here both *rasūl* and the *nabī* have been mentioned to have been sent, but only one has been called *rasūl*, for he is *the* envoy (*ar-rasūl al-muṭlaq*), who is commissioned to convey God's message to the people who are opposed to His religion. Noah was *rasūl* in this sense. It is said of him in an authentic *ḥadīth* that he was the first *rasūl* to be sent to people on the earth.³¹⁵ Many *nabīs* had gone before him such as *Shīth* and *Idrīs*, and of course Adam whom God had addressed. Ibn 'Abbās said that between Adam and Noah ten generations had passed all of whom had faith in Islam. Everyone of these prophets received revelations from God telling him what he should do, and what he should command the faithfuls of his time to do. To be sure, they had faith in them just as the followers of a *Sharī'ah* believe in what its scholars tell of their *rasūl*. The same was the case with the prophets of Israel; they were asked to expound the law of the Torah. They did sometimes

receive revelations in particular cases; but with regard to the *sharī'ah* of the Torah they acted just as a scholar from among us who has insight into the Qur'ān acts. An example is the insight which God gave to Solomon in the case that came up to him and David. Hence a *nabī* is one to whom God communicates something, whether an imperative to do or not to do something, or information about some reality, and he in turn communicates that information to those who would believe in what God has communicated to him.

But when they are sent to non-believers, they are asked to call people to believe in one God, to worship Him alone, without associating anyone with Him. What usually happens in this case is that a group of people denies them and belies them. God said, "Similarly, no messenger (*rasūl*) came to the people before them, but they said (of him), in like manner, 'a sorcerer or one possessed'" (51:52); or, "Nothing is said to you that was not said to the messengers before you" (41:43). The messengers (*rasūl*), therefore, are sent to the people of opposing beliefs, some of whom usually reject them... The words, "We did not send before you a *rasūl* or *nabī* but," show that a *nabī* is also sent, but he does not enjoy the title of *rasūl* for he is not sent to people who are unaware of God's message. The *nabī* preaches to the believers what they know to be true, just as their scholars do. That is why the Prophet said, "The scholars (*'ulamā*) are the successors of the prophets."³¹⁶

It is not necessary for a *rasūl* to give a new *sharī'ah*. Joseph was a *rasūl*; but he followed the *sharī'ah* of Abraham; and David and Solomon were *rasūls*, but they followed the *sharī'ah* of the Torah. Proof of the former is the verse, "And to you there came Joseph in times gone by, with clear signs, but you ceased not to doubt of the (mission) for which He had come. At length when he died, you said: 'No messenger will God send after him'" (40:34). And proof of the latter is the verse, "We have sent you revelation as We sent to Noah and the prophets after him. We sent revelation

to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the Tribes, to Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron and Solomon, and to David we gave the Psalms. Of some messengers (*rasūl*) We have told you the story; of others We have not; and to Moses God spoke direct' (4:163- 4).

[*An-Nubūwwah* 172-4]

(5.2) Signs of Prophethood

The signs of prophethood are only associated with the prophets and prove their veracity. They contravene natural phenomena, lie beyond the powers of human beings and jinns, and are incontestable. However, contravention of the natural law is not part of their definition, but only a necessary implication.

The property of a sign is that it necessarily implies the object it signifies. Whatever necessarily implies a thing is its sign; and it cannot be a sign unless it necessarily implies the object it signifies. Again a sign implies its object just as a proposition implies its consequence; and this implication is necessarily or almost necessarily known.

Signs proving the veraciousness of the prophets, peace and blessings of God be upon them, cannot belong to a category of signs which also signify others. The Mu'tazilah and other theologians have defined miracle (*mu'jizah*) as a contravention of '*ādah*, common phenomena. Since they are not able to explain what it actually means, and since they cannot distinguish them from the wonders performed by the sorcerers, diviners, and saints, some have recanted from that definition. Others have added the qualification that the miracle must be incontestable. They make this condition the differentia of prophetic miracles. They say that prophetic miracles (*mu'jizah*) contravene natural phenomena and are accompanied with a challenge that no one else can reproduce them. On this definition they feel free to allow nonprophets to work miracles as the prophets, provided they can be reproduced.

They put the wonders of the sorcerers and the diviners in the same category with prophetic miracles with the difference that the latter are not contestable.

This is obviously wrong, for we know that the miracles of Musaylamah³¹⁷ and Al-Aswad Al-‘Anasī³¹⁸ and other false prophets were not contested. One would also like to know what is meant by saying that they are incontestable? Do you mean to say that they are not contested by anyone at the time and place they are performed? On that meaning, the miracles of the sorcerers and the diviners are (*mu’jizah*) since they are not contested, and the miracles of Musaylamah and Al-Anasī were (*mu’jizah*) since they were not contested when they were performed. The other sense in which the qualification may be understood is that the miracles cannot be contested ever. But how can you know that? If it is asked what are the signs that prove the veraciousness of the prophet, the answer is that they are signs that are known to be associated with the prophets alone proving their veraciousness, and can only happen at the hands of true prophets. They have to contravene the natural phenomena, lie beyond the power of men and jinns, and have to be incontestable. But the condition that they contravene natural phenomena or are incontestable is a necessary consequence of miracle, not a part of its definition.

The knowledge that miracles prove the veracity of the prophets may be necessary, as it is in the case of the splitting of the moon, the turning of the club into a python, or the emergence of the she-camel from the mountain. Simply by observing these signs one can know with certainty that God has made them the proof for the veracity of the person who offers them. It also means that these are contraventions of natural phenomena, and that they cannot be contested. These things are part of their characteristics, but not the only characteristics. Suppose a person says that someone has sent him to you, that he comes to you with something which is regarded as a sign. And a sign (*‘alāmah*), a proof (*dalīl*) or evidence (*āyah*) is what implies its object, and the *āyāt* of prophethood prove the

veracity of the prophets. Obviously this would not happen unless they necessarily imply the veracity of the prophets. This means that they cannot be associated with non-prophets and that they cannot be reproduced by them. However, this does not rule out that another prophet may perform them, or that one who witnesses the veracity of the prophet produces something similar, for his witnessing them is proof of their veracity, and will only follow it. Sometimes signs prove the veracity of prophethood in general, and since they prove the veracity of the prophets in general, they prove the veracity of a particular prophet who claims that he is a prophet. This proof, however, cannot be adduced for a false prophet.

[*An-Nubūwwāt* 189-190]

(5.4) How the signs of prophethood differ from sorcery and divination.

First, what the prophets say is absolutely true; they neither lie nor say something false. On the other hand, what the sorcerers and diviners say contain things that are false, even pure lies. God has said, “Shall I tell you (O people!) on whom it is that the evil ones descend? They descend on every lying, wicked person” (26:221-2).

Second, as to their life and mission, the prophets preach nothing except the establishment of a just order (in this world), the pursuit of happiness in the next life, and the worship of the one and only God; and theirs is a life of virtue and piety. Others preach injustice, worship of many gods, and the pursuit of worldly goods alone; and theirs is a life of sin and crime.

Third, there is nothing unusual about sorcery, divination or things of this kind; they are quite well known and common practices. The miracles of the prophets, on the other hand, are for them alone, or for their true followers.

Fourth, divination or sorcery is something which is learned and acquired; this is known to all peoples. Prophethood, on the other hand, is not something to be acquired or learned.

Fifth, if prophethood is at all acquired, it is acquired through good deeds, honesty, justice and faith in one God. One who lies, even in matters human, not to say divine, cannot be a prophet. Hence, the way to achieve prophethood, if at all one can achieve it by one's efforts, requires that one is true in whatever one says of God.

Sixth, the wonders which the diviners and the sorcerers work are within the power of men or jinns who are required to believe in the prophets and follow them. On other hand, the miracles of the prophets lie beyond the power of men and jinns; rather they contravene the common practices their people are accustomed to. The Qur'ān says to the Prophet, "Say: If the whole of mankind and jinns were to gather together to produce the like of this Qur'ān, they could not produce the like thereof, even if they backed each other with help and support" (17:88).

Seventh, the wonders of diviners and the sorcerers can be reproduced by others; but the miracles of the prophets cannot be reproduced by anyone.

Eighth, the wonders of the non-prophets do not contravene the ways known to human beings; in fact, all of them are performed by some human being or the other. The miracles of the prophets, on the other hand, are only performed by the prophets or those who believe in them.

Ninth, some prophetic miracles are absolutely beyond the power of any created beings, angels or otherwise, such as the revelation of the Qur'ān or the address to Moses. Non-prophetic wonders, on the other hand, are within the power of human beings and jinns.

Tenth, if some prophetic miracles be within the power of angels, they never say anything of God which is not true. For example, they never say to a human being that God has made him a messenger whereas He has not. This is done only by the evil ones. As for the wonders that pious men in our *ummah* or in the *ummahs* before us have done or do, they do not go beyond the

practice of pious men; but the miracles of the prophets do transcend them. The former is attained through piety, through supplication and devotion; but the latter is not attained through these things. It does not happen even when it is demanded by the people until God permits it: “Say: Certainly (all) signs are in the power of God” (6:109; or, “Say: God alone has the power to send down a sign” (6:37).

Eleventh, the Prophet does not institute anything except what is good for the people in this life or the next. He commands only what is good and right and forbids only what is evil and wrong. He commands belief in one God and sincere service to Him, and forbids assigning partners to Him, and prohibits what is false and unjust. Human nature and reason uphold and support whatever the Prophet has said, or what any prophet before him has said. What is approved by reason and what is authentic in tradition support each other, as they support the prophet.

[*An-Nubūwwāt* 127-8]

(5.4) Revelation and its forms

Wahī means fast and secret communication. Sometimes one sees a light or hears a voice which does not come from anywhere outside the viewer, but only from within himself. This form of *wahī* is given to prophets as well as non-prophets. Another form of *wahī* is that the voice one hears comes from outside oneself, from God through any of His angels or through something else. The third form of *wahī* is that God Himself speaks to the recipient from behind a veil. The last two forms of *wahī* are the privilege of the prophets; no one else shares in them.

Speech (*kalām*) and conversation (*taklīm*) may take place in different ways and at different levels. Similarly, the communication of somebody’s words to a third person or persons may occur in different forms and at different levels, each with its own characteristics. Some people comprehend only some of these

forms, others comprehend only the lowest form and deny higher ones. Hence they believe in some parts of the prophetic message and deny others. Each group believes in the reality of what it itself comprehends, and denies the reality of what the other comprehends.

God has described the forms of *wahī* in His Book. He has said, “It is not given to (mortal) man that God should speak to him except by *wahī*, or from behind a veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, with His permission, whatever He wills (to reveal)” (42:51). At another place He has said, “We sent you *wahī*, as We sent it to Noah and the messengers after him. We sent *wahī* to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the Tribes, to Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron and Solomon, and to David We gave the Psalms. Of some messengers We have already told you the story; of others We have not; and to Moses God spoke directly” (4:63-4). At a third place He has said, “These messengers We endowed with gifts, some above others: To one of them God spoke; others He raised to degrees (of honor); to Jesus son of Mary We gave clear (signs) and strengthened him with the Holy Spirit” (2:253).

In the last verse, God has stated that He chose someone to speak to directly (*taklīm*); in the verse quoted before He has clearly mentioned that it was Moses to whom He spoke directly. There are also a lot of traditions to this effect. Obviously this address (*taklīm*) with which God honored Moses, but not Noah, Jesus or any other prophet, must be different from the general *taklīm* available to others which is referred to in the verse, “It is not given to (mortal) man that God should speak to him except by *wahī*, or from behind a veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, with His permission, whatever He wills (to reveal)” (42:51).

The Elders have correctly said that this verse comprehends all the levels of *taklīm*. Abū Naṣr As-Sijzī in his *Al-Ibānah*, Al-Bayhaqī and many other writers have noted on the authority of ‘Uqbah that when Ibn Shihāb³¹⁹ was asked about this verse, he said that it refers to all human beings whom God has honored with His

revelation (*waḥī*). Hence the *kalām* which God addressed to Moses directly was from behind a veil, and the *waḥī* which God reveals to any of His prophets (pbut), strengthening whatever He has put in his heart and which he commits to writing, is the *kalām* of God and His *waḥī*. A third *waḥī* is that which is between God and His prophets. A fourth *waḥī* is that which the prophets preach but neither put in writing for the benefit of others nor ask anyone to write down, although they communicate it to the people and expound on it to them since they have been commanded by God to communicate it and to expound on it to them. A fifth *waḥī* is that which God sends through any of His angels whom He wills, and the angel delivers it to the prophet whom God has chosen from among the people. There is still another *waḥī* which God sends by an angel He chooses, and that angel reveals it as *waḥī* to the heart of the prophet He has appointed.

I will explain. First, *waḥī* means fast and secret communication either in waking or in sleep; the dream of a prophet is also a *waḥī*, and the (good) dream which the Believers see is forty-sixth part of prophethood. There is a *ḥadīth* to this effect in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections.³²⁰ ‘Ubādah Ibn As-Samit, too, has reported that the Prophet said, “The dream of the Believers is a speech by which the Lord speaks to His servants in sleep.”³²¹ With regard to *waḥī* while awake, have another *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* in which the Prophet said, “Among the people gone before you there were men who had been addressed (*muḥaddathūn*). Were there any in my *ummah* it would be ‘Umar.”³²² In another version of the *ḥadīth*, also authentic, the word is *mukallamūn*,³²³ those who are spoken to. In the Qur’ān God says, “Behold! Is not *waḥī* to the disciples (*al-hawariyūn*) to have faith in Me and My messenger” (5:114); “I sent *waḥī* to the mother of Moses to suckle him” (28:7); “(God) sent *waḥī* to each heaven (telling) its duty” (41:12); and “Your Lord sent *waḥī* to the bee” (16:68).

From these texts it is clear that this form of *waḥī* may be sent to non-prophets, while awake as well as in sleep. Further, it may be sent in the form of a voice from “above” but inside the self of the person receiving it rather than from outside him, in a dream as well while awake. Similarly, the light that he sees may also be within him. This *waḥī* which takes place within the self and in which the voice of an angel is not heard is the lowest form of *waḥī*. However, it is the first form of *waḥī* which is given to the salik, the traveler (to God). This is the *waḥī* which metaphysicians from among the philosophers of Islam that have both Islam and non-Islam (*aṣ-ṣubū*) in them have discerned. It has led them to acknowledge some of those attributes of the prophets and messengers which are common between them and others and deny the rest. That is why some of them have said that prophethood is something acquired, that one can dispense with prophets, or that non-prophets may prove better than prophets. They also claim that this was the way God spoke to Moses, that He spoke to him from the heaven of the latter’s intellect, that the voice which Moses heard came from within himself, or that he heard it as an idea coming from the Active Intellect, and that it is quite possible for anyone else to attain the status of Moses.

One of these people has also claimed that he has secured a position which is above Moses, because whereas Moses heard the speech through the medium of an oracle within himself, he and his colleagues hear the words purely, without any sound. Some of them have said that Gabriel, who used to come to Muḥammad (pbuh), was nothing more than a bright image appearing to him from within himself just as one sees an image in a dream. They say that Muḥammad (pbuh) received the Qur’ān from this image which people call Gabriel. That is why Ibn ‘Arabī, the author of the *Fuṣūṣ* and the *Fuṭūḥāt Makkīyyah*, has said that he receives ideas from the same source from which the angel who reveals them to the prophet receives, and that prophethood (*nubawah*) ranks lower than sainthood (*walāyah*) though higher than messengerhood

(*risālah*). This is because in their mistaken opinion Muḥammad (pbuh) received revelation from this internal image which they call angel, whereas they receive ideas from Pure Intellect from whom this internal image itself gets them.

These people do not believe in the reality of God's speech, for them, He does not have an attribute of speech, nor has He ever willed to convey any word to anyone. They even say that He has no knowledge of particular things, as His knowledge and will is directed to universals not to particulars. Their basic doctrine is that God knows only the universals, and does not know the particulars except in a general way. Close or somewhat close to their view is the one that extends God's knowledge to accidents. This view, which is denounced as faithlessness by Muslims in general, has found its way into the thought of many people who have a place of honor in *kalām* and *taṣawwūf*. Had I not abhorred the idea of identifying them, I would have mentioned their names.

The second form of *wahī* is that in which the sound one hears comes from outside; it comes from God either through the medium of an angel or any non-angelic being. This is how the Jahmīyyah, the Mu'tazilah, and some others conceive *wahī*. They say that this is the only way God speaks to people. But the truth is that it is just one form of *wahī*, only one of many ways in which God speaks to people or to His prophets. It is the second form of *wahī* which God has mentioned in verse 42:51 in these words: "Or He sends a messenger who reveals, with His permission, what He wills (to reveal)." This is a revelation through a messenger, a revelation which is different from the first revelation (*wahī*) which proceeds directly from God, and which is a form of God's address (*taklīm*) in general.

Revelation through a messenger is also of different kinds. We have in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections of Al-Bukhārī and Muslim the *ḥadīth* reported by 'Ā'ishah (may God be pleased with her) that Al-Ḥārith Ibn Hishām asked the Prophet how revelation comes to him. The Prophet said, "Sometimes it comes to me like the ringing of a bell,

and that is hardest on me; then it stops and I get what (the angel) conveys. Sometimes, the angel appears to me in the form of a man and speaks to me and I get what he says.”³²⁴ ‘Ā’ishah (raa) adds that she saw a revelation coming down to the Prophet on a chilly day; when it stopped, his forehead burst out into sweat.³²⁵ The Prophet has made it clear that the angel would sometimes appear to him with the sound of a bell, and sometimes appear to him in the form of a man and speak to him. It is reported that Gabriel would come to him in the form of Dihyah Al-Kalbī.³²⁶ The Qur’ān says that Gabriel appeared to Mary in the form of a man in all respects (19:17), and that angels came to Abraham (11:69, 29:31) and to Lot (11:77, 29:33) in the forms of human beings. God has referred to both these forms of revelation, the delivery of a message by the angel (*liqā’ al-malak*) and his talk (*khiṭāb*), as *waḥī*, as they had an element of mystery in them, for when the Prophet saw the angel he needed to be told that it was an angel, and when he came with the sound of a bell he needed to comprehend what was conveyed along with it.

The third kind is speech from behind a veil, just as God spoke to Moses (pbuh) That is why God has used the terms *nidā’*, calling from a distance, and *nijā’*, conversing for it. His words are, “But when (Moses) came to the Fire, a voice called out (*nūdiya*): Moses! I am your Lord! Therefore put off your shoes; you are in the sacred valley (of) Ṭuwā. I have chosen you. Listen, then, to what is revealed (*yūḥā*)” (20:11-3). This kind of address is granted to some messengers only. God has said, “These messengers we endowed with gifts, some above others: with some of them God conversed” (2:253); or, “When Moses came to the place appointed by Us, and His Lord addressed him” (7:143). Again, after mentioning that He has sent revelations (*iyḥā’*) to many prophets, God says, “We conversed with Moses directly” (4:164). A group of people include this conversation in the first form of *waḥī*. We have in this group some philosophers as well as some writers on Ṣūfism who take this line. You may find it in works like *Mishkāṭ*

*al-Anwār*³²⁷ and *Khal' an-Na'layn*).^{327a} The author of the *Fuṣūṣ* and other monists take the same line. That this view goes against the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the scholars, as well as against reason is quite clear.

Mistaken, too, are those who say that God's conversing with Moses was a kind of inspiration (*ilham*) and revelation (*waḥī*), and that they themselves hear God's words just as Moses heard them. They belong to the Jahmīyyah, the Kullābīyyah and to groups like them. It is also quite clear that they are absolutely mistaken.

The terms *waḥī* and *kalām* are used in the Qur'ān in a wide sense, as well as in a narrow sense. When *waḥī* is used in a wider sense, it includes *kalām*; and, just the reverse, when *kalām* is used in its wider sense it includes *waḥī*. An example where *waḥī* is included in *taklīm*, in its wider sense is the verse 42:1 under discussion; on the other hand, the verse where *taklīm* is included in *waḥī* in the wider sense is this: "Listen to what is revealed (*yūḥā*)" (20:13). However, when *taklīm* is used in its limited and perfect sense, *waḥī* in the wider sense of secret communication given to prophets and non-prophets is not part of it. Similarly, when *waḥī* is used in its general sense common to prophets and others, *taklīm* in its limited and perfect sense is not a part of it. Look at the words which God first said to Zacharias, "Your sign shall be that you shall speak to no man for three nights, although you are not dumb," and what He said next, "He (Zacharias) came out to his people from his chamber and told them by signs (*awḥā*) to celebrate God's praises" (19:10-11). It is clear from these two verses that *iyḥā'*, to give *waḥī* is not part of *taklīm*, speaking. At another place God has said, "Your sign shall be that you shall speak to no man for three days, but with signals" (3:41). If the clause beginning with "but" (*illā*) is taken as a separate sentence, *taklīm* in both verses 19:10 and 34:41 will mean the same; but if it is taken as an exceptional clause, *taklīm* will mean what it means in verse 42:51, that is, in its wider sense. The way God spoke to Moses was a

special way of speaking, speaking in its perfect sense; that is why He has referred to it in these words: “There is one to whom God spoke directly” (2:253), though we know that God sent *wahī* to every prophet and spoke to him in the wider sense of the term. We also know that God has distinguished between His speech to His prophets and His revelation (*iyhā’*) to them. The same is the case with *taklīm* when used as infinitive. We further know that He has not included *taklīm* from behind a veil in *iyhā’*, but has rather mentioned it separately. This is supported by many *aḥādīth* of the Prophet and various sayings of his Companions which limit God’s speech (*taklīm*) to Moses. They underline the fact that God spoke to him with a voice which Moses heard. This is stated in a number of sayings of the Elders and the *a’immah* of Islam which are in perfect agreement with the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.

[*Fatāwā* 12:396-403]

(5.5) False prophets

False prophets and how their experiences differ from the experiences of the friends (awliyā’) of God.

Some experiences are devilish. ‘Abdullah Ibn Ṣayyād who appeared at the time of the Prophet had some such experiences on account of which some companions of the Prophet thought that he was the anti-Christ (*ad-Dajjāl*). The Prophet himself watched his case for sometime, till he came to the conclusion that he was not the anti-Christ, but only a diviner (*kāhin*). He hid something in his hand and asked him to tell him what it was. Ibn Ṣayyād said, “*Ad-Dukh, Ad-Dukh,*” but could not say that it was the Sūrat Ad-Dukhān of the Qur’ān, which the Prophet had held in his hand. Thereupon the Prophet said, “Down with you! You can never go beyond your limits.”³²⁸ That is to say, he could not do more than what a diviner does. Every diviner of that time had an agent from

among the devils who used to tell him of things unknown since they could steal some information (from the heavens) and mix them with false ideas of their own. Al-Bukhārī has recorded in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* that the Prophet said, “Angels come down to the clouds and talk about things that are decided upon in the heavens. The evil ones steal some of this information and pass them on to the diviners, adding to them hundred things of their own fabrication.”³²⁹

Muslim has another *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn ‘Abbās, “One day the Prophet was sitting with the Anṣār when all of a sudden a small comet shot through the air and there was light all around. The Prophet asked the people, “What did you use to say about such a thing when it happened in the days of ignorance (*jāhiyyah*)? They said, “We used to say that some great person might have died or was going to be born.” Thereupon the Prophet said, “Comets do not fall because someone dies or someone is born. When God decides upon something, the bearers of His Throne praise Him, then the angels of the nearest heaven praise Him, and then the angels of the next heaven, and so on till the angels of the last heaven praise Him. The angels at the seventh heaven ask the bearers of the Throne what the Lord has decided, and they tell them. Then the angels of the sixth heaven and then those of the next heavens in turn ask about it and are told what the Lord has decided, till the angels of the lowest heaven come to know it. At this time the evil ones steal some part of the news, for which they are struck (with a comet). It is this information that they pass on to their human agents. What they convey as such is true, but often they add to it many things.”³³⁰ In a variant of the *ḥadīth*, one of the narrators asked Az-Zuhrī, who has reported the *ḥadīth*, whether the evil ones were struck (by comets) in the days before the Prophet was sent. Az-Zuhrī said, “Yes they were, but now since the Prophet was there the vigilance has been tightened”³³¹

Al-Aswad Al-Ansī,³³² who claimed that he was a prophet, had some agents from among the evil ones who used to give him information about unknown things. When Muslims started fighting

him, they were afraid the evil ones might inform him of their moves. It happened that his wife came to know the truth about him and helped the Muslims against him, and they succeeded to kill him. Musaylamah,³³³ the liar, also had some agents from the evil ones who would tell him of unknown things and help him in different ways. There were some other impostors, too. One by the name Al-Ḥārith Ad-Dimishqī³³⁴ appeared at the time of ‘Abdul-Mālik Ibn Marwān and laid claim to prophethood in Syria. The evil one would set him free from chains, shield him against the sword and other weapons, produce sounds glorifying God from marbles when he touched them, and create the spectacle of men walking on foot or riding on horses in the air, whom he called angels, even though they were jinns. When Muslims caught him and intended to kill him, a man thrust his lance into him but could not pierce into his body. ‘Abdul-Mālik said that it happened because the man did not say the name of Allah in the beginning. Thereupon the lancer said God’s name and thrust the lance into him and killed him.

This means that the evil ones leave their human agents when things that counter their spell, such as the Verse of the Throne (2:255) are read out to them.... It has been seen that when this verse is read with conviction the spell is broken. It has also been observed that when people are under the influence of the evil ones, they may enter into a fire, or when they hear whistles and clappings, the evil ones come down upon them, speak through their mouths words that are strange and unintelligible, or tell what is going on in the mind of someone around, or speak different languages, just as a jinn speaks through the man who is possessed. People who have these experiences are not aware of what is going on within them. They are just like a possessed person from whose mouth the jinn speaks, but when he becomes normal he does not know what he was saying before. This is why when a possessed person is beaten he does not feel it, nor does he say when he becomes normal that he had the beating, for it was the jinn who had it.

Some of these people also receive from the evil ones foods, sweets, fruits and many other things which are not produced in their own area. With some the evil ones fly to Makkah or Jerusalem or other places; some they take to Arafat at the time of *ḥajj*, but bring them back in the same night with the result that they do not complete the *ḥajj*. Often they take away their *iḥrām* clothes when they reach the *mīqāt* or carry them away so that they are not able to pray at Muzdalifah, or make circumbulation (*tawāf*) of the Ka'bah, or do the *sa'ī* between Aṣ-Ṣafa and Al-Marwah, or throw stones at Satan at Minā, and so on, so that they are not able to perform the *ḥajj* properly.

[*Fatāwā* 11:283-286]

(5.6) How philosophers interpret prophethood and revelation.

The view of Ibn Sīnā and Al-Fārābī regarding waḥī and prophethood, its refutation.

A number of people who say that they believe in the Prophet and the prophets before him and in what has been revealed to them have an element of hypocrisy in them. To be sure, they do not belie the Prophet in everything he said; on the contrary, they hold him in honor, and believe that they should obey some of his commands, though not others. Of these those who are farthest removed from the prophetic religion are the so-called philosophers, esoterics and heretics. They do not recognize prophethood except insofar as it is common between the prophets and the non-prophets, namely dreams. Aristotle and his students did not speak on prophethood. Al-Fārābī³³⁵ treated it as a form of dreams; that is the reason he exalted the philosophers above the prophets.

Ibn Sīnā³³⁶ had a greater regard for prophethood. To him a prophet must have three characteristics. First is that he gets knowledge without learning. He calls this a holy faculty (*al-*

qawwah al-qudsīyyah), and identifies it with intuition (*al-qawwah al-ḥadsīyyah*). Second, the prophet conjures in his mind images of various things he knows. He can see within himself bright forms and hear voices just as one sees in sleep figures who speak to him and whom he hears. They exist in his mind rather than out there. In short, for these people what the prophet sees or hears without anyone around perceiving it, he just sees only within himself and hears only within himself. He is no different from a person under hallucination.

Third, the prophet has the power to work wonders in the world. This is what the miracles of the prophets mean to them, for in their view all that happens is caused by a spiritual, angelic or physical power, such as the souls of the heavens or of human beings, the spheres, and the natural forces that reside in the four elements and their compounds. They do not believe that beings above the heavens can do or produce anything, or speak or move in any sense, be they angels or non-angels. The Lord of the World is obviously farthest removed from these things. The intelligences which they posit have no movement from one state to another, whether in terms of will, speech, action or anything else. The same is true of the One, the First Cause. Hence, all that the prophets receive comes from the Active Intellect.

This is in essence the doctrine of the philosophers. However, when they learn the teachings of the prophets they try to reconcile them with their doctrines. They take the words of the prophets and use them in their discourses and writings, so that those who are not aware of what the prophets meant by them think that they have only used them in the prophetic sense and thus go astray. This may be found in the writings of Ibn Sīnā and those who have taken their ideas from him. Al-Ghazālī has referred to this fact when he states their doctrines and has often cautioned people against them. However, some of their ideas have also found their way into his writings, such as *Al-Maḍnūn bihi 'alā Ghayr Ahlihi* and others. Even in the *Ihyā'* he uses concepts like *al-mulk*, *al-malakūt*, and

al-jabarūt by which he means the worlds of physical bodies, souls, and intelligences respectively, as we have in the philosophers. Similarly, he mentions the Preserved Tablet (*al-lawḥ al-mahfūz*) and identifies it with the Universal Soul; and so on and so on. We have discussed these things elsewhere in detail, which may be consulted. It is strange that in the *Tahāfut* and other works he taxes the philosophers with faithlessness, but in *Al-Maḍnūn Bihi* he expounds on their own doctrines, even their view of prophethood and God.

The three qualities which the philosophers mention as distinctive qualities of prophethood are also found in the non-prophets, even in infidels from among the pagans and the People of the Book. We have among them people who are distinguished for their knowledge and devotion, by virtue of which they have extraordinary intuitions and insights not found in common people. As for the imaginative faculty, all human beings have it; that is why they have dreams. What distinguishes the prophet is the fact, they say, that he “sees” while awake what others see in dreams. But this quality is also found in many non-prophets who also see many things an ordinary person sees in dreams. They themselves admit it when they attribute it to sorcerers and men who are possessed. The only difference, they point out, is that the motive of the sorcerer is not good, and the man possessed by a jinn is not in control of his reason. Thus, according to them, the prophets belong to the same class as sorcerers and the insane. This is what the infidels have always said about the prophets as God has mentioned: “Similarly, no messenger came to the people before them, but they said (of him) in like manner (that he is) a sorcerer or one possessed” (51:2).

To these people the visions which the prophet sees and the voices which he hears are similar to what the sorcerers and the insane see and hear. The only thing in which they differ is that whereas the prophet preaches good, the sorcerer preaches evil, and the insane has lost his reason. But in this respect not only the

prophets but also ordinary men and women differ from the sorcerers and the insane. Hence the prophets would have no distinction in their view; they would be on a par with all other believers.

Similarly, the power to influence the ordinary course of events which the philosophers attribute to the prophets is also available to sorcerers and others. Since they do not recognize the existence of jinns and devils, they attribute the strange things that happen in the world they know of to some power of the human soul. Hence the miracles of the prophets and the wonders of the sorcerers and diviners, and the information which a possessed person gives, are the work of some power in the human soul. The soul gets information from its contact with the Universal Soul which they call *al-lawḥ al-mahfūz*, the Guarded Tablet, and effects changes in the course of events through its own psychic powers. When Ibn Sīnā was told of wonders which he could not deny he tried to explain them in the light of these principles. In the *Ishārāt* he writes that at first he did not recognize these events, but when he ascertained that such things did happen in the world he tried to find out the cause.

Aristotle and his students were not aware of these wonders, hence they did not discuss them or the miracles of the prophets. But magic and sorcery were present in their society, and they knew them, however, they were the least knowledgeable people on such matters. Other peoples such as the Indians, the Turks, and many others who believed in a variety of gods, worshiped idols, and engaged in talismans and spells were more knowledgeable on these matters; they knew that they were caused by jinns and demons at the hands of the sorcerers and the diviners who were in contact with them. These people, on the other hand, did not know that; that is why they believed that prophethood was something within the power of men. No wonder then, Suhrawardi Maqtul³³⁷ aspired to be a prophet, as did Ibn Sab'īn and others.

True *nubūwwah*, or prophethood, is a favor from God. It is a revelation from God to a servant of His choice; the prophet is one whom He chooses to receive the revelations, and the revelations come to him from none but God. The revelations of the non-prophets, on the other hand, come from the evil ones; and their recipients are false prophets like Musaylamah the imposter, and many others even worse than they, for Musaylamah and the like were in contact with spirits who would speak to them and tell them of unseen things, and who were out there, not inside them, a fact which these people do not know. Jinns and devils exist out there, and their words have been heard by countless numbers of people. The same is true of those whom they have possessed and from whose mouths they have spoken.

The difference between a prophet and a sorcerer is even greater than the difference between day and night. The prophet gets his revelation from an angel whom God appoints to communicate His message; the sorcerer gets his messages from the evil one whom he asks what to do or not to do. God has said, “Shall I inform you (people) on whom it is that the evil ones descend? They descend on every lying, wicked person (into whose ears) they pour hearsay vanities, and most of them are liars” (26:221-3). One message is not like the other message, nor is one command like the other command; similarly, one communicator is not like the other communicator, nor is one commander like the other commander; again one recipient of messages is not like the other recipient. That is why speaking of the agent who brought the Qur’ān to Muḥammad (pbuh), God has made it clear that he is an angel existing in himself, separate from the Prophet and not an idea in the latter’s mind as philosophers think. His words are, “Verily this is the word of a most honorable messenger, endued with power, with rank before the Lord of the Throne, with authority there (and) faithful to his trust. And (people,) your companion is not one possessed; without doubt he saw him in the clear horizon. Neither does he withhold grudgingly a knowledge of the Unseen, nor is it

the word of a spirit evil and accursed. Then whither go you? Verily this is no less than a message to (all) the worlds (with profit) to whoever among you wills to go straight. But you shall not will except as God wills, the Cherisher-Lord of the Worlds” (81:19-29). Thus the Qur’ān is the word of a messenger whom God and not the Evil One has sent, who is an angel, honorable and powerful, with a position of honor with the Lord of the Throne, who wields an authority and is obeyed, and who is faithful and trustworthy. His commands are obeyed by those who constitute the Grand Assembly to which the evil ones have no access. ‘Iblīs, too, did not have entry into it after he was driven out from it.

These so-called philosophers could not form a correct view of prophethood and went astray. A group of Ṣūfīs who boast to have true knowledge, such as Ibn ‘Arabī, Ibn Sab‘īn and many others also went astray. They took up the philosophers’ ideas and put them in their own mystical language. This is why Ibn ‘Arabī claimed that saints were better than prophets, that the prophets and saints took their theological doctrines from the Seal of the Saints, and that he in turn received them from the same source from which the angel would receive them and pass them on to the prophets. The angel, in his view, is the imaginative faculty (*khayāl*) of the soul which is subject to the authority of the intellect. This is what he thinks Gabriel is. To these people the Prophet receives from his *khayāl* whatever voice he hears within himself. That is why they say that Moses was addressed from the heaven of his intellect, and the voice that he heard came from within him and not from outside. Some of them even claim superiority over Moses, just as Ibn ‘Arabī claims superiority over Muḥammad, since he receives, he says, directly from the Intelligence from whom the prophet’s *khayāl* receives its ideas, for him the *khayāl* is the Angel from whom the Prophet receives his revelations. That is why he has said that he receives from the same source from which the Angel receives what he reveals to the prophets.

[*An-Nubūwwāt* 168-72]

(5.7) The authority of the prophet.

The way to truly obeying God passes through the Prophet. He is infallible in whatever he conveys from God; he must be believed in whatever he says; and must be obeyed in whatever he commands. All other authorities, religious and political, are to be obeyed so long as they do not enjoin anything which goes against the command of God, and no one other than the prophet is infallible.

Our duty is only to obey God, but there is no way to know His words and commands except through His messengers. Whoever speaks on His behalf, conveys His words and His commands, is, therefore, to be obeyed in whatever he says. Others are to be obeyed sometimes and sometimes not. Political authorities, for example, are to be obeyed within their jurisdictions so long as they do not order anything contrary to God's commands. Similarly, religious scholars are to be obeyed by common men in the injunctions they issue, since they either communicate from God or find out His will in matters which come up, and tell them; their verdicts are binding on people. The same position is enjoyed by spiritual leaders (*mashāyikh*) in religious matters, and worldly authorities in secular affairs, such as the imāms in prayers or in *hajj*, or the commanders in battle, or officers in government, or preceptors in spiritual matters: their orders are to be carried out and their precepts are to be followed.

The point I am making is that whoever sets up an authority and follows his words without any restriction in matters of belief or practice is wrong. Imāmite Shi'īs set up an infallible imām whose orders they say must be carried out. They are certainly wrong, for there is no infallible authority other than the Prophet, whose orders have to be followed in every matter. The imāms who they have set up from among the family of the *Prophet* (ahl al-bayt) were of

different statures. One of them, ‘Alī, was a rightly guided caliph; he was to be obeyed just like any other rightly guided caliph before him. Some of them, such as ‘Alī Ibn Al-Ḥusayn, Abū Ja‘far Al-Bāqir, Ja‘far Ibn Muḥammad Aṣ-Ṣādiq were religious scholars and leaders; to them we owe what we owe to any other religious scholar and leader. others rank even lower than them.

Similarly wrong are those who preach absolute and unqualified submission to a preceptor (*shaykh*) in a Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah* exalting him over other preceptors like him, such as Shaykh ‘Adīy,³³⁸ Shaykh Aḥmad,³³⁹ Shaykh ‘Abdul-Qāḍir,³⁴⁰ Shaykh Ḥayāt,³⁴¹ or who enjoin the following of any particular religious scholar such as any one of the four imāms in all that he says, enjoins or forbids without exception, or who preach obedience to kings, governors, judges, and officials in whatever they command to do or not to do without any reservation or qualification. Of course, they do not regard these authorities to be infallible, except for some extremists among the disciples of the Ṣūfī masters like Shaykh ‘Adīy and Sa‘d Al-Madīnī Ibn Ḥammawayh³⁴² and the like who believe them to be infallible, just as the extremists among the followers of the of Banū Hāshim believe their imāms to be. Some even claim them to be superior to the prophets, and ascribe to them a kind of divinity.

Most of the followers of a religious scholar or a preceptor do not differ in their feelings and wishes from their friends who believe that people must submit to their leader; they only do not say it openly, or assert it as a matter of belief. Their practice does not tally with their faith just as we have in the case of the sinners; however, they are better than those who believe that submission to their leaders is obligatory. The case with the followers of kings and rulers is no different. God has depicted their condition in these words: “We obeyed our chiefs and great men (blindly) and they took us away from the right path” (33:67). They follow their instructions, and obey their commands without taking it as an article of faith; however, some of them consider it as a part of faith.

Submission to the prophet depends upon knowledge of his teachings and the power to act upon them. When that knowledge and power vanishes it is the time of *faṭrah* - interregnum. Before our Prophet (pbuh), whenever such a time came a new message was revealed and a new prophet was sent. Think over this statement; it is very important.

The philosophers, theologians and Ṣūfīs who elevate analogy, reason or intuition (*dhawq*) into an absolute principle, and give precedence to the leaders of *kalām*, logic, philosophy, or mysticism over the Prophet are just like those who submit absolutely to a personality. Let it be clear that absolute submission is due only to the Prophet.

[*Fatāwā* 19:69-71]

(5.8) The way to knowledge of the Unseen is through prophethood.

No one can dispense with the revelations to the Prophet in matters unseen. His word guarantees the truth. The experience of a mystic, or his reason cannot sit in judgment over his word.

The view held by various esoteric groups, such as the authors of the *Rasā'il Ikhwan Aṣ-Ṣafā'* from among the Shi'īs, Ibn Sab'īn, Ibn 'Arabī and others from among the Ṣūfīs, and expounded by Abū Ḥāmid³⁴³ and many others in their writings, that those who engage in spiritual exercises and purify their hearts, and adorn their souls with noble virtues know the truth about such realities as God, angels, the Books, the prophets, the Last Day, jinns and devils independently of what prophets say, and want us to believe is based upon a wrong premise. The assumption is that when one purifies one's soul, it receives knowledge from the Active Intellect or from another source.

Abū Ḥāmid speaks of it a lot. It is one of the points on which people have found fault with him. They have charged him with

dispensing with the agency of prophethood in knowing unseen realities, and of saying that the Qur'ān and Sunnah do not tell the real truth about them, that we cannot know from their words what they really mean, or what is to be taken literally and what is to be interpreted metaphorically as well as of claiming that when a person engages in spiritual exercises things appear to him as such; hence what agrees with his vision should be confirmed and what does not should be interpreted. That is why his writings, they say, undermine faith in prophethood. His ideas are derived from the philosophers, In his *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* and *Kīmiyā' as-Sa'ādah*, for example, he simply restates their doctrines. He says, for example, that for one who engages in spiritual exercises it is possible to hear the word of God just like Moses son of 'Imrān (pbuh). This and other similar ideas that he has expounded on in his writings have been condemned by various Muslim scholars better aware of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah from various schools of thought: Shāfi'īs, Mālikīs, Ḥanafīs, Ḥanbalīs, Ṣūfīs faithfully following the Prophet, the *ahl al-ḥadīth*, and theologians of the Ahl as-Sunnah.

Some theologians and rationalists have also found fault with those ideas of Abū Ḥāmid which are true. They have said, for example, that purification of the heart and spiritual exercises have nothing to do with knowledge. This is wrong. The truth is that piety and purification of the soul is one of the most important ways to acquire knowledge. This does not, however, dispense with faithful adherence to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah in belief and in practice. No one can know independently by himself what the Prophet has said of the Unseen; he is indispensable in these matters. His word categorically tells the truth, and neither the intuition of a mystic nor the logic of a philosopher can be set in judgment over it. It verifies the intuition and the reason it agrees with and negates the ones it differs from. In fact, every so-called "intuition" and "reasoning" which goes against the word of the Prophet is a false reasoning and a false intuition. With regard to

things like this we say, “We take shelter in God from the reasoning of the philosopher and the intuition of the mystic.”

It often happens that a person purifies his soul, but Satan drops in it different ideas. If he does not stick to the message of the Prophet, Satan takes charge of him, as God has said, “If anyone withdraws himself from remembrance of (God) the Most Glorious, We appoint for him an evil one to be an intimate companion to him” (43:36). On the other hand, He has made it clear, “Whoever follows My guidance will not lose his way, or fall into misery” (20:123).

[*Ar-Radd ‘alā al-Mantiqīyyīn* 509-11]

(5.9) Infallibility of the prophets

(a) Prophets neither default nor commit any error in communicating God’s revelations to the people. But they may err in judgment (ijtihād); however, they are soon corrected. They are completely innocent of major sins, but may commit some minor mistakes; however, they never persist in them. This is the view of Muslim scholars in general.

Scholars are agreed that prophets neither default nor commit any error in communicating their message; however, in forming opinions or making judgments in matters of law (*ijtihād*) they may err sometimes, but they are not left uncorrected. Scholars similarly agree that all the decrees which the prophets promulgate on behalf of God are to be obeyed, and all the statements they make are to be believed. They further agree that their own injunctions, commands or prohibitions have to be complied with. This is what all the schools of thought in the *ummah* believe. Only the Khawārij differ; they say that the prophet is infallible in whatever he communicates from God, but not in what he himself enjoins. They have been denounced for this heresy by the entire body of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah....

Most of the scholars, or at least many of them rule out the commission of major sins on the part of the prophets. But they do not rule out minor faults. However, the majority which allows them and those who allow major sins say that the prophets do not persist in them. They immediately repent, and their repentance raises their status in the sight of God....

As for error in judgment, there are two views on the subject; but all are agreed that the prophets are not left uncorrected, and that they are to be obeyed in what they are confirmed, and not in what is disapproved of them and rectified.

[*Minhāj as-Sunnah* 2:82]

Ibn Taymīyyah was asked about a person who was denounced by another as infidel (kāfir) on saying that the prophets never commit major sins but they may commit minor ones, was he right or was he wrong; has any scholar said that the prophets are innocent of all sins, major and minor. What is the correct view on the subject? Ibn Taymīyyah wrote this answer:

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. The person (whom you have mentioned) is not a *kāfir* this is agreed upon by all religious scholars. Nor is this matter a question of abusing the Prophet, on which opinions differ as to whether the abuser would be allowed to recant or not; there is also no disagreement on this issue. Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ³⁴⁴ and other scholars have clearly stated it. Although they greatly stress the innocence of the prophets and call for punishing the one who abuses them, they are agreed that one who holds the view mentioned above is not guilty of abusing prophets and is not liable for any punishment, what to say of being condemned as infidel (*kāfir*) or transgressor (*fāsiq*), for the view that the prophets are free from major rather than minor sins is held by the majority of Islamic scholars and all the schools of thought. This is also the view of most theologians. Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Āmidī^{345a} has written that this is what most Ash‘arīs as well as

most scholars of *tafsīr*, *ḥadīth* and *fiqh* believe. This has been reported of the *Salaf* and the *a'immah*, the Companions, the Successors, and their Successors

The view which the great majority of scholars hold is that the prophets are not free from minor sins but they do not persist in them. They do not say that they never commit any minor sin at all.

The first group of people to uphold absolute innocence and to stress upon it greatly was the Rāfiḍah. They even claim that the prophets never forget anything, nor make any mistake nor interpret anything wrongly. They also assert these things of the imāms in whom they believe, such as 'Alī and the rest of the Twelve-Imām Shi'īs. The same '*iṣmah*' is asserted of their imāms by the Ismā'īlīs who once ruled over Egypt, and claimed to have descended from 'Alī through Fāṭimah, even though scholars hold that they are descended from 'Ubaydullah Al-Qaddāh.³⁴⁵ The truth about them, as Al-Ghazālī has written in the book he wrote in refutation of them, is that openly their religion is *rafḍ*^{345a} but in reality it is pure faithlessness.

Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā and many other scholars have discussed the view of these people in their writings. They and those who think like them are very much extremists; they dub as infidels those who differ from them. The truth is that these extremists themselves are infidels as Muslims in general believe. Those who condemn as infidel one who allows minor sins for the prophets are very much like these Ismā'īlīs, Nuṣayrīs, Rāfiḍah, and Ithnā-'Ashariyyahs. They have no support from anyone form among the followers of Abū Ḥanīfah or Mālik or Ash-Shāfi'ī, nor from anyone form among the theologians of the Ahl as-Sunnah, whether a follower of Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullah Ibn Sa'id Ibn Kullāb.³⁴⁶ or Abū Al-Ḥasan 'Alī Ibn Ismā'il Al-Ash'arī, or Abū Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Karrām,³⁴⁷ or any other, nor even from any renowned commentator of the Qura'n, *muḥaddith* or Ṣūfī. None of them has charged any person with faithlessness on this account. Hence, if

anyone does so he should be asked to recant; if he recants he should be left alone; otherwise he should be punished severely so that it may deter him as well as others from repeating the charge. Certainly if anyone commits a thing which is faithlessness, or *zandaqah*, he will be charged accordingly. Similarly, if anyone calls *fāsiq*, transgressor, the holder of the view in question he will also be chastised after he is shown that he is mistaken for his stand amounts to charging all the *a'immah* of Islam with transgression. [*Fatāwā* 4:319-21]

(c) Opinions differ as to whether a prophet may say something which is incorrect and which God would correct afterwards and would not leave him to persist therein. It has been claimed that the Prophet once said about the gods of the Makkans, “These are great stars, and their intercession will be acceptable.” Thereupon God repudiated these words which Satan had put in the mouth of the Prophet, and made him reaffirm the words that He had revealed to him.³⁴⁸ Some scholars do not allow for such things while others do, since they think that it does not involve anything repugnant, and since God has Himself says, “Never did We send a messenger or a prophet before you, but when he framed a desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire. But God will cancel anything (vain) that Satan throws in, and God will confirm His verses, for God is full of knowledge and wisdom, that He may make the suggestions thrown in by Satan simply a trial for those in whose hearts is a disease and who are hardened of heart. Verily the wrongdoers are in schism far (from the truth)” (22:53-54). However, all of them agree that prophets are not left to continue in their error or fault. They are not prepared to attribute anything to them which is not consistent with their duties and their mission as the preachers of God’s messages. Moreover, the majority of those scholars who allow for the commission of minor sins on their part say that they do not persist in those sins. They soon repent; hence their sins do not reduce their status. A tradition says that David was better than

before after he had repented. God certainly loves the penitent and the pure in heart; sometimes one does an evil which paves the way for entry into Paradise.

As for forgetting in *ṣalāh* or outside *ṣalāh*, it does happen with the prophets, and may serve some good purpose, namely that their followers may learn what to do in such cases. Mālik has noted in his *Muwattā* that the Prophet said “I forget or I am made to forget so that I may show them what to do in such cases.”³⁴⁹ He is also reported to have said, “I am a human being; I forget as you do, hence remind me when I forget.”³⁵⁰ This has been recorded by both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim.

[*Minhāj as-Sunnah* 1:130]

(5.10) Approaching God through the Prophet

The wasīlah, the means which God has asked us to take in order to approach Him, only means that we should perform obligatory and supererogatory works. It means nothing else. Furthermore, what obligatory duties and what supererogatory works we should engage in has been defined by the Prophet. Hence, to take the wasīlah means nothing but to follow what the Prophet has taught. As for approaching God through the Prophet (tawassul bi al-nabī), it is, first of all, through belief in him and obedience to his commands. Next, it is through his prayers and his intercessions, the former in this life and the latter on the Day of Judgment. Both are perfectly right, and completely agreed upon among the Muslims. But if it is taken to mean adjuring God in the name of the Prophet or beseeching Him in his name, none of his Companions ever did that in his life or after his death.

Wasīlah and *tawassul* are ambiguous terms and have been used in different senses. To do justice to them we have to define various senses in which they have been used. We have to see how they have been used in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and what they have

meant there, what the Companions have meant by them and how they have practiced them, and finally what they have come to mean in our times. Much of the confusion people have with regard to these terms is due to their ambiguous nature as we have said. The result is that they are not able to find out what the truth is.

Wasīlah occurs in the Qur’ān in the following verses: “You who believe! Do your duty to God, seek the means of approach unto Him” (5:35); and, “Call on those besides Him whom you fancy. They have neither the power to remove your troubles from you nor to change them. Those whom they call upon do desire (for themselves) means of access (*wasīlah*) to their Lord, even those who are nearest. They hope for His mercy and fear His wrath, for the wrath of your Lord is something to take heed of” (17:56-7).

This means that the *wasīlah* which God has asked us to seek, and which He has advised His angels and prophets to seek is the performance of obligatory and supererogatory works. Everything which is obligatory or desirable is included in the *wasīlah*, and what does not fall into these two categories is not part of *wasīlah*, that is, things that are forbidden, undesirable or permissible. Moreover, the obligatory and the desirable are defined by the Prophet and enjoined as duty or commended by him. All this follows from faith in the Prophet. In short, the *wasīlah* which God

has asked us to seek is to approach Him through submission to what the Prophet has taught; there is no way to God other than that.

As for the *ḥadīth*, the word *wasīlah* occurs in some authentic *aḥādīth*. In one *ḥadīth*, the Prophet (pbuh) says, “Pray to God to grant me *wasīlah*, which is a particular position in Paradise reserved for a servant of God, and I hope to be that servant. Whoever of you asks it for me, shall intercede for him on the Day of Judgment.”³⁵¹ In another *ḥadīth*, he said, “On hearing the call for *ṣalāh* whoever says, ‘O God, the Lord of this perfect call and this ensuing *ṣalāh*, grant Muḥammad *wasīlah* and honor, and raise him

to the laudable position that You have promised him; certainly You do not violate your promise,' he shall have my intercession."³⁵²

Wasīlah in this sense is for the Prophet alone; our duty is to pray to God to bless him with this honor. He has said that God will grant it to one of His servants, and has expressed the hope that he shall be that servant. He has asked us to pray to God to grant it to him and said that we shall be rewarded for that prayer with his intercession on the Day of Judgment. Since reward is usually in terms of the things calling for the reward, when we are called to pray for the Prophet we shall be rewarded with the Prophet's prayer for us, his intercession. He has said, "Whoever invokes God's blessing on me one time, God will bless him ten times."³⁵³

In the language of the Companions, *tawassul bi al-nabī* means approaching God through the Prophet's prayer and intercession. But in the language of many later scholars it came to mean adjuring God in the name of the Prophet or beseeching Him in his name, as they adjure in the name of any other prophet or pious man, or one whom they consider to be pious. In short, *tawassul bi al-nabī* is used in three different senses; two of them are correct and agreed upon among the *ummah*, but the third has no support from the Sunnah. Of the two correct meanings, one is approaching God through faith in the Prophet and obedience to his commands; the other is approaching God through prayer and intercession, as mentioned above. *Tawassul* in these two senses is approved by all the Muslims. You may refer, for example, to the words of 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb when he said "O God! Earlier when we had drought we would approach You through the Prophet (*tawassal nā ilayka bi nabīyyinā*), and You would give us rain. Now we approach You through the uncle of the Prophet, so give us rain."³⁵⁴ In other words, through his prayer and intercession. God's words, "seek the means to approach Him," mean that we should approach Him through obeying His commands as well as the commands of His Prophet, for obedience to the Prophet is obedience to God, as God

has Himself has said, “He who obeys the Messenger obeys God”(4:80).

This *tawassul* is the heart of Islam, and no one has ever denied it. As for *tawassul* through the prayer and intercession of the Prophet, as is referred to by ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb, it is a *tawassul* through his prayer, not through his person. That is why after the death of the Prophet, ‘Umar moved away from *tawassul* through the Prophet to *tawassul* through his uncle, ‘Abbās. Had *tawassul* through the person of any being been allowed ‘Umar would have referred to the person of ‘Abbās. So when he left the *tawassul* through the Prophet and took to *tawassul* through ‘Abbās, it means that what was possible in the Prophet’s life was no longer possible after his death. This is why the second *tawassul* is different from the first *tawassul*, through faith and obedience to the Prophet, which is available all the time.

To sum up, *tawassul* may mean three different things. One is *tawassul* through obedience to the Prophet; this is a duty and your faith is not complete without it. The second is *tawassul* through his prayers and intercession; it was possible in his life and will be possible on the Day of Judgment. The third is *tawassul* through his person, in the sense that you adjure God in his name and ask of Him in his name. This was never done by the Companions, whether praying for rain or anything else, neither in the life of the Prophet nor after his death, neither near his grave nor away from it. Nothing of this kind is referred to in their prayers that have come down to us through authentic channels. However, in weak traditions going back to the Prophet (*marfū’*) stopping at the Companions (*mawqūf*), or emerging from persons whose words carry no authority, we do have some things of this kind.

It is this third kind of *tawassul* which Abū Ḥanīfah and his students have pronounced unlawful and forbidden. They have said, “God should not be prayed to in the name of any creature. Nobody should say for example, ‘Lord! I pray to You in the name (*bi ḥaqqi*) of your prophets.” Abu-Ḥanīfah’s words are, “Nobody

should pray to God except in His name. I dislike that anyone should say ‘in the name of this or that servant of Yours (*bi ḥaqqi khālqika*).’ Abū Yūsuf has said that he disliked the words “in the name of Your prophets, or messengers, or the Sacred House (*Bayt al-Ḥarām*), or *Mash‘ar al-Ḥarām*.”³⁵⁵ Al-Qudūrī has written, “Prayer in the name of any creature is not permissible, for no one has any right over God.”³⁵⁶

The verdict of Abū Ḥanīfah, his disciples and many other scholars that God should not be prayed to in the name of any creature, be he a prophet or a messenger or anyone else, means two things: One adjuring God in anyone’s name (*iqsām ‘alā Allah*) for doing something. This is forbidden according to the overwhelming majority of scholars, as we have mentioned before; the same is true about adjuring God in the name of the Ka‘bah, or the *mashā‘ir*;³⁵⁷ scholars are also agreed on that. Second, it means praying to God in the name of someone. This is permitted by some scholars; it is also reported that some Elders have allowed it, and many people have been heard praying to God in this way. However, every report from the Prophet to this effect is without exception weak or even fabricated; we have nothing authentic from him which may be cited as an argument, except the *ḥadīth* of the blind man whom the Prophet taught to pray in this way: “Lord! I pray to You, and turn to You through Your Prophet, Muḥammad, the prophet of mercy.” But this *ḥadīth* does not support their view; it simply means that the blind man approached God through the Prophet’s prayer and intercession. He requested the Prophet to pray for him, and the Prophet instructed him to say, “O Lord! Accept his (i.e. the Prophet’s) intercession in my favor.” When the Prophet prayed for him, God gave him back his sight.³⁵⁸ This is counted as one of the miracles of the Prophet.

[*Fatāwā* 1:199-203. 222-3]

6. THE QUR'ĀN

(6.1) The Qur'ān is the word of God

Texts telling that the Qur'ān is God's speech, and not the speech of any human being or angel.

From the words, "This is verily the word of an honorable messenger" (69:20; 8:19), it is wrong to infer that the Qur'ān was composed by a messenger. This is because God has said these words at two different places in the Qur'ān. In one, the messenger is Muḥammad, and in the other, it is Gabriel. The first verse is, "This is verily the word of a respectable messenger. It is not the word of a poet; little it is you believe. Nor is it the word of a soothsayer; little admonition it is you receive. (This is) a message sent down from the Lord of the Worlds" (69:40-3). The messenger referred to here is Muḥammad, peace and blessings of God be upon him. The second verse is, "This is verily the word of a most honorable messenger endued with power, with rank before the Lord of the Throne, with authority there, (and) faithful to his trust" (81:19-21). The messenger here is Gabriel. Now if the words, "This is verily the word of an honorable messenger" meant that the messenger was the author of the Qur'ān or any part of it, one verse would contradict the other, for if either of the two messengers had composed the Qur'ān the other could not have done so.

Second, the verse says, "This is verily the word of an honorable messenger"; it does not say, "It is the word of an angel or a prophet." The word "messenger" means that he has been sent by someone, that he is conveying the message of his sender. If the message is ascribed to him it is in the sense that it is delivered by him, and not in the sense that it is composed or initiated by him.

Third, God has condemned as an infidel a person who says that the Qur'ān was the word of a human being: "He thought and

plotted! And woe to him how he plotted! Yes, woe to him how he plotted! Then he looked round; then he frowned and he scolded; then he turned back and was haughty; then he said, ‘This is nothing but the word of a mortal!’ Soon will I cast him into Hell-Fire!” (74:18-26). Since Muḥammad was a human being, whoever says that the Qur’ān is the speech of Muḥammad is an infidel. It makes no difference whether he says that it is the speech of a man or a jinn or an angel; on every count he commits infidelity. And since, refuting his claim, God has affirmed that the Qur’ān is the word of an honorable messenger, it can only mean that the messenger is its conveyor, that he delivers the words of the One Who has sent him, and not that he himself has composed it. It is the word of God, Who has appointed him as messenger, as He has said elsewhere, “If anyone among the pagans asks you for asylum grant it to him, so that he may hear the word of God” (9:6). This clearly shows that what the messenger conveys is the word of God, not the word of the messenger.

This is the reason why the Prophet would say to the people of the various tribes who came to Makkah at *ḥajj* time, “Is there anyone among you who can take me to his people that I may preach to them the words of my Lord; the Quraysh do not allow me to preach the words of my Lord.”³⁵⁹ This *ḥadīth* is recorded by Abū Dāwūd and many other traditionists. Obviously, words are the words of the person who says them first, not of the person who conveys or delivers them. Moses heard the word of God directly from Him, not through any medium. The Believers, on the other hand, hear God’s words, one from the other. Moses’ hearing was direct hearing, without any intervening medium; people’s hearing, on the other hand, is indirect hearing through a medium. God has made this difference clear when He has said, “It is not fitting for a man that God should speak to him except by revelation (*waḥī*) or from behind a veil, or by the sending of a messenger to reveal, with God’s permission, what God wills” (43:51). He has thus differentiated between speaking from behind a veil, which he did

in the case of Moses, and speaking through the medium of a messenger, as He did in the case of all the prophets to whom He sent a messenger.

[*Fatāwā* 12:135-37]

(6.2) What we should believe regarding the Qur'ān.

The Qur'ān is the word of God, and it is uncreated. It has originated from Him, and to Him it shall return. It is with God in a Guarded Book, as it is remembered by men in their hearts, or written in books, or recited by tongues. However, the ink with which it is written, the voice in which it is read, as well as the acts of writing and reading, all are created.

What one should believe with regard to the Qur'ān or, for that matter, with regard to any other thing, is what the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh) say on the subject and what is agreed upon by the Elders, who and whose followers have received God's applause, whereas those who have diverged from their path have received His condemnation. One should believe

- that the Qur'ān which God has revealed to His Servant and His Messenger is His word; that even though it has been sent down, it is uncreated;
- that it has originated from God and shall return to Him;
- that it is, as God has said, "an honorable reading, in a Book well-guarded which none shall touch but those who are clean" (56:77-9), or "a glorious reading (inscribed) in a Preserved Tablet" (85:21-2) or, "(inscribed) in the Mother Book, in Our presence, high (in dignity) full of wisdom" (43:4);
- that it is preserved in the hearts as the Prophet has said, "Keep on reciting the Qur'ān for it slips out of one's heart much more easily than a camel from the cord that hobbles it;"³⁶⁰ or, "The heart which has nothing of the Qur'ān is like a house in ruin."³⁶¹

- that what was written within the covers of the *muṣḥaf*, the sacred scripture which the Companions compiled, was the word of God, as the Prophet has said. “Do not travel with the Qur’ān to the land of the enemy, lest they seize it.”³⁶²

This is, I think, what a Muslim should believe with regard to the Qur’ān....

To this I will add a few words by way of explanation. Whoever believes that the ink used in the *muṣḥaf* or the voice of the person who recites the Qur’ān is eternal and everlasting is wrong and mistaken; he goes against the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, as well as the consensus of the Elders and all the scholars of Islam. No doctor of Islam either from among the followers of Imām Aḥmad or any other imām has ever said that these things are eternal. Whoever attributes it to any doctor from among the followers of Aḥmad is either misinformed or deliberately lying. What has come down authentically from Imām Aḥmad and from his followers in general is that one who says that his reading of the Qur’ān is uncreated is guilty of *bid’ah*; on the other hand, one who says that his reading of the Qur’ān is created is a Jahmī.

Abū Bakr Al-Marwazī,³⁶³ a great disciple of Imām Aḥmad, wrote a book on this subject, and Abū Bakr Al-Khallāl³⁶⁴ reproduced it in his *Kitāb as-Sunnah* in which he quoted the words of Imām Aḥmad and other imāms on creedal issues. Some scholars of *ḥadīth* at that time used to say that their reading of the Qur’ān was uncreated. They said so in reaction to those who had said that their reading of the Qur’ān was created. When Imām Aḥmad was informed of it he condemned it in strong terms, denounced the people who had said it as heretics (*mubtadi’*) and declared that no scholar had ever said that. If this is his verdict on those who say that their reading of the Qur’ān is uncreated, you can imagine what he would say about those who say that their reading of the Qur’ān is eternal (*qadīm*)! Certainly far more mistaken are those who say that the ink in the *muṣḥaf* is eternal. The entire galaxy of imāms

belonging to the school of Aḥmad as well as other schools has unanimously condemned this statement. I am not aware of a single scholar who upholds it, except some ignorant people from among the Kurds. God Himself has differentiated between His words and the ink used in writing His words. He says, “Say: If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it for its aid” (18:109). Hence, those who say such things are mistaken.

Similarly mistaken are those who say that the Qur’ān is learned by the heart the same way as God is apprehended by it, or that it is recited with the tongue just as “God” is spoken with it, or that it is written in the *muṣḥaf* just as God is written in the hearts, on the tongues, or in the books at the same level as God’s existence in these places, for the existence of a being in the *muṣḥaf* is clearly different from the existence of a word in it. You know that things exist on four different levels: (1) out there; (2) in mind; (3) in speech; and (4) in writing. The idea in mind corresponds to the thing outside; the spoken word corresponds to the idea in mind, and the written word corresponds to the spoken word. Hence, when it is said that a thing is in the Book of God, as we have in the verse, “Everything that they have done is in the books (of their deeds) (52:54),” it only means that the thing which is inscribed in the books corresponds to the words that are used to express the ideas in mind of the things done. Hence between the thing out there and the *muṣḥaf* there are two levels of being, the spoken word and the written word. As for speech (*kalām*) itself there is no ontic stage between it and the *muṣḥaf*, for it is the speech (*kalām*) itself which is there in the book, even though the spoken word differs from the written word in some respects. However, if by the statement, “X is in the *muṣḥaf*” you mean that X is mentioned in it, then this is something different. In the Qur’ān we have, “Verily this is a revelation from the Lord of the Worlds; the Trustworthy Spirit has brought it to your heart so that you may be among those who

preach and admonish in perspicuous Arabic. Without doubt, it is (announced) in the books of former peoples. Is it not a sign to them that the learned among the Children of Israel know it?" (26:192-6). Obviously, what is in the books of the former people is not the Qur'ān itself, which was revealed to Muḥammad (pbuh) and not to anyone before him, but only an announcement about it. People's deeds provide another example. The Qur'ān says, "All that they do is noted in their books (of deeds)" (54:52). Hence we must distinguish between saying that something is in the books and saying that a word or speech (*kalām*) is in the books. God has said, "This is indeed a Qur'ān most honorable, in a Book well-guarded" (56:72-8); and, "A messenger from God rehearses the Scripture kept pure and holy wherein are decrees right and straight" (98:2-3). Hence, whoever says that the ink is eternal is wrong, and whoever says that the word of God is not in the *muṣḥaf*, but only the ink which is what one means by the word of God, is also wrong. The correct view is that the Qur'ān is in the *muṣḥaf*, as any other word or speech is in the pages of a book. This is agreed upon in the *ummah*, and is part of the Muslim faith. Every ontic state has its own specific characteristics.

The existence of speech in the Book is not like the existence of a quality in an object such as knowledge or life in a being, so that you may say that an attribute of God has entered into something other than Him, or that it has left Him. Nor is it simply a sign among other signs, as the existence of the world is a sign of its Creator. You are not justified in saying that what is there in the Book is only a sign for the speech of God; it is something completely different. If you do not distinguish between one ontic state and another referred to by different adverbs of place, or if you do not differentiate, for example, between a body being in a space or place, or an accident being in a body, or an image being in a mirror, or if you do not distinguish between seeing a thing with the eyes while awake and seeing it mentally or in sleep, and so on, you will be confusing everything.

The question whether what is in the *muṣḥaf* is contingent or eternal (*al-qadīm*) is ambiguous. The Elders have not used the word *qadīm*; they have only said that the Qur'ān is God's speech (*kalām*) and uncreated, and that it is His speech whether it is recited or written. It is just one Qur'ān and one speech irrespective of the forms it takes in recitation or in writing, and irrespective of the sounds and the ink that are involved, for speech is the speech of the person who first makes it, and not of the one who rehearses or transmits it. When a traditionist reports that the Prophet said, *innama al-a'māl bi al-nīyyāt*³⁶⁵ (actions shall be judged according to the intentions) we say that this is the speech of the Prophet, in word and in meaning, even though we know that the voice of the transmitter is not the voice of the Prophet (pbuh). The same is true for every piece of prose or poetry which someone other than the author relates.

When we hear God's speech recited or see it in a *muṣḥaf* and say it is God's speech we point to the speech itself without referring to the voice of the reciter or the ink of the writer. Hence, if someone says that the voice of the reciter or the ink of the writer is God's uncreated speech he is wrong. We should rather say that the Qur'ān is the uncreated speech of God, and that it is in the *muṣḥafs* as all other speech acts are in books. We should never say that the ink or the paper is uncreated; we should rather say just the opposite; the paper and the ink, like every other paper and ink, are created. We may also say that the Qur'ān which is in the *muṣḥaf* is God's speech and uncreated or that the Qur'ān which Muslims recite is God's speech and uncreated.

The Elders are united on the point that the whole of the Qur'ān is God's word, its language and its ideas; that no part of it is composed by anyone else; that He has simply sent it down to His messenger; and that it is not ideas only or words only; it is both ideas and words combined, as is all speech, which is neither ideas only nor words only but both of them combined. It is just like a human being living and speaking; you cannot say that he is merely

a soul or that he is merely a body; he is the two combined in one. God does speak with a voice as is mentioned in authentic *aḥādīth*, though His voice is not like the voice of any created being, reciter or otherwise, for God is unlike any being in His essence, attributes and acts. Just as His knowledge, power, and life are unlike the knowledge, power and life of a creature, similarly His speech is unlike the speech of any creature in its ideas, words and voice. Whoever likens God with His creatures misinterprets His names and words; and whoever denies the attributes which He has affirmed of Himself, also misconstrues His names and words.
[*Fatāwā* 12:235-244]

(6.3) The Qur'ān is the uncreated speech of God.

The most important thing with regard to this issue is to study the statements of the Qur'ān itself, for what the Elders and the leading scholars among the Companions, their righteous Successors, and the whole *ummah*, such as the four imāms as well as others, have said on the issue is nothing other than what is stated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Rational arguments also support the same view. The Qur'ān is the word of God, sent down by Him and uncreated; it originated from Him and will return to Him. It is God Who has composed it and uttered it, just as He has composed and uttered the Torah, the Gospel, and all other words which He has spoken. It is not something created and existing separately from Him. Moreover, He has spoken it of His free will and with His power. No one among the Elders has ever said that God's word is created, or that it exists separate from Him; or that the Qur'ān, the Torah or the Gospel are necessary to His Essence, eternal and everlasting; that He has not said them of His free will and with His power; or that the words He addressed to Moses or any other particular word of His is eternal or everlasting. They have only said that God has been speaking from eternity as and when He has

willed. His speech is eternal only in the sense that He has been speaking from eternity as and when He has willed...

Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl (raa) has said, “(The Qur’ān) has originated from Him; that is to say, He is its composer and utterer (*mutakallim*).” When some people started saying that the Qur’ān is created and that God has created it in something other than Himself whence it has come down, the Elders said that it originated from God, that it is God Who is its author and articulator. He did not create it in some other being so that one may call it the speech of that being. When God creates an attribute in any object, it is an attribute of that object, not an attribute of God. When, for example, He creates a taste or a color in some body, it is that body which is qualified with that taste or color. Similarly, when He creates life, will, power, knowledge or speech in some body, it is that body which is living, willing, powerful, knowing, or speaking with that speech. God, on the other hand, is qualified with those attributes only which inhere in Him, and not with those which He creates in other beings. He is Living, Knowing, Powerful, Hearing, Seeing, Merciful and Speaking the Qur’ān or any other speech in virtue of His own life, knowledge, power, or speech existing in Him, and not in virtue of any such attributes as He has created in other beings. Whoever says that God’s speech is created has to admit that it was a created being who said to Moses, “Verily, I am God; there is no god but I. So serve Me alone and establish regular prayer (*ṣalāh*) for celebrating My praise” (20:14). Obviously, this cannot be the word of anyone except the Lord of the Worlds.

Now, when it is established that God is the One Who has composed the Qur’ān, the Torah, and all other Books (of His) with their ideas and words formed out of their letters, no part of them can be called created; the whole of them must be believed to be the speech of God....

[*Fatāwā* 12:37-38, 40-41]

(6.4) Our recitation of the Qur'ān is something created, even though the Qur'ān itself is uncreated.

The Qur'ān which people read and write is the word of God, and, as the word of God, it is uncreated. However, their act of reading or reciting, and the sound which they make in the process are created. Similarly, the ink which they use in writing the Qur'ān is also created.

The Qur'ān is God's speech. He composed it, words as well as ideas, and He spoke it out in His own voice. But when reciters or readers recite or read it they do so in their own voice. When one pronounces, for example, *al-ḥamdu li Allahi, Rabbi al-'ālamīn, Ar-Raḥmāni Ar-Raḥīm* (1:1-2), the speech which is heard from him is the speech of God, not his own speech, though he recites it in his own voice, not the voice of God. The speech is the speech of God, and the voice is the voice of the reciter. That is why the Prophet has said, "Embellish the Qur'ān with your voice,"^{365a} or, "Is there no one among you (pilgrims to the House of God) who takes me to his tribe that I may preach to them the words of my Lord!"³⁶⁶ Both *aḥādīth* are authentic; they prove that the word which the Prophet wanted to preach was the word of his Lord, but when a reciter recites it he recites it in his own voice. The Prophet has also said, "Whoever does not chant (*yataḡhannā*) with the Qur'ān is not of us."³⁶⁷ Aḥmad, Ash-Shāfi'ī as well as others have explained the word *yataḡhannā* to mean rendering the voice sweet and beautiful in reading the Qur'ān. Aḥmad's words are "*yuḡassinuhu bi ṣawtihi*," that is, one should make the Qur'ān sound beautiful through his voice. This means that to Aḥmad the voice with which the reciter recites the Qur'ān is his own voice....

Man and everything that belongs to him, his voice, his movements, etc. is created; it comes into existence after it was not there. On the other hand, God and all that He is qualified with,

attributes, words and deeds, is uncreated. When people read God's words, the words they read are His words, not those of any other person, and the words that He utters cannot be something created; but the movements they make and the sounds they produce in reading His words are created.

Similarly, the speech of God which is written in the *muṣḥafs* is His speech written in them, and His speech is uncreated; but the ink with which His speech is written is created. This distinction has been drawn by God Himself when He has said, "Say: If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it for its aid" (18:109). The word of God is uncreated, and the ink with which it is written is created. The Qur'ān written in the *muṣḥaf* is uncreated, as is the Qur'ān written in the Preserved Tablet. God has said so in many verses, such as, "No, this is a glorious Qur'ān (inscribed) in a Tablet Preserved" (85:21-2); "Let whosoever will keep it in remembrance. (It is) in Books held (greatly) in honor, exalted (in dignity), kept pure and holy" (80:12-14). A messenger from God rehearses the Books (*ṣuḥuf*) kept pure and holy, wherein are (decrees) right and straight" (90:2-3); and, "This is indeed a Qur'ān most honorable, in a Book well-guarded, which none shall touch but those who are clean" (56:77-9). [*Fatāwā* 12:53-6]

(6.5) The letters that are in the Qur'ān are uncreated.

The letters that are in the Qur'ān are different from the letters that represent human speech; the former are uncreated while the latter are created.

These and other things taken in the abstract as undifferentiated and unindividuated universals have no existence outside the mind; what exists out there is something particular. Out there we have either the Creator or the objects created. Moreover, each created

object has its own specific existence, even though the word existence is applied to everything that exists. The same is true of knowledge and power; they are universals which comprehend all the individuals that belong to their class. They do not exist out there; what exists out there is either the knowledge of the Creator, or the knowledge of any created being. Moreover, the knowledge of one created being is specific to it and exists only in it. Similarly, the terms speech sound or letter comprehend every individual speech sound or letter, but out there you have either the speech of the Creator or the speech of created beings, each created being with its own specific speech. Out there you have either the sounds that you get in the speech of the Creator or the sounds that you get in the speeches of created beings. Now if it is said that God's knowledge, power and speech are uncreated, or that the sounds that form His speech are uncreated, it does not follow that the knowledge, power or speech of man are also uncreated, or that the sounds that constitute human speech are uncreated.

Again, the term letter (*ḥarf*) refers both to the speech sound and the written letter. So when it is said that God has spoken with the spoken sounds, as He did in the case of the Arabic Qur'ān, and uttered, for example, the words *Alif-Lām-Mīm*, or *Ḥā-Mīm*, or *Ṭā-Sīn-Mīm*, or *Qāf* or *Nūn*, and so on, they form His speech and His speech is uncreated. Similarly, when they are written down in the *muṣḥafs*, whatever makes up the speech of God is uncreated, even though the ink, or the shape (*shakl*) that it takes is created.

Also, when people read God's speech, the speech itself is uncreated since it is God's speech. Its reading by a human preacher does not rob it of its status as the speech of God; for speech is the speech of the person who made it first, irrespective of whether it is an injunction or a statement; it is certainly not the speech of the person who preaches it. The task of the messenger is to deliver God's message. When he recites God's words we may refer to it in different ways. We may refer to the word itself as the word of God and say, "This is the word of God," without looking to the

attributes of the messenger who recites it. We may refer, in the second place, to the activity of the messenger involved, his action and movement. We may also refer to both of them together. Obviously, what we have referred to first is uncreated, and what we have referred to next is created, and what we have referred to last, part of it is created and part of it is uncreated. Things that go to make up a human speech similar to those which make up the divine speech are like all other human attributes, and are not like divine attributes. One might think that the letter *qāf* in the verse '*aqimū aṣ-ṣalāt li dhikrī*, "Establish *ṣalāh* for celebrating My praise" (20:14) is like the letter *qāf* in the line of the poet, *qifā nabkī min dhikrā ḥabīb-in wa manzili*,³⁶⁸ ('let us stop here and weep in remembrance of our love and her house'), but what God has uttered and is heard from Him is not like what a human being says and is heard from him. However, when we transmit God's word, we transmit it through our medium, our acts and attributes, which are created. One created thing is like the other created thing....

Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl and other imāms of the Ahl as-Sunnah used to say that he who says *al-lafẓ bi al-Qur'ān*, 'recitation of the Qur'ān', or *lafẓī bi al-Qur'ān*, ('my recitation of the Qur'ān') is created he is a Jahmī; whereas one who says that it is uncreated is a heretic (*mubtadi*). This is also reported in a slightly different way. Whoever says that his recitation of the Qur'ān is created, while he means by it the Qur'ān itself, is a Jahmī, for *lafẓ* may be taken as an infinitive and refer to the action of the person which is something created, but it may also be taken to mean the words which he speaks, and which is the word of God, not the word of the speaker. So when one says that it is created one says in effect that the Qur'ān is not the word of God, and what Muslims recite is not His speech, which obviously goes against what is definitely known of the religion of the Prophet.

As for the human voice which is involved in reading the Qur'ān, it is definitely created. Aḥmad and others have clearly

stated that the sound which is heard is the sound of the man who recites. Aḥmad has never said that whoever says that his voice in reading the Qur'ān (*ṣawtī bi al-Qur'ān*) is created is a Jahmī. He has only said, "Whoever says his recitation of the Qur'ān (*lafẓī bi al-Qur'ān*)"; and the difference between the two expressions is clear. When we transmit the speech of another person in the words of the latter, we transmit his words, rather than our words, but we transmit it in our voice not in his voice.

[*Fatāwā* 12:70-4]

(6.6) Views of different schools of thought regarding the Qur'ān.

Ibn Taymīyyah lists the views of different factions of the Muslims regarding the Qur'ān, and points out what the Elders believed in this matter.

With regard to the Qur'ān many views, seven or more, have been held by people who take Ka'bah as their *qiblah* (*ahl al-qiblah*). One is held by philosophers, like Ibn Sīnā, and Ṣūfīs, like Ibn 'Arabī Aṭ-Ṭā'ī, Ibn Sab'īn and others. They endorse in a way the view of the Sabaeans that the word of God has no existence outside the mind of its recipient, that it comes to him only in the form of ideas, assertive or prescriptive, either from the Active Intellect, as most philosophers say, or from an unidentified source as their mystical-minded brothers think. This is the belief of the Sabaeans, whereas this group says that the words that Moses heard existed only in his mind. The author of the *Mishkāt al-Anwār*³⁶⁹ and other works of the kind has said things very much similar to these although at times he condemns their authors. This view is far more removed from truth than the one that the Qur'ān is created.

The second view is held by the Mu'tazilah and others that toe the Jahmī line that God's speech is created, that He creates it in

some body whence it proceeds and not from God, for them, God has neither a speech nor a will. This view was first expounded by Al-Ja'd Ibn Dirham³⁷⁰ whom Khālīd Ibn 'Abdullah Al-Qasrī³⁷¹ slaughtered on the day of *'Īd al-Qurbān*. In his sermon to the people who had gathered on that day he said, "Offer your sacrifices, and may God accept them. I, on my part offer the sacrifice of Al-Ja'd Ibn Dirham, for he says that God did not take Abraham as friend, nor spoke to Moses in words. Exalted is God far above what Al-Ja'd says about Him." Then he came down from the pulpit and slaughtered him.

It is these people who won the caliphate over to their ideas and instituted trials on the issue of the Qur'ān during the reigns of Al-Mā'mūn, Al-Mu'taṣim and Al-Wāthiq, and tortured people until God came to the aid of the scholars of the Ahl as-Sunnah like Imām Aḥmad and their followers, exposed the errors of this group in the reign of Al-Mutawakkil, and made the view of the Elders dominant that the Qur'ān is the speech of God and uncreated, and that it proceeds from Him and will return to Him. In other words, it is the word of God, composed by Him, and that it has issued from Him and not from any other being as the Jahmīyyah say. It is God Who has revealed it, as He has said, "The revelation of this Book is from God, the Exalted in Power, Full of Wisdom" (37:1); and, "Those to whom We have given the Book know full well that it has been sent down from your Lord in truth" (6:14); *'Hā-Mīm*, a revelation from (God) Most Gracious, Most Merciful" (141:1-2); and, "Say, the Holy Spirit has brought the Revelation from your Lord in truth" (16:02).

The third view is held by Abū Muḥammad Ibn Sa'īd Ibn Kullāb Al-Baṣrī,³⁷² Al-Qalansī,³⁷³ Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash'arī and others. They say that God's speech is an idea which exists in His Essence; it is an injunction enjoining everything He has enjoined as it is a statement regarding everything He has stated; it appeared in the form of the Qur'ān when it was expressed in Arabic, in the form of the Torah when it was expressed in Hebrew, and in the

form of the Gospel when it was expressed in Syriac; commands, prohibitions and statements which form God's words do not stand in relation to it like species to a genus into which it is divided, but as attributes which qualify a single person, just as we call some person the son of Zayd, the uncle of 'Āmr, or the father of Bakr.

Some of those who hold this view say that God's word is one from eternity and that it is command, prohibition and statement altogether from eternity. This is the view of Al-Ash'arī. Others say that it becomes command or prohibition at the time when the people to whom it is addressed come to exist. Still others say that it is not one single thing but a multiplicity of ideas - commands, prohibitions, statements, and questions. A consequence of this view, which people have been quick to point out, is that it makes knowledge, power, will and life one and the same thing, and the more learned among the expounders of this view admit that charge. The absurdity of this view is obvious to all sections, the Ahl as-Sunnah as well as the heretical groups...

The fourth view is held by different groups from among the theologians and the scholars of *ḥadīth*, such as the Salīmīyyah³⁷⁴ and others. They say that God's speech consists of eternal words and sounds, and that they have meanings which exist in His essence. They agree with the Asha'irah and the Kullabīyyah in saying that when God speaks to a person He only creates knowledge in the person He addresses, that His speech has no existence separate from its recipient. However, they abstain from saying that the sound (of God's eternal speech) is the sound which is heard from any reciter (of His speech) as they distinguish one from the other. Some of them, however, say that the eternal sound (of God's speech) is heard from the reciter. Sometimes they identify the eternal sound with the sound of the reciter, and sometimes they distinguish between the two and say that they hear from the reciter two sounds, one eternal and one contingent. However, many or most of them do not say that the eternal dwells in the contingent; they only say that the eternal appears in the

contingent just as a face appears in the mirror. But others do say that the eternal dwells into the contingent.

None of the views stated above was ever held by the Elders or the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummaḥ*, neither Imām Aḥmad nor any of his leading followers, nor any other imām. All of them are agreed in denouncing any person who says that his recitation of the Qur'ān is uncreated. They condemn all the more any person who says that his voice is uncreated, or that it is eternal....

God has said, "If anyone among the pagans asks you for asylum, grant it to him, so that he may hear the words of God" (9:6). The Prophet (pbuh), it is reported, would offer himself to peoples visiting Makkah and say, "Would any of you come forward and take me to your tribe so that I may preach to you the word of my Lor;"³⁷⁵ or, "Beautify the Qur'ān with your voice;"³⁷⁶ or, "Allah listens more carefully to the person who reads the Qur'ān in a beautiful voice than the owner of a maid singer does to her song."³⁷⁷ Thus God and His Prophet have made it quite clear that the Qur'ān which is heard is God's speech, not the speech of any being from among His created beings, but when people read it they read it in their own voices. Therefore, if anyone says that the Qur'ān which is heard is not the word of God or that it is the word of the person who recites it, he says what is obviously wrong, in the sight of both reason and the *shar'*. Similarly, whoever says that the voice which is heard is not the voice of a man, or that it is the voice of God, also says what is wrong in the sight of reason and the *shar'*. The correct view is that the Qur'ān is the speech of God, not that of any other being. Gabriel heard it from God; the Prophet heard it from Gabriel; the Believers heard it from the Prophet; they transmitted it to those who came after them. In this process of transmission no one did or does anything except transmit the Qur'ān through his action and in his voice, without effecting any change in its words, syntax or meaning. All is the word of God.

The fifth view is the one which is expounded by the Hishāmīyyah,³⁷⁸ the Karrāmīyyah,^{378a} and some others. It says that

God's speech does exist in His essence but it is something contingent, since God did not speak it before the time He actually spoke it, though He had the power to speak from eternity. To put it otherwise, God has been speaking from eternity only in the sense that He has the power to speak from eternity. We cannot think, they say, of eternal speech on the part of God as we cannot think of an eternal act on His part just as the Mu'tazilah and their followers say. They point out that God's speech consists of words and sounds, and assert that He brings it into being in Himself by His own power and will. They shy away from saying that the sounds that are heard and the ink which is used in the *muṣḥaf* are eternal. They rather say the contrary that they are contingent.

The sixth view is the view of all the people of *ḥadīth* and their leading scholars (*a'immah*). They say that God has been speaking from eternity as and when He has willed, that He speaks with a voice as it is said in the traditions, that the Qur'ān and other books of God are His speech which He has made with His power and will, and which are not different from Him as things which He has created are. They do not say that He was not speaking from eternity and only came to speak at a particular time, nor do they say that His speech is contingent. On the contrary, they say that He has been speaking from eternity as and when He has willed, and that even though He spoke to Moses and called him of His free will and power, His word is infinite, as He has Himself said, "Say: If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, soon would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it, for its aid" (18:109).

[*Fatāwā* 12 163-73]

7. THE LIFE HEREAFTER

(7.1) Qur'ānic arguments for resurrection

The arguments which the Qur'ān advances for resurrection and the life hereafter appeal to human nature and are convincing.

God has discussed the life hereafter in detail and has demonstrated conclusively the possibility of resurrection. But His method differs from the method of the scholastic theologians, who in their effort to prove that it is really possible only succeed in showing that it is theoretically possible. For example, they say that it is possible because our belief in it does not involve anything impossible. The point is: how do you know that your belief in it involves nothing impossible? It is a negative proposition, and there is no way to ascertain its truth....

Furthermore, that a proposition is theoretically possible only means that we do not know that it is impossible, but our inability to know that it is impossible does not mean that it is really possible. A thing may not be said to be impossible in theory but not also be claimed to be possible in reality; this is what theoretical possibility means. This is the line which theologians take in proving resurrection. God does not take this line; He is not interested in just proving its theoretical possibility, for a thing may not be impossible in itself, but it may be impossible for an external reason. But this is not the case with a thing which is really possible; for if we know it to be really possible it cannot be impossible.

That something is really possible we know only when we find it existing, or when we find a thing of the same kind in existence, or when we find a thing existing which is greater than it, for the existence of a thing is proof that a thing which is lesser than it is more likely to exist. Now when it is shown that something is possible, we have only to show that God has power to bring it into

existence; otherwise, merely the knowledge of its possibility will not mean that it can really happen.

All these points have been taken care of in the statements on resurrection which we have in the Qur'ān. Read, for example, these verses: "Do they not see that God, Who created the heavens and the earth, has power to create the like of them? Only He has decreed a term appointed of which there is no doubt. But the unjust refuse (to receive it) except with ingratitude" (17:99); "Is not He Who created the heavens and the earth able to create the like thereof? Yes, indeed! For He is the Creator Supreme of skill and knowledge (infinite)" (36:81); "Do they not see that God, Who created the heavens and the earth and never wearied with their creation, is able to give life to the dead? Yes, verily He has power over all things" (46:33); "Assuredly the creation of the heavens and the earth is a greater (matter) than the creation of men" (40:57). It is quite evident that the creation of the heavens and the earth is a greater matter than the creation of man, that the former requires more powers than those needed for the latter, and that the latter is far easier to be brought into being as compared to the former.

Read the other argument which is based on the creation of man for the first time. God says, "It is He Who creates first, and then repeats it, and this is all the more easy for Him" (30:27). That is why He goes on to add, "To Him belongs the loftiest similitude (we can think of) in the heavens and the earth" (30:27). At another place He says, "Mankind! If you have a doubt regarding the resurrection, (consider) that We created you out of dust, then out of sperm, then out of a leech-like clot, then out of a lump of flesh, partly formed and partly unformed, in order that we may manifest (Our power) to you" (22:5).

Read these words also: "And he makes comparisons for Us, and forgets his own (origin and) creation. He says: 'Who can give life to (dry) bones that are decomposed?' Say: He will give them life Who created them for the first time" (36:78-9). The words,

“Who can give life to bones that are decomposed,” contains an argument from which one of the premises is dropped because it is too obvious, and of which the second premise is a general negative and implies the inference. It is actually a parable introduced with the words, “And he makes comparison for Us, and forgets his own creation. He says: ‘Who can give life to (dry) bones that are decomposed?’” This question is in fact a denial, a negation, for it means that there is none who can give life again to the bones which have decomposed. The objector thinks that their decomposition entails the impossibility of their revival since they are dry and cold, while life requires something which is wet and warm; furthermore, they have disintegrated and mixed with other elements, a fact which is also not conducive to revival. His argument can be paraphrased in this way: These bones are dry and decomposed, and no one can give life to dry and decomposed bones; therefore, no one can give life to these bones. But the middle proposition which denies revival is a negative proposition and is false. God has shown the possibility of resurrection on many grounds. First, He has power over what is a much more difficult task, namely, the creation of man for the first time. He has said, “He will give them life Who created them for the first time!” Also, He has created man from dust. Further, He is well versed in every kind of creation, which means that He knows all the smallest particles into which the bones may disintegrate. Again, He is the One Who produces for you fire out of the green tree” (36:80). In other words, the One Who produces fire which is dry and hot from a thing which is just its opposite, cold and wet ... will find it easier to produce a living being from dust. Moreover, “Is not He Who created the heavens and the earth able to create the life thereof?” (36:81). The truth of the first proposition in this argument is evident to everyone. This is why the argument has been stated in the form of a question which implies that the proposition is part of common knowledge. Finally, the argument is concluded by saying,

“Verily, when He intends a thing, His commands is ‘Be’, and it is!” (36:82).

We do not need to elaborate on these arguments and show in detail how they prove the truth (of resurrection); moreover, this is not the proper place for it. Our purpose here is only to draw attention to the importance of the Qur’ānic arguments.

[*Dar’ Ta’āruḍ al-‘Aql wa al-Naql* 1:30-35]

(7.2) The life between death and resurrection

Texts concerning the life between death and resurrection, and the reward and punishment therein.

(a) The *Salaf* and the *a’immah* believe that people meet some kind of reward or punishment after death, that they experience it in the soul as well as in the body, that the soul, after it has separated from the body, continues to live and experience pleasure or pain, and that sometimes it joins the body and experiences along with it pain or joy. When the Day of Judgment comes, the souls will be returned to their bodies and people will be raised from their graves to face the Lord of the Worlds. The resurrection of the body is an integral part of the Muslim faith, as it is a part of the Jewish and the Christian faiths. All this is agreed upon by the scholars of Ḥadīth and Sunnah.

As for the questioning by the angels, Munkar and Nakir, in the grave and punishment therein, there are many *mutawātir aḥādīth* on the subject. For example, the two *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections have the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn ‘Abbās that the Prophet once passed by two graves and said, “The men in these graves are being punished, and not for something great. One used to move about slandering, and the other did not take proper care in passing urine. Then he asked for a green branch of date palm, split in two and planted one on each grave. People asked him why he did that and he said, “It may lessen their pain for as long as they do not dry up.”³⁷⁹ We also have

in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim and other *Sunan* collections the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet said, “When you finish the last *tashahhud* say, ‘I take shelter in God from four things: the torments of Hell, the torments of the grave, suffering during life and at the time of death, and the seductions of the anti-Christ.’”³⁸⁰ ... Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have noted the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Ayyūb Al-Anṣārī that one evening after the sun had set the Prophet came out and said, “The Jews are being punished in their graves.”³⁸¹ They have also the *ḥadīth* in which ‘Ā’ishah (raa) says that an old Jewish woman of Madinah came to her and said that people are punished in their graves. She did not believe in her statement nor did she endorse it. She went to the Prophet and said that an old Jewish lady had come to her and said that people are punished in their graves. He said, “She was right. People are punished in such a way that animals hear their shrieks.” Thereafter, ‘Ā’ishah said, she saw the Prophet praying to God in every *ṣalāh* to save him from the torments of the grave.³⁸²

There are many more *aḥādīth* on the subject. In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* as well as the *Sunan* collections we have the *ḥadīth* reported by Barā’ Ibn ‘Āzib (raa) that the Prophet (pbuh) said, “When a Muslim is questioned in the grave and says that he witnesses that there is no god except Allah and that Muḥammad is His messenger, it is what is referred to in the verse, ‘God establishes in strength those who believe, with the word that stands firm in this world and the Hereafter’” (14:27).³⁸³ ... The two *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections also have the *ḥadīth* reported by Qatādah and Anas Ibn Mālīk that the Prophet said, “When a person is put in the grave and his people depart, and he still hears the shuffling of their shoes, two angels come to him and make him sit up and ask they him, ‘What do you say about this man (i.e. Muḥammad)?’ If he is a Believer, he says, ‘I witness that he is Muḥammad, the servant of God and His messenger.’ Then they say, ‘Behold your seat in the Fire. God has replaced it with one in Paradise.’ He will then look at both seats.... The two angels

will also come to the infidel and the hypocrite and ask the same question: ‘What do you say about this man?’ He will say, ‘I do not know. I just used to say what others would say (about Him), that I do not recognize him.’ He will then be beaten with iron rods on his head; he will cry out so loudly that everything will hear him except men and jinns.”³⁸⁴

[*Fatāwā* 4:284-293]

(b) The dwelling of the soul in the dead body in the grave will be different from its dwelling in the body alive in this world. In some respects, it will be more perfect, just as life in the Hereafter will be more perfect than this life. In fact, every stage of life in this world, in the grave, and on the Day of Judgment, will be different from one another. That is why the Prophet said, “Graves will first be widened for the dead, and then they will be interrogated.”³⁸⁵ Even if the earth is not changed the souls will be returned to the body of the dead and then taken out.

[*Fatāwā* 4: 274]

(7.3) The next life

The life after death will be different from this life.

The next life will be different from this life; whereas this life comes to an end, the next life will continue forever. Moreover, people in the next life will not excrete anything foul. It is authentically reported that the Prophet said, “The people of Paradise will pass neither urine nor stool, neither spit nor blow mucous out of their noses, except a sprinkle of musk.”³⁸⁶ We also have a *ḥadīth* recorded in the two *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that the Prophet said, “Men will be raised barefoot, naked, and uncircumcised.” Thereafter he quoted the verse, “Even as We produced the first creation, so shall We produce a new one. (It is) a promise We have undertaken, and We shall fulfill it truly”

(21:104).³⁸⁷ Hence people will be raised from their graves uncircumcised.

Commenting on this verse, Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī and Mujāhid say that the words, “Even as We produced the first creation” mean that as God created men in this world while they were nothing at all He will raise them again on the Day of Judgment. Qatādah says that men have been created from earth and to earth they will return, just as God has said, “From the (earth) did We create you, and unto it shall We return you, and from it shall We bring you out once again” (20:55); or “Therein shall you live, and therein shall you die, and from it shall you be taken out at last” (7:25).

[*Fatāwā* 17:249-50]

(7.4) Calling the unbelievers to account.

Will the unbelievers be called to account (ḥisāb) on the Day of Judgment? The answer is both yes and no, depending on what is meant by calling to account (ḥisāb).

Ibn Taymīyyah was asked if the unbelievers will be called to account for their deeds or not. He answered that it was a controversial issue, and scholars of later times in the school of Aḥmad as well as other schools had held different views. Some, like Abū Bakr ‘Abdul-‘Azīz,³⁸⁸ Abū Al-Ḥasan At-Tamīmī,³⁸⁹ Qāḍī Abū Ya‘lā,³⁹⁰ and others believe that they will not be called to account. Others like Abū Ḥafṣ Al-Barmakī³⁹¹ from among the followers of Aḥmad, as well as Abū Sulaymān Ad-Dimishqī³⁹² and Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī³⁹³ believe that they will be called to account.

In fact, *ḥisāb* may either mean that their deeds will be reviewed before them and they will be interrogated about them, or it may mean that their good and evil deeds will be weighed against each other. If you take the first meaning, the unbelievers will certainly be called to account; but if you take the second meaning and think that they will have good deeds which may possibly qualify them

for Paradise, it is not correct. However, if you think that they will differ in their punishments, and the punishment of one who has committed more sins will be greater than the punishment of one who has committed fewer, or that the one who has done some good deeds will have his punishment reduced, it is true. Certainly, the punishment of Abū Ṭālib³⁹⁴ will be less than the punishment of Abū Lahab.³⁹⁵

This is supported by a number of texts, for example, God has said, “Those who reject God and hinder (men) from the path of God, for them will We add penalty to penalty” (16:88); or, “Verily the transposing (of a prohibited month) is an addition to unbelief” (9:37). And it is well known that Hell will have different strata. Hence, if some unbelievers will receive a more severe punishment than others since they had done more evil and less good, then *ḥisāb* in their case will mean the determination of their punishment, rather than whether or not they should be sent to Paradise.
[*Fatāwā* 4:305-6]

(7.5) The children of the unbelievers

Opinions differ as to what will happen to the children of the unbelievers. In Ibn Taymīyyah's view, the best thing that we can say in this regard is that God knows better what they would have been doing.

The best thing to say on the issue is that God knows better what they would have been doing. This is the answer which the Prophet gave, when he was questioned about it, as we have in an authentic *ḥadīth*.³⁹⁶ However, a group of *ḥadīth* scholars is of the view that they all will go to Hell. This view has been attributed to Aḥmad, but it is not correct. Another group is convinced that they will go to Paradise. This is the opinion of Abū Al-Fāraj Ibn Al-Jawzī³⁹⁷ and others. They argue from the *ḥadīth* which says that the Prophet saw Abraham (pbuh) in a dream and saw that he had the

children of the Believers with him. When the Prophet was asked about children of pagans he said, “also children of pagans.”³⁹⁸

However, the correct thing to say on the issue is that God knows better what they had been doing, and abstain from saying who among them will go to Paradise or who will go to Hell. In a number of *aḥādīth* we have that (on the Day of Judgment when people gather on the open ground they will be asked to do some things and refrain from some others. Those who obey will enter Paradise, but those who disobey will enter Hell.”³⁹⁹ Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash‘arī: has said that this is the view of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah. He has further added that the obligations of religion come to an end with entry into Paradise or Hell; they will be tried before that on the Judgment ground as they will be tried in the life between death and resurrection by being asked questions as to who their Lord is, what their religion is, and who their prophet is. In the Qur’ān we have, “That day the shin shall be laid bare, and they shall be summoned to bow in adoration, but they shall not be able to do so” (68:42).

In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections we have the *ḥadīth* reported through different channels that when people assemble on the Judgment ground, God will appear and there will be an announcement: “Let every group follow the one whom they were worshiping,” whereupon the pagans will follow their gods. When only the Believers are left, God will appear to them in a form they were not aware of, so that they will not recognize Him when they see Him. Then He will appear to them in the form they were aware of, and they will fall on the ground in prostration, but the backs of the hypocrites will stay straight like the horns of a bull; they will try to prostrate themselves before Him but will not be able to. Saying that, the Prophet recited the verse, “That Day the shin will be laid bare, and they shall be summoned to bow in adoration, but they shall not be able to do so”⁴⁰⁰ (68:42). For a more detailed treatment of the subject, the reader should consult other writings.

[*Fatāwā* 4 303 4]

(7.6) The joys of the people in Paradise.

The people of Paradise will enjoy the pleasures of the spirit as well as the body.

That people in Paradise will eat and drink is stated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and is agreed upon among the Muslims. This is a well-known article of the Islamic faith. It is also known that there will be birds and mansions in Paradise. This has been stated in many authentic *aḥādīth*. Similarly, it is known that people there will not pass urine or stool, nor will they spit. No one who believes in Allah and His Messenger has ever contested these things; only the unbelievers and the hypocrites deny them.

Among those who deny this, mention may be made of the Jews and the Christians. They say that people of Paradise will not eat or drink or have sexual intercourse, that they will only hear sweet voices and smell sweet smells, even though they believe that resurrection will be the resurrection of the spirit as well as the body, and that reward and punishment will happen to both. Other deniers, such as the Sabaeans, the philosophers and the like, believe only in the resurrection of the spirit; they say that it is the spirit alone which will suffer punishment or enjoy reward. Many groups of infidels and pagans deny resurrection altogether, of the body as well as the spirit. In His Book as well as through His Messenger, God has clearly affirmed the resurrection of both spirit and the body, and refuted the views of the unbelievers and the infidels in most clear and definite terms.

As for the hypocrites of this *ummah* who do not abide by the words of the Qur'ān or the statements of well-known *aḥādīth* and interpret them in their own ways, they say that they only convey in symbolic language the idea of spiritual resurrection. This group includes the esoteric Karmathians, who have taken their ideas from the Magians and the Sabaeans, the philosophers who follow the

Sabaeans though they call themselves Muslims, and various writers, physicians, theologians and mystics like the authors of the *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity*, as well as avowed hypocrites. All of them are infidels. The *ummah* is agreed that they should be killed. The Prophet has clearly and definitely stated the verdict in this regard, which has come down to us and is known to all, the learned as well as the common man. Some Jews came to the Prophet and said, “Muḥammad, you say that the people of Paradise will eat and drink, but you know that whoever eats and drinks goes to the toilet,” whereupon the Prophet said, “Yes, but they will only pass something like musk.”⁴⁰¹ It is the duty of the ruler to put to death whoever denies the resurrection of the body even though he may subscribe to the texts on the subject, and more so the one who denies them too.

[*Fatāwā* 4:313-15]

(7.7) To gaze upon the face of God will be the greatest joy of Paradise.

Paradise is the name for all the good one will have in the next life, and the best of all that good will be to gaze upon the face of God. Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* has noted the *ḥadīth* reported by ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Laylah through Ṣuḥayb that the Prophet said, “When the people of Paradise enter it a voice will call, ‘People of Paradise! God has given you a promise which He would now like to fulfill.’ They will say, ‘What is that? Has He not brightened our faces, tilted down our scales, put us into Paradise, and saved us from the Fire?’ At that moment the veil will be removed from God’s face and people will look upon it; they will not have any joy greater than to look upon His face.”⁴⁰² This is what is referred to as an additional joy (*ziyādah*) in the Qur’ān (10:36).

This explanation, I hope, will remove the confusion which the person (you have referred to) may have caused by his words, “I have not worshiped You for the love of Your Paradise, or for fear

of Your Hell. I have worshiped You only to have a look at You.” This man and his followers have thought that Paradise only means eating, drinking, donning clothes, having intercourse, hearing sweet voices, and so on - only the pleasures of created things. This is also the view of Paradise which the Jahmīs and many other theological and juristic groups who deny the possibility of the Beatific Vision have formed. They think that Paradise will have nothing except the pleasures of created things. That is why when a misguided Ṣūfī *shaykh* heard the verse, “Among you are some who hanker after this world, and some who work for the Hereafter” (3:52), he said, “Where are those who want only God. Commenting on the verse, “God has purchased of the Believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the Garden (of Paradise)” (9:111), another Ṣūfī has said, “If we sell our life and property for Paradise how will we get a look at God’s face? “All this is due to the misconception that a look at God’s face is not part of Paradise.

The truth is that Paradise is the abode for all kinds of joys, including the greatest joy of all, looking upon the face of God. That favor will be granted only in Paradise, as has been stated in a number of texts. It will be denied, on the other hand, to the people of Hell. If the person that has said the words mentioned above has said them with good intention, it can be taken to mean that even if God had not created Hell or Paradise it would have been the duty of the people to worship Him, seek His pleasure, and love to see Him. But he has, we must add, a poor idea of Paradise; he thinks that it is just a name for some ordinary pleasures.

We cannot imagine that any living being would act without a motive or will. Those ascetics and devotees who say that man’s perfection lies in negating his will altogether are absolutely wrong. They only say such things while in the state of *fanā*; they are not aware that the Ṣūfī who is lost in his love still has will and desire, even though he is not conscious of it, for love is one thing and will is another, and the consciousness of it a third thing. When they are

not conscious of their will they think they do not have it, which is obviously wrong. We cannot imagine human beings moving without love or aversion for something or without will. That is why the Prophet has said, “The truest name for a man is Ḥārith, the cultivator, or Hammām, the aspirant.”⁴⁰³ Everyone cultivates one thing or another, which is his work, and everyone has some aspiration, which is what he strives for. It may happen, however, that one’s love for God impels him to obey God’s command, or one’s respect and awe for Him may prevent him from defying His will. ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb referred to this possibility when he said about Ṣuḥayb, “How good Ṣuḥayb is! He would not disobey God even if he were not to fear Him.” That is to say, even if he did not have to fear God he would not disobey Him; but now when he fears God you can imagine how obedient he would be. His regard and reverence for God prevents him from disobedience to His will.

When a person feels pain on losing sight of God, or feels pleasure on seeing Him, it is certainly due to his love for Him. It is love that has made him look for a vision of His face or fear of His being hidden, even though the thing which he fears or looks for is the pain or pleasure which is produced by something created. He seeks them through worship and obedience to God which involves His love. And when he tastes the love of God he is sure to find it sweeter than any other love. That is why the seeing of God for the people of Paradise will be the greatest joy they shall have. The Prophet has said. “The people of Paradise will receive inspiration to celebrate God’s glory just as they will receive inspiration to breathe.”⁴⁰⁴ This means that their best pleasure will be in remembering God and loving Him.

[*Fatāwā* 10:62-64]

(7.8) Condonation of punishment in the next life.

There are ten grounds on which punishment in the next life is condoned.

Sins expose the Believers to punishment in Hell in the Hereafter, but it may be condoned on ten grounds. One is repentance. The person who repents of his sins is like one who has no sins. One may repent of all kinds of sins: faithlessness, intransigence and disobedience; and his repentance may be accepted. God has said, “Say to the unbelievers, if they desist (from unbelief) their past will be forgiven them” (8:38); and, “They do blaspheme who say: God is one of the three in a Trinity, for there is no god except one God. If they desist not from their words (of blasphemy) verily a grievous penalty will befall the blasphemers among them. Why turn they not to God, and seek His forgiveness? For God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (5:76-7)....

The doors of repentance are always open for every Believer. God has said, “But man undertook it (the responsibility); he was indeed rash and foolish. (This was done) so that God might punish the hypocrites, men and women, and the unbelievers, men and women, and that God might turn in mercy to the Believers, men and women, for God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (33:72-3). He has also stated in His Book how the prophets repented and prayed for forgiveness. Of Adam, for example, He said, “Then Adam learned from his Lord words of inspiration, and his Lord turned towards him; for He is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful” (2:37). Of Moses He said that he prayed to Him: “You are our Protector, so forgive us and give us Your mercy; for You are the best of those who forgive. And ordain for us that which is good in this life and in the Hereafter, for We have turned unto You” (7:155-6).... We all know that repentance is for everyone, prophets and non-prophets, that God exalts a man after repentance, that when He tests a person with sin and the latter repents of it, He lifts

him up rather than bring him down. He loves those who repent again and again and keep themselves pure, and replace their evil acts with good ones....

The second ground for the condonation of punishment is *istighfār*, that is, beseeching forgiveness. *Istighfār* is a prayer; often it accompanies *tawbah*, repentance, but not necessarily every time, for one may repent but not pray for forgiveness, as one may pray and may not repent.... Repentance wipes out all kinds of sins, which nothing else can do, for God “will not forgive that partners be set up with Him, He may forgive anything else” (4:48).... About repentance, on the other hand, He has said, “My servants who have transgressed against their souls, despair not of the mercy of God, for God forgives all sins, He is Oft Forgiving, Most Merciful” (39:53). This is for those who repent. That is why God has said that one should not despair of His Mercy; one should rather repent and turn to Him. Following the words quoted above God has said, “Turn You to Your Lord (in repentance), and bow to (His will), before the penalty comes to You. After that You shall not be helped” (39:54). On the other hand, prayer for forgiveness without repentance does not bring forgiveness, although it may contribute to it.

The third ground is good works (*al-a‘māl aṣ-ṣāliḥah*). God has said, “Good works remove evil” (11:114). And the Prophet, addressing Mu‘ādh Ibn Jabal, said, “Fear God wherever you are; do good after you have committed evil, for it may wipe out the latter, and behave well with people. In an authentic *ḥadīth* reported by Al-Bukhārī and Muslim, the Prophet has said, “The five prayers (in a day), the congregational prayers on Fridays, and the fasting in Ramaḍān wash away the sins that you commit in between them, so long as you refrain from the major sins,”⁴⁰⁵ He has also said, “One who performs *ḥajj* to this House (of God) and does not abuse anyone, or commit any transgression becomes free from his sins like a new-born child.”⁴⁰⁶ And, “Charity wipes out the sin just as water extinguishes the fire.”⁴⁰⁷ This *ḥadīth* has been reported by

At-Tirmidhī with the remark that it is authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*). God Himself has said, “You who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that shall save you from a grievous penalty? Believe in God and His Messenger, strive (your utmost) in the cause of God, with your property and your persons. That would be best for you, if you only knew it. He will forgive you your sins and admit you to gardens beneath which rivers flow and to beautiful mansions in gardens of eternity. That is indeed the supreme achievement” (61:11-12). We have also the authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*) *ḥadīth*, “The martyr shall be forgiven all sins except default in paying debts.”⁴⁰⁸...

The works for which God forgives sins and wipes out evil deeds are the works which He accepts. And He accepts only from the righteous ... and only such acts as are done in the prescribed way. The *Sunan* collections have the *ḥadīth* reported by, ‘Ammār (raa) that the Prophet (pbuh) said, “One finishes his *ṣalāh* and what is credited sometimes to his account is only half of it, or a third, or a fourth, even a tenth.”⁴⁰⁹ Ibn ‘Abbās has said that of the *ṣalāh* what is credited to one’s account is what one has done with understanding. The Prophet is also reported to have said, “Many people who fast do not get of their fasting except thirst; and many who offer *ṣalāh* in the night get nothing except staying awake.”⁴¹⁰ The same is true for *ḥajj* and *jihād*. In short, sins are forgiven or wiped out on account of such acts only as are accepted by God, but many people do not perform their acts properly, not even *ṣalāh*.

The fourth factor which contributes to the condonation of punishment is prayer by other believers. When believers pray at the funeral of a Believer, it contributes to the forgiveness of his or her sins. Their prayers at other times also contribute to that end....

The fifth factor is the prayer by the Prophet in his lifetime for the forgiveness of any Believer, and after his death on the Day of Judgment in the form of intercession on his behalf....

The sixth factor is the good deed which someone does and offers for the benefit of a person who is dead. It may be charity, *ḥajj* or fasting on behalf of the other. There are authentic *aḥādīth*

which say that the benefits of these deeds reach the dead. This is different from the case of prayers by sons or daughters for their parents, which is in a sense a part of their own deeds. The Prophet has said, “When a person dies, his deeds come to an end except three of them: charity, knowledge which benefits the people, and a righteous son (or daughter) who prays for him.”⁴¹¹ This *ḥadīth* is reported by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. The son/daughter is his own work, and his/her prayers are credited to his own account. This is not the case with the prayer of any other person; one is only awarded the benefit of one’s own deeds.

The seventh reason is the trouble that one suffers in life. God condones the sins of a person on account of his sufferings. The Prophet has said, “Whatever illness, hardship, pain, or grief you suffer, even the smallest thorn that pricks you, God condones of your sins on that account.”⁴¹²...

The eighth reason is the hardship the dead experiences in the grave at the hands of the two angels sent to interrogate him or her.

The ninth reason is the hardship one will suffer on the Day of Judgment.

The tenth reason is the affliction that believers will experience when they cross the Bridge (*aṣ-Ṣirāṭ*) and stand on the ground between Hell and Paradise for a period in which they will be punished for the harms they have inflicted upon others. After justice is done and they are cleansed and purified, they will be led into Paradise.

[*Minhāj as-Sunnah* 3:179-186]

(7.9) Deeds which benefit the dead.

There is consensus on the point that charity on behalf of a dead person benefits the deceased. The same is true of ḥajj, sacrifice, and the freeing of a slave done on his behalf, as well as of praying and seeking God’s forgiveness for him. With regard to fasting, supererogatory ṣalāh and recitation of the Qur’ān on his behalf,

there are two opinions among the scholars. But as for hiring someone to read the Qur'ān and offering its benefits to the dead, it is not right; similarly to prepare food and invite people to it in order to benefit the dead is also unlawful, it is a wrong innovation (bid'ah).

All praise is for Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. On the question of charity on behalf of a dead person, there is complete agreement among the *ummah* that it does profit the deceased. There are a number of prophetic sayings to that effect. For example, it is reported that Sa'd said to the Prophet, "My mother could not speak at the time of her death; if she could have she would have given something in charity. Will it benefit her if I give something in charity on her behalf?" "The Prophet said, "Yes."⁴¹³ A lot of things may similarly benefit the dead, such as *hajj*, sacrifice, setting slaves free on his or her behalf, as well as praying and seeking God's forgiveness for him or her. There is no disagreement on this point among the *a'immah* (of the *ummah*).

As for fasting or performing supererogatory *ṣalāh* or reciting the Qur'ān on behalf of the dead, there are two opinions among the scholars. One is that the dead will benefit from it. This is the view of Aḥmad and Abū Ḥanīfah and a group of Shāfi'ī scholars as well as others. The other view is that he will not benefit from it; this is what is commonly known to be the opinion of Mālik and Ash-Shāfi'ī.

However, to hire someone to recite the Qur'ān and offer the benefit to the dead is not correct. Scholars have debated the idea of taking wages for teaching the Qur'ān, making the call for *ṣalāh*, leading the *ṣalāh*, or making *hajj* on behalf of others; the man who is hired is paid for his work. However, Mālikī and Shāfi'ī scholars in general justify it, while others do not; they say that these works must be performed only to please God; moreover, they must be performed only by a Believer, not a non-believer. Since in this case they have been performed for the sake of money they will not be

rewarded by God. He only accepts the deed which is done for His sake and not for some worldly gains.

There is a third opinion on the issue, which is held by some scholars among the followers of Aḥmad. They say that remuneration may be paid to a person who is poor. They argue from the fact that God has permitted the guardian of an orphan to take a part of the latter's money for his sustenance if he is poor. This view is better than the other; for if a poor man does these things for God and takes some money for it in order to meet his needs and prepare himself for carrying out God's commands, God will reward him for his intention. He will be earning what is right, as well as doing what is meritorious.

However, if he does not recite the Qur'ān except for money, there is no merit in it, and when there is no merit in it, nothing can be passed on to the dead. The dead benefits from the merit of an action, not from the action itself. Therefore, when one gives something in charity to a person who deserves it, the dead will benefit from it. If one does it to help someone by reading the Qur'ān or teaching it one will be doing a more meritorious act. Helping a Muslim personally or through money by learning the Qur'ān, reading it, or teaching is one of the most meritorious acts.

For the relatives of the dead to prepare food and invite people is not lawful; it is an unlawful innovation (*bid'ah*). The practice of the Companions was just the opposite. Jarīr Ibn 'Abdullah says that for us to join the relatives of the deceased in the food which they had cooked for people was part of mourning (which is forbidden). The proper thing for people to do on such occasions is to prepare food and send it to the relatives of the dead. When the news of the death of Ja'far Ibn Abī Ṭālib came, the Prophet said, 'Prepare food for the family of Ja'far; they cannot do it in this situation.'⁴¹⁴

As for reciting the Qur'ān on the graves, as a matter of practice the Elders did not do it. Should we recite the Qur'ān on graves? Abū Ḥanīfah and Mālik disapprove of it; this is also what is

usually reported of Aḥmad. However, a report of later origin says that he permitted it when he came to know that ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar said that the first and last verses of Sūrat Al-Baqarah should be read when the dead is put in the grave. Some Companions from the Anṣār have also been reported to have willed that Sūrat Al-Baqarah be read at their grave at the time they are buried. However, on the issue whether the Qur’ān should be read after the burial nothing has been reported of them. That is why Aḥmad has differentiated between reciting the Qur’ān at the time of burial and reciting it after the burial. The latter is an unjustified innovation; there is nothing to support it.

Those who say that the dead benefit from hearing the Qur’ān and are rewarded on it are wrong. The Prophet (pbuh) has said, “When someone dies, his deeds come to an end except three of them: charity, a contribution to knowledge which continues to benefit, and a righteous son who prays for him.”^{415a} Hence, the dead is not rewarded for hearing the Qur’ān or for anything else, even though he does hear the shuffling of the shoes when people leave him after burial, or the greetings of peace (*salām*) which the visitors offer. He also hears other things, but none of them are counted as his deeds except the ones mentioned in the *ḥadīth* above.

[*Fatāwā* 24:314-17]

(7.10) Intercession

Prayers of the prophets or their intercession are not to be equated with faith in them and compliance with their commands, for faith in them and obedience to their commands do secure deliverance from punishment in the Hereafter and guarantee happiness there, whereas their intercession and prayer cannot benefit anyone unless he fulfills certain conditions. They cannot, for example, save any person from the Fire or do him any good unless he believes in them. However, they may lessen their

suffering, as will happen with Abū Ṭālib; we have an authentic *ḥadīth* to that effect. For the Believers, on the other hand, they will certainly do a lot of good; they will benefit them in various matters, worldly and religious, add to their merits, and elevate their position on the Day of Judgment. The sinners from among the followers of any prophet will certainly benefit from the intercession of that prophet; there is complete consensus among the *ummah* on this point. The intercession which the Qur'ān has rejected is intercession in favor of those who are guilty of committing *shirk* against God from among the People of the Book or from among the Believers who think that there are beings with positions of honor with God who can intercede with Him on their behalf without His permission.

(a) The *ummah* agree that Prophet (Muḥammad) has a very high position of honor with God, that no one else is more honorable to God than he, or in a better position to intercede with Him on their behalf. However, it is also true that the intercession of a prophet is not like faith in him or obedience to his commands. Faith in him and obedience to him definitely guarantee salvation and happiness in the Hereafter. One who dies with faith in God and His prophet, and has obeyed Him and His prophet is certainly among the happy ones; on the other hand, one who dies not believing in His prophet will be consigned to Hell.

As for the prayer or intercession of a prophet, one must fulfill certain conditions to qualify for it. Anyone who does not believe in him will not have his intercession to relieve him from the Fire, and will not benefit from his prayers if he persists in his unbelief, however great a position the prophet may have with God. There is no one more honorable to God than Muḥammad (pbuh), and Abraham is next to him. But when the latter prayed for his father's forgiveness in these words, "Our Lord! Cover (us) with Your forgiveness, me, my parents, and the Believers on the Day the Reckoning will be established" (14:41), and when following his

example, the Prophet intended to pray for his uncle, Abū Ṭālib, and some Muslims wanted to pray for their relatives, God admonished them, “It is not fitting for the Prophet and those who believe that they should pray for forgiveness for pagans, even though they be kin, after it is clear to them that they are companions of the Fire” (9:113). With regard to Abraham’s prayer, He observed, “Abraham prayed for his father’s forgiveness only because of a promise he had made to him. But when it became clear to him that he was an enemy to God, he dissociated himself from him. Abraham was most tender-hearted, forbearing. God does not let people go astray after He has guided them till He makes clear to them what to fear (and avoid)” (9:114-5).

The greatest of all intercessors, the Prophet Muḥammad is also on record as saying, “I sought the permission of my Lord to pray for the forgiveness of my mother, but He did not permit me; then I sought permission to visit her grave, which He permitted.”⁴¹⁵ This has been recorded by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. In another version of the *ḥadīth*, it states that the Prophet visited the grave of his mother and wept, as did others around him, and then he said, “I sought God’s permission to pray for forgiveness for my mother, but He did not permit me. Then I sought permission to visit her grave and He permitted me. So you may also visit the graves; it will remind you of death”⁴¹⁶ Anas (raa) narrated a *ḥadīth* recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that a man asked the Prophet where his father was. He said “In the Fire.” When the man departed he called him back and said, “My father and your father are both in the Fire.”⁴¹⁷

The intercession of the Prophet and his prayers for the Believers will also benefit them in various matters, worldly and religious; his intercession may even add to their merit on the Day of Judgment and raise their position and status. There is full agreement on bothse counts among the *ummah*. It is, however, said that some heretical sects do not believe in it.

As for the Prophet’s intercession for the sinners of his *ummah*, this is also agreed upon by the Companions, their righteous

Successors, the four *a'immah* of the Muslims, as well as others. Only some heretical sects such as the Khawārij, the Mu'tazilah and the Zaydiyyah deny it; they say that when one enters the Fire one will no get out of it on account of any intercession or any other reason. For them no one who enters Paradise will ever enter the Fire, and no one who enters the Fire will ever enter Paradise, and no one can be both rewarded and punished. But the Companions, the righteous Successors, the four *a'immah* as well as other imāms, on the other hand, agree on what is stated clearly in a number of *aḥādīth* that God will take some people out of the Fire after they have suffered there for some time. Some He will take out due to the intercession of Muḥammad (pbuh), and some due to the intercession of others, and some without any intercession. The heretical sects which deny intercession argue from the following verses: "Then guard Yourself against a day when one soul shall not avail another, nor shall intercession be accepted from it, nor shall compensation be taken from it" (2:48); "Neither shall compensation be accepted from it, nor shall any intercession profit it" (2:113); "You who believe! Spend out of (the bounties) We have provided for you before the Day comes when no bargaining (will avail), nor friendship, nor intercession" (2:254); "The wrongdoers will have no intimate friend or intercession which could be listened to" (40:18); and, "Then no intercession of (any) intercessors will profit them" (74:48).

The Ahl as-Sunnah answer this argument in this way: First, these verses only say that no intercession will profit those who set up partners with God, for at one place God has said that when they are asked, "What led you into Hell-Fire?" they will say, 'We were not of those who prayed, nor were we of those who fed the indigent. We (also) used to talk vanities with vain talkers, and used to deny the Day of Judgment until there came to us (the Hour) that is certain.' Then no intercession of (any) intercessors will profit them" (74:42-8). It is clear, therefore, that they will not get anyone to intercede for them because they were unbelievers. Second, these

verses negate the kind of intercession which is claimed by those pagans who set up partners for God, or those heretics among the People of the Book and the Believers who believe that there are men who have the authority to intercede with God without His permission, just as some men intercede with their fellow human beings who accept their recommendations for various reasons: they either fear them or expect some favor from them, or they want to secure something from them in exchange. The pagans would take angels, prophets and pious men as intercessors, make images of them and pray to God in their name. They believed that since they were dear to God they could approach Him through them by worshiping them and praying to them to intercede with God in their favor, just as common people approach kings through those who are near and dear to them, who recommend them to the latter without their permission, and at times even knowing that he would not like it, nevertheless would grant their request because he either fears them or needs their help.

God has negated this kind of intercession on many occasions, for example, "Who is there who can intercede in His presence except as He permits" (2:255); "How many soever be the angels in the heavens, their intercession will avail nothing except after God has given leave for whom He pleases and that he is acceptable to Him" (53:26). Referring particularly to the angels He has said, "They say: 'God Most Gracious has begotten offspring.' Glory to Him! They are servants raised to honor; they speak not before He speaks, and they act (in all things) by His command. He knows what is before them, and what is behind them, and they offer no intercession except for those who are acceptable, and they stand in awe and reverence of His (glory)" (21:26-28). He has further said, "Say: Call upon other (gods) whom you fancy besides God. They have no power - nor the weight of an atom - in the heavens or on the earth. No (sort of) share have they therein, nor is any of them a helper to God. No intercession can avail in His presence, except for those for whom He has granted permission" (34:22-3). And,

“They serve, besides God, things that harm them not, nor profit them, and they say these are our intercessors with God. Say: Do you indeed inform God of something He knows not in the heavens or on earth? Glory to Him! And far is He above the partners they ascribe (to Him)!” (10:17-8).... “And those whom they invoke besides God have no power of intercession, except those who testify to the truth and know it” (43:86)... “All sounds shall humble themselves in the presence of (God) Most Gracious. Nothing shall you hear but the tramp of their feet (as they march). On that Day no intercession shall avail except for those for whom permission has been granted by (God) Most Gracious and whose word is acceptable to Him” (20:108-9).

This is the intercession which the pagans attributed to the angels, prophets, and pious people. They put up their images, and believed that to pray to them is to pray to the beings whom they represented. They visited their graves in the belief that if they asked them to intercede on their behalf they would intercede with God. They also carved their statues and worshiped them. It is this kind of intercession which God and His Messenger have rejected, condemned its perpetrators and dubbed them infidels. Speaking about the people of Noah, for example, God has said, “They say (to each other): Do not abandon your gods, abandon neither Wadd nor Suwā‘, neither Yaghūth nor Ya‘ūq, nor Naṣr. They have already misled many” (71:23-4). Ibn ‘Abbās and other commentators have said, “These were the most righteous men among the people of Noah. When they died people haunted their graves, made images of them and worshiped them.” This is what is mentioned in many commentaries on the Qur’ān as well as works of *ḥadīth* by Al-Bukhārī and others.

The Prophet has rejected this *shirk* altogether and destroyed it root and branch. He has cursed the people who visit the graves of their prophets and pious men and offer *ṣalāh* near them, even though they may not invoke them. He forbade *ṣalāh* in the direction of the graves, and sent ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib with the order

to level every grave which was raised and knock down every image which was set up. He also cursed those who made the images. Abū Al-Hayyāj Al-Asadī says that ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib told him that he wanted to send him on the same mission the Prophet had sent him. He had commissioned him to destroy every image (*timthāl*) he would come across, and level every grave that had been raised high. In another version of the tradition we have the word *sūrah* - ‘figure’ - instead of *timthāl* – ‘image or statue’. Muslim has mentioned this tradition in his book.⁴¹⁸

[*Fatāwā* 1:145-52]

(b) There are a number of *aḥādīth* on the intercession of the Prophet. Some say that when people assemble on the Ground of Judgment, and there will be among them Believers as well as non-believers, they will request him to intercede on their behalf. This means that there may be some kind of intercession for the non-believers also. There is also the *ḥadīth* which says that Abbās Ibn ‘Abdul-Muṭṭālib asked the Prophet if he could do any good for Abū Ṭālib, who used to defend him (against his enemies) and help him. The Prophet said, “Yes, he is only in a thin layer of Fire. Were it not for him, he would have been immersed deep into the Fire.”⁴¹⁹ Abū Sa‘īd Al-Khudrī says that once when Abū Ṭālib was mentioned to the Prophet he said, “Maybe my intercession will do him some good on the Day of Judgment and he is put in a thin layer of fire which reaches up to his ankles only, even though it would still be enough to make his brain boil.”⁴²⁰

These texts clearly say that the Prophet will intercede on behalf of some non-believers, and that his intercession will reduce their punishment and make them the least sufferers among the people of Hell. Ibn ‘Abbās has also reported these words of the Prophet recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections: “The person who will suffer the least of all the people of the Fire will be Abū Ṭālib; he will be wearing only shoes (of fire) that will make his brain boil.”⁴²¹

[*Fatāwā* 1:116-7]

PART III

TERMINOLOGY

8. TERMINOLOGY OF THE QUR'AN AND SUNNAH

(8.1) The correct way to understand Qur'ānic terms.

There are three kinds of terms: one whose meanings can be determined in light of the Arabic language, e.g. shams (sun), and qamar (moon); second, those whose meaning is determined in light of the conventions ('urf) of a society, e.g., fahash (obscene), and (ma'rūf) good practices; third, those whose meaning is determined in light of the Shar', such as ṣalāh, zakāh. To this category belong also such terms as īmān, islām, nifāq, and kufr. When the Prophet explains them and states what is meant by them, we no longer need a scholar of language or any other person to give their meaning.

Let it be clear that when the terms occurring in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are explained by the Prophet (pbuh) we no longer need to need to refer to the explanations of the lexicographers or any other persons. This is the reason why jurists have as classified terms into three categories.: One whose meanings are known through the statements of the *shar'*, such as ṣalāh and zakāh; second, terms whose meanings are known through their use in language, such as *shams* (sun), and *qamar* (moon); and third, terms whose meanings are determined in the light of the conventions of society, such as *fahash*⁴²² or *ma'rūf* in the verse, "Behave with them according to the *ma'rūf*," (the good practices of society) (4:19)

What terms like ṣalāh, zakāh, ṣiyām, and ḥajj mean in the language of God and His Messenger have been fully explained by the Prophet. The same is true of *khamr*, wine, and other, similar terms. Their meanings can be fully ascertained from his statements. If anyone tries to give them a meaning different from what the Prophet has given, his suggestion will not be accepted. However, as for the derivation of a term, or variation in its

meaning, it is part of the science of linguistics. Similarly, the discussion of its significance or the reasons of its choice by the Qur'ān from among other similar terms may provide an additional insight; but our knowledge of what is meant by it does not depend on these things.

The most important words in this category are *īmān*, *islām*, *nifāq* and *kufr*. The Prophet has explained their meanings so thoroughly that we do not need to look at their derivations or the way the Arabs had used them before; we have only to look at their uses in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah to determine what is meant by them; that will be more than enough. In fact, the meanings of these terms is known in their essence to everyone, the elite as well as the common folk. Take, for example, *īmān*. If you look at what the Khawārij and the Murji'ah have said with regard to it you will know that it definitely goes against the pronouncements of the Prophet. You will also know that obedience to Allah and His Prophet is part of *īmān* or that everyone who commits a sin is not to be dubbed a *kāfir*. Suppose some people said to the Prophet that they believed in what he taught, that they were convinced that it was true, and had no doubt about it at all, and that they openly confessed that God was one and he was His messenger, nevertheless they would not comply with any of his commands, they would not offer *ṣalāh*, or fast, or perform *ḥajj*, or they would not speak the truth, keep trusts, fulfill promises, do good to kin, or carry out anything he had commanded, or they would instead drink wine, marry those who are prohibited, kill his companions and the people of his *ummah* and take their property, even wage war against him along with his enemies and kill him, would the Prophet say to them that they were true believers perfect in faith, that he would intercede in their favor on the Day of Judgment, that none of them would enter the Fire? Every Muslim knows that the Prophet would say to them that they were the worst rejectors of faith, and that they would be killed unless they repented.

Similarly, every Muslim knows that the Prophet would not treat those who drink, commit adultery, slander or steal as apostates who deserve to be killed. The Qur'ān and the *mutawātir aḥādīth* from the Prophet have prescribed definite punishments for these crimes different from what is prescribed for apostasy. The Qur'ān, for example, says that the slanderer and the adulterer shall be lashed, that the thief's hand shall be chopped off. We also know definitely that the Prophet enforced these punishments. Had their perpetrators been apostates, the Prophet would have beheaded them. In short, the views of the Khawārij or the Murji'ah are not at all part of the religion of the Prophet.

When heretical sects deviated from the right path, a disease overtook them. They started building up the structure of Islam on the basis of propositions which they thought to be correct from the point of view of language or reason and ignored the statements of God and His Prophet. They did not realize that a proposition which conflicts with any statement of God or His Prophet is wrong. This was the reason why Aḥmad wrote his famous work⁴²³ on the refutation of those who adhere to what they suppose to be the view of the Qur'ān without referring to the statements of the Prophet, his Companions and their Successors on the subject. He elaborated the same position in the letter which he wrote to Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān Al-Jurjānī⁴²⁴ refuting the views of the Murji'ah. He was pursuing the method which all the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah* had followed, namely that one should not, so far as possible, diverge from the elucidations of the Prophet on any point. Whoever deviates from this path lands himself in heresy (*bid'ah*), which means to ascribe something to God and His Prophet what one has no knowledge of, or to say what is not true. God and the Prophet have clearly forbidden this. Speaking of Satan, for example, God has said, "He commands you what is evil and shameful, and that you should say of God that of which you have no knowledge" (2:169); and speaking of the People of the Book, He has said, "Was not the Covenant of the Book taken from them, that they would not ascribe

to God anything but the truth?” (7:169). These verses in effect condemn any interpretation of the Qur’ān solely in the light of one’s reason. The Prophet has issued a clear warning against this stance: “Whoever speaks about the Qur’ān solely in the light of his reason shall have his seat in the Fire.”⁴²⁵

[*Fatāwā* 1 7:286-8]

(8.2) One should not interpret the words of God and the Prophet in the light of their usage in later times.

To understand a term of the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth, the first thing one should do is to look for its usage in the Book of God and the aḥādīth of the Prophet, and then its usage in the language of his people and his Companions. Never should one interpret it in the light of its usage in the language which developed later and was not known to the Prophet or his Companions. The main reason heretical sects misinterpreted Qur’ānic terms is that they based themselves on literary and theological writings of later times or resorted to metaphorical interpretations and conjectures and did not turn to the Qur’ān and the aḥādīth themselves or to their elucidations by the Companions and their Successors.

In order to understand a term that occurs in the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth you should first look for similar instances of its use in their pages and find out what God and His Prophet meant by it. This will help you understand the language of the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth, and the way God and the Prophet address people, their style and their method. Thereafter, if you find similar instances in the language of the Arabs and get them in considerable number, you may conclude that the meaning of the term and the way it is used is part of the common language and not something peculiar to the Prophet; it is rather the language of his people. You should not interpret his words in the light of the usage of later times not known to him or to his Companions. Many people make that

mistake without knowing that the usage of the later times did not exist in his time.

You cannot use analogy to establish the meaning of a word, though you can use it to express an idea. It is quite permissible to use a word to express an idea similar to what people use to express it, provided you clarify the point with which you differ, but you cannot use a word in a sense or senses other than those in which people commonly use it, and say that they understand it in the sense similar to the one you give to it. This will certainly be altering and distorting the language. For example, when the Prophet says, “*al-jār aḥaqqu bi ṣāḥibihi*”^{425a} (‘the neighbor should be given priority in case of the house in his neighborhood’) the *jār* is *jār*, neighbor, not a *sharīk*, partner, for *jār* does not mean partner in the language of the Arabs. There is nothing in the language to suggest that the *jār* has a right over the part of the house which is for sale prior to any other (as is the case with the partner); it only means that it is better that the house be sold to him than to any other....

Before interpreting the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth* we must know how God and the Prophet use the words to express their ideas, and how we should understand their language. We must know the Arabic in which they have addressed us, so that we may understand what they want to say. We should also know the way in which words convey ideas. The major reason that heretical sects erred lies here. They began interpreting the words of God and His Prophet in light of what they thought them to mean, while they did not mean that, and on the basis of their understanding, they called some meanings literal and some metaphorical. A case in point is the interpretation of the word *īmān* by the Murji’ah. They claim that its real meaning is *taṣḍīq*, that is, belief or faith; as for action, its inclusion in *īmān* is only metaphorical.

In response to this, we will say that if we reject the distinction between the real and the metaphorical meanings the matter ends; but if we allow it, even then the Murji’ah will not profit from it, for

it will go against them. For the real meaning of a word is the one which it conveys when it is taken by itself, without considering any related factor, and the metaphorical meaning is that which it conveys when the related factors are considered. It is clear that when *īmān* is used by itself in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah actions are included in its connotation, but they are not included when it is qualified. That this is true is proved by the *ḥadīth* that *īmān* has more than seventy parts.⁴²⁶

As for the *ḥadīth* of Gabriel,⁴²⁷ if by *īmān* the Prophet meant what he said with regard to it as well as what he said with regard to *islām*, then actions are part of *īmān* and, I am sure, this is what the Prophet really meant. For in a similar way he meant by *iḥsān* what he said with regard to it as well as what he had said earlier with regard to *īmān* and *islām*. Obviously he could not have conceived *iḥsān* without *īmān* and *islām*. However, if *īmān* in the *ḥadīth* is taken in the sense of *taṣḍīq*, belief or faith, it is not possible to take it in that sense without taking into consideration any related factor, which will make the inclusion of actions in *īmān* metaphorical. If you read the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* you will find it too obvious to be contested. The opposite view that *īmān* in language means *taṣḍīq* and that the Prophet did not change or alter its meaning and only meant by it what people speaking the language meant by it without qualifying its sense, is not true. None of these two propositions can be established; in fact, they are false, and can be easily shown to be false....

In interpreting *īmān* the Murji'ah have deviated from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and the statements of the Companions and their righteous Successors. Aḥmad has often said that most of the errors that people make are due to the symbolic interpretation (*ta'wīl*) and analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) they indulge in. You will see that the Mu'tazilah, the Murji'ah, the Rāfiḍah and other heretical sects explain the Qur'ān solely by means of their reason, using their so-called rational ideas and symbolic method of

exegesis. They do not base their explanations on the *aḥādīth* of the Prophet, or the sayings of the Companions and their Successors, or the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah*. They refer neither to the Sunnah nor to the consensus of the Elders and their traditions. They base them only on reason and language. They hardly consult commentaries which are based upon traditions, which cite *aḥādīth* and the sayings of the Elders. They only consult literary books or theological works which are their own creations. This is the way of renegades. They believe only in the ideas that are set forth in the books of philosophy, literature and language, without referring to the Qur'ān, the *ḥadīth* or the traditions of the *Salaf*. They either ignore prophetic texts in the belief that they do not yield knowledge, or interpret the Qur'ān symbolically in light of what their reason and understanding dictate without referring to the *aḥādīth* of the Prophet and the traditions of the Companions. We have already mentioned that Aḥmad has refuted these people and condemned them as heretics.

[*Fatāwā* 47:115-91]

(8.3) *Īmān*

The word īmān is sometimes used by itself and sometimes along with other words such as islām, submission, or 'amal ṣāliḥ, righteous action. When it is used alone, islām, and 'amal ṣāliḥ are included in its connotation. But when it is used along with islām, islām stands for external actions, and īmān stands for actions of the heart, such as faith in God, His angels, prophets and the Hereafter.

The word *īmān* is sometimes mentioned alone without mentioning the word *islām* or the word *'amal ṣāliḥ*, or any other such word. But sometimes it is mentioned along with *islām*, as we have in the *ḥadīth* where Gabriel questions the Prophet about *islām*

and *īmān*⁴²⁸ or in the verse, “The Muslim men and Muslim women, the *mu’min* men and *mu’min* women...” (33:35), or the verse, “The desert Arabs say: ‘We believe (*āmannā*). Say: You have no faith (*lam tu’minū*); you should (only) say, We have submitted (*aslamnā*)” (49:14), or the verse, “Then we evacuated those of the Believers who were there, but We found not there any Muslims except in one house” (51:5).

Īmān has also been mentioned along with ‘*amal ṣāliḥ*’ at various places in the Qur’ān. For example, “Those who believe and do *as-ṣāliḥāt*, righteous acts” (10:9)”... Or it has been mentioned along with *al-lazīna utū al-‘ilm*, those who are endued with knowledge. For example, “Those who are endued with knowledge and faith say...” (30:56), or “God will raise up to (suitable) ranks (and degrees) those of you who believe (*āmanū*) and who have been granted knowledge (*‘ilm*)...” (58:11), or, “But those among them who are well-grounded in knowledge and the Believers (*al-mu’minūn*) believe in what has been revealed to you and what was revealed before You” (4:162).

When *īmān* is mentioned along with *islām*, *islām* stands for visible external actions: the two *shahādahs*, witnessing to the unity of God and the prophethood of Muḥammad, ṣalāh, zakāh, fasting, ḥajj. *Īmān* stands for what is in the heart: faith in God, His angels, books, prophets, and the Last Day. An example is the ḥadīth which Aḥmad has noted from Anas that the Prophet said, “Islam is something open, and *īmān* is in the heart.”⁴²⁹

But when *īmān* is mentioned alone, *islām* and righteous actions enter into its connotation. A clear example is the ḥadīth which tells of different parts of *īmān*: “*Īmān* consists of more than seventy parts, the greatest being the declaration that there is no god except Allah and the smallest being to remove an obstacle from the road.”⁴³⁰ There are also many *aḥādīth* in which particular acts of virtue have been mentioned as parts of *īmān*.⁴³¹ Again, there are *aḥādīth* in which *īmān* is denied when a particular action is not

forthcoming,^{431a} which shows that it is an essential part of *īmān*. But when the faith of the person who practices any such action is praised rather than negated it shows that that action is commendable. God or His Prophet never deny an epithet to anyone or to anything unless he or it fails to fulfill the essentials of that epithet. Examples are the following *aḥādīth* of the Prophet, “There is no *ṣalāh* without the *umm al-Qur’ān*,⁴³² i.e. the first *sūrah*, or, “He has no faith (*īmān*) who does not keep the trust,”⁴³³ or, “He is not a religious man who does not fulfill his promise”⁴³⁴

There are numerous verses in the *Qur’ān* which underline the fact that *īmān* as such includes actions. For example, “Only those believe in Our signs who when they are recited to them fall down in adoration and celebrate the praises of their Lord, and are not puffed up with pride” (32:15). This means that God denies *īmān* to those who do not have these qualities. If the *Qur’ān* is read to someone and he does not prostrate when prostration is mentioned, he is not a believer (*mu’min*). Prostration in the five daily prayers is obligatory; the *ummah* is agreed upon it. As for prostration in the process of recitation, opinions differ. Those who hold it to be obligatory argue from the verse mentioned above. For a discussion on the point, however, the reader should consult relevant works.

Other verses of this kind are, “Only those are Believers who have believed in God and His Messenger, and have never since doubted, but have striven with their belongings and their persons in the cause of God” (49:15); “Only those are Believers who, when God is mentioned, feel a tremor in their hearts..” (9:2); “ Only those are Believers who believe in God and His Messenger, and when they are with him on a matter requiring collective action, they do not depart until they have asked for his leave” (24:62); God forgive you! Why did you grant them exemption until you could know those who told the truth and those who were liars. Those who believe in God and the Last Day do not ask you for exemption from fighting with their goods and persons. And God knows well those who do their duty. Only those ask you for

exemption who believe not in God and the Last Day, and whose hearts are in doubt, so that they are tossed in their doubts to and fro” (9:43-5).

There are many more verses like the last one mentioned. For example, “You will not find any people who believe in God and the Last Day loving those who resist God and His Messenger” (58:92), or “If only they had believed in God, in the Messenger, and in what has been revealed to him, never would they have taken them for friends and protectors” (5:84). Thus God has made it clear that certain things necessarily follow from *īmān*, that others are diametrically opposed to it, and that its presence necessitates the existence of the former and the non-existence of the latter. One of those things which are opposed to *īmān* is love for those who resist God and His Messenger; another is to seek exemption from *jihād*. God has also made it clear that the only ones who seek exemption from *jihād* are those who do not believe in Him and the Last Day. The words, “God knows those who fear Him,” (9:44), further indicate that those who fear Him are those who are the Believers. You may put in the same category the following *aḥādīth* of the Prophet: “One does not commit adultery when one is a believer (*mu'min*).”⁴³⁵ “One does not have faith if his neighbors are not secure from his transgressions.”⁴³⁶ “You will not have faith unless you love each other.”⁴³⁷ “None of you will have faith unless I am dearer to him than his children, his parents and all the human beings.”⁴³⁸ “None of you will have faith unless you love for your brother the same good that you love for yourselves,”⁴³⁹ and, “He who cheats us is not of us; and he who takes up the sword against us is not of us.”⁴⁴⁰

[*Fatāwā* 7:13-5, 160-1]

(8.4) *Īmān* of the heart is not simply *taṣdīq*, belief and confession.

Īmān differs from taṣdīq in word as well as meaning; even īmān of the heart is not the same as taṣdīq except when it is accompanied by love and obedience.

Īmān of the heart does not simply means *taṣdīq*, belief or confession which is not accompanied by the action of the heart and its causes, such as love of God and His Messenger. Again, it is not *īmān* if it is simply an idea or a wish; it has to be a commitment of the heart as well as action of the heart (*‘amal al-qalb*).

Īmān is not a synonym of *taṣdīq*, as some people think. *Taṣdīq* is used in the context of every kind of statement. If you say something which is very well known such as, “one is half of two,” or “the sky is above the earth,” we would say *ṣadaqta* - ‘you are right’, and *ṣaddaqnā bi dhālika* – ‘we confirm it’. But we would not say *āmannā laka* – ‘we believe you’, or *āmannā bi hādhā*, ‘we believe in it’. We say these words only when the thing which is asserted is not seen. Only then we say *āmannā laka* or *āmannā bihi* - ‘we believe him, or we believe in it. The brethren of Joseph said to their father: *‘mā anta bi mu’min lanā* (12:17), ‘you will not believe us,’ that is, you will not accept or confirm what we say (*muqirr lanā wa muṣaddiq lanā*). They said these words because they had told of something which happened in the absence of their father. There are many other examples, such as “Shall we believe in you (*a nu’minu laka*) when it is the meanest people who follow you” (26:111); “Shall we believe in (*a nu’min lī*) two men like ourselves, and their people are subject to us” (23:47); “If you believe me not (*lam tu’min lī*), at least keep yourselves away from me” (44:21); “But none believed in (*fa mā āmana lī*) Moses except some children of his people (10:83), that is, *aqarra lahu*, believed in him.

This is because *īmān* is different from *taṣdīq* in word as well as meaning. One may say, *ṣaddaqtuhu*, I testify that he is right, for *taṣdīq* is a transitive verb and has an object. But one would not say, **āmantuhu*, except when one wants to say, “I gave him shelter.” One would rather say, *āmantu lahu* – ‘I believe in him’. It is possible to say, *mā anta bi muṣaddiq lahu*, ‘you are not going to testify that it is true’; for when the object precedes its verb, or when we have a participle which is in principle weaker than the verb, the practice is to support it with a preposition. We say *arāftu hādhā*, but *anā bihi ‘ārif*, ‘I know it’. Or *ḍarabtu hādhā*, but *anā lahu ḍārib*, I beat him... Similarly, we say, *ṣaddaqtuhu* but *anā lahu muṣaddiq*, ‘I testify that he is true’. But we do not say, **ṣaddaqtu lahū or bihi*. The case of *āmāna*, on the other hand, is different. When we want to say, *ṣaddaqtuhu*, ‘I testify that he is true’, we cannot say, **āmantuhu*, though we can say *aqrartuhu*. However, just as we say *āmantu lahu*, we may say *aqrartu lahu*. This is one difference between *īmān* and *taṣdīq* from the point of view of language.

The other difference between them, as we have said earlier, is that the former is not used in the case of all kinds of statements, but only in the case of statements about things which are not in sight and about which one may entertain doubt. When, in a case like this, the listener approves of the statement we say, *āmāna*, he believes it. *Taṣdīq*, on the other hand, can be used in the case of every kind of statement.

This was with regard to the usage. As for meaning, *īmān* is derived from *amn*, which means peace and tranquility (*ṭamanīyyah*) and *iqrār* is derived from *qarra*, which conveys almost the same sense. The *ṣādiq*, i.e. one who speaks truth, feels peace of heart in speaking the truth, whereas the liar does not have that peace. That is why we have the saying, “Truthfulness is peace and lying is agony.” The *mu’min* enters into peace as the *muqirr* enters into tranquility (*qurr*). The word *iqrār* implies commitment,

and is of two kinds, one informative, which conveys the sense of confirmation, and *shahādah*, confession, or witnessing which you get in the works of *fiqh*, in the section on confession (*kitāb al-iqrār*) The second is declarative. We have in the Qur’ān, “Do you agree (*aqrartum*), and take this My covenant as binding on you? They said: We agree. He said: Then bear witness, and I am with you among the witnesses” (3:81). Here *iqrār* is not merely informative, for just before the words quoted above God has said, “Behold! God took the covenant of the prophets saying, If I give a Book and wisdom and then comes to you a messenger, confirming what is with you, you must believe in him and render him (all) help. Do you agree (*aqrartum*), and take this covenant as binding on you?” Hence *iqrār* here is a commitment to believe in the Messenger and help him.

Similarly, in *īmān* there is an element informative and another declarative which is not the case with simple *taṣḍīq*. if you make a statement to someone, it does not necessarily mean that he will confide in you. Nor is it necessary to say that he will believe (*āmana*) in you. But the case will be different when the statement implies confidence in you. At times your statement may win compliance with what you say, and at times only faith in its truth. When it wins compliance from the listener, he will not simply believe in what you say but also obey what you command, implying faith (*taṣḍīq*) and obedience (*tā’ah*) together. That is why *kufṛ*, which is the opposite of *īmān*, is also used for abstaining from compliance and obedience. It is clear that *īmān* should be taken like *iqrār* in the sense of commitment and compliance. A verse that underlines the action part of *kufṛ* is, “We said to the angels, ‘Bow down to Adam’, and they bowed down. Not so Iblīs; he refused and was haughty, He was of the *kāfirūn*, the defiant” (2:34).

[*Fatāwā* 7:529-31]

(8.5) The difference between *islām* and *īmān*

Islām is to surrender to God, submit to Him, worship Him and serve Him. It is a matter of action, action of the heart and the body. Īmān on the other hand, is to believe, confess, and acknowledge; it is a commitment of the heart involving the action of the heart.

The difference arises from the fact that *islām* is *dīn* submission. *Dīn* is the infinitive of the verb *dāna*, *yadīnu* which means to submit and surrender. The religion of Islam which God has ordained and promulgated through His prophets is to submit to Him alone. It is nothing but submission, worship and service to God and to Him alone. Hence if one serves Him and serves another god besides Him, he is not a Muslim; similarly one who does not serve Him, and refuses out of pride to serve Him, is not a Muslim. One becomes Muslim when one submits to God; hence *islām* is a matter of action, action of the heart and the body.

As for *īmān*, it is essentially *taṣdīq*, belief and confession, *iqrār*, consent and commitment, *maʿrifah*, knowledge and realization. It is a commitment of the heart, implying action of the heart. Its essence is *taṣdīq* and action follows from it. That is why the Prophet described *īmān* as faith of the heart (*īmān al-qalb*) and its submission, faith in God, in His angels, books and messengers. On the other hand, he described Islam in terms of submission and observance, observance of the five fundamentals. In the same way he has characterized *islām* and *īmān* at other occasions. For example, he has said “*Islām* is something visible, and *īmān* is in the heart.”⁴⁴¹ Actions are visible and we can see them; but belief, knowledge, love, fear, and hope are invisible. However, they do have their signs which demonstrate their presence; and since a sign cannot prove the existence of the thing it signifies unless it is a necessary consequence of the latter, it follows that the actions which a believer does are the necessary consequences of his faith.

In a *ḥadīth* reported by ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar and Abū Hurayrah the Prophet has said, “A *muslim* is one from whose tongue and hand other Muslims are safe, and a *mu’min* is one from whom people feel secure with regard to their life and property.”⁴⁴² This means that he has described *muslim* in terms of something which is visible, safety of the people, whereas he has described *mu’min* in terms of something invisible, the feeling of security with regard to life and property. Obviously, the latter epithet is more noble than the former, for the one who inspires in you a feeling of security, you will certainly not receive any harm from him. The converse is not true: if one does not do any harm to you, it does not mean that you should feel secure from him. He does not cause you any harm, but you may not feel secure from him, for it is possible that he has refrained from harming you in hope or fear of something, and not because he believes in his heart that he should not harm you.

Take another *ḥadīth*, which is reported by ‘Āmr Ibn ‘Absah. A man asked the Prophet, “What is Islam?” He said, “Feed people and to be soft in speech.” Then he asked, “What is *īmān*?” He said, “Magnanimity and patience.”⁴⁴³ Feeding is an external action which one does for various reasons; similarly, soft speech is an external action. Magnanimity and patience, on the other hand, are virtues which are hidden in the soul. God has also said, “They enjoin patience and they enjoin compassion to each other” (90:17). Obviously, magnanimity and patience are better than feeding people and speaking softly. [*Fatāwā* 7:263-41]

(8.6) *Īmān* increases and decreases

Eight reasons showing that īmān increases and decreases, and that men differ in their īmān.

Eight reasons can be cited to show that the *īmān* which God enjoins, as well as the *īmān* which the Believers have, increases

and decreases. First, the *īmān* which is enjoined may be *īmān* in principle and may be *īmān* in details. Whoever believes in God and His Messenger must submit in principle to whatever they command. Obviously, the duties of the people when the Qur'ān began to be revealed were not the same as when the revelation was completed. It is also clear that the things in which one has to believe when they are told to him by the Messenger are not same as those that are told by someone else. Similarly, when one knows the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and understands them fully he has to believe in things in greater detail than one who does not know them. Again, if a person has sincere faith in God and in His Messenger, but dies before he comes to know the details of the Shari'ah, he will die in the faith which is incumbent on him. Obviously, what he is obliged to believe or what he actually believes cannot be like the faith of one who knows the details of the Shari'ah, believes in them and acts upon them. The faith of the latter will be more perfect, both in the sense of what he should believe and in the sense of what he does believe...

Second, the distinction between faith in principle and faith in detail is also applicable to what people actually believe in. One may in principle believe in whatever the Messenger says and never deny anything, but not care to know in detail what he says, enjoins or forbids, though knowledge of these things is a duty; he does not acquire that knowledge, or act upon it; rather he pursues whatever he likes. Another tries to know what the Messenger has commanded and act upon it; and a third tries to know it, and comes to know it and believe in it, but does not act upon it. All of them are one with respect to their duty to know the teachings of the Messenger, but one who acquires knowledge in detail and acts upon it, has faith more perfect than one who knows what his duties are, believes in them and commits himself to them, but fails to act upon them all. The one who believes in the teachings of the Messenger but commits sins and admits them, and fears punishment from God, is better than the one who does not try to

learn his teachings or act upon them, nor fears punishment for his sins. He is, in fact, ignorant of the Messenger's teachings, even though in his heart he believes in his prophethood and confesses it openly.

When one knows what the Messenger has said and believes in it, and knows what he has commanded and acts upon it, it adds to his faith what he did not have before, even though he had the faith and the confession in principle. Similarly, one who knows the names of God and what they mean, and believes in them, has faith more perfect than that of one who does not know them in detail and only knows them in outline or knows only a few of them. The better one knows God's names, attributes, and signs the more perfect shall be his faith.

Third, knowledge and faith may themselves vary in strength. Some of them may be stronger, more established, and freer from doubt than others. This is something which everyone experiences within himself. Everyone sees the moon, but one sees it more clearly than another. The same is the case with regard to hearing, smelling, and tasting, as well as knowing and believing, which one experiences in the heart. They also vary much more than sensuous things in various aspects. People differ more widely in their understanding of God's names and His words than they do with regard to any other thing.

Fourth, the faith that moves the heart into action is more perfect than the faith that does not, and the knowledge on which one acts is more perfect than the knowledge on which one does not act. Of two men, the one who believes in God, His Messenger, Paradise and Hell, and whose faith produces in him love for God and fear for Him, or longing for Paradise and aversion for Hell - his faith will be stronger than the faith of the one who does not have these things: the stronger the effect, the stronger the cause which produced it. All these things are the products of knowledge. When you know that something is lovely, you try to have it; when you know it is dangerous, you flee from it. But, if the effect is not

forthcoming, it only means that the cause was weak. That is the reason why the Prophet said, “A hearer is not like a seer.”

Fifth, the above-mentioned things also vary according to the factors that cause them. For example, the faith which is produced by arguments that generate conviction and dispel doubt is different from the faith which is produced by arguments that do not generate conviction. If the arguments can produce necessary knowledge, the faith that they generate will be different from the faith which arguments can produce that are doubtful and need to be supported by further arguments and reflection. No one doubts that a thesis which has been established by a number of weighty arguments, and whose counter-thesis has been disproved and the arguments in its favor countered, is not like the thesis which is supported by only one argument and not defended against various objections. Obviously, the more numerous and weighty the arguments in favor of an idea and the fewer and weaker the arguments on the opposite, more sound and true is the idea....

Sixth, *īmān* also increases or decreases accordingly as the acts of the heart increase or decrease. Every Muslim knows from experience that people differ in their love for God and His Prophet, in their fear, trust and sincerity of devotion to Him, in the purity of their heart from self-conceit, pride and pretensions, in the love and sympathy they have for others, and many other similar virtues. Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have recorded that the Prophet said, “One who has three things in him gets the joy of faith: that he loves God and the Prophet more than anyone else, that he loves none except for the sake of God, and that he hates to return to unfaith after God has taken him out of it as much as he hates to be thrown into fire.”⁴⁴⁴ God has said, “Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your spouses, or your kindred, or the wealth that you have acquired or the commerce in which you fear decline, or the dwellings in which you delight are dearer to you than God or His Messenger, or the striving in His cause, then wait until God brings about His decision; and God guides not the

rebellious” (9:24). And the Prophet has said, “By God, fear God more than any one of you, and know more than any one of you the limits that He has set (in everything).”⁴⁴⁵ Once he said, “You will not have true faith unless I am dearer to you than your children and your parents, and the rest of mankind.” Hearing this ‘Umar said, “Prophet of God, you are indeed dearer to me than anything except myself,” whereupon the Prophet said, “No, ‘Umar, not until I am dearer to you than your own self.” ‘Umar then said, “Now, yes, you are dearer to me than my own self.” The Prophet then said, “Now, ‘Umar (you have the true faith).”⁴⁴⁶

All these *aḥādīth* are in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections, and there are many more besides. They speak of differences in love and fear which people feel. In the Qur’ān we have, “Those who have faith are overflowing in their love for God” (2:165). This is something everyone can feel in himself, for it happens that one loves a thing more at one time than at another, or fears a thing more on one occasion than on another. That is why people who know God most have said that faith and love increase and decrease; they experience it in themselves. The following verse also testifies to it: “People said to them (the Muslims): ‘A great army is gathering against you, so you should fear them.’ But it (only) increased their faith; and they said: ‘For us God is sufficient, and He is the best disposer of affairs’” (3:170). In other words, the alarming news did not cause panic in them; on the contrary, it only increased their faith. This fact is also supported by many *aḥādīth* of the Prophet, such as, “Those Believers are most perfect in their faith who are most virtuous.”⁴⁴⁷

Seventh, those who remember God and mind His commands, and never forget them, are more perfect in faith than those who believe in them yet often forget them. Forgetfulness does not go along with perfect knowledge and conviction. That is why a companion of the Prophet, ‘Āmr Ibn Ḥabīb,⁴⁴⁸ said, “When we remember God, praise Him or glorify Him, our faith increases; but when we do not remember Him, or forget Him, or lose sight of His

commands our faith decreases.” This is true. Mu‘ādh Ibn Jabal⁴⁴⁹ used to say to his friends, “Let us sit together for a while and strengthen our faith (*nu’min*).” In the Qur’ān we have, “Do not obey one whose heart We have rendered neglectful of Our remembrance, one who follows his own desires” (18:28); “Teach the message; for teaching benefits the Believers” (51:55); and, “The admonition will be received by those who fear God, but it will be avoided by those most unfortunate ones” (87:10-11). Whenever you recall what you knew before and act upon it, you realize something new which you did not realize before and understand God’s name and signs better than before. There is also a tradition that supports this: “Whoever acts upon what he knows, God bestows upon him the knowledge of what he does not know.” This truth every Believer can experience within himself....

Eighth, people sometimes deny or reject things when they do not know whether the Prophet has said or commanded it. Had they known it they would not have denied or rejected it. In their heart of hearts they know that the Prophet does not say anything but what is true and does not command anything but what is right. But after they have heard a verse or a *ḥadīth* and understood its meaning by reflecting upon it, or after someone has explained it to them, or by some other means, they come to believe what they had previously denied or accept what they had first rejected. This is a new acknowledgment (*taṣdīq*) and a new commitment (*īmān*) which strengthens their faith obviously, they were not disbelievers before; they were only ignorant.^{450a}

[*Fatāwā* 7:232-237, 562-568]

(8.7) *Kufr, shirk, fisq and zulm*

Kufr is of two kinds: one on account of which a person goes out of the millah of Islam; the other on account of which he does not. The same is true of shirk, fisq and zulm.

There is the essence of *īmān* and there are its consequences. *Kufr* is opposed to *īmān* in both respects. The essence of *īmān* is belief (*taṣdīq*) and confession (*iqrār*), and the actions of the heart or the body are its consequences. The opposite of *iqrār* and *taṣdīq* which is the essence of *īmān* is the rejection (*kufṛ*) of God and what He has said, and the refusal to believe (*taṣdīq*) in Him and in His words. The opposite of *īmān* which is action and not confession is the *kufṛ* on account of which one does not go out of the *millah*, but a *kufṛ* which renders the actions worthless...

Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā Ibn Rāfi‘ narrates from ‘Abdur-Razzāq, from Ma‘mar, from Ibn Ṭawūs, and he from his father that when Ibn ‘Abbās was asked about the words “Those who fail to judge in terms of what God has revealed are unbelievers (*kāfirūn*)” (5:44), he said that they were guilty of *kufṛ* on that account. Ibn Ṭawūs adds that this does not mean that they are like those who deny God, His angels, His books and His messengers.... In a different version of the tradition which Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā has narrated from ‘Abdur-Razzāq, from Sufyān, from a man and finally from Ṭawūs, we have it that Ibn ‘Abbās said, “He is guilty of *kufṛ* but not in the sense that he goes out of the *millah*.⁴⁵⁰ Ibn Ishāq has said that Wakī‘ narrated from Sufyān, from Ibn Jurayj that ‘Aṭā’⁴⁵¹ said that he was guilty of a lesser *kufṛ*, a lesser *ẓulm* and a lesser *fiṣq*.

Muḥammad Ibn Naṣr⁴⁵² says that what ‘Aṭā’ has said is right; people do sometimes call an unbeliever (*kāfir*) *ẓālim*, wrongdoer, just as they call a sinning Muslim *ẓālim*. There are different kinds of *ẓulm*, wrong acts. The perpetrator of one *ẓulm* may cease to be a Muslim, but the perpetrator of another *ẓulm* may not. On one occasion God has said, “It is those who believe and confuse not their belief with *ẓulm*...” (6:82); on another occasion He has said, “Verily, associating someone with God is a great *ẓulm*” (31:13). A *ḥadīth* which is reported by Ibn Mas‘ūd says that when the words, “those who believe and confuse not their belief with *ẓulm*” (6:82) were revealed, the Companions of the Prophet were perturbed and

said to him, “Who of us is there who has not done any *ẓulm* (wrong)!” The Prophet said, “This is not what is meant here. Have you not heard the words of a pious man (quoted in the Qur’ān): ‘Verily *shirk* is a great *ẓulm*’ (31:13). *Ẓulm* here means *shirk*.”⁴⁵³ Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā narrates from Ḥajjāj Ibn Al-Minhal, from Ḥammād Ibn Salamah, from ‘Alī Ibn Zayd, from Yūsuf Ibn Mahrān that Ibn ‘Abbās said that whenever ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb entered his house, he would open the *muṣḥaf* and read a few verses from it. One day when he entered his house and began reading he came to the verse “those who believe confuse not their faith with any *ẓulm*...” (6:82). He put on his shoes, flung his sheet on his shoulders, and went to Ubayy Ibn Ka‘b and said, “‘Abā Al-Mundhir, have you read the verse, ‘Those who believe and confuse not their faith with any *ẓulm*’? Don’t we commit *ẓulm* (wrong) and many other things?” Ubayy said, “‘Amīr al-Mu’minīn, this is not what is meant here. God has said, ‘Verily *shirk* is a great *ẓulm*’ (31:13), and this is what *ẓulm* here means.”⁴⁵⁴

Muḥammad Ibn Naṣr says that *fisq* likewise is of two kinds: one on account of which one goes out of the *millah*, and the other on account of which one does not. A *kāfir* maybe called *fāsiq*, just as a Muslim may be called *fāsiq*. God has said of Iblīs that “he defied (*fasaqa ‘an*) the command of his Lord” (18:50). This defiance was *kufr* on his part, as God has said elsewhere: “And those who defy and do wrong (*fasaqū*), their abode will be in the Fire” (32:20). Obviously He is referring here to the unbelievers, for following these words He says, “Every time they wish to get away from there they will be forced into it, and they will be told, ‘Taste you the penalty of the Fire which you were wont to reject as false’” (32:20). God has also called the defiant among the Muslims *fāsiqūn*, but He has not excommunicated them. For example, “And those who launch a charge against chaste women and do not produce four witnesses (to support their allegations), flog them with eighty stripes, and reject their evidence ever after, for such

men are *fāsiqūn*” (24:4); or, “If anyone undertakes to perform *ḥajj* during these (months) let there be no obscenity, nor wickedness (*fusūq*), nor wrangling in the *ḥajj*” (2:197). Scholars have said that *fusūq* here means sin (*ma ‘ṣīyah*).

Now, if *ẓulm* is of two kinds, and *fisq* is of two kinds, *kufr* is also of two kinds. On account of one *kufr*, one goes out of the *millah*; on account of the other one does not. Similarly *shirk* is of two kinds: one is to associate someone with God and violate His unity, on account of which one goes out of the *millah*. The other *shirk* is *riyā’*, dissimulation. God has said, “Whoever expects to meet his Lord, let him work righteousness, and admit no one as partner in the worship of his Lord” (18:110). In other words, he should not work righteousness to please someone else. It is this kind of *shirk* in action which is what is meant in the *ḥadīth*, “Augury is *shirk*.”⁴⁵⁵

[*Fatāwā* 7:324-29]

(8.8) *Nifāq*

Nifāq, hypocrisy, is of two kinds. One is to belie the Prophet, reject any part of his teachings, hate him, refuse to follow him, rejoice at the reverses of his religion, or grieve over its victories, and so on. This is the major hypocrisy. Minor hypocrisy, on the other hand, is hypocrisy in various actions, for example, lying when one speaks, breaking the promise one makes, violating the trust one should keep, and abusing the person one quarrels with, as is mentioned in the aḥādīth.

Some forms of hypocrisy are very grave, and their perpetrators will be cast into the lowest depths of Hell. The hypocrisy of ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubayy and his colleagues belong to this category. They belied the Prophet, rejected some of his teachings, hated him, denied that he had to be followed, rejoiced when he met reverses, and felt sad when he had victories, and so on - things which you

can only expect from an enemy of God and His Prophet. This kind of hypocrisy was present at the time of the Prophet and continued after him; in fact, it increased and multiplied. Even though factors promoting faith were quite strong in his time, this kind of hypocrisy was also there. After him, it naturally increased and became stronger.

The Prophet knew only some of the hypocrites and not all. God has said, "Certain of the desert Arabs round about you are hypocrites, as well as among the people of Madinah. They are obstinate in hypocrisy. You know them not; We know them" (9:101). Similarly, the caliphs who succeeded him and followed in his footsteps knew some of them and did not know others. Many of those who are called Muslims are hypocrites; they are found in all sections of the population, the elite as well as the laity. They are called *zindīqs*, heretics who are engage in undermining Islam. Scholars differ as to whether or not their repentance - if at all they repent - should be accepted, since it is difficult to ascertain if they are sincere, for they never cease to profess Islam.

They are found mostly among the philosophers, astronomers and physicians, in that order, and least among the scribes. They are also found among the so-called *Şūfīs* and jurists (*fuqahā'*) as well as men of arms, rulers and common folk. However, the majority of them come from the various heretical sects, particularly the *Rāfiḍah*, who have among them more *zindīqs* and hypocrites than any other sect. This is why you see that the *Khurramīyyah*,⁴⁵⁶ the *Bāṭinīyyah*, the *Karmathians*, *Ismā'ilīs*, *Nuṣayrīs*, and other, similar hypocritical *zindīqs* are *Rāfiḍah*.

Many of these hypocrites in our days love the rule of the Tatars since they do not ask them to follow the *Sharī'ah* of Islam, and allow them to do whatever they like. Others, however, dislike them because they mismanage their affairs, confiscate their properties, shed blood, and take men and women as slaves on non-religious grounds. This is certainly a kind of major hypocrisy.

Minor hypocrisy, on the other hand, is a matter of common life, for example, lying, breaking promises, violating trusts and using abusive language in disputes. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have recorded that the Prophet said, “A hypocrite is known by three things: he lies when he speaks, breaks the promise he makes, and violates the trust which is reposed in him.” In another version of the *ḥadīth* we also have the words, “Even though he may offer *ṣalāh*, engage in fasting, and claim that he is a Muslim.”⁴⁵⁷ They have also recorded the *ḥadīth* which ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Āmr has reported. The Prophet said, “Whoever does four things is a perfect hypocrite, and whoever does any one of them is a hypocrite to that extent unless he gives it up: telling lies, breaking promises, violating pledges and using abusive language in disputes”⁴⁵⁸

In this category you may also count fleeing from *jihād*, which is one of the known traits of the hypocrites. The Prophet has said, “Whoever dies and has not joined a *jihād* campaign or wished to join it dies with a sort of hypocrisy.”⁴⁵⁹ Muslim has recorded this *ḥadīth*. The (ninth) *sūrah*, Barā’ah, was revealed about the hypocrites; it was also called Al-Fāḍiḥah as it exposed the evil traits and designs of the hypocrites. Ibn ‘Abbās says that it is called the Exposer (Al-Fāḍiḥah) because it went on exposing one kind of hypocrite after another until people began to think that none of them would be left unexposed. Al-Miqdad Ibn Aswad⁴⁶⁰ said that this is a *sūrah* of probing (*buḥūth*), since it probes into the hidden traits of the hypocrites. Qatādah⁴⁶¹ says that it is infuriating (*muthīrah*) because it arouses the enmity of the hypocrites.

Sūrat Barā’ah was revealed on the occasion of the final campaign of the Prophet to Tabūk in the ninth year of the Hijrah. Islam had become a dominant force by that time, so God decided to expose the hypocrites and state that they were cowards, that they backed away from *jihād*, that they did not spend anything in His cause and only loved to hoard their money like misers. They suffered from two major evils, cowardice and niggardliness. It has

also been authentically reported that the Prophet said, “The worst evil that one may suffer from is appalling niggardliness and shameless cowardice.”⁴⁶² That is why they may at times be counted as grave sins which will land you in the Fire. There is a suggestion to this effect in the verse, “Let not those who covetously withhold of the gifts which God has given them of His grace think that it is good for them. No, it will be the worse for them. Soon shall the things which they covetously withhold be tied to their necks like a twisted collar on the Day of Judgment” (3:180). And in the verse, “If any do turn his back to them on such a day - unless it be in a strategy of war or retreat to a troop (of his own) - he draws on himself the wrath of God, and his abode is Hell, an evil refuge (indeed)” (8:16).

As for their cowardice and fear, God has referred to it in these words, “They swear by God that they are indeed of you, but they are not of you; they are afraid” (9:56).... “When a *sūrah* of clear and categorical meaning is revealed, and fighting is mentioned therein, you will see those in whose heart is a disease looking at you with the look of one in a swoon at the approach of death; may they perish!” (47:20). And, “Those who believe in God and the Last Day ask you not for exemption from fighting with their goods and persons. And God knows well those who fear Him and do their duty. Only those ask you for exemption who believe not in God and the Last Day, and whose hearts are in doubt, so that they are tossed in their doubts to and fro” (7:45). This is a warning from God that a Believer should not ask for exemption from *jihād*, for only those who do not have faith ask for exemption. If this is the case, you may think of those who stay away from *jihād* without taking permission.

With regard to their niggardliness, God has said, “The only reasons their contributions are not accepted are that they reject God and His Messenger, that they come to prayer but have no interest in it, and that they offer contributions unwillingly” (9:54). This is the remark about those who contribute unwillingly; you may

imagine what God would say about those who refuse to contribute anything. Elsewhere He has said these frightening words, “You who believe! There are indeed many among the priests and the anchorites who in falsehood devour the substance of men and hinder (them) from the way of God. And there are those who bury gold and silver and spend it not in the way of God. Announce unto them a most grievous penalty” (9:4).

[*Fatāwā* 28:434-9]

PART IV

ISLAMIC LIFE

9. WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY

(9.1) The Human soul is created.

The Elders and the a'immaḥ of the ummah are agreed that the human soul is a created object. Those who say that it is something eternal include some Sabaean philosophers and a group of heretical Ṣūfīs, theologians, and traditionists. They argue from the verse, "Say the spirit (rūḥ) is a command of my Lord" (17:85), but their argument is incorrect.

The human soul is something created and originated. The Elders and the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah* are agreed on this truth. A number of scholars have written that there is complete consensus among the *a'immaḥ* on the point that the spirit is created. Of them mention may be made of Muḥammad Ibn Naṣr al-Marwazī,⁴⁶³ a renowned scholar, most knowledgeable on the consensus of the scholars and their disagreements, and Abū Muḥammad Ibn Qutaybah,⁴⁶⁴ another distinguished scholar. The latter says that people are agreed that God is the Creator of all the bodies and all the spirits. A third scholar, Abū Ishāq Ibn Shāqallā⁴⁶⁵ says that the spirit is one of those things which is created. Many other leading scholars and Ṣūfī masters (*mashā'ikh*) have written on this issue and refuted the view that the spirit is uncreated.

Ḥāfiẓ Abū 'Abdullah Ibn Mundah⁴⁶⁶ has written a voluminous book, *The Spirit and the Soul (Ar-Rūḥ wa an-Nafs)*, and quoted great many *aḥādīth* and traditions on the subject. Imām Muḥammad Ibn Naṣr Al-Marwazī and others before him, as well as Shaykh Abū Ya'qūb Al-Kharrāz,⁴⁶⁷ Shaykh Abū Ya'qūb An-Nahrjūrī,⁴⁶⁸ Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā⁴⁶⁹ and others have also written on the issue, and clearly stated that the soul is created...

Imām Aḥmad has said, “Al-Jahm claimed that he had a verse in the Qur’ān which said that the Qur’ān was created. When we asked about it he recited the verse, ‘Christ Jesus, the son of Mary, was (no more than) a Messenger of God, and His word, which He bestowed on Mary, and a Spirit (proceeding) from Him’ (4:171), and then said that everyone knew that Jesus was created. We said, ‘God has not blessed you with any understanding of the Qur’ān. Jesus has been described in terms which are not used for the Qur’ān. He is said to have been born, to have been a baby, a child, a boy, a man who eats and drinks, is subject to the command of God, will be rewarded or punished, and is descended from Noah and Abraham. We cannot use these terms for the Qur’ān as they are used for Jesus. Have you come across God using the words that He has used for Jesus? The verse, “Christ Jesus is nothing more than a Messenger of God, and His word which He bestowed on Mary” only mean that Jesus is like the word that He bestowed on Mary when He said, “Be.” Jesus came into being through the word “Be”; he is not the word “Be” itself. He came into being through “Be”, which is a word of God, and as such it is not created...”

“Shaykh Abū Sa‘īd Al-Kharrāz,⁴⁷⁰ a great Ṣūfī master and a contemporary of Junayd, stated in his writings that souls are created, and advanced many arguments. One of them is that if the soul had not been created it would not have acknowledged God’s Lordship. When God took the pledge from the souls while they resided in corn like bodies He said, “‘Am I not your Lord!’ they said ‘Yes, we do testify’” (7:172)... He has further said that had the souls not been created, the Christians would not have been condemned for worshiping Jesus, or for saying that he was the son of God, or that he was one with God. His third argument is that if the soul were uncreated, it would never enter the Fire. His final argument is that were it uncreated it would not be denied a vision of God, or concealed in a body, or subjected to the authority of the angel of death or called to account (on the Day of Judgment) and

punished, or asked to worship God, to fear Him and to look for His grace and mercy....

The people who believe in the eternity of the soul are of two kinds. One group, that consists of Sabaeans and philosophers, says that it is eternal and everlasting, yet it is not divine. They put it in the category of intelligences and the souls of the spheres. Of these, those who subscribe to any faith identify them with the angels. The other group, which consists of heretics from all sections of the Muslim *ummah*, Šūfīs, theologians and traditionists, consider it to be divine; they are worse than the former. For them a human being consists of two parts, one divine which is his soul, and another human which is his body - he is half divine, half human. Christians assert this of Jesus only, and we know that God has condemned them for that very reason and called them infidels. You can think of what He would say to those who assert it of every human being, including Pharaoh, Haman and Qarūn. All statements to the effect that man is a servant of God, that he is created by Him and is in His control, or that Allah is his Lord, Creator, Master, and God imply that his soul is created...

As for the verse, “*qul ar-rūḥ min amr rabbī*” (17:85), some people say that *rūḥ* here does not mean the human soul, rather it means the angel who has been referred to in the following verses: “The Day that the *rūḥ*, the spirit and the angels will stand forth in ranks” (78:38); and “The angels and the spirit (*ar-rūḥ*) ascend unto Him” (70:4; and, “Therein come down the angels and the spirit by God’s permission” (97:4). Others say that it refers to the human soul. Both views have been held by a number of scholars, but from neither does it follow that *rūḥ* is uncreated.

First, *amr* in the Qur’ān has been used sometimes as an infinitive and sometimes as an object in the sense of something commanded, as we have in verses such as, “God’s *amr* comes to pass, seek not then to hasten it” (16:1); and, “The *amr* of God is a decree determined” (33:38). What is true of *amr* is also true of other words such as *khalq* (creation), *qudrah* (power), *raḥmah*

(mercy), *kalimah* (word). When it is said that *rūḥ* is a kind of God's *amr*, or a part of God's *amr*, and so on, it is clear that it is a particular *amr* of God in the sense of a thing commanded, rather than in the sense of the infinitive, to command. Since *rūḥ* is something concrete, a being that comes and goes, enjoys and suffers, it cannot be *amr* in the sense of the infinitive. This is the view of the Elders, the *a'immah* and the great majority of the *ummah*....

Second, the word *min* sometimes refers to the class a thing belongs to or is made of, as when we say *min ḥadīd* 'of iron'. Sometimes it refers to a beginning, as when we say *kharajtū min Makkah*, 'I went out from Makkah'. Hence the words, "*qul ar-rūḥ min amr rabbī*" do not necessarily mean that *rūḥ* is a kind of *amr*, command. It may suggest the beginning of *amr*, that is, the source from which it proceeds or arises. This is what Imām Aḥmad meant when, reacting to Jahm's interpretation he said that the words *rūḥ min hū* mean that Jesus proceeded from God and was brought into being by Him. Uses of *min* in this sense are many in the Qur'ān. For example, "He has subjected to you, as from Him (*jamī 'an min hū*), all that is in the heavens and the earth" (45:13); "And you have no good thing but is from (*min*) God" (16:53; and, "Whatever good happens to you is from (*min*) God" (4:79). Now, if the things that God has subjected to human beings, or the good things that they have or happen to them are from (*min*) Him, yet they are not part of His Being, but only proceed from Him, there is no reason why one should interpret the words to mean that Christ is a divine being. To be sure, the words *rūḥ min hū* are much more emphatic than the words *rūḥ min amr rabbī*. When the former cannot bar us from asserting that the spirit (*rūḥ*) is created or compel us to say that it is part of God, the latter cannot do so all the more so. It cannot restrain us from asserting that *rūḥ* is created, nor can it constrain us to believe that it is part of God, even part of His *amr*. This is the answer (to Jahm) if *amr* is taken as an attribute of God.

However, the two reasons that we have mentioned are two separate answers, but they may be combined into one. We may say that the words *rūḥ min amr rabbī* may either refer to *al-ma'mūr bihi*, the object commanded, or to an attribute of God. If they refer to the former, then *rūḥ* will belong to the category of objects commanded and therefore created; but if they refer to the latter, then they should be interpreted on the lines of phrases like *rūḥ min hū* and *jamī 'an min hū*, and that it should be taken to mean 'proceeding from my Lord'. In fact, people go wrong when they say that *amr* is an eternal attribute of God, and that the human soul is a part of that attribute. But as we have explained above, the verse does not mean either.

[*Fatāwā* 4:216-30]

(9.2) Man is the doer of his acts.

The Elders believe that God is the Creator of each and every thing, that He has power over all, and that He creates human acts. Nevertheless, men are actors in the true sense and they have both will and power. The Mu'tazilah deny that God creates human actions. They thought they had to do that in order to maintain that human actions are their own actions. The Asha'irah, on the other hand, assert that all actions are God's actions, and ascribe only kasb, acquisition to man. But the way they expound the idea of kasb does not make it different from jabr, coercion. Both groups are wrong. Their mistakes arise from their failure to distinguish between jamī 'an min hū in the sense of maf'ūl, the thing done, and jamī 'an min hū as a verbal noun, action. Fi'l in the first sense is a creation of God; in the second it is done by man, and there is no contradiction in saying that God is the Creator of the jamī 'an min hū even though man is its doer.

The Elders believed, on the one hand, that God creates each and every thing, that He is the Lord and the Master of all, that what

He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen, that He has power over everything, and that has made man impatient, for example, so that he is fretful when evil touches him and niggardly when good reaches him. On the other hand, they believed that man is an actor in the real sense, that he has will and power. God has said, “(This is) for whoever among you wills to go straight. But you shall not will except as God wills, the Lord of the Worlds” (81:28-9); “This is an admonition. Whosoever will, let him take a straight path to his Lord. But you will not, except as God wills” (76:29-30); and, “No, this surely is an admonition. Let any who will keep it in remembrance. But none will keep it in remembrance except as God wills. He is the Lord of righteousness, and the Lord of forgiveness” (74:54-6).

This is the place where many people who delve into the issue of *qadr* stumble. The Mu‘tazilah, for example, and those who deny *qadr* say that since faithlessness, transgression and disobedience are evil acts, and God is far from doing evil, as every Muslims knows, these acts cannot be attributed to God. Their opponents, who incline towards coercionism, say that they are God’s acts, that they are not human acts, but humans only acquire them. They say that men do not have power to produce anything whatsoever, or any of its attributes; what really happens is that God creates things when human beings exercise their power. In other words, actions are God’s creation (*khalq*) originated and brought into being by Him, and to man belongs nothing but their acquisition (*kasb*) since they happen at the time he exercises his power. Man can neither cause nor produce his actions. Notwithstanding this, these people claim that they do not believe in pure determinism, since they attribute, they say, a kind of power to man, a contingent power, whereas absolute determinists deny every power to him.

They make the distinction between *kasb* and *khalq* in this way: *kasb* means the happening of an object with the exercise of a contingent power, whereas *khalq* means bringing an object into being by eternal power. They also offer another definition; they

say that *kasb* is an act which exists in the subject that has power over it, whereas *khalq* is an act which exists outside the subject that has power over it.

People have raised objections to this definition. They have said that one cannot differentiate in this definition between the statement, “X acquires A” and the statement “X does, or brings into being, or causes, or makes, or performs A.” The doing of A or bringing it into being, causing, making, or performing all happens with the power which is contingent and exists in X, which is the locus of power. Moreover, the distinction is meaningless, for whether A exists in X or outside X makes no difference in the effectiveness of X’s power... Again, if the power to effect A is defined in terms of A happening with the exercise of that power, it makes no difference whether A exists in X, the locus of the power, or outside X.

The opponents of this view also point out that it is part of common knowledge that one who does justice is just, and one who does injustice is unjust, and one who speaks lies is a liar. But if men do not lie, do justice or injustice, rather it is God who does all this, He will be qualified with these acts; it is He who will be lying, doing justice or injustice... They have also pointed out that the Qur’ān is full of statements that attribute these acts to men. For example, “They will dwell there as a recompense for what they had been doing” (46:14); or, “Do what you will” (41:40); or, “Say: Work; soon will God observe your work” (9:105); “Verily those who believe and do good deeds” (10:9, 11:11, etc.), and so on. They have further said that both reason and revelation hold that men are responsible for their deeds and that they are to be praised or blamed and rewarded or punished for their deeds. But if their acts are not their acts, but those of some other being, then that being should be praised or blamed.

Many more things can be said against this view, but we will not go into them here. We would rather draw the attention of our readers to some other aspects of the issue which are more

important. When we say A is the *jamī ‘an min hū* of X this statement is ambiguous; for *jamī ‘an min hū* may sometimes mean the action itself, and sometimes the thing which is done. If the *fi ‘l* refers to an action such as *ṣalāh* or fasting, then both senses of the *fi ‘l* are one and the same; action is one with the thing done... But when the *fi ‘l* refers to the result of an action, such as wearing clothing or building a house, then the *fi ‘l* in the sense of action is other than in the sense of the thing done. In the Qur’ān we, have, “They worked (*ya ‘malūn*) for him, as he desired, arches, images, basins as large as cauldrons fixed (in their place)” (34:13). These things have been called works done by the jinns. In the same sense, ‘*amal* has been used in the verse, “But God has created you and what you do (*mā ta ‘malūn*)(37:96). The words *mā ta ‘malūn* according to the best interpretation of the phrase available, means the idols (*aṣṇām*) which people carve, since it is part of a speech which runs as, “Do you worship that which you have (yourselves) carved? But God has created you and what you do (*mā ta ‘malūn*) (37:95-6)”...

What we want to say is that words like *fi ‘l*, ‘*amal*, and *ṣan‘* (make) belong to a category which, like the words *bina* (build), *khiyāṭah* (tailor), *najjārah* (carve) are used for the act as well as the thing done. similarly the words *tilāwah* (recite), *qirā‘ah* (read), *kalām* (speak), *qawl* (say) are used for the act as well as the result of the act.

What I want to say is that when we describe these things as the acts of God or the acts of a human being, and mean by it that they are the actions of God, taking *fi ‘l* as a verbal noun it is wrong. This is the faith of every Muslim, as it is also the verdict of human reason. But if we mean that they are the result of God’s action, that they have been produced and created by God like all other things, it is right.

This distinction, however, would not be acceptable to those who say that God has no actions which exist by Him. These people

do not make the distinction between an action of God and a thing which is the result of His action, between His creative act and the thing created. However, the majority of Muslims do make that distinction and say that these things are created by God, that they are only the result of His actions not His actions themselves. As for men, they are their actions existing by them as well as the result of their actions. Those who do not distinguish between God's action and the result of His action call these things acts of God. Since God's act means only one thing for them, they are not prepared to say that these things are human acts or their results. Some of these people have said that these things are the act (*fi'l*) of God as well as of man. In other words, they assert two actors for one and the same act. The Mu'tazilah agree with these people in saying that God's *fi'l* can only be taken in the sense of the thing done even though they do not fail to distinguish between an act and the object of an act in the human context. This is the reason why these people as well as the Mu'tazilah find it difficult to solve the problem of *qadr*, and fail to see the light.

Those who believe that God's creation (*khalq*) of things is not same as the thing created (*makhlūq*) say that human actions are also created by God like all other created things and that they are the result of His action just as all created things are the result of His action. They do not say that human actions are God's action or creation. They only call them the actions of a human being, which removes any confusion that may arise. Lying, injustice, and other evils are evil acts, and their doers are those who do them. They are done by men and exist by them. They are not to be predicated of the One Who creates but of those who do them, just as the taste, color, smell, form, measure, or movement which God creates in things are not to be predicated of Him. If He is not said to have the color of a man which He creates, or the bad smell which He creates, or the sour taste, or the ugly figure which He creates, He cannot be said to be doing these evil acts or to be qualified with these evil traits if He creates them in some beings. Evil in this

context means what is harmful for its doer, what may expose' him to blame and punishment, or subject him to pain and suffering. The person who suffers these things is only the one who does them, and not the one who creates them in him.

[*Fatāwā* 8:117-231]

(9.3) Man's power to act.

Man's ability to act is of two kinds. One precedes the action and can be used to produce the action as well as its opposite; the other co-exists with the action and produces it alone. The first is ability in the legal sense, since it provides the basis for the obligations of the shar', its commands and prohibitions, as well as the reward and punishment for doing them. The second is ability in the effective sense, since it is power which produces the action. It is this ability which is related to the issue of fore-ordainment (qaḍā wa qadr). The former alone is not enough to produce the action, and, contrary to the belief of the Qadariyyah, it does not remove man's dependence on God in his actions; human will is dependent on the will of God.

Scholars of our school as well as those of other schools have discussed the issue whether man's ability, to act precedes the act or accompanies it. They have made it an issue of "either-or." Some say that man's power co-exists with the action; this is mostly the view of those who affirm fore-ordainment, such as the theologians of the Ash'arī school, and our own friends who agree with them on the issue. Others say that man's power precedes the action; this is the view of the Mu'tazilah and the Shi'ah, who deny fore-ordainment. The former group believes that human power is for doing one thing only which it accompanies; it does not exist separately from its object. The latter believe that power can be used for doing an act as well as its opposite, and that it does not have to co-exist with the act. These negators of fore-ordainment

are far from the truth since they deny the co-existence of power and the act. For them the cause has to precede the effect and not co-exist with it; this is true, they hold, of power, will and command.

The correct view is that which is stated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, that power precedes the action as well as co-exists with it. One may cause an action as well as its opposite, while the other can only produce an action, but not its opposite. Power, therefore, is of two kinds: one preceding an action, and meant for an action as well as its opposite; the other existing only with the action. The former provides the grounds for the action and makes it possible, the latter produces the action and brings it into being. The first is referred in many verses of the Qur'ān. For example, "Pilgrimage to the House (of God) is a duty one owes to God who can afford the journey" (3:77). Obviously, if this ability could only co-exist with the act, pilgrimage would not be a duty except for the one who actually does it, and nobody would sin by not doing it. Nor would it be a duty on anyone before one wears *iḥrām*, but rather before one completes the pilgrimage. Another verse says, "Fear God and obey Him as much as you can" (64:16). This means that we are commanded to obey God according to our ability. If ability only co-existed with the act, nobody would be asked to do except what he actually does, for this is what his ability co-exists with. The Prophet has said, "When I ask you to do something do as much as you can."⁴⁷¹ If ability could only co-exist with the act, the *ḥadīth* would have meant, 'Do just what you do,' for people would not have been asked to do except what they actually did... The verses which refer to the power that co-exists with the act are also many. For example, "They could not listen, nor could they see" (11:20); "(The nonbelievers) whose eyes have been under a veil from remembrance of Me, and who had been unable to hear..." (18:10). The ability which is referred to in these verses is the ability that co-exists with the act and produces it, whereas the one mentioned in earlier verses forms the basis of obligation.

The first ability is legal (*shar‘īyyah*) for it is the basis of all obligations, commands and prohibitions, as well as rewards and punishments for doing them. This is the ability with which jurists are concerned, and this is what we usually mean when we talk about it. The second ability is existential (*kawnīyyah*); it is the power which produces the act, and it is the power which is related to the issue of fore-ordainment. The first is pre-requisite for the words of God that are prescriptive and legislative, the second is pre-requisite for the words that are creative and existential. Both have been mentioned in the verse, “She testified to the words of her Lord, and (obeyed) His Books” (66:12).

People have differed on the question whether man has power to do what is in opposition to God’s knowledge and will. The answer is that man can have that power in the first sense of the term, namely legal capability which precedes the action. In that sense God, too, has the power to do what is opposed to His knowledge and will; otherwise He could not be said to have power over what He does. But man does not have that power in the sense in which it co-exists with the act, for he can only have it in the case of acts which God decrees and wills to happen, since what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen. It is this power which is referred to in the words of the disciples of Jesus: “Can your Lord send down to us a table set (with viands) from heaven?” (5:115), and in the thought of Jonah mentioned in the verse, “He thought that We would not have power over him” (21:87). We often refer to this kind of power when we say, “Can you do this?” meaning, “Would you do this?” This is quite common in language.

Since the Qadarīyyah believe that power in the first sense is sufficient to bring about an act, and that man can enforce his will, they make man independent of God’s will in producing the act. On the opposite side, the determinists (Jabrīyyah) think that it is power in the second sense which produces the act and that it comes from a source other than man; they, therefore, believe that man is

compelled to do what he does. Both groups are wrong. Man has a will, but it is subject to the will of God. This fact has been stated at many places in the Qur'ān. For example, "Let any who will, keep it in remembrance! But none will keep it in remembrance except as God wills" (74:556); "Whoever will, let him take a (straight) path to his Lord. But you will not, except as God wills" (76:29-30); "(It is) for whoever among you who wills to go straight. But you shall not will except as God wills, the Lord of the Worlds" (81:28-9).

Now, as these verses state, God has given man the power to will, choose and decide. You cannot say that he is coerced and compelled though he has been given the power to will, nor can you say that it is man who has given himself a will. It is unthinkable to say that he is compelled to choose, or that he is coerced to will, for this is not what is meant by coercion. Moreover, this power to will and choose can only be given to man by God.

The Qadarīyyah and the Jabrīyyah stand at opposite poles. Both are right in what they affirm, but wrong in what they deny. Abū Al-Ḥusayn Al-Baṣrī⁴⁷² and other Qadarīyyah say that the knowledge that man is the doer of his acts and the producer of his movements is a necessary piece of knowledge, and that its denial is mere sophistry. Ibn Al-Khatīb⁴⁷³ and other Jabrīyyah say that the knowledge that in order to do something rather than not to do it one needs something other than oneself is a necessary piece of knowledge; for it is not possible to choose one of two equally possible alternatives without any reason. Both these statements are correct, and it is not true that one contradicts the other. It is true that man produces his acts and performs them, that the production of an act needs a producer, and therefore man is the doer, the performer and the producer. Again, the fact that he comes to be a doer, performer and producer after he was not any one of these requires someone to make him so. Now think over the verse that I cited earlier: "(It is) for whoever among you who wills to go straight," that is, one who wills to go, straight will go straight. But

then it says, “But you shall not will except as God wills, the Lord of the Worlds” (81:28-9).

Hence, what is necessarily known and what is established by arguments from tradition as well as reason are all true. That is why we say there is no power and no strength except in God. Man really depends on God for all his things, his essence, his attributes and his acts, though he does have an essence and does have his attributes and does perform his acts. To deny his acts is like denying his attributes or denying his essence which is nothing short of denying a self-evident truth. It would be committing an excess like the one that some Ṣūfīs commit when they identify man with God. In the same way, to say that man is completely independent of God in any of his things, or to say that he can produce it without Him, is to claim something false and untrue, no less reprehensible than the claim of the one who said, “I am your Lord, Most High” (79:24), and claimed that it was he who created himself. The truth in this matter is with the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah.

[*Fatāwā* 8:371-6]

(9.4) Human will and Divine will.

The verse, “Verily this is no less than a message to all the worlds, (with profit) to whosoever among you wills to go straight. But you shall not will except as God wills, the Lord of the Worlds” (81:27-9) refutes the views of both groups, the compulsionists and the free-willers. Whereas, on the one hand, it affirms the will of man, on the other, it subjects it to the will of God. To say that the efficacy of human will is conditioned upon God’s will is not to negate human will altogether; it is only to negate its self-sufficiency.

The words, “but you shall not will (*tashāwūna*) except as God wills (*yashā’*)” do not mean that man is not the doer of the acts he

chooses to do, or that he does not have power over them, or even that he does not will (*yurīdu*) them. They only mean that he does not will them unless God wills them. This refutes the views of both groups, the determinist Jahmīyyah and the self-willer Mu‘tazilah. The verse begins with the words, “whosoever among you wills,” which means that God ascribes will and action to man. He then goes on to say, “But you shall not will except as God wills”; this is only to make man’s will dependent on the will of God. The first part of the verse refutes the determinists, and the second part refutes the self-willers who say that at times man wills what God does not will, just as God wills what man does not will.

They may say that the *mashī’ah*, will (of God) in the verse only means His *amr*, command, in other words, what the verse means is that you will not will to do what God commands if He does not command it. But the context of the verse does not permit this interpretation. It rather means that you will not do what God has asked you to do except as God wills it, for first God has mentioned commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments, and then He has said it is a reminder, so whoever wants let him take the right path to his Lord. Finally, He has added, “and you shall not will except as God wills.” The words “and you shall not will (*wa mā tashāwun*)” negate their will in the future; similarly, the words except as God wills (*illā an yashā’ Allah*) only make their will conditional upon God’s will in the future, for the particle *an* fixes the imperfect verb in the sense of future. Hence, the meaning of this part of the verb is: except if God wills it after that, that is, after man has willed it. It is like our saying, “We will not do it except if God wills it.”

The Elders and the *fuqahā’* are agreed that, if anyone says that he will offer *ṣalāh* tomorrow if God wills, or that he will pay off his debt tomorrow if God wills, and tomorrow passes but he does not offer *ṣalāh*, or pay off the debt, he will not be guilty of breaking his oath. If *mashī’ah* meant *amr* he would certainly be guilty of breaking his oath, for God has commanded him to offer

ṣalāh and to fulfill his oath. We can refute the Qadarīyyah in this way and they will not be able to counter it. That is why to get out of this impasse some of them have violated the consensus and said that the man who has sworn conditionally will be guilty of breaking his oath if he does not fulfill it.

Again, the words, “You shall not will except as God wills” are mentioned here in order to glorify God and remind us of His supreme might, as well as to underline the fact that we are dependent on Him. So had the words meant that you will not do except as God commands you, this would be true of everything that He has commanded. There would then be no praise in these words for God; on the contrary, there would be praise for men, for it would be saying that they will not do except as He commands them to do.

[*Fatāwā* 8:488-9]

(9.5) Fore-ordainment does not negate human responsibility.

If fore-ordainment is an argument for anyone, it is argument for all. But this would mean that no one should blame anyone for doing him any wrong, abusing him, taking his property, offending his family, or trying to kill him. But everyone does object to these acts and condemns their perpetrators. Certainly this would be contradicting and falsifying oneself.

When God wills anything He also wills its causes. If He ordains a person for Paradise, He also ordains that he has faith, does good deeds, and goes to Paradise on that account. Similarly, if He ordains another for Hell He ordains that he denies Him and commits evil, and enters Hell on that ground. Hence fore-ordainment does not mean that one should give up deeds.

Ibn Taymīyyah was asked about people who argue from fore-ordainment and say that everything has already been decided, that

the unhappy shall be unhappy and the happy shall be happy. Referring to the verse, “Those for whom the good (record) from Us has gone before, will be removed far from it” (21:101), they say that God has fore-ordained good and evil, that we will, for example, commit adultery, and that we have, therefore, no power over our acts, that all power rests in God, and we just accomplish what is destined for us...

To this Ibn Taymīyyah replied as follows: All praise is for God, the Lord of the Worlds. People who insist on this belief are greater infidels than the Jews and the Christians, for the Jews and the Christians do believe in God’s injunctions, His commands and prohibitions, as well as His rewards and punishments. They have only altered some parts of the revelation and rejected others, as God has said, “Those who deny God and His messengers, and (those who) wish to separate God from His messengers, saying, ‘We believe in some but reject others;’ and (those who) wish to take a course midway, are in truth (equally) unbelievers; and we have prepared for unbelievers a humiliating punishment” (4:150-1). Hence, if one who accepts some parts and rejects others is a real infidel, then what about the one who denies all, who acknowledges neither His commands and prohibitions nor His rewards and punishments, and rejects everything on the grounds that it has been foreordained. He is certainly a greater infidel than one who accepts one part and rejects another.

As for their argument from fore-ordainment, it is quite easy to refute. First, if fore-ordainment is an argument for one person, it should be an argument for all, for everybody’s actions are pre-ordained. Hence, if anyone is wronged, abused, robbed, offended, injured, killed, has his crops destroyed or his family slaughtered, he should not blame those who perpetrate those actions. But we know that everyone condemns these acts and denounces their perpetrators. This would simply be contradicting oneself and falsifying one’s own argument. If fore-ordainment provided justification for doing things which are forbidden or

defying those which are commanded, people should not hold anyone responsible for anything, nor blame and condemn him. They should not denounce this or that man as wicked, whatever wrong he might have done. Obviously no one is going to do that, and if they do it all order will collapse. This shows that the argument from fore-ordainment is not correct from the point of view of reason as well as revelation, and those who say that it provides justification for one's actions are certainly wrong.

Second, it would mean that Iblīs, Pharaoh, the people of Noah, 'Ād, and all those whom God has punished for their sins should have been excused. I am sure that people of all faiths will pronounce that blasphemous.

Third, it would mean that we should not distinguish between God's friends and His enemies, the Believers and the non-believers, the people who deserve Paradise and those who deserve Hell, even though God does distinguish between them. He says, "Shall We treat those who believe and work deeds of righteousness the same as those who do mischief on earth? Shall we treat those who guard against evil the same as those who turn aside from the right?" (38:28). And, "What do those who seek after evil ways think, that We shall hold them equal with those who believe and do righteous deeds – that equal will be their life and their death? Ill is the judgment that they make" (45:21). God has spoken these words even though He destined things for them and fixed their portions long before He brought them into the world. They will be happy on account of their faith and good deeds and unhappy on account of their unfaith and sins. This means that fore-ordainment does not provide anyone any excuse for any sin.

Fourth, fore-ordainment is something to be believed rather than invoked as an excuse. Those who argue from it, their argument is invalid, and their excuse is unacceptable. Had it been acceptable, Iblīs and all other sinners would have been excused; and if fore-ordainment provided any argument, nobody would be punished in this world or the next. The hand of no robber would be chopped,

nor would any murderer be hanged, nor any criminal sentenced; nor would *jihād* for the cause of God be instituted, nor the injunction to command the good and forbid the evil promulgated.

Fifth, when the Prophet was questioned in this regard he said, “There is none of you whose seat in Paradise or in Hell has not already been fixed,” whereupon a man said, “Should we, therefore, not give up working and just rely on what has been written?” The Prophet said, “No, work on, for every one of you is provided the means to the end for which you are destined.”⁴⁷⁴ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded by Al-Bukhārī as well as Muslim. Another *ḥadīth* says that the Prophet was asked, “Messenger of God, is it the case that people work and strive while the pens have dried up and the registers have been closed? Or is it that they work and things have not been determined for them?” This or something similar was the language in which the question was asked. The Prophet replied, “No, they work while the pens have dried up and the registers have been closed.” He was then asked, “What then will our action achieve?” He said, “Go on doing. Every one of you is provided the means to the end he has been created for.” (476)⁴⁷⁵

Sixth, God knew everything beforehand and wrote them as they happen now. He wrote that X will have faith, do good deeds and go to Paradise, and that Y will sin, do evil deeds and go to Hell, just as He knew and wrote that A will marry a woman, go in to her and have a child, that B will eat and drink and satisfy his hunger and thirst, and that C will sow seeds in the field and grow crops. Now, if anyone says that this or that person is one of the people of Paradise, that he will go there without doing good deeds, he is wrong and mistaken, for it is known that he will go to Paradise on account of his good deeds, so if he entered it without doing good deeds that would go against what God knows and has determined.

It is just like someone saying that he will not go to his wife and he will still have a child if God has so decreed. This man is a fool. When God decrees that he will have a child He also decrees that he

will go to his wife, that she will conceive and then give birth to a child. God does not ordain or write that he will have a child without intercourse with his wife and without her conceiving. Similarly with Paradise, God has made it for the Believers, so if anyone thinks that he will go to it even though he does not have faith, he is mistaken; or if he thinks that the works which God has enjoined are not required, or that it makes no difference whether he does good deeds or does not do them, he is an infidel. To be sure, God has barred the nonbelievers from Paradise. The view in question conflicts with the rule that without faith nobody will enter Paradise.

As for the words, “Those for whom the good (reward) from Us has gone before will be removed far from it” (21:101), certainly those for whom good reward has been decreed by God will have faith and do good deeds. If they do not have faith, no good reward will have been decreed for them. When God ordains something for a person, He engages him in works that lead him to that thing. For example, if He ordains a child for someone, He also ordains that he will go to his wife and that she will conceive the child. He ordains effects just as He ordains their causes; both are pre-ordained by Him. Hence, if anyone thinks that God has destined a good end for him without him doing the works that lead him to that end he is mistaken. God disposes effects as well as their causes He ordains the one just as He ordains the other.

[*Fatāwā* 8:262-266]

(9.6) God’s foreknowledge of one’s destiny, happiness or otherwise, does not make one’s effort redundant.

Those who think that God’s fore-knowledge and fore-ordination of things is sufficient to bring them into being, and that any effort or action on the part of man or all other causes are not required, are wrong.

A person put this question to Ibn Taymīyyah: "Some people have been destined to be happy and some have been destined to be unhappy; and certainly the happy ones will not become unhappy and the unhappy ones will not become happy. It is also obvious that deeds are not done for themselves; either they are done to secure happiness or to ward off misery, but these things have already been determined. Why then should one toil and suffer and deprive oneself of leisure? Everyone knows that what has been written will come to pass anyway." Ibn Taymīyyah replied:

This question was put to the Prophet himself. The answer he gave has been reported in many *aḥādīth*. One *ḥadīth*, which is reported by 'Imrān Ibn Ḥasan and is recorded in both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections, says that the Prophet was asked whether the people of Paradise and the people of Hell have been marked out. He said yes. "Then why should people work?" he was next asked. He said, "Everyone will be provided with things that lead to the end he is created for."⁴⁷⁶ In Al-Bukhārī's version of the *ḥadīth* the question begins, "Messenger of God, does everyone work for what he was created for, or what he is provided the means of?" In another *ḥadīth* which is reported by 'Alī, it is stated that one day the Prophet was raking the earth with a small stick in his hand and saying, "Whether you will be sent to Paradise or to Hell, and what place you will occupy there is already known." Hearing that, someone asked, "Messenger of God, why then should we work? Why should we not rely (on what is written?" He said, "No, you should go on working, for everyone is provided with the things that lead him to the end he was created for." He then read out the verse, "So he who gives (in charity) and fears (God), and (in all sincerity) testifies to the good, we will indeed make smooth for him the path to bliss. But he who is a greedy miser and thinks himself self-sufficient and gives the lie to the good, for him We will indeed make smooth the path to misery" (82:5-10)⁴⁷⁷

The verses of the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet that speak of God's fore-knowledge and fore-writing, or His

ordainment of things before they are brought into being, are many and multifarious. The Prophet has made it absolutely clear that these things do not invalidate human effort and action which leads to happiness or misery, that one who is destined for happiness shall do the works of the people of happiness as one who is destined for misery shall do the work of the people of misery, that one who is of the happy ones shall be provided with things that lead to happiness and one who is of the wretched ones shall be provided with things that lead to wretchedness. He has warned against relying upon fore-ordainment and giving up action. That is why those who count on fore-ordainment and give up doing what they are called upon to do are definitely those whose efforts have gone to waste in this life. Their inactivity and dereliction of duties is a part of the process through which the path to their misery is smoothed, for the happy ones are those who perform their duties and refrain from things forbidden. Hence those who neglect their duties and engage in things forbidden counting on fore-ordainment are among the unhappy ones whose path to misery has been smoothed.

This answer which the Prophet (pbuh) gave is most true and perfect. A similar answer he gave on another occasion, which is recorded by At-Tirmidhī. A person asked him, “Messenger of God, do you think that the medicine or the charms that we use or the precautions that we take will in any way affect what God has ordained?” He said, “All these are part of God’s fore-ordainment”⁴⁷⁸ God knows things and writes them as they are before they are. If He knows that they will happen when their causes, actions of the people or other factors are present, and if He allows them to happen in that condition, one should not think that they will happen without their causes being available which God has ordained for them. This is the general rule which governs every event that happens.

For example, when God knows and decrees that a particular couple shall have a child and makes its birth conditional upon their

intercourse and the ejection of sperm and the formation of the egg from which the child is formed, then it is not possible to expect a child without the realization of all these causes on which the birth of the child depends. And causes are of two kinds, usual and unusual. An example of the former is the birth of a child from the intercourse of the parents; an example of the latter is the birth of a child from the mother only, as we have in the case of Jesus, or from the father only, as we have in the case of Eve, or from neither, as we have in the case of Adam, the father of mankind who was created from clay. God knows all the causes, records them and ordains them before they come into existence; similarly He knows, records, and ordains all their effects in advance. His creation of the plants from the water that He sends down provides an example which He has referred to in this verse: "And in the rain which God sends down from the skies and the life which He gives therewith to an earth that is dead, and in the animals of all kinds that He scatters throughout the earth... are signs for a people who are wise" (2:164). All these things are determined, known and written down before they are brought into being.

Hence, if one thinks that when something is known to God and written by Him it should happen even if the actions and other factors needed for its happening are not available, he is ignorant and seriously mistaken. This is true for two reasons. One is that he turns knowledge into ignorance, for knowledge is what corresponds to reality and presents the thing as it is, and God knows that things come into existence from causes that He creates, which is what reality is. So if anyone says that God knows things to happen without their causes he ascribes to God something false. He is like the one who says, for example, that God knows that a child will be born without his parents, or that plants will grow without water. It makes no difference whether the thing known belongs to the past or the future. Whether you say that God knew a thing coming into existence sometime in the past without its causes or you say that He knew a thing coming into existence sometime in

the future without its causes, you are equally wrong in both cases. You are like the one who says that God knew that He created Adam without clay or that people would procreate without intercourse, or that He would produce plants without water or earth. This person is certainly mistaken, and his mistake is too obvious to be proved. He will be equally mistaken if he claims the same about the things of the future.

Actions are also the causes of reward and punishment. Hence if one says that God sent Adam out of Paradise without his committing a sin and that He had ordained it like that, or that He forgave Adam without repentance from him, and that He knew it beforehand, it will be imputing something false to God. But if he says that “Adam learned from his Lord words of repentance, and his Lord turned towards him (forgiving him)” (2:37), or that, “they (Adam and Eve) both ate of the tree, and so their nakedness appeared to them, (and) they began to sew together leaves from the Garden for their covering,” (20:121), he will be right. God knew what Adam would do even before he was created, just as He knew what he did after he had been created.

The same is true of the events mentioned in prophetic narratives. God knew in advance that He would destroy, for example, the peoples of Noah, ‘Ād, Thamūd, Pharaoh, Lot, and Midian on account of their sins, and that He would rescue the prophets and all those who would follow them on account of their faith and good deeds. He has said, “When they disregarded the warnings that had been given them, We rescued those who forbade evil, but We visited the wrongdoers with a grievous punishment, because they were given to transgression” (7:65)... Similarly, He knew in advance whatever He has told of the joys or the sufferings which people will experience on account of their deeds. He has referred to it in various verses such as, “Eat and drink with full satisfaction, because of the (good) that you sent before you in the days that are gone” (69:24); “Behold the Garden before you! You have been made its inheritors for the (good) deeds you had been

doing” (7:43); “Have not the unbelievers been paid back for what they had been doing?” (83:36)... In these and many more verses than can be cited here, God has made it absolutely clear that happiness and misery in the Hereafter are the result of doing or not doing the works which He has commanded them to do and of refraining or not refraining from the works which He has forbidden. He has also made known the works which call for reward or punishment in this world.

The second reason why this view is wrong is that if God knows beforehand that something will happen and tells about it or writes it (in His Register), it does not mean that it will happen without the factors needed for its production being present, such as its doer, his power, and his will to do it. To think otherwise is sheer folly; this knowledge of God by itself is not sufficient to bring the object into existence; this is agreed upon among the scholars. This kind of knowledge corresponds to the object as it is; it neither adds to its properties nor acquires from it any property. It is just like our own knowledge of things which existed there before we ourselves came into being, the knowledge, for example, of God, His names and attributes. This knowledge of ours, everyone would agree, has no effect at all on the existence of its object, even though some of our knowledge does affect the existence of its object, such as the knowledge that moves us to act and produces a thing by telling us about the thing and its significance. Voluntary actions do not proceed except from self-conscious agents who know the objects they want; their will follows their knowledge. All of us distinguish between an active knowledge which affects the existence of its object, and a passive knowledge which has no effect at all on its object. This discussion, I hope, will clarify the issue.

There exists a similar distinction in God’s knowledge. His knowledge of Himself, for example, does not affect His own being, whereas His knowledge of things which He creates with His free will does affect the existence of its objects. What is true of His knowledge is also true of His speech and writing. When He creates

a thing He creates it with His knowledge, power and will. That is why creation presumes the knowledge of the thing to be created and is proof of the latter's presence. God has referred to this fact in the verse, "Should He Who created (the world) not know it, He who understands the finest mysteries and is well-acquainted (with them)?" (67:14).

However, when He says of a thing that it will happen in the future, His knowledge of it and His telling about it at the time does not affect its happening, just as His knowledge of it and His telling about it after it has come into existence does not affect its existence. For, first of all, the knowledge of a future object is like the knowledge of a past object. Second, effective knowledge implies a will which brings the object into existence; this obviously does not happen by telling about the object. Third, if at all one concedes that knowing and telling have some effect on the object told about, even then we would need a power and a will to bring it into existence. In short, mere knowing does not produce an object without a power and will.

It is now clear that knowing, telling and writing alone cannot dispense with the need for an agent that has power as well as will. One thing that supports this truth is that God knows the things which He will be doing and of which He has told us something. For example, He knows that He will bring about the Day of Judgment and has told us about it, but it is also clear that in spite of that, His knowledge of it and His telling about it will not produce it unless the factors involved in bringing it about are present.

Now that this point is clear let us turn to the original question. To say that the happy ones will not be unhappy and the unhappy ones will not be happy is true. That is to say, one whom God has destined to be happy will certainly be happy, but he will be happy by doing deeds which make one happy; similarly, the unhappy will be unhappy only by doing deeds which make one unhappy, including resignation to fore-ordainment and ignoring one's duties.

As for the statement of the questioner that actions are not done

for their own sake but only to secure pleasure and happiness or to ward off suffering and misery, whereas the fact is that these things have preceded our actions, we would ask what exactly has preceded, happiness and misery themselves, or the fore-ordainment (*taqdīr*) of happiness and misery in the sense that they have been known, decided and written down? People generally mix up these two things and land themselves in error. They do not distinguish between the existence of an object in (God's) knowledge and its ordainment, on the one hand, and its actualization and emergence into existence, on the other. The first is only a matter of knowing the thing or telling about it or writing it down, nothing of which is part of the thing, its essence or properties with which it is qualified...

Now if the questioner says that what precedes us is happiness or misery itself, he is obviously wrong, for happiness comes only after one has come into existence; it is the living man who is happy. Similarly, misery comes only after its subject has come to exist. What actually precedes is the knowledge or the decision regarding happiness or misery, not the happiness or misery itself. Now if this is the case, then in that sense actions also precede like happiness and misery. Both are pre-ordained and both come into being after the person concerned has come to exist. God knew and decided that X will do such-and-such, and will be happy on their account, and that Y will do such-and-such, and will be unhappy on their account. He also knew that good deeds would bring happiness just as He knew all other causes and their effects. This shows that asking why one should trouble oneself to do good, and deprive oneself of pleasures since what has been written down in eternity shall come to pass is wrong. For what has been written in eternity is that the happy will be happy when they do good deeds, and the unhappy will be unhappy when they do evil deeds; one has not been written without the other...

Many people raise a question here. Since what has been written down will necessarily come to pass, is it that if one does not act,

what has been written will also change? This question is raised in the case of murder. It is asked if a person who was killed had not been killed, would he have died a natural death. The answer is that if one does not do good deeds one will not be happy, and if one does not do evil deeds one will not be unhappy. God knows what has happened and what will happen, as He knows how what has not yet happened will happen when it does happen. This is just as He has said: "If there were in the heavens and the earth other gods besides God, there would have been confusion in both" (21:22); or, "If they were returned, they would certainly relapse to the things they were forbidden" (6:28)... In the same manner one can say that if a person had not been killed he would not have died, he rather would have lived on unless some other factors might have caused his death. The consequential clause in this sentence is opposed to the actual reality, which is known and ordained, and you know for the impossible to happen is just impossible. This is quite clear.

[*Fatāwā* 8:272-286]

(9.7) Man's perfection lies in serving God (*'ibādah*).

Man's perfection does not lie in knowledge alone, as philosophers think; it lies in serving God in knowledge as well as action.

Opinions differ with regard to the end of human endeavor, the goal of man's life. A section of philosophers think that it consists in knowledge, whose crown, they believe, is metaphysics. They think that worship in all its forms is an exercise meant only to cultivate virtue which prepares man for knowledge and makes his soul a world in itself facing and reflecting the world of existence.

These people are utterly mistaken; in fact they are infidels for various reasons. First, they think that perfection lies in knowledge alone. This is the view of Al-Jahm⁴⁷⁹ and Aṣ-Ṣāliḥī,⁴⁸⁰ as it is the more popular most of the two views ascribed to Al-Ash'arī.⁴⁸¹

Most of Jahm's followers believe that faith is only one kind of knowledge. Philosophers, however, are the worst people in this regard, for whereas the Jahmīyyah identify faith with knowledge of God, the philosophers limit human perfection to the knowledge of absolute being or being as such. They should know that absolute as such exists only in the mind, not out there, nor do universals exist out there except in particulars. Even though they divide universal beings into necessary and possible, their objects do not exist out there. Šūfīs like Ibn 'Arabī,⁴⁸² Ibn Sab'īn⁴⁸³ and various others are one with the philosophers on these points. Again, the Jahmīyyah believe in the prophets and in their teachings; in general they affirm that God has created the heavens and the earth, and many other truths which the prophets have taught; but the philosophers do not believe in these truths. In short, man's perfection does not lie in knowledge alone. Besides knowledge one must engage in loving God, in worshiping and obeying Him, and in turning to Him always. This involves action and will as it also involves knowledge and understanding.

Second, they think that the knowledge that makes man perfect is the knowledge they engage in. The truth is just the opposite; most of what they expound is mere folly and ignorance.

Third, they are simply ignorant of the knowledge about God which prophets have taught, knowledge supreme which, along with acting upon it, makes man perfect in the real sense.

Fourth, they think that when they attain the knowledge they seek the injunctions of the *shar'* are no longer incumbent upon them, that they are free to engage in what has been forbidden. This is the way of various esoterics, Ismā'ilīs and others like Ya'qūb As-Sajistānī,⁴⁸⁴ the author of *Al-'Aqalid al-Malakūtīyyah*, and his followers, and the way of heretical Šūfīs who interpret the word *al-yaqīn* in the verse, "Serve God till there comes to you *al-yaqīn*" (15:99), to mean knowledge. They think that when one attains knowledge, deeds are no longer required. The truth, on the contrary, is what Junayd said when he was asked about people who

were saying that by following the way of virtue they could reach the stage where they no longer had any duties to observe or any taboos to avoid. He said, “Even adultery, robbery and drinking wine are lesser evils in comparison to what these people say.”⁴⁸⁵

For some of these people, the pursuit of mystical truth and illumination is much more valuable than the performance of God’s duties... For others, perfection lies in power and authority, power over nature or authority over people, either through exoteric political means or esoteric spiritual methods. All their worship and austerity is geared to this end. They would not even shrink from polytheistic and magical practices, such as the worship of stars and idols if they could secure the help of the evil ones for their ends. This group is more removed from truth and further steeped in ignorance than the former. Those who worship God for the sake of miracles do not get anything more than miracles. A third group works for bothse ends. They indulge in things and deeds which are nothing but *shirk* and sorcery, and with the help of the evil ones only try to know things that are hidden or to work wonders in nature.

The truth in this regard is that the perfection of man lies in worship and service (*‘ibādah*) to God, both in knowledge and in action, in the way He has commanded. Those who serve Him in this way are His true servants, true *mu’min* and true *muslim*. They and only they are the righteous friends (*awliyā’*) of God, and of the party of God which shall be triumphant. They are adorned with knowledge which is beneficial and practices which are righteous. They have purified their souls and perfected themselves, perfected their theoretical and cognitive faculties as well as their practical and active faculties.

[*Fatāwā* 2:94-97]

(9.8) The better one serves God, the more perfect one is, and to greater heights one rises.

The perfection of a created being lies in serving its Creator. The better one serves Him, the more perfect one is, and to greater heights one rises. Those who think that they can transcend the boundaries of servanthood (*'ubūdiyyah*) in any respect or that transcendence is a mark of perfection are most ignorant and deluded people. God has said, "They say that God Most High has begotten offspring. Glory to Him, they are but servants raised to honor. They speak not before He speaks, and act (in all things) by His command. He knows what is before them and what is behind them, and they offer no intercession except for those who are acceptable, and they stand in awe and reverence of His (glory)" (21:26-8)... With regard to Christ in particular, He has said, "He was no more than a servant" We granted our favor to him, and We made him an example for the children of Israel" (43:59).

You may also read these verses, "To Him belong all (that is) in the heavens and the earth. Even those who are in His very presence are not too proud to serve Him, nor do they (ever) weary (of serving Him). They celebrate His praises night and day, nor do they ever flag or intermit" (21:19-20). "Christ disdains not to serve and worship God, nor do the angels, those nearest (to God). Those who disdain His worship and defy in ignorance, He will gather all together unto Himself to (answer). But to those who believe and do deeds of righteousness, He will give their (due) rewards - and more out of His bounty. But those who are disdainful and arrogant, He will punish with a grievous penalty, and they will not find, besides God, any to protect or help them" (4:172-3).

The Qur'ān abounds in verses like these which praise the great creatures of God who served Him, and denounce those who defy Him. We also have verses which say that God has reiterated the same thing in all the revelations that He has given to His prophets, for example, "Not a messenger did He send before you without this

inspiration sent by us to him: that there is no god but I; therefore worship and serve Me” (21: 25); “We assuredly sent among every people a messenger (with the command): Serve God and eschew evil” (16:36); “I have only created jinns and men that they may serve Me” (51:56); and, “Say: Verily I am commanded to serve God with sincere devotion, and I am commanded to be the first of those who bow to God in submission” (39:11-12).

[*Fatāwā* 10:176-78]

(9.9) *‘Ibādah* comprehends the whole life.

‘Ibādah is a comprehensive name for every word we say and every act we do, whether of the heart or the body, which God loves and approves of.

‘Ibādah comprehends every word and deed, internal or external, that God loves or approves of. This includes *ṣalāh*, *zakāh*, fasting, *ḥajj*, speaking the truth, fulfilling the trust, doing good to parents and to kin, keeping promises, enjoining good and forbidding the evil, *jihād* against the infidels and hypocrites, good behavior towards neighbors, orphans, the poor, wayfarer, slaves, and animals, prayer and supplication, remembering God and reading the Qur’ān, and so on, similarly, to love God and His Prophet, to fear Him and turn to Him in repentance, to be patient in adversity and thankful in prosperity, to resign oneself to God’s decrees, to put trust in His help, to hope for His mercy, to fear His punishment, and so on. All are part of *‘ibādah* to God.

This is because *‘ibādah* is the purpose for which God has created all the beings of the world, the end of which is very dear to Him. He has said, “I have not created the jinns and men but that they serve Me (*ya ‘budūnī*)” (51:56). This was the message He gave all His prophets to preach. Noah, for example, said, “My people! Worship and serve God, you have no other god but Him” (7:59). Similar was the call that Hūd (7:65), Ṣāliḥ (7:73), Shu‘ayb

(7:85) and the other prophets gave to their peoples. Referring to the whole community of prophets God says, “We assuredly sent among every people a messenger (with the command): “Serve God and eschew evil” (16:35); or, “Nor a messenger did We send before you without this message sent by Us to him: there is no god but I, therefore worship and serve Me” (2:25); or, “This brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood and I am your Lord and Cherisher; therefore serve Me (and no other)” (21:92).

Read also these words in which God has described and praised His angels and prophets: “To Him belong all (creatures) in the heavens and the earth. Even those who are in His very presence are not too proud to worship Him, nor do they ever weary of serving Him. They celebrate His praises night and day, and never flag or intermit” (21:19-20); “Those who are near to your Lord disdain not to worship and serve Him; they celebrate His praises and bow down before Him” (7:206)... The best of His people He has referred to as His servants: “A fountain where the servants (*‘ibād*) of God will drink, making it flow in unstinted abundance” (76:6); or, “The servants of God most honored are those who walk on the earth in humility” (25:63)...

Speaking of Christ, whom Christians believe to be a god and the son of God, He says, “He was no more than a servant. We granted our favor to him, and made him an example to the children of Israel” (43:59). It is in view of what the Christians did with Jesus that the prophet cautioned his people in these words: “Do not exalt me as the Christians exalted Jesus, son of Mary. I am a servant; call me the servant of God and His messenger.”⁴⁸⁶ And God referred to him at the height of his glory as His servant. Telling about his night journey He said, “Glory to (God) Who did take His servant for a journey by night” (17:1). Conferring on him the honor of revelation, He said, “So did (God) convey the revelation to His servant - conveyed (what) He (meant) to convey” (53:10). The Prophet’s invocation to Him He described in these words: “Yet when the servant of God stands forth to invoke Him,

they just make round him a dense crowd” (72:19); and His challenge to those who belied him, He issued in this way: “And if you are in doubt as to what We have revealed from time to time to Our servant, then produce a *sūrah* like it” (2:23).

The whole of the *dīn* is included in '*ibādah*.. *Dīn* means to submit and surrender. We say *dintuhu fa dāna*, that is I made him to submit so he submitted. We also say *yadīnu Allah* or *yadīnu li Allah*, that is, he worships God, obeys Him, and submits to Him. Hence *dīn Allah* means worship, service, obedience and submission to Him. '*Ibādah*, too, means to submit humbly to someone. *Ṭarīq mu'abbad* is that road which is perfectly leveled and smoothed. However, the '*ibādah* which is enjoined upon us implies submission and love; it is humble submission and perfect love. One who submits to someone with hatred towards him does not worship him; similarly one who loves someone but does not submit to him in humility does not worship him. If he loves God as he loves his son or his friend, he is not a worshiper (*'ābid*) of God. Submission and love are integral parts of God's worship (*'ibādah*); one cannot dispense with the other. In fact you must love God more than anything else, as well as humble yourself in submission to Him to your utmost. To be sure, none other than God commands our deepest love and absolute submission...

If your love for someone is not for God, that love is wrong, and if your reverence for someone is without order from Him, that reverence is wrong. God has said, “Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates, or your kindred, and the wealth you have gained, the commerce in which you fear a decline, and the dwellings in which you delight are dearer to you than God or His Messenger, or the striving in His cause, then wait until God brings about His decision” (9:24). You may give love to God as well as His Messenger, and render obedience to God and His Messenger. Similarly you may seek the pleasure of God and the pleasure of the Messenger. God has said, “It is more befitting that they should please God and His Messenger” (9:62)... But '*ibādah*

and things of this category like trust, fear, etc. have to be reserved for God alone, as He has said, “Say: O People of the Book, come to just terms as between us and you, that we worship (*na ‘budu*) none but God and that we associate no partners with Him” (3:64)...

‘Abd may mean *mu ‘abbad*, that is the one whom God has taken slave, has subjugated him and controlled his life and movements. In this sense every creature is God’s *‘abd* whether he is good or bad, believer or unbeliever, a man of Paradise or a man of Hell. He is the Lord, the Master and the Ruler of each and everyone. They do not move out of His dominion, His authority and control. They are subject to His cosmic words that encompass the pious and the wicked alike. What He wills happens even though they may not will it, and what He does not will does not happen even though they may will it. He has referred to it in these words, “Do they seek for other than the religion (*dīn*) of God while all creatures in the heavens and on the earth have willingly or unwillingly bowed to His will, and to Him shall they all be brought back?” (3:83).

God is the Lord of the Worlds, their Creator and Provident, the Giver of their life and death, the Controller of their hearts and the Dispenser of their affairs; there is no lord, no master, no creator other than He, whether they accept it and acknowledge it or not. Only the Believers among them know this truth and acknowledge it, whereas those that do not know or do not acknowledge this truth deny these realities with arrogance and refuse to submit to Him, even though they may know that He is their Lord and Creator...

When a person acknowledges that God is his Lord and Creator and that He is dependent upon Him, he acknowledges his own *‘ubūdīyyah*, servanthood, and God’s *rubūbīyyah*, Lordship. He may then beseech the Lord, surrender to Him and trust in Him, but at times he may obey His commands and at times disobey Him, worship Him at times and worship (*ya ‘bud*) Satan and the idols at times. This kind of service (*‘ubūdīyyah*), however, will not qualify him for Paradise, and save him from Hell, nor will he be a believer (*mu ‘min*). He is of those about whom God has said, “And most of

them believe not in God without associating (others) as partners with Him” (12:106). For the pagans of pre-Islamic Arabia did acknowledge that God was their Creator and Cherisher, but in spite of that they worshiped others besides Him...

Many Ṣūfīs who talk of truth (*ḥaqīqah*) and the experience of truth, experience only this truth, which is only an existential truth, which the Believers and the nonbelievers, the pious and the wicked both know and perceive. Iblīs, too, acknowledges it, as do the people of Hell. Of Iblīs, God has quoted these words, “My Lord! Give me then respite till the Day the (dead) are raised” (15:36); “My Lord! because You have put me in the wrong, I will make wrong fair-seeming to them on the earth, and I will put them all in the wrong” (5:9); “By Your power! I will put them all in the wrong” (38:82); and “Do you see! This is the one whom You have honored above me! (17:62). There are many more statements like these in which Iblīs acknowledges that God is his Lord and Creator as of others. Similarly, the people of Hell will acknowledge, “Our Lord! Our misfortune overwhelmed us, and we became the people that went astray” (23:100). God has also this observation regarding them: “If you could but see when they are confronted with their Lord! He will say: Is not this the truth? They will say: Yes, by our Lord!” (6:30).

Hence those who perceive this existential truth, stand by it, and do not submit to the religious truth which is to serve God as His divinity demands, and carry out His orders and the orders of His Messenger, belong in the same category as Iblīs and the people of Hell, even though they may think they are friends (*awliyāʾ*) of God, saints and gnostics, or that they are no more subject to the commands of the *sharʿ*. To be sure, they are the worst heretics and infidels.

[*Fatāwā* 10:1449-57]

10. SULŪK: JOURNEY TO GOD

(10.1) *Sulūk*, the way to God, is to be learned from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

The way to God which He Himself and His Messenger have taught and which consists of beliefs, prayers, and morals has been expounded clearly in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, as it is the food of the Believers on which they subsist. The Companions of the Prophet and their Successors in their journey to God devoted themselves to the works which the Qur'ān and the Sunnah have enjoined or commended, and did not deviate from that path. But many of the devotees ('ubbād), the ascetics (zuhhād), mendicants (fuqarā') and mystics (Ṣūfis) who came later did not care to know the teachings of the Prophet regarding the way to God he himself followed and taught, and blindly followed the instructions of their teachers. As a result, they differed among themselves, and took to many heretical practices.

Many (*fuqahā'*) of later times, rather most of them, express their inability that they cannot deduce the rules of the Sharī'ah from Prophetic sources directly; hence they put the words of their imāms in place of prophetic texts, and uncritically follow them. To be sure, most of the people have to follow their leading scholars in matters which come up from time to time and which they cannot themselves investigate and decide.

Many also who devote themselves to worship, take to poverty and follow the Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*, adhere blindly to the teachings of their preceptors. They often take them as infallible and refuse to learn anything from anyone else, even from the Prophet, though learning *sulūk* from him is easier than adducing Sharī'ah rules from his texts. The way to God consists of the belief, prayers and morals which God and His Prophet have enjoined, and which are clearly

expounded in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, for they form the food of the Believers on which their life rests.

This is the reason all the Companions of the Prophet learned *sulūk* from the texts of the Qur'ān and Sunnah which come from the Prophet. They did not need to consult the scholars among them, nor did they differ in these matters, as they did in matters of law where most Companions could not form any opinion by themselves. There was only a group of men who could advise in matters of law, and to whom others turned for guidance. But everyone who wanted to approach God, do what was obligatory and pursue what was recommended, could go to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and get them easily from there since they elaborate them very clearly. If anyone suggested anything on the subject and did not cite any text of the Qur'ān or the Sunnah in support, most probably he had inferred it from them in some sense or the other. Sometimes someone said a word of wisdom on his own and then came to know a *ḥadīth* of the Prophet to that effect, which was “light upon light” to borrow a phrase from the Qur'ān (24:35).

But many devotees and ascetics ignore the Prophet's teachings which define the way to God he himself followed. Instead they adhere to the teachings of their masters. There are various issues in *sulūk* on which Ṣūfī teachers have different views. But if one looks into the Qur'ān and the Sunnah one can find the right view on such issues, which most travelers on the path can easily understand. The issues of *sulūk* are just like the issues of faith: both are clearly stated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Theologians did not differ on credal issues except when they ignored the Qur'ān and the Sunnah; and when they did that they came out with heretical ideas and differed among themselves. In the same way most of the disagreement that we have in matters of *sulūk* arose when people turned away from the way which the Prophet had prescribed. They indulged in new and unproved practices and differed among themselves.

The same thing happened in law *fiqh*. Differences arose in it when the words of the Lawgiver (Shari‘) were ignored. However, differences in this field pertain only to matters of detail; on major issues, however, there is no difference among the scholars. In such matters the Companions themselves had different opinions on some issues, but on the crucial issues they hardly differed, nor did they differ in matters concerning the way to God, by following which one attains the status of the friends (*awliyā’*) of God, the righteous (*abrār*), or the nearest ones (*muqarrabūn*) to God. That is why most Ṣūfīs fall back on the opinions of the (*fuqahā’*) in matters of *fiqh* such as marriage, inheritance, ritual purification, correct prostration, and so on, in which the formation of views in the light of the texts is not very easy. But in matters regarding trust, sincerity, abstinence and the like, on the other hand, they exercise their minds and form their own views. Those who follow the Prophet strictly in this field are right and those who diverge are wrong...

Most of the unapproved practices (*bid‘ah*) which crept into later devotees, ascetics, mendicants, and Ṣūfīs did not exist at the time of the Successors or their successors. But heretical ideas did appear at the time of the Companions and their Successors. This means that the reasons for disagreement in these matters were manifold, and people who entered into them were more sophisticated. In the matters of *sulūk* on the other hand, those who introduced unapproved practices were less educated and farther removed from the Prophetic way.

[*Fatāwā* 19:272-5]

(10.2) Forms of worship, lawful (*shar‘ī*) and unlawful (*bid‘ī*)

*The lawful (*shar‘ī*) forms of worship are those which God and His Messenger have instituted, such as ṣalāh, fasting, reading the Qur’ān, praying in the night, visiting Makkah and the other two*

mosques, charity, jihād, remembering God, and invoking Him which the Companions and their righteous Successors practiced. The unlawful (bid'ī) forms of worship are those which the devotees ('ubbād) and the ascetics (zuhhād) who appeared later invented, such as retirement to solitary places, remembering God by calling the name 'Allah, Allah' without adding any predicates or saying Hū, Hū, i.e. He, He. Al-Ghazālī's view that one who empties his mind of all ideas and says Allah, Allah, will attain intuitive knowledge is one of the lingering influences of philosophy on him.

The forms of worship in which people engage in their journey to God are of two kinds. One form is approved by God and His Messenger and loved by them. Some of these acts are obligatory and some recommended. The Prophet has mentioned both categories in these words that he has quoted of God: "No one comes closer to Me than by doing things that I have commanded him to do. But my servant comes closer and closer to me by doing supererogatory works till I love him; and when I love him, I become his ears with which he hears, his eyes by which he sees, his hands by which he strikes, and his legs by which he walks. He hears by Me, sees by Me, strikes by Me, and walks by Me. When he asks of Me anything I give it to him; when he seeks My protection I protect him. I never hesitate to carry out what I decide except when I want to take out the soul of My servant who is faithful. He does not want to die, and I do not like to do what he does not want; but what has been decided upon has to be carried out."

We know that of *ṣalāh* there are some which are obligatory, such as the *ṣalāh* five times every day, and there are some which are supererogatory, such as *ṣalāh* late in the night. Similarly, some fasting is obligatory, such as fasting in Ramaḍān, and some is supererogatory, such as fasting three days every month. Visiting the Sacred Mosque at Makkah is obligatory, and visiting the other two mosques, the one of the Prophet at Madinah and the other in

Jerusalem, is supererogatory. Likewise, some charity is obligatory and some supererogatory, namely giving out what is more than one's needs. God has said, "They ask you how much they are to spend (in charity). Say: What is more than your needs" (2:219)...

The point I am making is that there are works which are approved by the *shar'*, whether obligatory or non-obligatory, and there are works which are not approved by the *shar'*. It is the works approved by the *shar'* which bring you close to God, which form the Way to Him, which are *birr*, or virtue, such as obedience, good behavior, kindness, and generosity... Undoubtedly we have in this category the prescribed forms of *ṣalāh*, obligatory and non-obligatory, the *ṣalāh* late in the night, reading the Qur'ān in the prescribed form, remembering God and supplicating Him in prescribed ways. Some of these are to be said at particular times, for example, prayers at both ends of the day or at the time of entering the mosque, or prostration on reading some specified verses of the Qur'ān, or *ṣalāh* at the time of lunar or solar eclipses, or *ṣalāt al-istikhārah*,⁴⁸⁷ chants and invocations (*dhikr* and *du'ā'*) which have been instituted on all these and other occasions into which we cannot go at the present.

It also includes various kinds of approved fasts, such as fasting half the year or one third or two thirds, or one tenth, which is three days every month. It further includes approved visits, such as the visit to the Sacred Mosque at Makkah, and the other two mosques, as well as *jihād* of different kinds. Most of the Prophet's *aḥādīth* speak of *ṣalāh* and *jihād*. In the same category is placed the reading of the Qur'ān in the prescribed form...

In this article here, we particularly want to point out the unlawful forms of worship which appeared in later ages. One of them is retreat to solitary places. This practice resembles in a sense *i'tikāf*, which is lawful. But the *i'tikāf* which is instituted by the *shar'* and is one of the approved forms of worship is done in a mosque. This was the practice of the Prophet and his Companions. As for retreat to solitary places or monasteries, some people argue

from the fact that before he received the revelation the Prophet used to retire to the cave of Ḥira'. But this argument is wrong, for what the Prophet used to do prior to his prophetic call would have been obligatory or commendable for us only if he had instituted it during his prophethood, otherwise not. And we know that after God appointed him prophet he never went to the cave of Ḥira', nor did any of his righteous caliphs. He passed more than ten years at Makkah before he migrated to Madinah, visited Makkah at the time of compensatory *'umrah* (*'umrat al-qadā*), spent again about twenty days when he entered Makkah victorious, and another four days at the time of his farewell *hajj*, but not once did he visit the cave of Ḥira', though it was close at hand.

Arabs before Islam used to retire to caves for some days; 'Abd Al-Muṭṭālib, the grandfather of the Prophet is said to have started that practice. The forms of worship which were introduced by the *shar'* like *ṣalāh* and *i'tikāf* in mosques were not known to them. Naturally, therefore, when they were instituted they replaced the earlier practices... Some people make retreat for forty days and hold the practice in great esteem. They argue for it from the fact that God called Moses to His audience on Mount Sinai for thirty days and then extended it to a further ten days. It is said that Moses (pbuh) fasted during those days, that Jesus, too, fasted for forty days and received revelation at the end of that period. It is further said that after the completion of this period, one usually gets a call or a revelation as it happened with the Prophet at the cave of Ḥira'. This argument is not correct. This practice is not part of the Prophet's *Sharī'ah*. It was only a part of the Mosaic *sharī'ah*, like the institution of *Sabt*, neither of which was instituted for the Muslims. Many things, on the other hand, were forbidden in the Mosaic *sharī'ah*, but they are not forbidden in the Muḥammadan *Sharī'ah*. Hence, those who argue for this practice in fact argue from a *sharī'ah* which has been superseded or from a practice of pre-prophetic days.

It has been seen that those who engage in these unlawful (*bid'ī*) forms of worship are visited by devils and addressed by them; some are even flown by them in the air. I know some of these people who looked for revelations like those of the prophets; they were visited by devils as they went out of the Prophetic Sharī'ah which they were asked to follow. The Qur'ān says, "Then He put you on a (particular) *sharī'ah* in religion; so follow that (*sharī'ah*) and follow not the desires of those who know not. They will be of no use to you in the sight of God. It is only wrongdoers (who stand as) protectors one to the other. But God is the Protector of the righteous" (45:18-9).

Many people do not fix any place or period for retreat; they rather ask their disciples just to go on retreat. Some who go on retreat engage in forms of worship which are approved by the *shar'*, such as *ṣalāh*, fasting, reading the Qur'ān, and *dhikr*, but most of them engage in forms which are not approved by the *shar'*. An example is the practice which Abū Ḥamīd (Al-Ghazālī) and his followers have followed. They ask the person on retreat only to do what is obligatory and nothing more, neither read the Qur'ān or the *ḥadīth* nor do anything else. Then they ask him to devote himself to *dhikr*, to say, first, what Abū Ḥamīd calls the *dhikr* of the common folk, namely, *lā ilāha illā Allah* (there is no god except Allah), then the *dhikr* of the chosen ones, "Allah, Allah", and then the *dhikr* of the chosen of the chosen, "*Hū, Hū*" (He, He).

To say simply the name Allah or the pronoun *Hū* without adding any predicates, whether aloud or in silence, is unlawful from the point of view of the *shar'* and wrong from the point of view of the language. God's name by itself is not a meaningful sentence, nor is it an object of faith or unfaith... On account of this, many Ṣūfīs of later ages have clearly stated that their purpose is not to remember God, but only to concentrate on a particular thing so that the soul is prepared to receive what comes to it. They instruct their disciples to say Allah a number of times. When as a

result he attains concentration, he has devilish experiences which Satan produces in him and makes him think that he has been admitted to the Assembly of the Angels, and that he is given what was not given to Muḥammad in the night of his Ascension, nor to Moses at Sinai. Some in our times have also fallen into this trap.

Some Ṣūfīs have openly said that their sole purpose is to attain concentration, whatever may be the means. It makes no difference, they say, whether one says *Yā ḥayyu!* (O Living One!) or *Ya jahsh!* This is what one of them said to me personally, and I flayed him for that. These people want nothing but the concentration of the mind so that they may receive Satanic revelations. Some of them say let us make the search, the seeker and the sought one thing. Thus they enter at the outset in the Unity of Being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*).

Of course, Abū Ḥamīd and others who follow this path do not think that it will lead them to faithlessness. But let everyone know that unlawful innovation is the doorway to faithlessness. These people first ask their disciples to empty their minds of all ideas. They advise them for that purpose to sit in a dark place, cover their heads and say, "Allah, Allah." They believe that when the mind becomes empty it is able to receive the knowledge which they seek. They even claim that they receive revelations similar to the revelations of the prophets. Some go further and claim that they receive more than what the prophets received. Abū Ḥamīd lauds this method in the *Iḥyā'* and his other books, just as he lauds *zuhd* out of all proportions. This is one of the lingering influences of philosophy on him. Ibn Sīnā and other philosophers claim that whatever ideas prophets and others received, they get them from the Active Intellect. That is why they say that prophethood is something acquired. When one turns away from everything, one's heart is purified, and then one receives things similar to what the prophets received. For these people, the voice that Moses heard came from the heaven of his own mind, not from anything outside. No wonder then if they say that their revelations are similar to the

revelations of Moses, even more sublime than his. Abū Ḥamīd himself says that he heard a voice addressing him just as Moses did, although he does not mean that he was addressed (by God). All these ideas they expound only because their faith in prophethood is defective: they believe in only a part of what the prophets taught and reject the other. Their theory of inspiration is wrong for various reasons:

One, what they call “Active Intellect” is nothing at all; it is simply a non-entity, as we have shown elsewhere. Second, the ideas which God puts in the heart, He sometimes puts them, when true, through the angels, and sometimes, when false, through the devils. The angels and the devils convey them in words, as many prophetic traditions say, and as many Ṣūfis who have that experience say. Philosophers, however, regard the angels and devils as faculties in the human soul, which is clearly false. Third, prophets sometimes receive God’s revelations through the medium of angels, and sometimes God brings them near unto Him and speaks to them as He spoke to Moses. To say that their revelations are merely an outflow of ideas, as these people say, is wrong. Fourth, when a person’s mind is free from all ideas, how can he know that what he gets is true? He can know that only in the light of his reason or revelation, but neither of them supports his idea.

Fifth, what we know from tradition or reason is that when the mind is free from all ideas, the evil ones take their place. They descend upon them just as they descend upon soothsayers and diviners. They cannot enter into hearts which remember God in words that prophets have taught. so when hearts are empty they are occupied by the devils. God has said, “If anyone withdraws himself from remembrance of (God), Most Gracious, We appoint for him an evil one to be an intimate companion to him. Such (evil ones) really hinder them from the Path, but they think that they are being guided aright” (43:36). Many Ṣūfis have been misled in this way. They have taken their devil-caused experiences as divinely inspired, and have wrought things like the ones which diviners and

magicians have wrought, believing all the while that they are the miracles which God gives to His friends. However, we have discussed this point at length elsewhere.

Sixth, if this method had been correct, it would have been useful to those to whom no prophet had been sent. But those to whom a prophet was sent and whom he has shown the right path and asked to follow it, will certainly go astray if they oppose him. The Seal of the Messengers (pbuh) taught his *ummah* things like *ṣalāh*, *dhikr*, prayer (*du‘ā’*), and reading the Qur’ān. He has not asked them to empty their minds of all ideas and wait for revelations. If at all this method was taught by any previous prophet, it is now superseded by the Muḥammadan revelation. The fact is that this method is one which was practiced by pagans in pre-Islamic times, and certainly cannot be expected to deliver the desired good. This is not to rule out the possibility that God puts by means of inspiration some ideas into the hearts of people who follow this way. But that would be just incidental, rather than something resulting from that method.

The places to which people retreat are not usually the places where the call for the *ṣalāh* is given, and where the daily prayers are offered. They are either mosques that are deserted or caves or caverns in mountains or graveyards where any religious personality is buried, or shrines which are said to contain the relics of a prophet or a saint. That is why people have devilish experiences in such places, even though they call them divine miracles. Some see that the man who was buried there hundred of years ago has risen up, that he introduces himself and says he is one of those who come out of their graves after they are put there. At-Tūnisī,⁴⁸⁸ for example, saw Nu‘mān As-Salāmī⁴⁸⁹ appear to him.

The Devil often appears in human form, in dreams as well as in waking. He may appear to one who does not know the truth and say he is this Ṣūfī *shaykh* or that religious scholar. He may also say he is Abū Bakr or ‘Umar. He may also appear in waking rather than in a dream and say he is Christ or Moses or Muḥammad.

There are many such incidents that I know of. Some people say that prophets appear in waking in their own forms, and there are Ṣūfī masters known for their asceticism, gnosis, piety and religiosity that certify such statements.

Some even believe that when they visit the grave of a prophet, he rises from his grave in his own form and speaks to them. One of them said that he saw in the *Ḥarām* the figure of a *shaykh* who said that he was Ibrāhīm, the beloved friend of God. Another said that the Prophet came out from his apartment and talked to him; his comrades considered it to be his miracle. Some of them believe that if they call the person in the grave he will respond. Some even tell the story that when Ibn Mundah⁴⁹⁰ could not figure out a *ḥadīth*, he would go to the Prophet's apartment and question him about it, and he would answer his question. A man from Morocco claimed that he had a similar experience and counted it among his miracles. To a person who believed in this story Ibn 'Abdul-Barr⁴⁹¹ put the question: "Do you think that this man is better than the *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār* of the earliest times? Did they ever question the Prophet (pbuh) after his death, and did he answer their questions? The Companions differed on many things, but they did not ask the Prophet regarding them and seek his answer. Look at his daughter, Fāṭimah. She differed from the *khalīfah* and others on the question of inheritance from her father, the Prophet. How is it that she did not ask him for a verdict?"

[*Fatāwā* 10:389-407]

(10.3) *Dhikr*, lawful (*sunnī*) and unlawful (*bid'ī*).

The proper way of dhikr is to say a complete sentence. To say simply the name Allah or the pronoun Hū (He) in its place is not supported by any texts. Moreover, it leads to many unlawful practices, false ideas, and evil experiences.

The best *dhikr* is *lā ilaha illā Allah*, as At-Tirmidhī, Ibn Abī Ad-Dunyā and others have reported. The Prophet said, “The best *dhikr* is *lā ilaha illā Allah*, there is no god except Allah, and the best *du‘ā*, call is *al-ḥamdu li Allah*, ‘all praise is for God.’”⁴⁹² In the *Muwattaʿ* and other collections we have the *ḥadīth* reported by Talḥah Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Kuthayyir that the Prophet said “The best that I and the prophets before me have said is, *lā ilāha illā Allah, wa aḥdahu lā sharīka lahu; lahu al-mulk wa lahu al-ḥamdu wa hūwa ‘alā kulli shay-in qadīr*. ‘There is no god besides Allah, the one, without a partner. His is the Kingdom, and for Him is all praise, and He has power over everything.’”⁴⁹³

Those who say that this is the *dhikr* of the common man, that the *dhikr* of the elite is Allah, Allah, and that the *dhikr* of the elite is *Hū, Hū*, are mistaken. Their argument from the verse, “Say: Allah, then leave them to plunge in vain discourse and trifling” (6:91), is certainly wrong, for Allah is mentioned in the verse in answer to an interrogative sentence, “Say: Who then sent down the Book which Moses brought as light and a guidance to man?... Say: Allah (6:91). In other words, ‘It is Allah Who sent down the Book which Moses brought. Allah is the subject, and the predicate which is not mentioned is indicated by the preceding interrogative sentence. An example of this kind of usage in common language is that when anyone asks you who your neighbor is, you say, “Zayd.”

To say simply the name Allah or the pronoun He in its place is not to make a meaningful statement or utter a complete sentence; nor is it the object of belief or unbelief, command or prohibition. None of the Elders ever said that, nor did the Prophet institute this practice. It neither makes any sense to our mind, nor inspires any useful feeling. It is only a concept, not a proposition that may be asserted or denied. Since it neither states anything meaningful nor invokes any useful feeling, it is meaningless. The Sharī‘ah consists of things which are meaningful in themselves, not things which derive their meaning from something else. Of those who engage in this kind of *dhikr* some have come out with heresies, and others

with doctrines of union and unity of Being, as we have explained elsewhere.

Saying *Hū* alone is far more removed from the Prophetic practice, and steeped deeper in *bid'ah*. Those who say *Yā Hū! Yā Hū*, 'O He, O He!' or *Hū, Hū*, or the like, the pronoun in these utterances does not refer to anything other than what comes to their heart, and the heart is sometimes right and sometimes wrong. The author of the *Fuṣūṣ*⁴⁹⁴ has written a book entitled, *Kitāb al-Hū*. Some others interpret the verse, "No one knows its meaning (*tāwīluhu*) except God" (3:7), to mean that no one knows the meaning of this name, viz. *al-Hū*, except God. Every Muslim and rational being would say that this interpretation is Clearly wrong. To some of these people I once said that if what they said were correct the verse should have read, "No one knows the meaning of 'He' (*tāwīla Hūwa*)," as an independent pronoun.

The Qur'ānic verses, "Keep in remembrance the name of your Lord, and devote yourself to Him wholeheartedly" (73:8); "Glorify the name of your Guardian-Lord, Most High" (87:1); "But those will prosper who purify themselves and glorify the name of their Guardian-Lord, and offer prayers (87:14-5); and, "Celebrate with praise the name of your Lord, the Supreme" (56:74, 96), and so on, do not mean that we should say Allah, Allah. In the *Sunan* collections we have the *ḥadīth* that when verse 56:74 came down the Prophet commanded the people: "Put it in your *sujūd*, prostration."⁴⁹⁵ Thus he command to say *Subḥāna Rabbī Al-'Aẓīm* (Glory to my Lord the Great) in *rukū'* and *Subḥāna Rabbī Al-A'lā* (Glory to my Lord the Greatest) in prostration (*sujūd*). A *ḥadīth* in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections says that the Prophet used to say in *rukū'* *subḥāna Rabbī Al-'Aẓīm*, and in *sujūd*, *Subḥāna Rabbī Al-A'lā*.⁴⁹⁶ This is the meaning of his saying, "Put it in your *rukū'*," or "in your *sujūd*." There is complete agreement on this point in the Muslim *ummah*.

Hence we are to celebrate God's name or great name by saying a complete, meaningful sentence. In a *ḥadīth* which is recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections, the Prophet says, "The best sentences (*kalām*) next to the Qur'ān are four, and all of them are derived from the Qur'ān: *Subḥāna Allah, al-ḥamdu li Allah, lā ilāha illā Allah, Allahu akbar*⁴⁹⁷ (Gory to Allah; all praise is for Allah; there is no god except Allah; and Allah is great? In another *ḥadīth* we have, "Two sentences (*kalimah*) are light on the tongue but heavy in the Balance and very dear to (God) the Gracious: *Subḥāna Allah wa bi-ḥamdi-hi* (Glory to Allah, and praises for Him!), and *Subḥāna Allah al-'Azīm* (Glory to Allah the Most High!)"⁴⁹⁸ There is also the *ḥadīth* in the two *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that the Prophet said, "Whoever says one hundred times in a day the words, *lā ilāha illā Allah, wa aḥdahu lā sharīka lahu; lahu al-mulk wa lahu al-ḥamdu wa hūwa 'alā kulli shāy-in qadīr* (There is no god except Allah, the one without a partner; to Him belongs the kingdom, and for Him is all praise, and He has power over everything), God saves him from Satan that day till the evening. No one will do better than he except him who says as he has said or more. And whoever says one hundred times in a day *Subḥāna Allah wa bi-ḥamdihi* or *Subḥāna Allah al-'Azīm*, his sins are wiped out, even if they be like the froth on the ocean"⁴⁹⁹

All the *dhikrs* that the Prophet instituted in the *ṣalāh*, *adhān*, *ḥajj* and on the two *īds*, are likewise complete sentences. Look at the *adhān*, the call for the *ṣalāh*: "Allah is great! Allah is great! I witness that there is no god except Allah. I witness that Muḥammad is Allah's Messenger." Look at the *dhikr* in *ṣalāh*: "Allah is great; glory to my Lord the great; glory to my Lord the most Supreme; God has heard the one who praised Him; Our Lord, all praise is for You; and all greetings are for Allah." Look at the *dhikrs* of the *ḥajj*: "I am at Your call, Lord; I am at Your call," and so on. All the *dhikrs* which God has prescribed are meaningful sentences. Never do we have only the name of God or any pronoun

in its place. They are what we call *kalimah* in language, as it is said in the *ḥadīth* have quoted above: “Two *kalimahs* are light on the tongue but heavy in the Balance and very dear to (God) the Gracious One: *Subḥāna Allah wa bi-ḥamdihi* or *Subḥāna Allah al-‘Azīm*.”⁵⁰⁰ In another *ḥadīth*, we have it that the best *kalimah* which any poet has ever spoken is the *kalimah* of Labid: “To be sure, everything other than God is perishable.”⁵⁰¹ The Qur’ān says, “Grievous is the thing that issues from their mouth as a *kalimah*, saying” (18:5); and, “The *kalimah*, saying of your Lord, is perfect in truth and in justice” (6:115). These are the examples of the use of *kalimah* in the Qur’ān and the *ḥadīth*, as well as in the language of the Arabs. Invariably, everywhere it means a complete sentence...

The point I am making is that the prescribed way to remember God is to say a complete sentence, which is what is called *kalām*, or *kalimah* in the singular. It is this *dhikr* which benefits us, or with which we earn reward or punishment, come close to God, know Him, love Him, fear Him, and attain various other laudable things of Islam. As for saying simply the word Allah or *Hū*, there is no justification for doing so, or to say that it is the *dhikr* of the chosen people or the gnostics of God. On the contrary, it leads to various kinds of unlawful practices, false ideas, and evil experiences, such as union or oneness with God, as we have explained elsewhere in our writings.

[*Fatāwā* 10:225-331]

(10.4) The merits of *dhikr*

Remembering God all the time is, on the whole, the best thing one may engage in.

You have asked what the best thing is that one may engage in after performing one’s obligatory duties. The answer is that it varies with individuals, with things they can do, and their

circumstances. One answer cannot be given for everyone. However, one thing agreed upon among the scholars of religion is that to remember God all the time is overall the best thing that one may engage in. This is supported by the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah and recorded by Muslim. The Prophet said, “The *mufarridūn* have gone ahead! People asked, “Who are the *mufarridūn* (lit. intensely devoted)?” He said, “Those men and women who remember God a lot.”⁵⁰² Abū Dāwūd has noted another *ḥadīth* which is reported by Abū Ad-Dardā’. The Prophet said, “Shall I not tell you what is the best work of yours, the one which is most noble in the eyes of your Lord, which raises you to the highest ranks, which is better than giving gold and silver, even better than fighting your enemies, killing them and being killed by them?” “Certainly, Messenger of God,” the people said. He answered, “Remembering God.”⁵⁰³ The Qur’ānic evidence in support of this point, stated and unstated, are many.

The least thing that one can do in this regard is to say regularly the *dhikrs* which have come down from the great Teacher of the Good and the Leader of the Pious, the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be upon him, and which are to be said at particular times, such as in the morning or the late afternoon, when going to bed and getting up, at the end of obligatory prayers, and when eating, drinking, getting dressed, having intimate relations, entering one’s house or a mosque or the bathroom, and coming out from them, as well as at times of rain, thunder, and the like.

One may remember God in different ways, but the best *dhikr* is to say, “*lā ilāha illā Allah* (there is no god except Allah).” At times, however, is better to say *Subḥāna Allah* (glory to God), *al-ḥamdu li Allah* (All praise is for God), *Allahu akbar* (Allah is great, *lā ḥawla wa lā quwwata illā bi Allah* (there is no authority and no power except with God).

You should also know that all that you say with your tongue to please God, or think of in your heart while learning or teaching something or enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, is part of

remembering God. That is why those who, after performing the obligatory duties, acquire any useful knowledge, learn religion or promote its understanding, which God and His Prophet have called *fiqh*, engage in the best *dhikr* of God. If you ponder the statements of the Elders on this point you will not find much difference among them.

[*Fatāwā* 10:660-61].

(10.5) Reading and reciting the Qur'ān

Reading and reciting (tilāwah) the Qur'ān is in general better than dhikr. Dhikr, in general, is better than du'ā'. However, an inferior act becomes superior under certain circumstances. Ibn Taymīyyah has cited two such cases.

Ibn Taymīyyah was asked what is better for a person to do (who has memorized the Qur'ān and fears not that he may forget it, if he should read the Qur'ān all the time or engage in *tasbīh* (glorifying God), *istighfār* (seeking forgiveness) and various other *dhikrs* of different occasions. He knew very well the merits of saying *al-bāqiyāt as-ṣāliḥāt*,⁵⁰⁴ or *lā ilāha illā Allah* (there is no god except Allah *lā ḥawla wa lā quwata illā bi Allah* (there is no authority or power except with Allah), the chief *istighfār*,⁵⁰⁵ *Subḥāna Allah wa bi-ḥamdihi* (glory to God and praise for Him), (glory to God the Great).

In reply, he wrote: All praise is for God. The answer to this and similar other questions is based upon two principles. First, reading the Qur'ān is in general better than *dhikr*, just as *dhikr* in general is better than *du'ā'*. A *ḥadīth* recorded by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* says that the Prophet said, "The best things that one can say next to reading the Qur'ān are four, and all of them are derived from the Qur'ān: *Subḥāna Allah, al-ḥamdu li Allah, lā ilāha illā Allah, Allah akbar*."⁵⁰⁶ At-Tirmidhī has noted the *ḥadīth* which is

reported by Abū Sa'īd. The Prophet quoted God as saying, "For the one who is engaged in reading the Qur'ān so much so that he does not find time for remembering (*dhikr*) Me and supplicating to Me, I will give him more than I would give to any other supplicant"⁵⁰⁷ In the *Sunan* collections, we also have the *ḥadīth* that a man said to the Prophet, "I cannot memorize anything of the Qur'ān. Will you, sir, tell me what I should say in the *ṣalāh*." The Prophet said, "Say: *Subḥāna Allah, lā ilāha illā Allah, and Allahu akbar*."⁵⁰⁸ This is the reason why reciting from the Qur'ān in *ṣalāh* is compulsory. You cannot leave that and engage in *dhikr*, except when you are unable to recite; obviously, a substitute is not better than its original. This is agreed upon among the *a'immaḥ*.

Again, you cannot read the Qur'ān unless you observe the higher degree of ritual cleanliness,⁵⁰⁹ but this is not the case with *dhikr* and *du'ā'*. Obviously the thing which requires greater preparation is better than that which requires less preparation. *Ṣalāh* requires that you observe both kinds of cleanliness; that is why it is better than merely reading the Qur'ān. The Prophet has said, "Keep on the right path; however, you cannot do all that is good. Remember that the best of your deeds is *ṣalāh*."⁵¹⁰ That is why scholars have clearly stated that the best voluntary action of the body is *ṣalāh*. Again, the thing in which the Qur'ān is written is not to be touched except by one who is clean. That is why scholars are agreed that reading the Qur'ān is better.

Some Ṣūfis, however, consider *dhikr* to be a superior act. Some have even claimed that in the case of a veteran Ṣūfī it is definitely the better thing to engage in. This is what Abū Ḥamīd has written in his books. Others say that *dhikr* is better only for beginners. This view, I think, is nearer the truth. We shall elaborate on it while discussing the second principle, namely that in certain situations an inferior act may become superior. These situations are of two kinds, one which applies to all human beings, and the other which varies with individuals. The first may be related to the time, place

even the nature of certain acts. For example, after the dawn and afternoon (*‘aṣr*) prayers when *ṣalāh* is forbidden, reading the Qur’ān, *dhikr* and *du‘ā’* are better than *ṣalāh* during those times. Similarly, there are places where *ṣalāh* is forbidden, such as bathrooms, stables for camels or horses, and graveyards. In these places *dhikr* and *du‘ā’* are better than *ṣalāh*. Again, for people who need to bathe, *dhikr* is better, and for those who need only ablution, reading the Qur’ān is better. The general principle is that when a higher act cannot be performed for any reason, it is better to do the lower in that situation; this is the verdict of the *shar‘*.

Reading the Qur’ān in the position of bowing (*rukū’*) and prostration (*sujūd*) has been forbidden. The Prophet said, “I have been asked to eschew reading the Qur’ān while bowing and prostrating. Therefore, glorify the Lord in bowing, and invoke Him while prostrating; for it is more likely that your prayers are granted (in prostration).”⁵¹¹ Scholars are agreed that reciting the Qur’ān while bowing and prostrating is highly undesirable. They have differed only on the point of whether such *ṣalāh* becomes invalid or not. Both opinions have been advanced in the school of Aḥmad. The reason which is given is that the honor and the dignity of the Qur’ān do not allow it to be read in these states (of humility), just as it is not permitted in funeral prayers, and is disapproved of in bathrooms.

The time after *tashahhud* in the *ṣalāh* is the time of supplication (*du‘ā’*), as is clear by the act as well as the word of the Prophet. At this time, (*du‘ā’*) is certainly the best thing to do; rather, it is what has been enjoined, neither reciting (of the Qur’ān) nor making *dhikr* should be done this time. Similarly in *ṭawāf* round the Ka‘bah or during the stay at ‘Arafah or at Muzdalifah, or while throwing stones at Satan in Minā, what is prescribed is either *dhikr* or *du‘ā’*. Opinions have differed with regard to the recitation of the Qur’ān in *ṭawāf*. Some consider it undesirable (*makrūh*), while others do not.

The other kind of situations affecting priorities are those which vary with individuals. A person may not be able to perform an act which is better; for example, he may not be able to memorize any part of the Qur'ān, just as a Bedouin expressed his inability to memorize anything of the Qur'ān and asked the Prophet what he should do.⁵¹² Another person may not be able to perform a higher act properly, although he can perform a lower act perfectly. This is the reason why some people have exalted *dhikr* over reading the Qur'ān. These people in fact speak for themselves, just as most of the Ṣūfis and gnostics do when they speak of their own experiences; they are not stating a universal principle. Gnosis (*ma'rifah*) is concerned with individual experience, while knowledge (*'ilm*) is concerned with universal truths. A gnostic may find greater concentration of the mind and conviction of the heart in *dhikr* than in reading the Qur'ān, or he may experience light and insight in the former which he may not get in the latter. It may also happen that when he reads the Qur'ān he does not understand it, or is not able to concentrate on it, or that Satan throws him into confusion. On the other hand, there are people who have better concentration when reading the Qur'ān, in understanding and reflecting on it, rather than in offering *ṣalāh*. Everything which is better on the scale of the *shar'* is not necessarily better for an individual to do. He is required to do what is better for him. There may be people for whom charity is better than fasting, and there may be people for whom just the reverse is true, even though in principle charity is a higher act. Similarly, there may be people for whom *hajj* is better than *jihād*, such as women who cannot fight, even though in principle *jihād* is a higher act. The Prophet has said, "*Hajj* is the *jihād* of the weak."⁵¹³ Many more examples can also be given.

Now when these two principles are clear, it is easy to answer the original question. *Dhikrs* which have been prescribed for various occasions, such as the one to be said at the time of the call (*adhān*) for *ṣalāh*, are better than reading Qur'ān in those times.

This is also true of the morning and late afternoon *dhikr*, or *dhikr* at the time of retiring to bed. However, when one gets up at night it is better for him to read the Qur'ān if he can; otherwise let him do what he can, and *ṣalāh* is better than both. That is why the late night *ṣalāh*, which was compulsory in the beginning, was later made voluntary, and replaced by reading the Qur'ān. "Your Lord," God said, "does know that you stand forth (to *ṣalāh*) about two-thirds of the night, or half of the night, or a third of the night, and so does a party of those with you. But God does appoint night and day in due measure. He knows that you are unable to keep count thereof. So He has turned to you (in mercy): therefore, read of the Qur'ān as may be easy for you" (73:20).

[*Fatāwā* 23:56-60]

(10.6) *Du'ā'*

Du'ā' is of two kinds, reverential and supplicatory.

The word *du'ā'* or *da'wah* in the Qur'ān is used in two senses, reverential and supplicatory. For example, "Call not (*lā tad'ū*) on any god besides Allah, or you will be among those under the penalty" (26:213; "Yet when the devotee of God stands forth to invoke (*yad'ū*) Him, they make round him a dense crowd" (72:19); "For Him (alone) is prayer (*da'wah*) in truth: any others that they call upon (*yad'ūn*) besides Him hear them no more than if they were to stretch forth their hands for water to reach their mouths but it reaches them not" (13:14); "Those who invoke not (*yad'ūn*) with God any other god, nor slay such life as God has made sacred, except for just cause, nor commit fornication" (25:68)...

Ṣalāh literally means *du'ā'*, and it is called *du'ā'* because it implies the sense of *du'ā'* which is worship and supplication. The words "call on Me (*ud'ūnī*), I will answer your call" (40:60), have been explained to mean "worship Me and follow My commands;

I will answer your call.” In both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections we have a *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said, “Our Lord comes down to the lowest heaven every night when a third of it is yet to pass, and says, ‘Who is there to call Me (*yad’ūnī*)? I will answer his call; who is there to ask of Me (*yas’alūnī*)? I will give him; who is there to ask of Me forgiveness (*yastaghfirūnī*)? I will forgive him.”⁵¹⁴ Thus God has first mentioned *du’ā’*, then *su’āl*, supplication, and lastly *istighfār*, seeking forgiveness, although the one who seeks forgiveness is a supplicant, as one who supplicates is a *da’ī*. But He has mentioned the supplicant for safety from evil after the supplicant for the good, and mentioned both after *da’ī*, which includes them both and more besides. This is therefore a case of mentioning individual parts after mentioning the class as a whole.

The point I am making is that the words *da’wah* and *du’ā’* imply both senses of worship and supplication. The Qur’ān says, “Their last call (*da’wah*) will be: Praise be to God, the Cherisher-Lord of the Worlds” (10:10). In the *ḥadīth* we have, “The best *dhikr* is ‘*lā ilāha illā Allāh* (there is no god except Allah), and the best *du’ā’* is *al-ḥamdu li Allāh* (All praise is for God).”⁵¹⁵ “Ibn Mājah and Ibn Abī Ad-Dunyā have recorded this *ḥadīth*. In another *ḥadīth* recorded by At-Tirmidhī and others we have that the Prophet said, “The *da’wah* of my brother Dhū An-Nūn was: ‘There is no god but You. Glory to You! I am indeed wrong’” (21:87). No one who is grieved ever praises God in these words whose suffering is not alleviated.”⁵¹⁶ The Prophet called it *da’wah* because it implies both senses of *du’ā’*. The words “there is no god but You” is to acknowledge the unity of Godhead, (*ilāhīyyah*) which implies one of the two senses of *du’ā’*. For *al-ilāh* alone deserves that He should be called upon in worship as well as in supplication. He is Allah; there is no god except Him. The words, “I was indeed wrong” are an acknowledgment of one’s sin, and a prayer for forgiveness...

At-Tirmidhī and other scholars of *ḥadīth* have recorded the *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said, “To whoever is so engaged in reading the Qur’ān that he does not get time for remembering Me (*dhikr*) or begging of Me any favor (*mas’alatī*) I give more than what I give to those who beg of Me.”⁵¹⁷ In the judgment of At-Tirmidhī this is a good (*ḥasan*) *ḥadīth*... When Sufyān Ibn ‘Uyanah was asked about the Prophet’s words, “The best *du‘ā*’ on the day of ‘Arafah is to say, *lā ilāha illā Allah, wa aḥdahu lā sharika lahu; lahu al-mulk wa lahu al-ḥamdu wa hūwa ‘alā kulli shay-in qadīr* (there is no god other than Allah, the one, without any partner; the kingdom is His; He deserves all praise; and He has power over everything)⁵¹⁸ he made mention of this *ḥadīth*...

Du‘ā’, whether reverential or supplicatory is for God alone. Whoever associates others with God in any one of them is left in destitution and disgrace. If anyone wants to have hope he should put his hope in God alone, as he should ask of Him alone. This is why the Prophet said in an authentic *ḥadīth*, “If this money comes to you while you have not asked for it, or do not look for it, take it; otherwise do not go after it.”⁵¹⁹ Looking for something is a matter of the heart, and asking for it is a matter of the tongue.

[*Fatāwā* 10:237-9; 243-5, 58-9]

(10.7) Visiting graves

The lawful and the unlawful ways of visiting graves.

One may visit the graves of the Believers in one of two ways, lawful (*shar‘ī*) and unlawful (*bid‘ī*). The lawful visit is one that is made for the purpose of praying for the dead, which is also the purpose of the funeral prayers. To stand at someone’s grave is like offering *ṣalāh* for him. When speaking about the hypocrites, God told the Prophet, “Never pray for any of them who dies, nor stand at his grave” (9:84). He thus forbade the Prophet to offer *ṣalāh* for

them or to stand at their graves; this is because they rejected God and His Prophet and died as unbelievers. Since He forbade both acts just because of their unbelief, it means that in the absence of unbelief the prohibition does not apply; and since the prohibition was meant for the unbelievers it also means that in case of others one may offer *ṣalāh* as well as stand at their graves. Had it been unlawful, the hypocrites would not have been singled out and the prohibition would not have been associated with their unbelief.

This is why to offer *ṣalāh* on the dead from among the Believers or to stand at their graves is an approved, established practice. The Prophet used to pray for the Believers when they died, and he instituted it as a practice to be followed. When a Believer was buried he would stand at his grave and say, "Pray for the peace of the dead, for he will be questioned now."⁵²⁰ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded by Abū Dāwūd and others. The Prophet also used to visit the graves of the people in Al-Baqī' and the graves of the martyrs of Uḥud. He instructed his Companions visiting the graves to say, "Peace be upon you, people of *īmān* and *islām* who are here. We shall also be joining you when God wills. May He have mercy on those of us who have gone before as well as those who are to follow. We pray Him to bestow peace on us and on you. Our Lord! Deprive us not of the reward You have given them, nor put us to trial after them."⁵²¹ Muslim has noted the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet went out to a graveyard and said, "Peace be upon you Believers who are here. We shall be joining you whenever God wills."⁵²² The *aḥādīth* on the subject are well known. They all underline that the purpose of visiting the graves is only to pray for the dead.

Visiting the graves of unbelievers, on the other hand, is for a different purpose. Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, An-Nasā'ī, and Ibn Mājah have recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet went to the grave of his mother and wept for a while. The people with him also burst into tears. He said, "I asked the Lord for permission to pray for her forgiveness, but He did not permit me.

Then I sought permission to visit her grave, and He permitted me. So visit the graves, for they remind you of the Hereafter.”⁵²³ This visit which reminds you of death benefits you even if the person in the grave is not a believer. It is different from the visit whose purpose is to pray for the dead, and which is not allowed except when the dead is a Believer.

As for unlawful visits, they are the ones in which the visitor prays to the dead and asks him for some favor, or requests him to pray for him or intercede on his behalf, or offers prayer to God near his grave in the belief that his prayer there is more likely to be granted. Visits with any of these objectives are unjustified. The Prophet did not institute them, nor did the Companions practice them, neither at his grave nor at the grave of anyone else. These visits are pagan practices and lead to various forms *shirk*.

If the purpose of the visit is to offer *ṣalāh* near the grave of a prophet or a pious man, and not to pray to them or pray for oneself at their graves, that is to say, to use their graves as a prayer ground, that, too, is prohibited and strictly forbidden, and the visitor will be incurring the wrath and the curse of God. The Prophet has said, “God’s wrath is on the people who take the graves of their prophets as prayer grounds.”⁵²⁴ He has also said, “God’s curse is on the Jews and the Christians who turned the graves of their prophets into prayer grounds.”⁵²⁵ And, “The people who came before you turned the graves of their prophets into prayer grounds. I warn you! Do not turn graves into prayer grounds. I strictly forbid it.”⁵²⁶

Now if this practice is strictly forbidden and invites God’s wrath and curse, what do you think of praying to the dead, or praying by his side, or praying through him? These practices have been considered by people to be helpful in the acceptance of prayers, granting of petitions, and fulfillment of wishes. To be sure, they formed the beginning of *shirk* in the people of Noah, and led to the worship of idols among various other peoples. Ibn ‘Abbās has said that between Adam and Noah we had ten

generations which practiced Islam, and then there appeared *shirk* in them when they began to adore the graves of their pious men.

[*Fatāwā* 1:165-7]

(10.8) Merits of different deeds and their ranks.

The merits of different deeds and their ranks are to be learned from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, not from kashf and miraculous performance (taṣarruf).

Whoever has knowledge and faith is a learned Believer; he is better than one who has faith but does not have knowledge. This is a basic principle which must be kept in mind. There is another principle also: The actions that produce revelations (*kashf*) or enable one to work wonders (*taṣarruf*) in the objects of nature are not necessarily better than the actions which do not. For the *kashf* or *taṣarruf* which does not promote the cause of Islam is only one of the goods of this world. Even the pagan unbelievers and the People of the Book may have them while true Believers may not, though they are destined for Paradise and the others are destined for Hell.

The merit of a deed or its rank is not to be learned from *kashf* and *taṣarruf*; it is to be known from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Different deeds bring power and money to their agents. But the people that enjoy honor in the sight of God are those who are pious. Those who worship and serve God without knowledge may cause greater harm than good, even though they may have miraculous revelations, work wonders, or command a large following among the people. We have discussed this point elsewhere in detail, to which the reader may refer.

The third principle is that one deed may in itself be better than another deed. For example, the basic principles of religion are better than the details, but sometimes a deed is better only under certain conditions. For example, a certain deed may be better for X

than for Y, while another deed may be better for Y than for X, and both may be equally good for Z. It is also possible that what is inferior is better under certain situations than that which is superior. A person would better off doing an inferior deed that he can do well and profit from than taking up a superior deed which he cannot do properly.

Reading the Qur'ān as such is better than *dhikr*. This is supported by a *ḥadīth*⁵²⁷ of the Prophet as well as the consensus of the *ummah*. Obviously, the opinions of ignorant people to the contrary carry no weight. Even then the Qur'ān is not to be read while one is bowing or prostrating to God. In these states we are asked only to make *dhikr*. Similarly, *dhikr* and *du'ā'* in *ṭawāf* around the Ka'bah are better than reading the Qur'ān. Again, the *dhikrs* which have been prescribed for various occasions, like those at the time of hearing the call (*adhān*) for *ṣalāh*, entering the mosque or the House, or coming out of them, or hearing the voice of a rooster or donkey, etc., are better than reading the Qur'ān on these occasions.

Many Ṣūfīs who read the Qur'ān are not able to understand it; consequently they do not get the joy and pleasure of faith which one gets when one understands the Qur'ān. When such people engage in *dhikr* they get the joy and pleasure of faith which *dhikr* produces. In their case, therefore, *dhikr* is better than reading the Qur'ān, which they do not understand. They do not have the faith that increases with reading the Qur'ān. If they had it, it would certainly have increased and been enhanced by reading the Qur'ān; this, to be sure, cannot be had through *dhikr*. This is the third principle.

The fourth principle is that in the case of a person who can do a superior deed but cannot do it properly and sincerely, or cannot fulfill its requirements, an inferior deed which he can do properly is certainly far better.

[*Fatāwā* 11:398-400]

(10.9) An inferior deed may be preferred sometimes.

If it is possible for someone to do many things of the faith he should do what pleases God most and what he can do better, even though it is inferior to others. This is better in his case.

One has to have the faith (*īmān*) which is necessary, perform the worship (*‘ibādah*) which is obligatory, and practice the abstinence (*zuhd*) which is compulsory. People differ in their faith, just as they differ in doing the things which faith demands. Everyone tries to have what he can achieve and do the good deeds he is capable of. In these matters people certainly do differ. For some, knowledge is easier than abstinence (*zuhd*); for others, abstinence is easier than knowledge; and for yet others, devotion (*‘ibādah*) is easier than both. What is required of a person, therefore, is that he do the best he can. God has said, “So fear God as much as you can” (64:16). If he can do a number of things, he should do what is dearer to God, and what he can do better. It may happen that one does an inferior thing better and gets more from it than from doing the deed which is superior. Obviously, he should do what profits him more; that is certainly better for him. He should not go for the superior if he cannot do it or finds it very difficult. A person may read the Qur’ān at night, ponder it and profit from reading it, whereas he may find *ṣalāh* hard for him and may not profit from it at all; or he may benefit from *dhikr* more than he benefits from reading the Qur’ān.

The work which profits the doer more and pleases God better is better for him to do than that which he cannot do properly which he may spoil and thus lose what was more profitable to him. We know that *ṣalāh* is more important than reading the Qur’ān, and reading the Qur’ān is better than *dhikr* and *du‘ā’*. We also know that *dhikr* on certain conditions, in bowing and prostration, for

example, is better than reading the Qur'ān in that position, and that *dhikr*, reading the Qur'ān, and *du'ā'* at sunrise and sunset are all better than *ṣalāh* at these times.

[*Fatāwā* 7:651-52]

(10.10) Is the reward proportionate to the hardship involved?

A superior deed may be more exacting, but its superiority is certainly not due to the hardship it involves, but for other reasons. In fact, hardship is not something desirable in itself, but patient pursuit of a superior deed which is exacting wins greater reward, and the more exacting it is the greater the reward for it.

The saying that reward is proportionate to the hardship involved is not absolutely true. The proof is that various monastic and devotional practices which were in vogue among the people were disapproved by God and His Prophet and the restrictions which had been placed on lawful articles by the pagans were removed by them. Excessive indulgence in devotion and hair-splitting were forbidden. "The extremists, *al-mutanaffi'ūn*," the Prophet warned, "are doomed"⁵²⁸ On another occasion he threatened, "If the month were extended I would go on fasting without break, so that those who are indulging in excess might give in."⁵²⁹ He also proscribed excessive hunger and thirst which affects the mind or the body, or hampers the performance of duties, or bars the pursuit of commendable deeds which are more profiting. We may place in the same category going barefooted, refusing to wear clothes, and walking long distances, which may prove harmful. A man called Abū Isra'īl had vowed to fast standing in the sun without sitting for a moment and keeping silent all the while. The Prophet commanded him to sit down, go into the shade, speak, and complete his fast.⁵³⁰ This has been recorded by Al-Bukhārī. There are other *aḥādīth* also on the subject.

Reward is for obedience and is proportionate to the measure of obedience one offers. Sometimes one pleases God and His Prophet by doing things which are very small, for example, when one says the two small sentences which are the best of all that one can say. The Prophet said, "Two sentences are light on the tongue. but heavy in the Balance and very dear to God: *Subhāna Allah* (Glory to God), and *Subhāna Allah Al-‘Azīm* (Glory to God, the Great)."⁵³¹ Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have recorded this *ḥadīth*.

The saying that reward is proportional to the benefits that accrue from the work is also true. The first criterion concerns the command itself; the second concerns the nature of the thing commanded. The benefit of a deed may sometimes be due to the fact that it is commanded, sometimes to some characteristics found in the deed and sometimes to both. From the first point of view one's action is either obedient or sinful, and from the second point of view it is either good or bad. We call it obedient or sinful when we look at it in relation to the command given, and good or bad when we look at it in itself...

As for its being difficult, that is no reason for calling it superior or better. However, it is true that a superior deed is sometimes hard, but its superiority is certainly not due to the hardship which it involves. To be sure, patiently bearing the hardship does increase the reward, and in that sense hardship adds to the reward. One who lives far away from the House of God will have greater reward for his *ḥajj* or *‘umrah* than one who lives nearby. This is supported by what the Prophet (pbuh) said to ‘Ā’ishah (raa): "You are rewarded according to what you exert."⁵³² The reward depends upon the effort that is made, and the greater the distance the greater the effort, and hence the greater the reward. The same is true of *jihād*. Another *ḥadīth* that supports the point is this: "One who reads the Qur’ān very well shall be, along with scribes from among the angels, honorable and righteous; but one who reads and stammers and does it with difficulty shall be doubly rewarded."⁵³³

Often rewards increase with the hardship one faces and the

labor one puts in, but this is not because suffering hardship is the object; on the contrary, reward increases because the deed involves hardship. The burdens and yokes of the former days have been removed from our Shari‘ah; we have not been subjected to hardship or put to trouble. In the earlier codes, that might have been a part of the purpose. Many people think that hardship, difficulty, labor or suffering is something desirable, and that it wins God’s pleasure because it robs the soul of its pleasure, turns it away from worldly goods and frees the heart from submission to the body. But this is simply a Sabaeen or Indian view. That is why these people engage like hermits in various austere practices and devotions which are severe and painful even though their benefits are very small in comparison to the great harm and suffering they cause. The same mentality is at work in the praise which the ignorant give to those who neither marry nor eat meat, and follow the way of the hermits. The sincere servants of God, on the other hand, follow the way of the Prophet, who has said, “I fast and I eat; I marry women, and I eat meat. Those who do not follow my example are not of me.”⁵³⁴

These practices are part of a false religion. They are to be censured just as love of the world should be. People are of different kinds. Some are purely this-worldly; they hardly think of the Hereafter. Some have a false religion; they are infidels and heretics who believe in devotions and austerities God has not approved. There is the third group, which believes in the true religion, which is Islam, and adheres to the Qur’ān, the Sunnah and the community (*jamā‘ah*).

[*Fatāwā* 10:620]

(10.11) *Aḥādīth* regarding merits

A weak (ḍa‘īf) ḥadīth regarding the merit of a deed does not provide the grounds on which the judgment of the Shari‘ah, whether something is obligatory or commendable, is to be based.

However, when that judgment is once made on proper grounds, a weak ḥadīth may be acted upon.

Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl has said that in case of legal *aḥādīth* which tell whether something is lawful (*ḥalāl*) or forbidden (*ḥarām*) we very strictly scrutinize the narrative chain (*isnād*), but in the case of those *aḥādīth* which exhort or warn we are quite lenient. Scholars are similarly lenient in the case of weak *aḥādīth* regarding the merits of various deeds. The judgment whether something is desirable or not is not made on the basis of *aḥādīth* which do not qualify as legal evidence. The desirability or otherwise of a deed is a legal judgment which has to be made on the basis of legal evidence. Hence, if anyone says that God loves this or that thing without giving its legal basis, he is enacting something for which he has no authority from God. Judgments on these things are made in the same way as they are made on questions of whether something is obligatory or forbidden. In fact, this is very much an important part of our religion.

The stand which the scholars take is that the judgment as to whether something is desirable or undesirable in the sight of God is to be made on the basis of a clear text (*naṣṣ*) or consensus, as it is done with regard to reading the Qur'ān, glorifying God (*tasbīḥ*), invocation (*du'ā'*), charity, freeing a slave, kindness towards people, or with regard to lying, breaking a trust, etc. Once we have a *ḥadīth* telling the desirability of an act and the reward therefor, or the undesirability of another and the punishment therefor, we can entertain a weak *ḥadīth* provided it is not fabricated (*mawḍū'*) and act upon it. That is to say, we will expect the reward and fear the punishment which it promises. It is like the person who knows about a certain business that is profitable, and then hears a report that it has given a lot of profit; if he believes in the report he will benefit from it, but if he does not he will not be harmed. Traditions that belong to this category emerge from Jewish sources or are

based on dreams or are derived from the sayings and experiences of the Elders and the scholars, none of which qualify as legal evidence. No judgment with regard to the desirability or otherwise of a thing can be passed on their basis; however, they may be used for exhortation or warning, persuasion or deterrence.

When we know about the merits or otherwise of a tradition on grounds recognized in the *shar'*, that knowledge is useful not harmful, whether or not the tradition is true or false. If it is found to be false and fabricated, it could be ignored, for what is false is useless. But if it is found to be authentic it can be utilized in forming legal, *shar'ī* judgments. But if both possibilities are open, it may be reported; for maybe it is true, and in the other case it would not do harm. Aḥmad has said that when we have a *ḥadīth* which exhorts or threatens we are not strict in scrutinizing the narrative chain. That is to say, the scholars report this kind of *aḥādīth*, too, even though they are not narrated by reliable and authoritative narrators. This is also the meaning of the saying that they “act upon” weak traditions concerning the merits of different works. To “act upon” means to perform the good deed which they describe, such as reading the Qur'ān and saying *dhikr*, and to avoid the evil act which they mention.

This is supported by the *ḥadīth* recorded by Al-Bukhārī in a report of 'Abdullah Ibn 'Āmr. The Prophet said, “Pass on to people what you hear from me, even if it is a verse (of the Qur'ān). You may also narrate from the Jews; there is no harm in it. But whoever ascribes to me anything he knows is not true reserves his seat in Hell.”⁵³⁵ He has also said, “When the People of the Book narrate anything to you, neither certify it nor falsify it.”⁵³⁶ Thus he has permitted narrating their traditions, but cautioned against saying whether they are true or false. Obviously, if there had been no benefit in narrating from them, he would not have permitted or asked us to narrate them; and were it right to believe in their traditions, he would not have cautioned us against believing in them. People do sometimes profit from things which they think to

be correct.

However, if a weak *ḥadīth* of merit tells something specific with regard to an act, such as that one should offer a particular *ṣalāh* at a particular time, or read in it some particular verses, or offer it in a particular way, it will not be acceptable. For the desirability of these specifics is to be established on legal (*sharʿī*) evidence which is not available. The case will be different if the *ḥadīth* says, for example, that one who enters a market saying, *lā ilāha illā Allah* (There is no god except Allah) will have this or that reward, for to remember God in the market is something very much desirable since it is remembering God when others may not be doing so. A well-known *ḥadīth* says, “To remember God among those that do not remember Him is like a green tree amidst a grove of dead trees.”⁵³⁷ However, whether the amount of reward mentioned in the *ḥadīth* is right or not does not matter. This is hinted at in a *ḥadīth* which is reported by At-Tirmidhī: “One who receives word that God will give this or that reward for a particular deed and does it in expectation of that reward, God will grant it to him, even if it is not true.”⁵³⁸

To sum up, a weak *ḥadīth* regarding merits may be reported and accepted insofar as doing or not doing the said deed is concerned, but it cannot by itself establish the desirability or otherwise of that deed. Furthermore, whether the amount of reward or punishment which it specifies should be believed or not, for that, too, *sharʿī* evidence is, needed.

[*Fatāwā* 18:65-68]

(10.12) Major sins and minor sins

A major sin (al-kabīrah) is that in which a specific punishment in this life or the next has been promised, and a minor sin (aṣ-ṣaghīrah) is that for which nothing of the kind has been mentioned.

Whenever faith is negated or Paradise is denied in a ḥadīth, it is done only on account of a major sin.

The best thing with regard to this question is what has been said by Ibn ‘Abbās (raa). Abū ‘Ubayd, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl and others have quoted him as saying that minor sins are those for which no punishment here or in ‘*alā* has been mentioned. This is also the implication of the statements such as the following: “A minor sin is that for which no specific punishment (*ḥadd*) in this life has been prescribed.” “All sins which are said to invite the wrath or curse of God or to lead to the Fire are major sins.” “Minor sins are those on which no specific punishment (*ḥadd*) in this life has been mentioned, nor any specific warning (*wa’īd*) with regard to the next life issued, such as that the person will be sent to the Fire or that he will incur the wrath of God or His curse.” A specific warning (*wa’īd*) for the next life is like a specific chastisement (*‘uqūbah*) in this life. We do distinguish between specific sentences prescribed for specific sins, such as amputation of a hand, beheading, administering a hundred or eighty lashes, and unspecified sentences which are called *ta’zīr* -chastisement. In case of the *ta’zīr* sentences, too, which God may inflict on sins not committed against human beings, we distinguish between the sentences that are referred to as the wrath or curse (of God) and the Fire, and the sentences that are not referred by any such words.

This rule is not subject to the criticism which has been advanced against other rules, for it covers all those sins which have been named major sins in any text, such as adultery, sorcery, slander against married, chaste and believing women, etc., for which one or another specific sentence has been prescribed, as well as the sins like flight from the battlefield, misappropriation of an orphan’s property, usury, disobedience to parents, false oath, false testimony, etc., on which some specific warnings have been issued. In the case of flight from battle, for example, it has been said, “If anyone turns his back to them on such a day - unless it be a

strategy of war or retreat to a troop (of his own) - he draws on himself the wrath of God, and his abode is Hell, an evil refuge” (8:16). In the case of others we have these warnings: “Those who unjustly eat up the property of orphans eat up a fire into their own bodies; they will soon be enduring a blazing Fire” (4:10); “Those who break the covenant of God after having plighted their word thereto, and cut asunder those things which God has commanded to be joined, and work mischief in the land, on them is the curse, and for them is the terrible Home” (13:25); “Is it to be expected of you, if you were put in authority, that you will do mischief in the land and break your ties of kith and kin? Such are the men whom God has cursed, for He has made them deaf and blinded their sight” (47:22-3); “As for those who sell the faith they owe to God and their own plighted word for a small price, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter, nor will God (deign to) speak to them or look upon them on the Day of Judgment, nor will He cleanse them (of sin). They shall have a grievous penalty” (3:77).

Similarly, all those sins are grave whose perpetrators are told that they will not enter Paradise, or that they will not have its fragrance, or that they “do not belong to us,” or that they are sinners (*āthim*); all such sins are major sins. Read, for example, these *ahādīth*: “No one will enter Paradise who severs his relations with kith and ki;”⁵³⁹ “No one who has a particle of arrogance in his heart will go to Paradise;”⁵⁴⁰ “Whoever cheats us is not of us”⁵⁴¹ “Whoever takes up a sword against us is not of us;”⁵⁴² “No one who commits adultery is a believer at the time he is committing it; no one who steals is a believer at the time he is stealing; no one who drinks wine is a believer at the time he is drinking; no one who plunders the property of a respectable man people look up to is a believer at the time he is plundering...”⁵⁴³

This is because to negate the faith of the sinner or to deny that he is a believer does not mean what the Murji’ah say, that he is not one of their good men; for if he gives up that sin it will not follow that he is one of their good men. Nor does it mean what the

Khawārij say, that he has become an unbeliever (*kāfir*), nor even what the Mu‘tazilah say, that he has lost faith altogether, and that he shall abide in Hell for ever and never come out. All these views are wrong; we have discussed them at length elsewhere where they may be consulted.

The truth in this regard is that the Believers who deserve Paradise and will enter it without any chastisement are those who fulfill the duties which are obligatory and eschew the things which are prohibited. They are those who are meant when the word Believers (*mu‘minūn*) is used without any qualification. So when someone commits these major sins, he is not one of such Believers, for he is liable to be punished for his sins. This is what people mean when they say that the Prophet only means to negate the true faith or the perfect faith, for certainly they do not mean to deny only the perfection which is desirable since the absence of that perfection does not call for condemnation or punishment.

Hence, those who say that by the negation of perfect faith only the negation of the faith which is desirable and not necessary is meant, they are wrong; their view is very much like the view of the Murji‘ah. The truth is that the negation of faith in the *aḥādīth* quoted above is the negation of the faith which is necessary. This rule should be applied to all the statements of God and the Prophet in which they negate faith or anything else. Take, for example, the verse, “Believers are those alone who, when God is mentioned, feel a tremor in their hearts, and when they hear His signs rehearsed find their faith strengthened, and put (all) their trust in their Lord, who establish regular prayers and spend (freely) out of the gifts We have given them for substance. Such in truth are the Believers” (8:2-4). Or note the *ḥadīth*, “He does not have faith who breaches a trust, and he does not have religion who does not keep his word.”⁵⁴⁴ Or the *ḥadīth*, “There is no *ṣalāh* without the Mother of the Qur’ān, (i.e. Al-Fātiḥah),”⁵⁴⁵ and so on. In all these examples faith is negated because some necessary part of it is missing, and not something which is only desirable but not necessary. They all

mean that whoever fails in the qualities mentioned fails in something necessary, something without which his faith is incomplete, even though he has a part of it. This is because faith has parts, and is more or less. The Prophet has said, “He who has a particle of faith in his heart shall be taken out of the Fire.”⁵⁴⁶

To sum up, denying faith or Paradise to someone or denying that he is a Believer means that he has committed something grave. This is not done in case of one who commits any minor sin. Faith is not denied for failing in a part which is merely desirable, nor for committing any minor sin, only for a major one.

[*Fatāwā* 11:650-4]

(10.13) Moderation in worship (*‘ibādah*).

God and His Prophet love moderation in worship, and condemn excess, since the latter often leads to default in duties which are obligatory, or failure in deeds which are better and more useful, or it leads to the commission of things which are forbidden and undesirable. God does not love or approve of torturing the body or subjecting oneself to hardship. It is not true that the more arduous the act the better it is. Many ignorant people think that reward is proportionate to the hardship one suffers. No, this is not true. Reward is proportionate to the good that the act produces and the benefits that follow from it, as well as the extent or degree to which one obeys the command of God and His Prophet.

What is required of us, and what God and His Prophet want us to observe is moderation in worship (*‘ibādah*). The Prophet has said, “Live a balanced life and pursue moderation.”⁵⁴⁷ He has also said, “This religion is well balanced. Whoever tries to stretch it in any direction shall be defeated. Therefore, take help from (the prayers of) early morning and evening, and from some of them in late night. Observe moderation, observe moderation; you will

reach the destination.”⁵⁴⁸ Both these *aḥādīth* are in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections. Ubayy Ibn Ka‘b,⁵⁴⁹ a Companion of the Prophet, has said, “Moderation in practices approved (*sunnah*) is better than exertion in things not approved (*bid‘ah*).”

When excessive exertion in devotion becomes harmful and hinders the performance of duties which are more beneficial, it is forbidden. An example is the fasting which weakens you so much that you are not able to earn your livelihood which is your duty, or affects your mind so much that you are unable to think properly and attend to your duties, or interferes with the *jihād* which is obligatory. Similar is the case of a devotional act which lands you in evils that outweigh the good it produces. For example, you give all your money in charity and then go to people begging.

If devotions render you so weak that you are not able to pursue what is better or land you in what is undesirable, they are not desirable... The Qur’ān says: “You who believe! Make not unlawful the good things which God has made lawful for you, and commit no excess; for God loves not those who are given to excess” (5:87). This verse was revealed in the case of some Companions of the Prophet who swore in a meeting that they would give themselves to devotions. Someone said that he would fast every day; another said he would pray all night; the third said he would not eat meat; the fourth said he would keep away from women. God reproved these people in the above verse and warned them against forbidding themselves things which are lawful, like eating meat or marrying women, thereby committing excess, which is doing more than what is approved whether it is excess in fasting, praying, reading the Qur’ān, making *dhikr* or anything else. Excess in forbidden things is to forbid oneself more than what is forbidden, and excess in permitted things is to indulge in them more than what is permitted. God also commanded this group of Companions to atone for the oath they had taken, an oath to forbid themselves the lawful and commit excess in devotions.

A *ḥadīth* reported by Anas and recorded in both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections says that some Companions of the Prophet inquired from his wives about his devotions at home. Then one of them said, “As for me, I will fast (every day) and will not eat.” Another said, I will pray all night and will not sleep.” The third said, “I will not marry any woman.” The fourth said, “I will not eat meat.” When the Prophet came to know this, he said, “What is the matter with these people who are saying such things? I pray and I sleep; I fast and I eat; and I marry and eat meat. Now, if anyone deviates from my way (*Sunnah*), he is not of me.”⁵⁵⁰

It is also recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Āmr Ibn Al-‘Āṣ began to fast every day, pray all night, and read the whole Qur’ān in three days. When the Prophet was informed of this, He called ‘Abdullah and said, “Don’t do that, for if you do, your eyes will be heavy and your body will become weak.” That is to say, his eyes will sink and he will feel uncomfortable and weary. The Prophet further said, “Your body has a right over you, your wife has a right over you, and your guest has a right over you. Render to each what is his due.”⁵⁵¹ He thus emphasized upon him that his body, his family, his friends all have rights on him, that he should not engage in so many devotions that he is not able to perform all these duties. He must render to each and every one what is his due. The Prophet then advised him to fast three days a month, saying that it would be equal to fasting the whole month. He also advised him to read the Qur’ān in a month. But ‘Abdullah said that he was able to do more than that. The Prophet allowed him to do more, and then more till he said, “Fast one day and eat one day; this is the best way of fasting.” ‘Abdullah said, “I can do more,” whereupon the Prophet said, “There is nothing better than this. There is nothing better than this.” When ‘Abdullah grew old, he said he wished he had accepted the concession the Prophet had given him.⁵⁵² At times he was not able to fast even on alternate days. He would eat some days and then fast an equal number of days. He did not want to do one thing during the life of the Prophet

and another after him. ‘Abdullah did this because his body was strong enough, but if anyone fasts on alternate days which bars him from doing something better than it, fasting would not be the better thing for him to do in that situation.

The Prophet himself fasted in this way, and this was better than the fast of David (pbuh). Even so, when he was asked about fasting all year long he said, “Whoever fasts all year long neither fasts nor does not fast.”⁵⁵³ This is a *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth*. When he was asked about one who fasts for two days and eats the third day, he said “Who can do that?”⁵⁵⁴ When he was asked about one who fasted one day and ate two days, he said, “I wish I could do that.”⁵⁵⁵ He was also asked about one who fasts on alternate days. He replied, “That is the best way to fast.”⁵⁵⁶ It is clear from these *aḥādīth* that he wished he could fast one third of the year, for he had to do other things which were more important for him and more dear to God, which he could not do along with fasting one third of the year.

It is also reported in a *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* that at the time he was marching on Makkah during Ramaḍān he asked his Companions to stop fasting, and when some people fasted against his will, he said “They are sinners!”⁵⁵⁷ Once he offered *ṣalāh* riding on his camel, and asked his Companions to do likewise, but one man got down from his camel and prayed on the ground. On that he said, “He is defiant. He has defied God by this act of his.”⁵⁵⁸ That man turned apostate before he died. Ibn Mas‘ūd⁵⁵⁹ has said, “When I fast I feel weak and am not able to read the Qur’ān, and reading the Qur’ān is much dearer to me.” Many more things can be said on the subject; for a fuller treatment of it one should look to another place.

If, however... one swears by God to do some such thing, or vows it, he should do it. ‘Ā’ishah (raa) has reported that the Prophet said, “Whoever vows to do something right in obedience to God should do it, but if he vows to do something defying Him, he should not do it.”⁵⁶⁰ Therefore, if the oath that you take proves harmful and leads you to negligence of duty or commission of something forbidden, you will be sinning if you fulfill your oath.

Certainly you are not required to fulfill such a vow. Similarly, if you vow to engage in a devotion which is undesirable, such as praying the whole night, or fasting all the days, you do not have to carry it out. Opinions differ on the question whether you should make expiation for your vow. To me the correct view is that you should make expiation. The Prophet has said, "Atonement for a vow is the same as the atonement for an ordinary oath."⁵⁶¹ He is also reported to have said, "A vow is an oath."⁵⁶² In the *Sunan* collections we have it that he said, "There is no fulfilling of a vow which is for something sinful; however, it should be atoned for like any other oath."⁵⁶³ Al-Bukhārī has recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn 'Abbās that one day the Prophet saw a man standing in the sun. He said, "What is this?" He was told, "This is Abū Isra'īl; he has vowed that he will keep standing, that he will never go into the shade or speak to anyone, and will go on fasting." He said, "Tell him to speak, go into the shade, sit down, and complete his fast."⁵⁶⁴ This means that when he saw a man engaged in devotions which are not approved, namely keeping silent, standing and staying in the sun, he commanded him to complete that part which is approved and give up those which are not approved.

However, if one is not able to fulfill his vow, or would put himself in hardship if he tried, then he should atone for it and do something in its place. It is reported that 'Aqabah Ibn 'Āmir said to the Prophet that his sister had vowed to make *ḥajj* on foot. He said, "God does not want your sister to torture herself. Tell her to accept a ride and offer a sacrifice."⁵⁶⁵ In another version of the *ḥadīth* we have it that he commanded her to fast (to atone for her vow).⁵⁶⁶

This man (whose case you have stated) vowed to God that he would fast half the year. But if he does it, his mind and body will be affected. He must therefore break the fast, take what improves his health and mental condition, and atone for not fulfilling the vow. He should refrain from fasting till his sanity is restored and his physical and mental health are improved. He should refrain from fasting for the period necessary, whether it is two-thirds of

the year, three-fourths of it, or the whole of it. When he regains his health he may resume fasting on alternate days if it does not cause any harm, or fast however he finds useful, without turning away from things which are dearer to God than fasting. God does not want anyone to turn away from what is dearer to Him and engage in what is inferior. Obviously this man is not required to fulfill his vow.

As for the light that he experiences while fasting, the first thing to note is that acts of devotion and worship are not pure evil. Even those forms which are forbidden have some good consequences along with the evil ones. When their evil outweighs their good, the Law-giver prohibits them, as He has prohibited fasting all year long, or praying the whole night always, or offering *ṣalāh* after the morning (*fajr*) or evening (*‘aṣr*) prayers. Another thing which is to be noted is that people do see light when they fast continuously on account of the excessive hunger they experience. But this light is also seen by the infidels from among the People of the Book and the pagans, the hermits and the worshipers of graves. Excessive hunger over and above the limit allowed by the *shar‘* is harmful in the life here as well as in the life hereafter; its harms are greater than its benefits. I have seen many a people who engage in austere practices and severe penance ending up in frustration, inactivity, even sinful acts. They have often turned away from God altogether, or given up higher deeds for lower ones. Sometimes they have turned mad or developed some form of insanity. This is because their devotional structure is raised on foundations which are not approved by the *shar‘* or supported by the Sunnah.

One must know that God’s pleasure or love does not lie in torturing oneself or subjecting oneself to hardship; it is not true that the harder the work the more rewarding it is. Many ignorant people do think that reward is proportionate to the hardship one encounters. This is not true. Reward is proportionate to the usefulness of the act one performs, the good and beneficial consequences it produces, as well as the extent one obeys the

command of God and His Prophet. The more useful the act and the better one carries out God's will, the better it is. Acts are not superior or inferior on account of their quantity, but on account of what goes on in the heart while one performs the act.

This is the reason why the Prophet said to 'Aqabah Ibn 'Āmir when his sister vowed to make *hajj* on foot, "God does not want your sister to torture herself. Tell her to accept a ride."⁵⁶⁷ According to another version of the *ḥadīth* he commanded her to offer a sacrifice, and according to a third version, to fast (atoning for her vow).⁵⁶⁸ He saw his wife, Juwayrīyah, saying *tasbīḥ* on pebbles or date pits while he visited her at noon and again after sunset. He said, "Had you said four words only three times it would have outweighed what you have been saying the whole day..."⁵⁶⁹

One should know the truth, that God does not enjoin except what is beneficial for us, and does not forbid except what is harmful to us. He forbids things because they are harmful and injurious and commands things because they are useful and promote our well-being, though they do sometimes involve hardship. It is true that in making *jihād* or performing *hajj*, or enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, or acquiring knowledge, we encounter hardships. But when we bear the hardship and are rewarded for it it is because of the need which the act produces. At the time of his farewell *hajj*, when 'Ā'ishah (raa) made *'umrah* starting from Tan'im the Prophet did say to her, "Your reward shall be proportionate to the amount of labor you put in."⁵⁷⁰ But if the good that the act produces is not equal to the hardship one undergoes in its performance, it will be something evil, and God does not love evil...

All that has been instituted in the *shar'* is based on justice, moderation, and the principle of balance, which is the best and the noblest of all things. *Firdaws* is the highest grade of Paradise, and it is its best part. Hence, one who follows the principle of balance will go, God willing, to *Firdaws*.

This is true of all devotional acts which are not pursued for themselves, such as hunger, vigils and traveling on foot. But those which are pursued for themselves such as knowledge or love of God, turning to Him (in penitence), and trust in Him, perfection in them has been commended by the *shar'*. However, excess may be committed in these acts, too, by adding to them what does not belong to them. For example, in practicing trust one may discard the means which have been prescribed, or in cultivating love one may engage in what is unlawful or avoid what is lawful. One must differentiate between the two. However, knowledge is with God. [Fatāwā 25:272-84]

(10.14) Imitation of the Prophet (*ittibā' as-sunnah*)

What the Prophet has done by way of service (ta'abbud) to God is devotion ('ibādah) and is worthy of imitation. If any time or place is specified for it, it is with that specification a sunnah. To follow the Prophet is to do what the Prophet has done, as he has done, and for the purpose he has done. If he has done anything incidental, the majority view is that its imitation is not commendable; imitation is only in things which are done intentionally.

We have been asked to believe in things which the prophets have been given and to follow their examples. God has said, "Say: We believe in God, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and (the revelation) given to Moses, and Jesus, and that given to all prophets from their Lord. We make no difference between one and another of them, and we submit to God alone" (2:136). And, "These are the (prophets) who received God's guidance. Follow their example" (6:190). Muḥammad (pbuh) is the Seal of the prophets; there shall be no prophet after him and his *shar'* has superseded the *shar'* of the earlier prophets. Hence you cannot

reach God except by following him. The devotions (*'ibādah*) that he has instituted and made obligatory or desirable are as he has instituted them; similarly the works that he has commended and their merits and status that he has stated are as he has commended or stated them.

No one can say that something is desirable or prescribed except on the basis of a *shar'ī* argument. A weak *ḥadīth*, it should be noted, cannot serve as an argument; however, when it is established on the basis of a *shar'ī* argument that a certain deed is commendable, weak traditions regarding its merits can be cited provided it is not known that they are false. This is because the amount of reward is generally not mentioned. Hence, when we have a weak *ḥadīth* which tells the amount of reward it should not be discarded unless it is ascertained that it is false. It is with regard to these traditions that Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl and others have been lenient, just as they have been lenient with regard to the traditions of merits (*faḍā'il*). They were, however, far from establishing the lawfulness or desirability of a deed on the basis of a weak *ḥadīth*. Similarly, if they had found out that a particular *ḥadīth* was false, they never allowed it to be narrated except when they explicitly mentioned that it was false. The Prophet has said, "Whoever narrates a *ḥadīth*, ascribing it to me and knowing that it is a lie, is one of the liars."⁵⁷¹

Whatever the Prophet has done by way of service (*ta'abbud*) to God is a devotional act *'ibādah* and is worthy of imitation. If he has specified any time or place for it, it is with that specification his *sunnah*, his example to be followed. For example, he has reserved the last ten nights of Ramaḍān for *i'tikāf* or the Maqām Ibrāhīm for *ṣalāh*. Imitating the Prophet means doing what he did, as he did it, and because he did it. That is to say, we should do a thing for the same purpose for which he did it. If, for example, he took up a journey for *ḥajj* or *'umrah* or *jihād* we should also take up that journey for the same purpose. If he administered lashes to

someone in order to enforce a sentence, we should administer lashes only for that purpose. It follows that if one takes up the journey but with a purpose different from the purpose he had, or participates in administering lashes but with a purpose other than his own, he is not imitating him.

With regard to the actions which the Prophet did incidentally, as for example, he camped at a particular place in a campaign, or poured water on a plant from the water he had with him, or his camel walked on a particular side of the road, and so on, one may ask the question whether to imitate him means to do these things also. Ibn ‘Umar⁵⁷² (raa) loved to do them just as the Prophet had done them, but his righteous caliphs and the great majority of his Companions did not do them, for it was not the imitation of his example, which requires that he must have done the act on purpose. Hence, if he did not do something intentionally, just incidentally, to do that deed is not to follow him. Ibn ‘Umar would do the deed even if the Prophet did not do it intentionally. He thought that the Prophet’s doing it was itself something good irrespective of the way he did it and loved to do likewise, either because it would strengthen his love for him or bestow upon him the blessing (*barakah*) that lies in its imitation.

To the same category belongs giving out dates in *ṣadaqat al-fiṭr*⁵⁷³ by a person whose staple food is something else. Aḥmad seems to agree with Ibn ‘Umar in this matter; he allows it, following the latter’s practice. He also allows, following Ibn ‘Umar, touching the pulpit on which the Prophet used to sit. However, the contrary view, held by the majority of scholars that it is undesirable (*makrūh*), is also reported of him and is said to be his predominant view. Imām Mālik and other scholars are definite that such practices are undesirable even though Ibn ‘Umar engaged in them. Their reason is that elder Companions like Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and others did not do them. It is authentically reported that ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb once passed by a place where people used to get down and offer *ṣalāh*. On inquiry he was told

that the Prophet once offered *ṣalāh* at that place. He said “Do you want to turn the relics of your Prophet into prayer grounds? The people who went before you were destroyed for engaging in such practices. If the time for *ṣalāh* comes here offer the *ṣalāh* here; otherwise move on.”⁵⁷⁴

Opinions have also differed with regard to things otherwise lawful which the Prophet did not do intentionally. Is imitating him in those things only permissible or also commendable? Both views have been reported of scholars in the school of Aḥmad as well as in other schools; we cannot go into them here. It may be noted, however, that neither Ibn ‘Umar nor any other Companion visited the places where the Prophet camped during his campaigns, or the houses of his wives where he passed his nights. The question here is with regard to imitation of the Prophet in the action itself, even though it is known that he did not take it as a kind of devotion. As for the places themselves, the Companions are agreed that we should only sanctify those places which he has sanctified.

[*Fatāwā* 10:408-11]

(10.15) Piety (*taqwā*)

Taqwā is to refrain from the unlawful by doing what is enjoined or eschewing what is forbidden, particularly the... It is called taqwā, ‘safeguarding’, because by doing the enjoined or eschewing the forbidden one saves oneself from the wrath and the punishment of God.

Taqwā, as scholars, earlier as well as later, have stated, is to do what you are commanded to do and to eschew what you are commanded to eschew. At the time of the tragedy of ‘Uthmān (raa), Ṭalaq Ibn Ḥabīb⁵⁷⁵ used to say, “Guard yourself against it through *taqwā*.” When asked what is *taqwā* he said, “It is to do things in obedience to God’s commands, in light of His guidance, and in hope of His reward, and to refrain from disobeying Him,

following His instructions and fearing His punishment.” God Himself has said in the largest *sūrah* of the Qur’ān, “Alif-Lām-Mīm. This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear God (*muttaqūn*), who believe in the Unseen, who are steadfast in prayer, and spend out of what He have provided for them...” (2:1-4). He has thus described the *muttaqūn* as those who have faith, and do righteous acts, such as offering *ṣalāh* and paying *zakāh*. He has further said, “You people! Adore your Guardian-Lord Who created you and those who came before you, that you may learn *taqwā*, righteousness” (2:21); and, “It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards East or West. Righteousness is to believe in God and the Last Day, and the angels, and the Book, and the messengers, to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, on your kin, on orphans, on the needy, on the wayfarer, on those who ask and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer and practice regular charity; to fulfill the contracts which you have made and to be firm and patient in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout the period of panic. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing (*muttaqūn*)” (2:177). This is a great verse of the Qur’ān, which comprehends all aspects of the religion. It was revealed in answer to a question about faith. At-Tirmidhī has recorded on the authority of Fāṭimah bint Qays that the Prophet said, “There are duties on wealth other than *zakāh*.” Then he read out this verse.⁵⁷⁶ There are many more things which this verse underlines.

First, those who practice the things that are mentioned in the verse are *muttaqūn* in the real sense; and most of the things they practice are obligatory. Second, they are the things which constitute righteousness (*birr*), and only those who practice them are true in their faith. Third, most of these things are positive, that is to say deeds which have been enjoined. This means that things which are enjoined are part of righteousness (*birr*), piety (*taqwā*) and faith (*īmān*) more so than and having priority over those which

are forbidden. Fourth, one will be granted Paradise on the basis of these three things. God has referred to them in the following verse: “As for the righteous (*abrār*), they will be in bliss, and the wretched, they will be in the Fire” (82:13-4); “Shall we treat those who guard against evil the same as those who turn aside from the right?” (38:28); “As to the righteous (*muttaqūn*), they will be in the midst of gardens and rivers” (54:54); “Is then the man who believes (*mu'min*) no better than the man who is rebellious and wicked? They are certainly not equal” (32:18). Finally, the deeds that are mentioned in the verse are obligatory; for only those people who practice them have been called “true” (*ṣādiq*) and pious (*muttaqī*). To be sure truthfulness (*ṣidq*) is obligatory just as faith is obligatory...

Prophets like Noah, Hūd, Ṣāliḥ and Shu‘ayb all launched their mission with the call: “Serve God! You have no other god but Him” (11:50, 61, 84). This is what is said in Sūrat Hūd. In the *sūrah* “Poet,” their call is put in these, words, “Will you not fear God (*a lā tattaqūn*)?” (26:106, 124, 142, 151, 177),” or “Fear (*ittaqū*) God and obey me” (26:144, 150, 163, 179). Elsewhere in the Qur’ān God has said, “Righteousness (*birr*) is that you fear God (2:189); “No, those that keep their plighted faith and act aright - verily God loves those who fear Him (*muttaqūn*)” (13:76). Fulfill your engagements with them to the end of their term; for God loves the righteous (*muttaqūn*)” (9:4); And “As long as they stand true to you I stand you true to them; for God does love the righteous (*muttaqūn*)” (9:7)

God has made it clear that keeping a pledge or engagement is a part of *taqwā* which He loves and which is one of the obligatory duties. Obligatory duties are obligatory either because the *shar‘* has made them so or because they are pledged. Both are obligatory: one is fulfilling a pledge that one makes to God and the other is fulfilling a pledge that one makes to man. *Taqwā* is either to fear God or to fear His punishment. The Qur’ān says, “Then fear

the Fire whose fuel is men and stones” (2:24); and, “Fear the Fire which is prepared for those who reject faith” (3:131). In short, *taqwā* is to eschew the unlawful by doing what is enjoined or refraining from what is forbidden, particularly by the first. It is called *taqwā* because by doing what is enjoined and refraining from what is forbidden one saves oneself from God’s wrath and punishment. The motive behind *taqwā* is fear of sin, not hope for the useful or the harmless, for in that case it would be something commendable which one may do or may not do. It has been called *taqwā* in order to underline the fact that it is obligatory, and that one who fails in it is liable to punishment.

Another thing that I would like to point out is that if *taqwā* is explained as abstention from the forbidden taking clue from the verse, “Help you one another in righteousness and piety (*taqwā*) (5:3), it is supported by some Elders. They have said, “Righteousness (*birr*) is what you are asked to do, and piety (*taqwā*) is what you are asked to eschew.” In that case *taqwā* will be used in conjunction with something which is obligatory such as *birr*. The Qur’ān describes the call of Noah in these words, “Worship God, fear (*ittaqū*) Him, and obey me” (71:3). This is because *taqwā* implies the performance of what is enjoined.

Last, many people do a part of what has been enjoined, but only those who are true in their faith refrain from things forbidden. Sahl⁵⁷⁷ has said that this is because we have an urge within ourselves to do the duty; but abstention from forbidden things is against our desires and requires warring against the self which is often difficult. That is why those who abstain are few. No one can practice abstention except when he tries to do his duties. *Taqwā* is not simply eschewing something, for one who eschews *shirk* or abstains from evil or unlawful pleasures cannot succeed unless he does what is enjoined and lawful, which may divert him from the unlawful. Hence *taqwā* is doing things one is asked to do and refraining from the evil ones which may harm him. On the other

hand, one who does what is enjoined as well as what is forbidden, his evil deeds will spoil his good deeds, and he will not be safe. That is why salvation in ‘*alā* is for those who practice *taqwā*. God has said, “The (trust of the) Hereafter is for righteousness (*taqwā*)” (20:32); “The (best) end is for the righteous (*muttaqūn*) “ (7:128) and, “If you are constant and do right (*tattaqūn*), not the least harm will their cunning do to you” (3:120).

[*Fatāwā* 20:132-61]

11. RELIGIOUS VIRTUES

(11.1) Repentance (*tawbah*)

We are to repent not only of doing evil but also of not doing the good which is required of us, and the latter is much more important than the former. The third repentance, which is even more important, is repentance for erroneous beliefs. Scholars are agreed that there is no repenting for good deeds. The meaning of the saying, "The good of the righteous (abrār) is the evil of the intimates (muqarrabūn)" is explained. No one other than the Prophet is innocent or protected against a sin, major or minor. Prophets may commit minor sins incidentally, but they are not left with them; other friends (awliyā') of God may persist in them without repenting.

Repentance is of two kinds, obligatory and desirable. The former is for not doing obligatory duties or for doing forbidden things. This repentance is compulsory for all, as God has said in His Book and conveyed through His Messenger. The latter repentance is for not doing things that are desirable not compulsory, or for doing things that are undesirable. Those who repent in the first sense only are the middle-rankers in piety, and those who repent in the second sense also are the front-runners and most dear to God. But those who do not repent even in the first sense are wrong-doers, either infidels (*kāfirūn*) or transgressors.

Tawbah is to turn away from the thing you repent of. Hence the repentance which is advocated by the *shar'* is turning to God, doing what is enjoined and eschewing what is forbidden. Some people think that one has to repent of evil deeds only; they are simply ignorant. They cannot think of repentance except for shameful acts or evil deeds. The truth is that there is repentance for not doing the good which one is asked to do, and this repentance is much more important than the one for doing the forbidden. Many

people do not do things which God has asked them to do in their hearts or with their bodies. Often they are not even aware of them; and if they are aware they do not do them. Hence, they are either ignorant and mistaken, or deserve the wrath of God for opposing the truth knowingly...

People are sometimes aware and sometimes unaware that they should repent of things which they commit or omit. They often do not know that x is obligatory or y is forbidden and come to know it only after they have failed to do the former or have committed the latter. Sometimes they have that knowledge but do not act upon it, since their will to do the former and eschew the latter is not strong. Often this happens because their knowledge of the matter is imperfect; when knowledge is perfect, will usually follows. That is why the Qur'ān says, "God accepts the repentance of those who do evil in ignorance and repent soon afterwards; to them will God turn in mercy. For God is full of knowledge and wisdom" (4:17).

Repentance for erroneous beliefs is more important than repentance for evil deeds. For one who fails in a duty or commits an evil and believes that the former is obligatory and the latter is forbidden, his belief may sometimes urge him to do the former and eschew the latter so that he may not persist in his omission or commission. Or he may have a conflict of motives. His conscience may reproach him with the result that he may sometimes do his duty and sometimes fail to do it, or sometimes eschew evil and sometimes succumb to it. You can see that in the lives of many mistaken Muslims who sometimes perform their duties and sometimes not, or sometimes indulge in sins and sometimes abstain from them. In fact they are caught between conflicting urges. On the one hand, they have the basic faith which urges them to do their duty and eschew the evil; on the other hand, they suffer from doubt and burn with lusts which take them on the opposite path.

If, on the other hand, a person does something in the belief that it is his duty or abstains from it in the belief that it is forbidden, he

will have an urge stronger than that of someone who has wrong beliefs, since for the latter to repent it will first be necessary for his belief to be corrected and he knows the truth. This may prove more difficult, since he does not have the urge to give up his belief, as opposed to the former who has some urge to discard his lust. But sometimes it may be easy, for he may be interested in things which go against his belief. For example, he may dislike the heavy burden and the crippling yoke under which the People of the Book labor, or the disgrace they suffer at the hands of Muslims in the form of the poll-tax (*jizyah*) they have to pay to them. These things may urge him to examine the credibility of his beliefs and may lead him to truth and develop in him an interest which may eventually rescue him from his predicament...

A category of beliefs is forgivable, namely those that are acquired by mistake or unknowingly. God has forgiven such things in the case of this *ummah*. He has advised us to pray, "Our Lord! Condemn us not if we forget or err" (2:286); and an authentic *ḥadīth* says that God has granted this prayer.⁵⁷⁸ The Prophet is also reported to have said, "If a ruler or judge exercises his mind and forms a correct opinion he will have two rewards but if he exercises his mind and errs he will have one reward."⁵⁷⁹

As for repentance for *ḥasanāt*, or good things, no Muslim scholar has ever endorsed it. In fact, if anyone repents of good deeds knowing very well that they are good he is either an infidel or wicked. But if he does so unknowingly he is ignorant and mistaken. This is because *ḥasanāt* are either right faith or right deeds; therefore, repentance for them would mean turning away from the right faith, which is apostasy and faithlessness, or turning away from good deeds that God has commanded, which is sin and transgression.

The aphorism, "The good of the righteous is the evil of the intimate," has not come down from any authority, neither from the Prophet nor from anyone from among the Elders and the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah*. It is just an ordinary saying which may be

interpreted rightly or wrongly. Rightly interpreted it may mean either that since the righteous do what is obligatory, and eschew what is forbidden, and do not try to do more, for the intimates of God to adhere to this policy is unbecoming, for it would mean that they stay away from higher good and fail to attain intimacy, and that will certainly be something evil for them... Another right interpretation of the saying is that the good that a person does, whether obligatory or commendable, he does according to his own level of knowledge and power, but there may be others who have more knowledge and power and can do things which are far better than and superior to what he does. Hence, if the others do just what he does they will be failing in their duty and doing something undesirable. I will give an example. Common people are required to refer in matters of religion to learned scholars who are honest and sincere, and follow what they say; they cannot be charged with what is not within their power. On the other hand, those who have access to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and can make judgments on their own, if they do not try it and do just what a common man does, they will be failing in their duty and committing something wrong.

The wrong interpretation of the aphorism is that the *ḥasanāt*, or the good things which God has commanded everyone including the righteous to do are evil for the intimates, that, for example, praying five times a day, loving God and His Messenger, putting trust in Him, devoting oneself sincerely to His service, which are required of everyone, are not required of the intimates, and that they will be committing evil if they do them. This is absolutely wrong; only heretics (*zanādiqah*) determined to undermine Islam and the hypocrites posing as scholars and devotees say that. They claim that they have attained the status of intimates, that they are no longer subject to divine commands applicable to everyone else, and that they have no duties to fulfill and no forbidden things to eschew, be it adultery, drinking or gambling. Some have said similar things about the states of the heart which every Muslim is

required to cultivate; for them these internal states and feelings are good only for the common people but not for the intimates. Both these ideas are absolutely wrong and extremely vicious.

We have a consensus of opinion among the Elders, and the *a'immah* of all the schools, that no one other than the Prophet is innocent of (*ma'sūm*) or guarded (*maḥfūz*) against sin or error. People may sin, repent, and seek forgiveness; and they may commit error, then see the truth, and return to it. But this is necessarily the case with anyone except the Prophet. Even the best among the people other than prophets may die with one sin or another without being aware of it, which God will hopefully forgive. This is the reason why the consensus is that there is no one whose ideas are to be accepted without exception other than the Prophet (pbuh)... There is also a consensus that it is not necessary for a friend (*walī*) of God to be free from sin. The Qur'ān has described the friends of God in these words: "Behold! Verily on the friends (*awliyā'*) of God there is no fear, nor shall they grieve, those who believe and observe piety (*taqwā*)" (10:62-3). God's friends do not go out of the boundaries of piety when they commit a minor sin if they do not persist in it, or when they commit a major sin if they repent of it...

The Elders, the *a'immah* of the *ummah* and their followers are also agreed on what God has said in His Book, and what the Prophet has been authentically reported to have stated, that the prophets have repented of the faults (*dhunūb*) they have committed, and that God has raised them in honor on account of their repentance.⁵⁸⁰ "For God surely loves those who repent and turn to Him constantly, and loves those who keep themselves pure" (2:222). Their innocence (*iṣmah*) only means that they are not left to persist in their faults and errors. This is specific to them as against all other friends (*awliyā'*) of God, who may sin and err and may not repent. Prophets are rescued by God, Who turns to them, forgives their sins, and corrects their errors. He has said, "Never did We send a messenger or a prophet before you but when he

framed a desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire. But God will cancel everything (vain) that Satan throws in, and will confirm (and establish) His messages. For God is Knowing and Wise. (He allows this) so that He makes the suggestion thrown in by Satan a trial for those in whose hearts is a disease and who are hardened of heart. Verily the wrongdoers are in a schism far (from the truth)” (22:52-3).

[*Jāmi‘ ar-Rasā’il* 1:227-69]

(11.2) Abstinence (*zuhd* and *wara‘*)

Zuhd in something is lack of desire for it, with or without a dislike for it. Wara‘ is to abstain from something, to eschew it and guard against it. Hence there can be no zuhd or wara‘ in things that are necessary or desirable. They are possible only with regard to things that are forbidden or undesirable. As for things that are permissible, we can have zuhd in them, not wara‘.

Zuhd, lack of interest is the opposite of *raghbah*, desire, interest, inclination. People say A is *zāhid* in x, that is, A has no interest in x; and B is *rāghib* in y, that is, B is interested in y. *Ragbbah* is a form of will; hence *zuhd* is the absence of will, either with or without dislike for the thing. One can have *zuhd* in something if one does not will or desire it, even though one may not dislike it. If you are not interested in a thing and do not want it you are *zāhid* in it.

In the journey to God *zuhd* is commendable in things in which God has commended it, such as the good things of the world over and above one’s needs. Similarly, *raghbah*, interest, is commendable in things which God has commended and praised. That is why the journey to God begins with *irādah*, the will to please God. God has said, “Send not away those who call on their Lord morning and evening, seeking (*yurīdūn*) His pleasure” (6:52); and, “Those who want (*arāda*) the Hereafter, and strive therefore

with all due striving, and have faith, are those whose striving is acceptable (to God)” (17:19). Many more verses can be quoted on this subject.

God has praised *zuhd*, absence of desire, and has condemned avarice in many places in the Qur’ān, for example: “Those who desire the life of the present and its glitter, to them He shall pay (the price of) their deeds therein without diminution. They are those for whom there is nothing in the Hereafter but the Fire” (11:15-6); “The mutual rivalry for piling up (the goods of this world) diverts you (from the more serious things), until you visit graves. But no, you soon shall know (the reality). Again, you soon shall know! No, were you to know with certainty of mind (you would beware)! You shall certainly see the Hell-Fire! Again, you shall see it with certainty of sight! Then shall you be questioned that Day about the joys (you indulged in)” (102:1-8); “You devour inheritance all with greed, and you love wealth with inordinate love!” (89:19-20); “Man is really ungrateful to his Lord, as he is violent in his love of wealth; and to that (fact) he bears witness (by his deeds)” (100:6-8); “The life of this world is but play and amusement, pomp and mutual boasting, and multiplying riches and children (in rivalry) among yourselves” (57:20); and so on.

Our purpose here is to distinguish between the *zuhd* which the *shar‘* approves of and is therefore commendable and the *zuhd* which it does not, as well as between the interest which the *shar‘* approves of and the interest which it does not. For often *zuhd* is confused with dullness, inactivity and negligence in the matters of the *shar‘*, as interest is often confused with greed, avarice and misdirected activity.

As for *wara‘*, it is to abstain from something, to eschew it and guard against it. It involves dislike, contempt, and hatred towards its object; it is a kind of positive action. However, opinions differ whether the purpose behind it is to abstain from the forbidden object or to do the opposite; most people hold the latter view. To

be sure, one cannot be called pious (*war'ī*) or God-fearing (*muttaqī*) unless one abstains and does not do what is forbidden.

If you do not do the thing forbidden you do not expose yourself to its harmful consequences, namely condemnation and punishment. And since you have eschewed it and abstained from it and engaged in something right and desirable, you deserve its good consequences, namely praise and reward. Absence of evil consequences goes with abstinence from evil deeds, and existence of good consequences goes with performance of righteous deeds.

To sum up, *zuhd* is the absence of desire and will for something, and *wara'* is the presence of dislike and disdain towards something. You do not want to desire something unless you find it beneficial, or unless its benefits exceed its harms. On the other hand, you do not dislike a thing unless you find it harmful or its harms exceed its benefits. But if you have a thing which is neither harmful nor beneficial or whose harms cancel its benefits, then you will neither like the thing nor dislike it. You can have *zuhd* in such a case but not *wara'*. It follows that when you have *zuhd* you can have *wara'*, but not vice-versa. This is clear, for whatever is disliked and hated is neither desired nor willed. Absence of will follows upon dislike or hatred but not vice-versa, for whatever is not willed is not necessarily disliked; we do have things which we neither desire nor will, neither like nor dislike, and which are neither commanded nor forbidden.

It follows that things which have been commanded or recommended are not objects of *zuhd* or *wara'*; their objects are only those things which are either forbidden or disliked. However, things that have been permitted (*mubāḥ*) may also be objects of *zuhd*, but not of *wara'*. This is not difficult to see, but you may feel difficulty in cases where it is not clear whether the thing is commanded, forbidden or permitted, or when the thing in itself is permitted but it involves other things which may either change it into obligatory or forbidden, or when it is in itself obligatory but involves something which makes it forbidden, or vice-versa. In

such cases which involve both good and evil consequences, or are both beneficial and harmful, one really has a problem, and must investigate further.

[*Fatāwā* 10:616-9]

(11.3) Abstinence which is approved by the *shar‘*.

The zuhd which is approved by the shar‘ and loved by God and His Messenger is zuhd in things which are not useful for the Hereafter. But for things which are useful, such as worship, zuhd in them is sheer ignorance. Similarly, the wara‘ which is approved of is abstention from things which are harmful in the Hereafter, namely things which are clearly forbidden or doubtful or things abstaining from which is less harmful than engaging in them.

Some people indulge in severe ascetic practices and suppress all appetites and irascible urges, just as the devotees among the polytheists and hermits among the People of the Book do. These people consider *jihād* to be a fault since it means killing men, taking women and children captive and confiscating property. They say that God denied David the honor of building the Temple because his hands were red with blood. Some, like Brahmins, forbid the slaughter of animals; others do not forbid it but only abstain from it, considering it a devotional act. They abstain from eating meat and marrying women with the same idea, extolling celibacy and applauding vegetarianism.

The Prophet has disapproved of these practices. Both collections have the *ḥadīth* reported by Anas that some of the Prophet’s Companions inquired from his wives about his devotions at home. Then one of them said that he would not marry; another said that he would not eat meat; a third said that he would not sleep on a bed. When the Prophet came to know of them he went to his pulpit, praised God and said, “What has happened to these people who are saying such things! Look at me: I pray and I sleep; I fast

and I eat; I marry and I eat meat. Whoever departs from my way is not of me.”^{578a} God has said, “You who believe! Make not unlawful the good things which God has made lawful for you” (5:90). This verse was sent down in the case of Uthmān Ibn Maz‘ūn and his friends who had intended to live a life of celibacy and seclusion. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have recorded the words of Sa‘d that the Prophet did not allow celibacy to Uthmān Ibn Maz‘ūn, and had he allowed it they would have practiced castration.⁵⁸¹

The *zuhd* which is approved by the *shar‘* and loved by God and His Messenger is lack of interest (*zuhd*) in things which are not useful in the Hereafter. But as for the things which are useful in the Hereafter and which contribute to happiness there, *zuhd* in them is lack of interest in devotion and service to God. *Zuhd* is approved of only in those things which are either harmful or useless, but never in things which are beneficial. The Prophet has said, “Look for things which are beneficial for you, pray for God’s help, and do not lose heart.”⁵⁸²

Things that are useful to man are devotion to God and obedience to His commands and the commands of His Messenger; and those which are opposite to these are harmful to him. If he performs all his actions in a spirit of devotion to God and in obedience to His commands that will be all the more beneficial to him. On the other hand, if he performs a duty or does something permitted which does not help him in serving God, he will be doing what may benefit him or may not benefit him, though it will not harm him.

Similarly, the abstinence (*wara‘*) which has been approved of by the *shar‘* is abstinence from things which are harmful for the Hereafter, that is, things which are clearly forbidden or which are doubtful, or abstention from which is less harmful than indulgence in them. For example, you abstain from something doubtful just as you abstain from something forbidden even though you may be needing it, and do something instead which is clearly forbidden. Or you abstain from something obligatory which will certainly be

more harmful to you than if you do it without being confident about it. For example, you are to pay a debt which you or your parents owe to someone, but you do not have the required amount, though you have some other money about of which you are not sure if it is lawful; consequently you refrain from paying it, leaving the debt on you or your parents unpaid. In cases like this, to refrain from a thing about which you are not certain if it is obligatory or not is also a kind of *wara'*.

Perfect *wara'* is when, of two alternatives available, you do what is better and avoid what is worse. Let it be known that the object of the Shari'ah is to maximize good and minimize evil; hence, if one does not compare various options, good and bad, one may leave obligatory duties and indulge in things forbidden even though one may think that one is practicing *wara'*. For example, one may abstain from participating in *jihad* under an unjust ruler, or stay away from Friday prayers or prayers in congregation because the imām leading them is guilty of some *bid'ah* or is not pious, or one may reject the testimony of an otherwise honest witness or refuse to listen to the view of a learned scholar because they are guilty of some minor *bid'ah*, and believe wrongly all the while that he is observing *wara'*.

The same true of *raghbah*, interest, and of *zuhd*, disinterest. Whoever is not interested in what God and His Messenger approve of and love, or turns away from what they dislike, may leave what is obligatory and indulge in what is forbidden. He may, for example, abstain from proper food or necessary fat, which may weaken his body and affect his mental faculties so that he is not able to fulfill the obligations he owes to God or to people, or he may abstain from enjoining good and forbidding evil or waging *jihad* in the way of God, because that causes harm to some and suffering to others, with the result that non-believers and the wicked dominate the Believers and the righteous. This man obviously fails to see what is most conducive to the good of the people.

[*Fatāwā* 10:510-13]

(11.4) Mistaken abstinence

The abstinence (wara‘) which is approved by the shar‘ is both performance of duties and avoidance of things forbidden, not just the latter. Moreover, things which are conducive to greater good should not be given up for fear of some possible evil.

I have said above that doing something obligatory is better than avoiding something forbidden and that positive actions of obedience are better than abstaining from disobedience. I have also said that the abstinence (*wara‘*) which is approved by the *shar‘* is both performance of duties and avoidance of things forbidden, not avoidance only. Piety (*taqwā*), too, is both doing what is obligatory and eschewing what is forbidden. God has made this very clear: “Righteousness is not that you turn your faces towards East or West; righteousness is to believe in God, the Last Day, the angels, the Book and the messengers; to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, and for the ransom of slaves; to practice regular charity; to fulfill the contracts which you have made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or suffering), and adversity and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing, (*muttaqūn*)” (2:77).

It follows that those people are wrong who see in a particular action or property the evil aspect which calls for abstinence from it but fail to see the good aspect which calls for its performance or use. I will cite a case which Abū Ṭālib⁵⁸³ and Ibn Ḥamīd⁵⁸⁴ have mentioned. A person died and left some money of dubious nature; he also had a debt to pay. His son who inherited the money asked Aḥmad whether he should keep away from it. Aḥmad replied, “Would you leave the debt of your father unpaid?” This is the proper understanding of the *shar‘*. Paying off the debt is an

obligation; the creditor has a right to the money which the debtor has left, so that in case the inheritor does not pay, he can still realize the amount from the money left by the debtor. The inheritor should not waste the money; he should not harm the dead by leaving his debt unpaid. Moreover, the creditor has a right to it. Leaving the money as such will harm both the deceased and the creditor. This will be committing two wrongs, or failing in two duties. On the other hand, if the money is used it is possible that someone else is wronged. Nevertheless, Aḥmad advised the son to pay off the debt of his father from the money, for certainly it was better than wasting the money. Again, paying off the debt of his father is either a duty incumbent on him personally if no one else renders it, or a collective duty, or something much more commendable than abstaining from dubious money, because it serves a greater good.

Everyone has financial obligations. One has to spend on himself, on his kin, pay off debts, and so on. If one does not render these duties, one will be doing something definitely wrong. But if one makes use of money which is dubious, one does not do something which is definitely wrong. A Muslim is not supposed to avoid a wrong which is doubtful to commit a wrong which is definitely wrong. Sa'īd Ibn Al-Musayyib⁵⁸⁵ has said, "He is not good at all who does not like money by which he can serve his Lord, fulfill his responsibilities, help himself, and not have to depend on others." In the Sunnah collections, we also have the saying of the Prophet (pbuh), "God must help three people, one who marries, so that he can live a chaste life; two, a slave who takes leave from his owner to earn and pay off his price; and three, a debtor who strives to pay back his debt"⁵⁸⁶ The Prophet has underlined three duties here: chaste living, earning freedom, paying off debts. So it is part of your service to God that you pay off debts, help yourself, and not depend on others. Money is necessary for rendering these duties, and what is necessary for doing something obligatory is also obligatory. Those who do not

like to engage in things which are indispensable to religion are no good at all.

[*Fatāwā* 29:279-80]

(11.5) Giving thanks (*ash-Shukr*)

People give thanks for the good which is done to them. They can do so in the heart, with the hands, and with the tongue.

Hamd means to praise someone, to mention his good qualities and deeds, whether he has done any good to the person praising him or not. But *shukr* is to give thanks for the good that one has done to the person who thanks him. Hence *ḥamd* has a wider meaning than *shukr*, for it is done for the good qualities one has, as well as for the good one does to the person concerned. God is praised for the good attributes and sublime qualities He has, and for the good things that He creates in this life or will create in the life to come. He has said, “Praise be to God, Who created the heavens and the earth, and made darkness and light” (6:1); “Praise be to God, to Whom belong all things in the heavens and on the earth, (and) praise be to Him in the Hereafter” (34:1); “Praise be to God, Who created out of nothing the heavens and the earth, Who made the angels messengers with wings, two, three or four (pairs). He adds to creation as He pleases” (35:1).

Shukr, on the other hand, is only for the favor one does; it is, therefore, for things more limited. But it may be given in the heart, with the hand and with the tongue. An Arab poet has said:

“Your favors have put my three organs in action,
My hands, my tongue, and my heart.”

That is why God has said, “Work you, sons of David (with) thanks” (34:13).

Hamd is done with the heart and the tongue. In this respect *shukr* is more comprehensive than *ḥamd*, even though the reasons for *ḥamd* are more comprehensive than those for *shukr*. That is

why the Prophet has said, “Praise (*ḥamd*) to Allah is the chief thanksgiving, so one who does not praise God does not give thanks to Him.”⁵⁸⁷ In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections we also have his saying, “God loves for His servants to thank Him for every morsel of food they eat and every drop of water they drink.”⁵⁸⁸

[*Fatāwā* 11:133-4]

(11.6) Patience (*ṣabr*)

Patience (ṣabr) is of two kinds, patience in anger, and patience in affliction. One should not, however, invite trouble. The merits of patience are discussed.

(a) Patience is of two kinds, patience in anger and patience in affliction. Al-Ḥasan⁵⁸⁹ (raa) has said, “No one drinks a greater dose than the dose of forbearance at the time of anger, and the dose of patience at the time of affliction.” This is because the essential thing common to both is patience in a painful situation, and one who is patient in such a situation is really strong and brave. When the cause of pain is removable it produces anger, but when it cannot be removed it produces grief. Your face turns red when you are angry; this is because your blood surges up when you feel that you can do something. But your face turns pale when you are sad, for you feel that you cannot do anything.

The Prophet has referred to both facts in a *ḥadīth* recorded by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* of a report by Ibn Mas‘ūd. Addressing the people around him, he asked, “Whom do you call *raqūb*?” They said “*Raqūb* is one who has no children.” He said, “That is not *raqūb*. It is one who does not send any of his children before him.” He then asked them, “Whom do you call *ṣura‘ah*?” They said, “It is a person who is not defeated by anyone in wrestling.” He said, “That is not the case. The *ṣura‘ah* is one who controls himself at a

time of anger.”⁵⁹⁰ He thus defined *ṣabr* at the time of affliction and at the time of anger.

This is what the Qur’ān says with regard to affliction: “Give good tidings to those who patiently persevere, who say when afflicted with calamity: ‘To God we belong, and to God is our return’” (2:155). With regard to anger it says, “No one will be granted such goodness except those who exercise patience and self-restraint (*ṣabr*), none but the persons of greatest good fortune” (41:35). *Ṣabr* in affliction is mentioned here along with *ṣabr* in anger. But at times it is mentioned with self-restraint (*ṣabr*) in prosperity. For example, “If We give man a taste of mercy from Ourselves, and then withdraw it from him, behold, he is in despair and (falls into) blasphemy. But if We give him a taste of (Our) favors after adversity has touched him, he is sure to say, ‘All evil has departed from me.’ Behold! He falls into exultation and pride. Not so do those who show patience and constancy, and work righteousness; for them is forgiveness (of sins) and a great reward” (11:9-11). And, “(This was) in order that you may not despair over matters that pass you by, nor exult over favors bestowed upon you; for God loves not any vainglorious boaster” (57:23).

[*Al-Istiqāmah* 2:271-4]

(b) One should not, however, invite trouble and impose on oneself what the *shar‘* has not imposed. One should not, for example, swear to do something difficult, vow something arduous, strive for power, or enter a land where a plague is raging. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have recorded the *ḥadīth* reported through various channels that the Prophet discouraged making vows, saying, “It does not do any good, except take money out of the pocket of a miser.”⁵⁹¹ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have also the *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said to ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Samrah,⁵⁹² “Do not ask for governorship; for if you are given it at your request, you will be left to it. But if you are given it without asking for it, you will be helped in meeting its responsibilities. If you vow to do something and then see

something better for you, do the one which is better and atone for your vow.”⁵⁹³ Regarding plague, his advice was, “If you hear of one raging in a place do not go there, but if it breaks out at the place you are in do not flee from there.”⁵⁹⁴ This is also recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. We also have in them the *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said, “Do not pray to God for war; pray for peace. But when you meet the enemy be firm and steadfast (*iṣbirū*), and remember that Paradise is under the shadow of swords.”⁵⁹⁵ These and other *aḥādīth* underline the point that one should not impose on oneself things that one finds difficult to perform or avoid. Many people vow such things to God and then fail to do them.

It is imperative that when a person passes through an ordeal he be patient and persevering and not give in; he should be firm in his faith and persevere in his duties. All this requires patience. That is why the *ummah* is agreed that perseverance in meeting obligations and avoiding forbidden things is necessary. Patiently bearing all the afflictions that may come along the way and restraining oneself against temptation for forbidden things are no less necessary too.

God has spoken of *ṣabr* at more than ninety places in His Book. Sometimes He has mentioned it along with *ṣalāh* such as, “No, seek God’s help with patient perseverance (*ṣabr*) and praye; it is indeed hard except for those who bring a lowly spirit” (2:45); “Seek help with patient perseverance and prayer (*ṣalāh*), for God is with those who patiently persevere” (2:154); “Establish regular prayer (*ṣalāh*) at the ends of the day and at the approaches of the night. For things that are good remove those that are evil; this is the word of remembrance to those who remember (their Lord). And be steadfast in patience; for truly God will not suffer the reward of the righteous to perish” (11:11-5); “Patiently persevere, for the promise of God is true, and ask forgiveness for your fault, and celebrate the praises of your Lord in the evening and in the morning” (40:55); and, “Be patient with what they say, and celebrate (constantly) the praises of your Lord before the rising of the sun and before its setting” (20:130).

God bestows leadership in religion on those who demonstrate patience and firmness in faith. He has said, “And We appointed from among them leaders giving guidance under Our command, so long as they persevered with patience and continued to have faith in Our signs” (32:24). For religion is to know the truth and act upon the truth, and you cannot act upon the truth without patience. Mu‘ādh Ibn Jabal⁵⁹⁶ (raa) has said, “Strive for knowledge; for to seek knowledge is to worship God, to comprehend it is to fear Him, to work for it is to make *jihād*, to impart it to those who do not have it is to practice charity, and to discuss it is to engage in the glorification of God. With it we know God, serve Him, glorify Him, and affirm His unity. Through it God will raise up nations and make them leaders of mankind, whose precedents will be imitated and ideas followed.” This shows that Mu‘ādh (raa) considered the pursuit of knowledge part of *jihād*, and certainly you cannot carry out *jihād* without patience. That is why God has said, “By (the token of) time (through the ages) man is in loss, except such as have faith, do righteous deeds, and (join together) in the mutual teaching of Truth, patience and constancy” (103:1-3). He has also said, “Commemorate Our servants Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, possessors of power and vision” (38:45).

To acquire useful knowledge is to take the first step in the right direction, and to act upon it is to walk on the right path; the opposite of the first is ignorance, and the opposite of the second is to go astray; the first is acting without knowledge, and the second is indulging in evil desires. God has said, “By the star when it goes down, your Companion is neither ignorant of truth nor does he pursue evil desires” (53:1-2). You cannot follow the truth without knowledge, nor pursue the right course without restraining yourself (*ṣabr*). That is why ‘Alī⁵⁹⁷ said, “*Ṣabr* is to faith (*īmān*) as the head is to the body; if the head is removed the body will fall.” Saying that, he raised his voice and proclaimed “You cannot have faith without patience.”

[*Fatāwā* 10:38 -40]

(11.7) Trust

Trust in God is required of everyone, the commoner and the elite. Whoever says that it is only required of the common man is wrong. Moreover, trust is not required of you in worldly matters only, but in religious matters, too. You must put your trust in God in working for the purification of the heart, for the cultivation of piety, as well as for saving yourself from saying or doing anything evil. Trust in Him is very dear to God, and is required of everyone all the time. It is one of the most effective means to securing good and dispelling evil.

Virtues of the heart like love, trust and sincerity (*ikhhlāṣ*) in devotion to God are all good, pure and unmixed, and they are good for everyone: prophets, the most perfect in faith (*ṣiddiqūn*), the martyrs (*shuhadāʾ*) and the righteous (*ṣāliḥūn*). The view that they are the spiritual stages only for the common man to aspire for but not for the elite is absolutely wrong. No Muslim can ever dispense with them except for the hypocrite or the infidel...

They do, however, vary. They are different for the common man and for the elite, but the sense in which they are commonly thought to differ is not correct. It is said, for example, that the trust of the common man is a struggle against himself in the pursuit of his provision, whereas the elite do not have to struggle against themselves. It is also said that the common man uses his trust to secure various things, whereas the gnostic sees things in all their details, hence he does not strive for anything. I will say, first of all, that trust is not confined to worldly affairs; one does trust in God in one's efforts to purify one's heart, cultivate piety, guard one's tongue and will against evil, and these are certainly much more important things with regard to who should trust in God. We do say to our Lord in every *ṣalāh*, "You do we serve, and Your aid do we seek" (I:5). He Himself has commanded us, "Worship Him and

put your trust in Him” (11:123). Elsewhere He has directed everyone to say, “In Him I trust and unto Him I look (for help)” (11:88); and, “Say: He is my Lord. There is no god but He. On Him is my trust, and to Him do I return” (13:30)...

Second, trust in God is an essential part of religion, and no religious deed, whether obligatory or commendable, can be perfect without it. To ignore or disregard it is to disregard what God holds dear to Him and wants us to do... Third, trust in God is something very dear to Him, something that He has commended as well as enjoined. He has asked us to put our trust in Him in every matter all the time. And what is loved, commended and enjoined by God for all times cannot be for the average Muslim only and not for those who are dear to Him. These are the three observations which I wanted to make with regard to the view that those who put their trust in God do so only to secure some of their material interests.

As for saying that there is no room for trust since everything has been fore-ordained, that is like saying that we should not pray for anything because if it has been ordained there is no need to pray for it, and if not, prayer will not avail. This is one of the most fallacious statements in the judgment of revelation as well as reason. Similarly false is the statement that trust in God or prayer to Him does no good, nor does it save one from evil; it is only an act of worship. In fact, trust is no more than resignation (to the will of God). This view has been expounded by some Ṣūfī masters, but no matter who has done it, it is absolutely wrong. Equally wrong is the view that supplication (*du‘ā’*) is just a form of worship and nothing more.

There is one root cause of all this misconception. People think that the fact that things are fore-ordained means that one should not look for their causes and engage in them even though they are supposed to be done by us. They do not know that when God decides upon anything and ordains it He also ordains the causes which bring it into being, whether they are human actions or

anything else. If the said view were correct all human activity would cease.

The Prophet (pbuh) was questioned many times in this regard, and he made the issue fully clear. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have the *ḥadīth* reported by ‘Imrān Ibn Ḥaṣīn that some people asked the Prophet whether the people of Paradise have been demarcated from the people of Hell. He said, “Yes.” “What then is the purpose,” they asked, “of action?” He replied, “Everyone is provided with the means to work for what he was created for.”⁵⁹⁸ ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib says that they once were with the Prophet at a funeral. He was sitting with a small stick in his hand and scratching the ground with it. He then raised his head and said, “No one comes into being whose fate, whether he shall be happy or unhappy, is not decided already or whose place in Paradise or Hell is not determined beforehand and written down.” Hearing that, someone in the audience said, “Prophet of God, should we then not rely upon what has been written down for us and resign? Those who are destined to be happy shall be happy and those who are destined to be unhappy shall be unhappy anyway.” The Prophet said, “Work on. Everyone is provided with the means to work for what he was created for. The happy ones are provided for to work for happiness and the unhappy ones are provided for to work for unhappiness.” Then he recited the Qur’ānic verse, “So he who gives (in charity) and fears (God) and (in all sincerity) testifies to the good, We will indeed make smooth for him the path to bliss. But he who is a greedy miser and thinks himself self-sufficient, and gives the lie to the good, We will indeed make smooth for him the path to misery” (99:5-10).⁵⁹⁹ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* as well as the *Sunan* and *Musnad* collections. At-Tirmidhī has recorded that the Prophet was asked whether medicines and charms and the like which people used could dispel anything which God had ordained. He replied, “All of these are part of what has been ordained by God.”⁶⁰⁰ This point has been made in a number of *aḥādīth*.

The Prophet has made it absolutely clear that God's fore-knowledge or fore-writing of anyone's happiness or misery does not preclude his happiness or misery being caused by his good or evil deeds. God knows things as they are and thus does He write them. He knows that the happy shall be happy by doing good deeds and the unhappy shall be unhappy by doing evil deeds. Hence one who is destined to be happy shall be provided with the means to do the good deeds which will bring him happiness, and one who is destined to be unhappy shall be provided with the means to do the evil deeds which will bring him misery. Everyone shall have the path smoothed for him to the end he was created for, and shall be led to it according to the all-comprehending cosmic will of God, which He has mentioned in the verse, "They will not cease to differ, except those on whom your Lord has bestowed His mercy. And for this did He create them" (11:119).

[*Fatāwā* 10:17-24]

(11.8) Sincerity (*ikhlās*)

Muslims are generally sincere in their devotions, (ṣalāh) and fasting. However, they are less sincere in deeds which are for the welfare of society.

People have tried... to define sincerity (*ikhlās*). Some have said that a sincere Muslim is one who would not care to lose all the honor and respect that people have for him in order to set right his relation with God, or one who would not like anyone to know of even the smallest part of the good that he does, and so on. All these definitions are fine. They seem, however, to imply that one has to be sincere in each and every deed. This is not possible for all the people, not even for the majority of them. In general, Muslims are sincere in many of the acts which are required of every one of them, such as fasting in Ramaḍān. The vast majority of them do fast on those days only to please God. Similarly, those who offer

their prayers regularly pray only for His pleasure. But of those who are not regular, some pray for fear of someone, some to please others, and some for other worldly motives. That is why the Prophet said, “When you see a person going to the mosque regularly, you may bear witness to his faith, because God says, ‘The mosques of God shall be visited and maintained by such as believe in God and the Last Day, establish *ṣalāh* and pay *zakāh*’” (9:18).⁶⁰¹ At-Tirmidhī has recorded this *ḥadīth*.

One who does not offer *ṣalāh* without making ablution or bathing properly does not offer *ṣalāh* except to please God. That is why the Prophet (pbuh) has said in a *ḥadīth* recorded by Aḥmad and Ibn Mājah at the report of Thawbān, “Just try to keep yourself on the right path. You will not be able to do all that is right. Know that the best of all your deeds is *ṣalāh*, and no one makes ablution properly except one who is (really) faithful, because ablution is a secret thing between him and his Lord.”⁶⁰² Sometimes the ablution is broken and no one else can know, so when one maintains it, one maintains it only for the sake of God, and such a person can be none other than a Believer. However, sincerity in matters whose benefits reach out to people other than the doer is not so widespread as in the acts of devotion. That is why we have in a *ḥadīth* recorded in both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that the Prophet said, “Seven people will be under the shade provided by God on the Day when there will be no shade other than His shade: the ruler who is just; the youth whose days are passed in the service of God; the man who is ever-mindful of his prayers; friends who love each other, get together, and disperse just for the cause of God; the person who is invited by a beautiful and charming woman but ignores her call, saying that he fears God; the man who gives charity in such a way that his left hand does not know what his right hand has given; and the man who remembers God in secret such that his eyes burst into tears.”⁶⁰³

[*Fatāwā* 18:260-1]

(11.9) Love of God

(a) Love for God is the essence of faith and religion.

Love for God, or rather Love for God and His Messenger, is one of the essential parts and most important principles of faith; it is the essence of all the works of faith and devotion, just as it is the basis of all the commitments of faith and religion. Every activity in the world proceeds from one love or another, either love for something desirable or for something undesirable, as we have explained in the tract on the principles of love (*Qā'idat al-Maḥabbah*).⁶⁰⁴

All the acts of faith and religion proceed from the love which is commendable, which is rooted ultimately in love for God. On the other hand, acts which proceed from a love which is not approved by God are not good acts. In fact, all acts of faith and religion are to proceed from nothing but love for God, for God does not accept an act which is not done to please Him. The Prophet has reported these words of God: "Of all those whom people associate with Me I am the One Who cares least for the services which they offer. If anyone does something for Me as well as for others I do not accept it at all; I leave it for those whom he associates with Me."⁶⁰⁵ his *ḥadīth* has been mentioned in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections. They also have the *ḥadīth* which says that "the first group to enter the Fire will be the group of people who recite the Qur'ān to please others, who participate in *jihād* to please others, and who spend in charity to please others."⁶⁰⁶

Religion is for God alone. He does not accept any devotion or service which is not done to please Him alone. This is what every prophet and messenger in every age has preached, what every book which God has revealed has declared, and what all the leaders of faith have proclaimed. This is the essence of every prophetic mission and the center of all Qur'ānic teachings. God has said, "The revelation of this Book is from God, the Exalted in Power,

Full of Wisdom. Verily it is We Who have revealed the Book to you in truth; so serve God, offering Him sincere devotion. Is it not to God that sincere devotion is due?" (39:1-3). In fact the whole *sūrah* which begins with these words is devoted to this subject. Look at this verse: "Say: Verily I am commanded to be the first of those who bow to God in *islām*" (39:11-2)... The people of all eras, earlier and later, have been given the same message. With regard to the Jews and the Christians God has said, "The People of the Book did not make schisms until after there came to them clear evidence, and they were commanded no more than to serve God offering Him sincere devotion" (98:4-5).

Now, if the most essential thing in religion is sincere devotion to God, that is, seeking God alone, then what is sought for itself is loved for itself, which is what perfect love is. However, the ultimate goal is described as *'ibādah* rather than love. For example, "I have only created jinns and men that they may serve Me (*ya 'budūnī*)" (51:56); or "You people! Adore and serve (*i 'budū*) your Guardian-Lord Who created you and those who came before you" (2:21); and so on. *'Ibādah* entails perfect love and complete submission with humility. The being whom you love but do not revere nor submit to in humility is not your god (*ma 'būd*), nor is he your god whom you only revere but do not love. That is why God has said, "Yet there are men who take (for worship) others besides God, as equal (with God). They love them as they should love God. But those of faith are overwhelming in their love for God." (2:165)...

The word love has been applied to many things. Besides God, the Believer loves His messengers, His prophets, and His righteous devotees. But all these loves are part of his love for God, and the love that he has for God is reserved only for Him. This is why love has been mentioned along with those things which are reserved for God alone, such as worship (*'ibādah*), repentant return (*inābah*) and exclusive devotion (*tabattul*) to God; all these things also involve love for God...

(b) Love, fear, and hope

Since love is the essence of all religious activity, fear, hope and other similar virtues involve love and are involved in love. One hopes for those things only which one loves, not which one hates; and one fears something only because one loves to secure something else. God has said, “Those whom they call upon do desire (for themselves) means of access to their Lord, even those who are nearest hope for his mercy and fear His wrath” (17:57); and, “Those who believed and those who suffered exile and fought (and strove and struggled) in the path of God they have the hope for the mercy of God” (2:218).

God’s mercy (*rahmah*) encompasses everything good, and His wrath (*‘adhāb*) encompasses everything evil. Paradise is the abode of perfect and unmixed mercy, and Hell is the place of unmixed wrath. This world, on the other hand, is a combination of both. We hope for Paradise because Paradise stands for every possible good, the best of which is the vision of God, as we have in a *ḥadīth* narrated by ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Ubayy through Ṣuḥayb, and recorded by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. The Prophet (pbuh) said, “When the people of Paradise enter Paradise a voice will call, ‘People of Paradise! God has still to fulfill a promise He gave you.’ They will ask, ‘What is that? Has God not brightened our faces? Has He not tilted the scales in our favor? Has He not admitted us to Paradise and saved us from the Fire?’ At that time God will remove the veil (from His face) and they will look upon Him. There will be nothing more dear to them than to look upon Him. This is what has been referred in the Qur’ān (10:26) as “more”.⁶⁰⁷

In this light one should look at the words which have been attributed to a saint: “I did not worship You in the hope of Your Paradise nor in the fear of Your Bell; I worshiped You only to see You.” The person who has said these words, he and his followers, think that Paradise is only for enjoying food, drink, women, song,

fine clothes and other similar goods... That is why, when a saint heard the verse, “Among you are some that hanker after this world and some that aspire for the Hereafter” (3:152), he said, “Where are those who yearn for God?” Another saint, on hearing the verse, “God has purchased of the Believers their person and their goods for theirs (in return) is the Garden (of Paradise)” (9:111), said, “If our persons and goods are sold for Paradise, then for what shall we secure a look at God?” All these misconceptions are due to the fact that these people fail to see that the vision of God is part of Paradise. The truth is that Paradise is the name for all the good taken together of which the best and the highest is the vision of God. That seeing God is an integral part of the joys of Paradise is stated in many Qur’ānic verses and *aḥādīth*...

No action can be conceived of without some kind of desire and love. Some ascetics have held out that possibility but they are wrong. They think that the perfection of man lies in getting rid of all desires. They advance that idea in light of their experience of self-effacement (*fanā*). But they do not realize that persons in the state of *fanā* are occupied with their love, that they are not without desire and love, even though they are not aware of it. They think that they are free from all desires, but that is not true. You cannot think of someone moving without any motive, without any love, hate or desire. The Prophet has rightly said, “The truest names are *ḥārith*, the cultivator, and *hammām*, the aspirant,”⁶⁰⁸ for every person has something that he cultivates, and everyone has some aspiration which moves him. In the case of one, it is love for God which moves him to obedience to Him; in the case of the other it is awe and the fear of Him which keeps him away from sin. ‘Umar is on record as having said about Ṣuḥayb,⁶⁰⁹ “What a good man Ṣuḥayb is! Were he not to fear God, even then he would not commit a sin.” That is to say, he would not disobey God even if he did not fear Him, but now that he fears God you can imagine how deeply pious he is, his awe and reverence for God keep him away from all sins.

One who looks for God also fears Him; his hope and his fear are related to God's appearance or non-appearance to him. And you know that one looks for seeing God only because one loves Him. It is love for Him that generates longing for His appearance and fear of being deprived of it. But if his fear or hope is related to some created object which gives him pain or pleasure, he tries to avoid it or secure it by serving God, which does imply love for Him. One who feels pleasure in loving God will find it sweeter than any other love. That is why the best thing that the people of Paradise will engage in will be remembering God. A *ḥadīth* says that the people of Paradise will be inspired to glorify God just as they will be inspired to breathe."⁶¹⁰ This means that the best joy of Paradise will be the remembrance and love of God. In short, one's fear for a created thing or hope for it may drive him to God, which is the essence of all devotion.

The Qur'ān and Sunnah are replete with statements regarding the love of the faithful for God, for example, "Those who have faith are overflowing in their love for God" (2:165); "He loves them and they love Him" (5:54); "Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your spouses or your kindred, or the wealth that you have gained, or the commerce on which you fear a decline, or the dwellings in which you delight are dearer to you than God and His Messenger or the striving in His cause, then wait until God brings about His decision" (9:24). The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have recorded that the Prophet said, "He certainly feels the pleasure of faith who holds God and His Messenger dearer to him than anything else, who loves naught but for the sake of God, and who hates to return to unbelief after God has rescued him from it as much as he hates to be thrown into Fire."⁶¹¹

Love for the Messenger follows from love for God. This comes out in the verse in which God has joined love for the Messenger with love for His own Self, "If... (they) are dearer to you than God and His Messenger..." (9:24). The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have the words of the Prophet, "By the One Who has full control over my life, none of

you will be a Believer unless I am dearer to him than his children, his parents, even the whole of mankind.”⁶¹² Al-Bukhārī has recorded the words of ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb: “By God, Messenger of God, you are dearer to me than everything else except myself.” On hearing that, the Prophet said, “No, ‘Umar, not till I am dearer to you than your very self.” After that ‘Umar said, “Now, by God, you are dearer to me than my own self,” whereupon, the Prophet said, “Now, yes (you are a true Believer) ‘Umar!”⁶¹³

The love for the Companions and the family of the Prophet (pbuh) is similarly a corollary of one’s love for God. The Prophet has said, “The proof of faith is love for the *Anṣār*, and the proof of hypocrisy is hatred towards the *Anṣār*.”⁶¹⁴ He also said, “No one who believes in God and the Hereafter will hate the *Anṣār*.”⁶¹⁵ ‘Alī (raa) said, “The unlettered Prophet (pbuh) has given me the word that no one will love me except the Believer, that no one will hate me except the hypocrite.”⁶¹⁶ The *Sunan* collections have that the Prophet said to ‘Abbās, “By the One Who has my life in his hand, people will not enter Paradise unless they love you people for the sake of God and because you are my kith and kin.” He meant the descendants of Hāshim.⁶¹⁷ Ibn ‘Abbās has also reported a *ḥadīth* from the Prophet: “Love God since He nourishes you with His bounties; love me because of your love for God, and love my family because of me.”⁶¹⁸

As for God’s love for His devotees, we have a number of verses such as, “God did take Abraham for a friend” (4:125); “They love Him and He loves them” (5:54); “Do good; for God loves those who do good” (2:195); “Make peace between them with justice and be fair; for God loves those who are fair (and just)” (49:9); “Truly God loves those who fight in His cause in battle array, as if they were a solid, cemented structure” (61:4); And, “Surely, those who keep their plighted faith and act aright - verily God loves those who act aright” (3:76)...

(c) God is loved for Himself.

The truth which everyone believes, the Elders, the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah*, the *ahl al-ḥadīth* and *ahl as-Sunnah*, and all the leaders of the religion who have a following, and all eminent *Ṣūfī shaykhs*, is that God is loved for Himself and loved in truth and reality. In fact, love for Him is the most perfect of all love. He has Himself said, "Those who believe love God the most." (2:165). Similarly, God loves His faithful devotees in reality.

The Jahmīyyah have denied the possibility of love for God and by God, for in their view love can take place only between people who have something in common, and since there is nothing in common between the Eternal and the contingent, there can be no love between them. The first man to put forward this heretical idea in Islam was Al-Ja'd Ibn Dirham in the beginning of the second century Hijri... He said that God did not take Abraham for a friend, nor did He speak to Moses directly... Al-Jahm, Ibn Ṣafwān took this idea from him, preached it and advanced arguments in its support... Then the Mu'tazilah, the followers of 'Āmr Ibn 'Ubayd took the idea and preached it openly during the caliphate of Al-Mā'mūn, till the *a'immaḥ* of Islam were put to the test and were asked to subscribe to it.

The doctrine was originally expounded under the influence of such polytheists and Sabaeans as the Brahmins, the philosophers and heretics from among the people of the Book who believed that God had no positive attributes at all. They were opposed to Abraham, the dearest friend of God, since they worshiped stars and erected temples to them and the intelligences and other beings. They denied that God took Abraham for an intimate friend or that He spoke to Moses directly.

Kkullah means the most perfect love that takes hold of the whole being of the lover. A poet says of his beloved:

"You have permeated in me (*takhallaltī*), just like the soul. That is why the *Khalīl* (i.e. Abraham) was called the *Khalīl*."

This is supported by a *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Saʿīd. The Prophet said, “Were I to take an intimate friend (*khalīl*) from among the people of the earth I would take Abū Bakr to be my *khalīl*. But your Companion is the *khalīl* of God.”⁶¹⁹ He was referring to himself. In another *ḥadīth* he has said, “I have no one as my *khalīl*; had I taken anyone from among the people of the earth as *khalīl* I would have taken Abū Bakr as *khalīl*.”⁶²⁰ These *aḥādīth* make it perfectly clear that it did not behoove the Prophet to take any mortal to be *khalīl*, and were he to take one he would have taken Abū Bakr.

However, for a number of people the Prophet has said that he loves them. For example, he said to Muʿādh, “By God, I love you.”⁶²¹ He also expressed his love for the *Anṣār*.⁶²² Zayd Ibn Ḥārithah⁶²³ was known to be his darling, as was his son Usāmah.⁶²⁴ ‘Amr Ibn Al-ʿĀṣ once asked him, “Who is dearest to you?” He said, “‘Ā’ishah.”⁶²⁵ “Who among men?” he asked again. The Prophet said, “Her father.”⁶²⁶ To Fāṭimah, his youngest daughter, he once said, “Would you not love whom I love?” She said, “Surely, why not?” He said, “Then love ‘Ā’ishah.”⁶²⁷ Regarding (his grandson) Al-Ḥasan he prayed to God, “Lord! I love him, so Lord! You also love him, and love those who love him,”⁶²⁸ and so on.

It is therefore certain that the Prophet said that he loved some people. On the other hand, it is also true that he said, “I have no *khalīl* at all; and had I to take one I would have taken Abū Bakr for my *khalīl*.”⁶²⁹ This means that *khullah* is a higher form of love, or the most perfect love that permeates the whole being of the lover, who loves him for no other reason but for himself. The one whom you love for something else is inferior to one whom you love for himself. Since *khullah* is the most perfect love, it cannot have more than one being as its object; it takes hold of the whole being of the lover and leaves no room for another.

Khullah cannot admit of another, or give priority to anyone else. Its object must be loved for his own sake and without the participation of any other. Such a love can be for God alone, and cannot be directed to anyone else besides Him. God alone is loved for Himself, all other beings that are loved are to be loved for the sake of God. If ever any being other than He is loved for himself that love is wrong. Cursed is the world, and cursed is all that is in it, except what is loved for God. Let me hope that the meaning of *khullah* is now clear. So if anyone denies that God is loved for Himself he denies that anyone can take God for his *khalīl*; similarly, if anybody denies that God loves any of his devotees, he denies that God can take anyone for His *khalīl*, that He loves any of His devotees with perfect love, and that any of his servants may love Him with perfect love.

[*Fatāwā* 10:48-69]

(d) Love for God not only means submitting to His commands and devoting oneself to Him; it also means to love Him for His own Self.

When Islam was dominant and people read and understood the Qur'ān, it was not possible for those who had submitted externally to Islam to deny any part of the Qur'ān. But they could misinterpret God's names and, taking Qur'ānic verses out of their contexts, could explain love for God simply as submission to His commands and an effort to come closer (*taqarrub*) to Him. This is sheer ignorance, for you do not try to come near to anyone unless you love him, and if you do not love him you do not seek his nearness, for seeking nearness is only a means, and love of the means is subject to love of the end. It is not possible for you to love the means without loving the end.

The same is true of worship (*'ibādah*) and obedience (*tā'ah*). You do not love to worship or obey the One Who is Lord and God unless you love Him for Himself. Love for worship of and

obedience to Him is subject to the love for Him Himself; if He is not loved for Himself you would not like to worship or serve Him. And if you serve someone only to secure something from him or to ward off some chastisement from him you will be serving him only to have something in return or to save you from some evil. You will be neither loving him nor loving to serve or worship him. Love for someone does involve love for the things which are means to him, but that love is something different from the love which is essentially for the means. The latter is characterized as love for something in return, or love for safety from something evil. Love of God has nothing to do with either.

God has also distinguished between love for Himself and love for some action for His sake. He has said, "If they (i.e. the things that He has enumerated) are dearer to you than God and His Messenger and *jihād* in His cause.." (9:24). He has also distinguished between love for Himself and love for His Messenger, saying, "...dearer to you than God and His Messenger." Were love for God identical with the love for some action the latter would be simply a consummation of the former or would have been mentioned just as a particular thing is mentioned along with its class. But both interpretations are to be avoided unless there is some reason to justify them. Just as love for God is not to be reduced to love for the Messenger, it is not to be reduced to love of the actions performed for His sake. Again, when we want to say that we love someone we simply say we love him; we do not say that we love to obey him. The latter is not even a metaphorical way of saying the former. Hence, to interpret love for God in terms of love for actions in obedience to His commands is simply to misinterpret the language.

We have stated the truth at various places that no one other than God deserves to be loved for himself, just as no one other than He exists by himself. There is no lord except Allah, and there is no god except Him; He is the only Being That deserves to be loved for Himself and to be glorified for Himself with most perfect love

and glory. Every good quality that we think of and admire God deserves in its perfection, and everything that we praise in beings other than Him in fact comes from Him; thus He deserves our best and most perfect love. To deny that love to Him is in fact to deny that He is the God Whom we should worship and adore. Similarly, to deny that He loves His devotees is to deny His will, and to deny that He is Lord and Creator of the universe and the God of all. This is what the doctrine of the misinterpreters and negators of God's love amounts to.

That is why the best teaching that we have in the religions of the two communities of Moses and Jesus that have gone before us is, "Love God with all your heart, with all your reason, and with all your will."⁶³⁰ This is the real faith of Abraham, which is the basis of the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur'ān. Its denial first came from the polytheists and the Sabaeans who opposed Abraham, and then from those who took the ideas and followed them from among the philosophers, theologians, jurists and heretics.

[*Fatāwā* 10:69-73]

(e) Knowledge of God is the basis of love for God. He is loved for His blessings on man, as well as for the perfections He is qualified with.

Knowledge of God is the basis of love for God. There are two grounds for this love. One, He deserves our love because of the numerous blessings that He showers on us. This is accepted by everyone; it is part of our nature that we love those who do us good and hate those who do us wrong. Our real benefactor is God; from Him proceeds ultimately any good that comes to us from any source, since He controls all the sources and brings into being all the causes. However, if this love does not rise up to the love of God for Himself, we would be loving nothing other than ourselves, for if we love someone only for the good he does to us we love none but ourselves. However, this kind of love for anyone is

something good, not bad. The Prophet has referred to this love in these words: “Love God because He feeds you and nourishes you with His bounties. Love me because of your love for God, and love my family because of your love for me.”⁶³¹ However, the person who loves God only for this reason is ignorant of the other reasons he should love Him. He knows only one reason, God’s blessings on him. It is said that praise for God is of two kinds, praise which is only thanksgiving, and which is inspired by God’s blessings on us; and praise which is the celebration of His glory and loving Him for Himself.

The other basis of love for God lies in Him Himself. It is love that He deserves in Himself. One loves God in this way when one knows the perfections which He has and which inspire love. He deserves to be loved for every aspect of His being which His names and attributes highlight, as well as for all the things that He does, for every good that proceeds from Him is a favor from Him, and every chastisement that He inflicts upon us is just and fair. That is why He is to be praised in all situations, in prosperity and in adversity. This form of love is better and higher, and is given to the chosen ones only. It is they who look for a vision of the gracious face of God, who delight in remembering Him and speaking to Him, and hold that dearer than a fish holds water. If they ever cease to remember Him they will find it so painful that they will not be able to bear it. They are the fore-runners (*sābiqūn*) mentioned in the *ḥadīth* which Muslim has recorded on the authority of Abū Hurayrah. Once the Prophet went up a mountain called Ḥamdān. He asked his Companions to go around the mountain, and said, “The *mufarriḍūn* win the race.” “Who are the *mufarriḍūn*?” people asked him. He said, “Those men and women who remember God very much.”⁶³² In another version of the *ḥadīth*, the words are, “Those who devote themselves fully to remembering God (*mustahtirūn bi-dhikr Allah*), *dhikr* will reduce their burden so that they will feel light when they see God on the

Day of Judgment.”⁶³³ *Mustahtir* is one who loves to remember God, feels pleasure in it and does not stop remembering Him.

Hārūn Ibn ‘Antarah has narrated through his father that Ibn ‘Abbās said, “Moses said to God, ‘Lord! Which of your people are most dear to You?’ God said, ‘Those who remember Me and do not forget Me.’ Moses asked again, ‘Which of Your people are most knowledgeable?’ He said, ‘Those who are eager to learn from people and increase their knowledge of things which show them the right path and save them from pitfalls.’ Moses asked the third time, ‘Which of Your people are most wise?’ God replied, ‘Those who judge themselves by the same standards they judge others, and judge others as they judge themselves.’” This tradition, which mentions love, knowledge and justice, comprehends all the good.

[*Fatāwā* 10:84-6]

(f) Signs of love for God: imitation of His Prophet and striving for God’s sake.

The true servant of God is one who likes what God likes and dislikes what He dislikes, who loves what God and His Messenger love and hates what they hate, and who is the friend of God’s friends and the enemy of His enemies. It is he whose faith is perfect. The Prophet has said, “He who loves for God, hates for God, gives for God, and withholds for God, perfects his faith.”⁶³⁴ He also said, “The strongest link in the chain of faith is love for the sake of God and hatred for the sake of God.”⁶³⁵ He has further said, “Whoever has three qualities feels the joy of faith: that he holds God and His Messenger dearer to him than anything else; that he loves none except for God’s sake; and that he abhors to return to the life of faithlessness after God has rescued him from it just as he abhors to be thrown into fire.”

One whose likes and dislikes are same as the likes and dislikes of God would naturally hold God and His Messenger dearer to him than anything in the world. Again, since he loves people for the

sake of God and not for anything else, he will perfect his love for God. Love for things which are dear to the person one loves perfects his love for him. So when one loves God's prophets and His friends just because they work for things God loves, not because of any other thing, he loves them for God and for nothing else. The Qur'ān says, "Soon will God raise a people whom He will love as they will love Him, lowly with the Believers, mighty against the rejectors" (5:57). This is why the Qur'ān says to the Prophet, "Say: If you do love God, follow me; God will love you and forgive you your sins" (3:31). The Prophet commands only that which God loves and forbids only that which He hates, does only that which He approves of and preaches only that which He wants people to believe. Hence whoever loves God should follow His Messenger, believe what he says, obey what he commands, and imitate what he did. If he does that he does what God likes and He will, therefore, love him. There are two things by which you will know the lovers of God: they follow His Messenger and engage in *jihād* for His cause.

Jihād means to exert oneself to secure the faith and righteousness which God loves, and to fight the unfaith, immorality and sin which God hates. He has said, "Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your spouses or your kindred, the wealth that you have gained, the commerce in which you fear decline, or the dwellings in which you delight are dearer to you than God or His Messenger, or striving (*jihād*) in His cause, then wait until God brings about His decision, and God guides not the rebellious" (9:24). This is the warning that God has issued to those who hold their families and their wealth dearer than Him and His Messenger and striving in His cause. There is a *ḥadīth* in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that the Prophet said, "By the One Who has my life in His hands, not one of you will truly believe unless I am dearer to him than his sons, and his parents and the whole of mankind."⁶³⁶ We have also in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections that 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb said to the Prophet, "Messenger of God you are

certainly dearer to me than anything in the world except my own self.” The Prophet said, “No, ‘Umar, you cannot be a Believer unless I am dearer to you than everything else, Then ‘Umar said, “By God, you are now dearer to me than my own self,” whereupon the Prophet said, “Yes, ‘Umar, now.”⁶³⁷

Jihād is to exert oneself to the utmost to secure what God loves and eliminate what he hates. So if you withdraw from *jihād* while you have the power to carry it on, it only means that your love for God and His Messenger has weakened. You know that you do not secure what you hold dear, whether good or bad, unless you exert yourself; you do not earn money, achieve power or win a woman without toiling hard and taking pains in this life, besides what you may suffer in the life to come. So if you love God and His Messenger and are not prepared to take the trouble which those who work for worldly objects take to secure them, your love for God is weak indeed.

[*Fatāwā* 10:190-3]

(g) To call people to God and His religion is part of one’s love for God.

It is part of your love for God that you call people to God, call them to believe in God and in what His Messenger says and do what he commands. In fact, to call people to the Prophet is to call them to God. Again, to call them to abstain from what God has forbidden is to call them to Him. You also call them to God if you ask them to do what He and His Messenger approve of and to eschew what they disapprove of, whether it is a matter of action or belief: belief regarding His names and attributes, or any other unseen realities such as the Throne, the Footstool, angels, and the prophets whom He has sent to people at different times, as well as actions like loving God and His Messenger more than anything else.

Calling people to God and preaching to them His religion is a duty incumbent upon everyone who believes in Prophet Muḥammad and joins his *ummah*. Read what God says: “Those who follow the Messenger, the unlettered Prophet whom they find mentioned in their own (scriptures), in the Torah and the Gospel, who commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil, allows them as lawful what is good (and pure) and prohibits them from what is evil (and impure), who releases them from their burdens and from their yokes that are upon them; those who believe in him, honor him, help him and follow the light which is sent down with him - it is they who will prosper” (7:157). This is the description of the Prophet, and following is the description of his *ummah*: “You are the best of peoples evolved for mankind; you enjoin what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God” (3:110); and, “The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is just, forbid what is evil, observe regular prayers (*ṣalāh*), practice regular charity (*zakāh*), and obey God and His Messenger. On them God will pour His mercy, for God is Exalted in power, Wise” (9:71).

This mission is the duty of the *ummah* as a whole; a collective duty which is considered fulfilled on behalf of the community even if only some from the community render it. The basis of this rule is the verse, “Let then arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong. They are the ones to obtain felicity” (3:104). The whole community is to stand in place of the Prophet and carry out this mission. This is the reason why their consensus wields authority. In case they differ they must refer the issue to God and His Messenger. Now, when this is clear, it is the duty of every Muslim that he love what God and His Messenger love and hate what they hate, as is laid down in the Qur’ān.

It is not right to take the word of anyone other than the Messenger or the statement of anybody other than that of the Qur’ān as an authority in religion. Those who raise anyone,

whoever he may be, to the status of authority and follow his words and practices, are the ones about whom the Qur'ān says, "They split up their religion and become (mere) sects, each party rejoicing in that which is with itself" (30:32). You may study the religion and cultivate piety following the path of any imām or *shaykh* whom Muslims follow, but you should not make him or the promoters of his ideas or ways the arbiter of truth, siding with him on every issue and opposing those who differ with him. You must think over the issue in your own mind and act upon the view you arrive at. I hope this will serve as a caution. Certainly what goes on within the heart comes up at the time of trial.

Never should anyone call someone to a view or believe in it himself just because it is the view of his party or sect; nor should he ever fight for it. He should rather call to it because it is what God and His Messenger say or command and because it is his duty to submit to them. A preacher of Islam should first refer in his preaching to what is in the Qur'ān, for the Qur'ān is the light and guidance. He should then turn to the *imām al-a'immaḥ*, the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be upon him, and only as the last resort to the words of the *a'immaḥ*.

The preacher is either a *mujtahid*, an independent scholar who can form views in the light of the Qur'ān and Sunnah on his own, or a *muqalid*, one who follows an imām. If he is an independent scholar (*mujtahid*), he should look into the works of the scholars of the first three generations (*qurūn*), compare different views and choose what he thinks best. But if he is a follower, he should follow the Elders, because the people of earlier times are as a whole were better than the people of later times. Now that this is clear we will say what God, our Lord, has said: "Say: We believe in God and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to (all) prophets from their Lord. We make no difference between one and another of them, and we bow to God (in *islām*)" (2:136). We will enjoin what He has commanded and

forbid what He has prohibited, either in His Book or through His Prophet. He has said, “Take what the Messenger gives you, and abstain from what he withholds from you” (59:7). The basis on which this religion stands is the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and the Consensus.

[*Fatāwā* 20:7-9]

(h) Errors regarding love for God.

To love God is to perfect our service to God. However, it is only a part of that service. The other part is awe and fear (khashīyyah). When love is not combined with awe and fear one often becomes arrogant, makes high claims inconsistent with his servant-ship (‘ubūdīyyah) and violates the Sharī‘ah. This is what a number of Ṣūfīs do who abandon themselves in love.

Love for God is the completion of our service (‘ubūdīyyah) to God. Some people have a wrong idea of service. They think that our servanthood (‘ubūdīyyah) requires only submission and acquiescence, and has nothing to do with love. On the other hand, they think that love (for God) permits them to do whatever they like, even make claims which conflict with the divinity and lordship of God. This is why, when people wanted to discuss love in the presence of Dhū an-Nūn,⁶³⁸ he asked them not to enter into it lest someone indulge in high claims. Many a person of knowledge and gnosis shun the company of those who talk of love without fear. The Elders have said that whoever serves God with love alone is a *zindīq*, whoever serves Him with hope alone is a *Murjī’ī*, and whoever serves Him with fear alone is a *Khārijī*; only one who serves Him with love, fear and hope is a true Believer. That is why many Ṣūfīs who in later ages took liberties in love turned arrogant and made high claims which were not consistent with their servanthood. some even claimed a part in Lordship (*ar-rubūbiyyah*), which is reserved for God, some boasted of going

above the level of the prophets and messengers, some prayed to God for things which in their absolute forms behoove neither the prophets nor the messengers, but only God.

Many Ṣūfis have fallen in this trap. Their sense of their status as servants of God as expounded by His messengers and laid down in their revelations has weakened. Their reason by which they should have known their status has also been weak. And when reason becomes weak and knowledge of the religion fades, and love for God becomes strong, one begins to take liberties, just as a weak-minded person takes liberties, with the person he loves. He thinks that since he loves God he may do whatever he likes, even if it is wrong and foolish. This is sheer folly. It is the same kind of love that led the Jews and the Christians to claim, "We are the sons and friends of God" (5:18). God retorted by saying, "Say: Why then does He punish you for your sins? No, you are but men of the (same kind) He has created. He forgives whom He pleases and punishes whom He pleases" (5:20). Since He punishes them for their sins it means that they are not His beloved people, and that their relation to prophets is no credit for them. It only means that they are just like any other created beings.

Whomever God loves He engages in doing what He loves and approves of, and keeps him away from what He dislikes and disapproves of, such as faithlessness, immorality and sin. He dislikes anyone who commits a grave sin, persists in it and does not repent, just as He loves anyone who does good. His love for a person is in proportion to the latter's faith and piety. Those who think that their sins will not harm them since God loves them, and persist in their sins, are like those who think that if they take poison and go on taking it and shun the antidote, it will do them no harm.

Even a layman who thinks over the stories of the prophets which God has related in His Book, the way they repented and sought God's forgiveness, and the hardships they encountered which purified them and raised them in honor, will know that sins

do harm their doers, however great they may be. You know that if a lover neither knows nor does what is good for the person he loves, and does instead what he himself wants to do, something undesirable and unfair, he will only incur the wrath of his beloved and invite his chastisement.

Many Ṣūfīs have done things that are wrong and unjustified in the name of God's love; they have crossed the limits which God has set for them, failed in the duties which He has enjoined, and made boastful claims that are completely unjustified. One, for example, has said that if a disciple of his leaves anyone to suffer in the Fire he will have nothing to do with that disciple. Another has said that if any disciple of his cannot stop a Believer from entering into the Fire, he will have nothing to do with him. The former makes it incumbent on his disciples to rescue everyone from the Fire, and the latter to stop the perpetrators of grave sins from entering into the Fire. A third has said that on the Day of Judgment he will put up his tent on the banks of Hell and will not let people enter it. Many more boastful statements have come down from renowned Ṣūfī *shaykhs*; some of them, to be sure, are falsely attributed to them, but some have really been said by them. Such things occur from Ṣūfīs in the state of ecstasy (*sukr*) and self-effacement (*fanā*), states in which one loses reason completely or finds its hold to have weakened so that he does not know what he is saying. *Sukr* is rapture accompanied by loss of the sense of discrimination. That is why when they become normal they recant from what they had said in that state.

Ṣūfī *shaykhs* who love to hear songs of love and passion, yearning and desire, complaint and reproof, madness and infatuation, only want to kindle their love. They should know that God has made a test for love when He has said to the Prophet, "Say: If you love God, follow me, God will love you" (3:31). However, many people who claim to love God cross the limits of the Shari'ah and go beyond the practice of the Prophet and say things we cannot discuss here. Some have claimed that they have

no longer any duties to fulfill and no unlawful things to eschew, which obviously contradicts the Sharī‘ah. On the contrary, God has held *jihād* in his way as proof of love of Him and His Messenger, for *jihād* involves utmost love for what God has enjoined and utmost aversion for what He has forbidden. He has described those who love Him and whom He loves in these words: “Lowly with the Believers, mighty against the rejecters, fighting in the way of God” (5:57). This is also the reason why the love of this *ummah* for God is more perfect than the love of the communities before it, as its service to God is more perfect than their service. And of them those who are most perfect in these respects are the Companions of the Prophet (pbuh), and those whose lives resemble their lives the most. Those claimants to God’s love whom I have mentioned before bear no comparison with them.

[*Fatāwā* 10:206-210]

(11.10) *Riḍā*: resignation and willing obedience.

(a) Riḍā is of two kinds. One is willingness to carry out what God has commanded and refrain from what He has forbidden; this is a duty. The other is to resign oneself to suffering poverty, illness, etc.; this is commendable. Only ṣabr in it, or bearing it patiently is obligatory. As for resignation (riḍā) to unfaith, immorality and sin, it is forbidden. No Believer should resign himself to them in any situation. Many theologians and Ṣūfīs have entertained wrong ideas in this matter. Below is a refutation of those ideas.

Riḍā is of two kinds: One is willingness to do what God has commanded and to refrain from what He has forbidden. This includes the use of things which God has allowed without entering, however, into anything forbidden. God has said, “It is more fitting that they should seek the pleasure of God and His Messenger” (9:62); or, “If only they had been content with what God and His Messenger gave them, and had said, ‘Sufficient unto us is God;

God and His Messenger will soon give us of His bounty. To God do we turn our hopes” (9:59). This kind of assent is obligatory. That is why God has condemned those who fail in it: “Among them are men who slander you in the matter of (the distribution of) the alms. If they are given part thereof, they are pleased, but if not, behold, they are indignant. If they had been content with what God and His Messenger gave them, and had said, ‘Sufficient unto us is God; God and His Messenger will soon give us of His bounty. To God we turn our hopes’” (9:58-9).

The second kind of *riḍā* is to resign oneself to any suffering, such as poverty, illness or humiliation. One opinion is that this resignation is commendable, another is that it is obligatory. The correct view is that it is *ṣabr*, or patiently bearing, those sufferings that is obligatory. Al-Ḥasan⁶³⁹ said, “Indeed resignation (*riḍā*) is very difficult; the believer must take to patience.” Ibn ‘Abbās has reported these words of the Prophet: “If you can carry on willingly and with conviction, go ahead; but if not, then patiently bear the things you do not like; it is a great good.”⁶⁴⁰

But as for resigning oneself to unbelief, immorality and sin, the *a’immah* of the religion do not approve; God does not approve of them. He has said, “He does not like ingratitude and faithlessness from His people” (39:9); “Allah does not like disbelief” (2:205); “But if you are pleased with them God is not pleased with those who disobey” (9:96); “If a man kill a Believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein, and the wrath and the curse of God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him” (4:93); “This (is) because they followed that which called forth the wrath of God, and they hated God’s good pleasure, so He made their deeds of no effect” (47:28); “God has promised the hypocrites, men and women, and the rejecters of faith, the Fire of Hell. Therein shall they dwell, sufficient is it for them” (9:68); “Evil indeed are (the works) which their souls have sent forward before them (with the result) that God’s wrath is on them, and in torment will they abide” (5:83); and, “When at length they

provoked Us, We exacted retribution from them, and We drowned them all” (43:55). Since what they were doing did not please God, rather it angered Him, His wrath and curse fell upon them. How could one not dislike them and condemn them just as God has condemned them.

Two groups of people have developed wrong ideas about *riḍā*. One group, which consists of those who claim to follow the Sunnah in their controversy with the Qadarīyyah, have come to accept the view that God’s love or wrath or disapproval should be reduced to His will, even though, in opposition to the Qadarīyyah they do believe that God wills everything that happens in the world. But they say that He also loves what He wills. Having said that, they begin misinterpreting the texts. For example, they say that the verse, “God does not love mischief” (2:205), only means that He does not will it, or does not want the Believers to will it; or the verse, “He is not pleased with the faithlessness of His servants” (29:7), simply means that He does not want the Believers to do it. This is a serious mistake. In their view these statements are just like saying that He does not like faith or is not pleased with faith, that is to say, He does not will that the infidels have faith or that He does not like it that they should believe. The *ummah*, on the other hand, is agreed that whatever God enjoins is loved by Him, and may either be incumbent upon us or desirable for us to do whether or not we do it. For a details on this point one should look to other places.

The second group consists of certain Ṣūfīs who have gone astray. They perceive the order of things and exclaim “that God is the Lord of the whole universe, and that He determines everything and wills it, so they cannot but say that they are pleased with everything which He ordains and brings into being, even if it be faithlessness, immorality, or sin. Some even want to say that love is a fire which burns out everything in the heart except the will of the Beloved, and since He has willed the whole universe, it is to be loved in its entirety. This is how they have gone far away from the

truth. They have not distinguished between the efficient and the prescriptive will (*irādah*) of God, between existential and religious permission (*idhn*), the cosmic and the religious command (*amr*), and the natural and the religious dispatch (*irsāl*) which we have discussed in detail elsewhere.

This attitude of theirs is also the cause of their failure to distinguish between the obligatory and the forbidden, between the friends of God and His enemies, and between the pious and the wicked. They put those who believe and do good and those who do mischief on the earth on the same level, and the pious and the wicked, the obedient and the disobedient in the same category. They abolish the distinction between command and prohibition, between joyful promise and wrathful threat, between things enjoined and things forbidden. They call this the realization of truth (*ḥaqīqah*). By God, this is only the perception of existential reality (*ḥaqīqah*), and it is nothing to be proud of. Even the worshiper of idols knew that God has said, “If you ask them who it is that created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly say, ‘God!’” (31:25); or, “Ask: To whom belongs the earth and all beings therein? (Say) if you know! They will say, ‘To God!’ Say: Yet will you not receive admonition?” (23:4-5). This means that the polytheists who worshiped idols also recognized that God was the Creator of everything, and that He was their Lord and Master. Hence, those whose truth (*ḥaqīqah*) comes only to this are only close to the worshipers of idols.

A Believer differs from an unbeliever in that he believes in God and His messengers, believes in the truths they communicate, obeys what they enjoin, and engages in what God commands or loves for him, and not in the faithlessness, immorality, and sin which He determines and ordains. He is not to be resigned to the calamity that befalls him, or to be happy with the evil that he commits. He is to seek forgiveness for his sins, and bear patiently the affliction he has to suffer. In short, he has to do as God has said: “Patiently persevere, for the promise of God is true, and ask

forgiveness for your faults” (40:55). God has mentioned obedience along with patience at various places in the Qur’ān, such as, “If you are constant and do right, not the least harm will their cunning do to you” (3:120); “But if you persevere patiently and guard against evil, that will be one great thing” (3:180). Joseph repeated the same thing when, he said, “For him that is righteous and patient, never will God suffer the reward to be lost of those who do right” (12:90).

[*Fatāwā* 10: 682 -6]

(b) *Riḍā and celebrating the praises of God (ḥamd)*

Riḍā is an act of the heart, but its consummation is *ḥamd*, celebrating the praises of God. That is why some people explain *ḥamd* in terms of *riḍā* and it is also the reason why the Qur’ān and the Sunnah advise people to praise God in every situation. It is because *riḍā* involves resignation to God’s decrees. A *ḥadīth* says, “The first people to be called to Paradise will be those who praise God in prosperity as well as in adversity.”⁶⁴¹ Of the Prophet, it is said, “When something good happened to him he would say, ‘Praise be to God by Whose favor good things become possible.’ But when something unpleasant happened to him he would say, ‘Praise be to God in every situation.’”⁶⁴²

[*Fatāwā* 10:43]

(c) *Boastful utterances (shathāt) of the Ṣūfis regarding riḍā.*

Abū Nu‘aym has related the story of Samnūn⁶⁴³ which he heard from Abū Bakr Al-Wāsiṭī.⁶⁴⁴ Samnūn addressed God and said, “Lord I shall be happy with anything that You ordain for me.” Thereafter, for two weeks he was not able to pass urine, and would roll around on the ground like a snake that twists and rolls left and right. When he was relieved he said, “Lord! I repent and turn to you (for Your mercy).”⁶⁴⁵ Abū Nu‘aym writes that Samnūn

realized at the first touch of affliction the mistake which he made though his love for God was so well known that everyone talked about it.

In the chapter on *riḍā* in his book *Al-Qushayrī*⁶⁴⁶ has mentioned a similar incident regarding Ruwaym al-Muqrī,⁶⁴⁷ a friend of Samnūn's. He writes: Ruwaym once said, "He only resigns himself to God who if Hell is put on his right side will not pray to God to put it on the left." *Al-Qushayrī* then adds: This is like the saying of Samnūn, "Lord You may test me as You wish." But if Samnūn could not bear it when his urine was withheld, how could Ruwaym bear it if Hell were put on his right side!"⁶⁴⁸ *Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyāḍ*⁶⁴⁹ was at a level higher than these two. When he had difficulty in passing urine and was down with the pain he prayed, "Lord! Just for the love that I have for You relieve me from this pain!" And he was relieved...

Words like that of Samnūn are spoken by those who are in an intense emotional state, who are not aware of the consequences of their words. Never should they be imitated or followed; they only indicate the resignation (*riḍā*) and the love of the person who utters them. Remember that such people are not fully aware of the manners of the Way (*ṭarīqah*); they do not know what kind of piety and patience is within their powers and what is not. Prophets fully know the way to God, pursue it perfectly and guide people best. Hence those who move away from their practices follow a way which is not straight, commit mistakes and end in despair, even though they do not sin or defy or deny God's command. Their case is like that of a Bedouin who was down with fever. The Prophet visited him and asked whether he prayed to God for anything. He said that he did say, "Lord! if You were going to punish me in the Hereafter do it here in this life." The Prophet said, "Exalted is God! You could not bear that, you could not stand that. Why did you not say, "Lord! Give us the good of this life and of the Hereafter, and save us from the torment of the Fire.' (2: 201)."⁶⁵⁰

[*Fatāwā* 10:691-2]

12. RANKS OF THE BELIEVERS

(12.1) *Awliya'*, friends of God, are those Believers who are pious.

A walī is one who believes in God, wills what God wills, loves what He approves of, hates what He disapproves of, enjoins what He commands and forbids what He prohibits. The Prophet is the dividing line between the friends (awliyā') of God and His enemies. No one is a walī who does not believe in him and in what he teaches, as well as follow him in the external and internal actions. Those who claim to love God and be His friends but do not follow him are not at all the friends of God.

The *awliyā'* of God are those that have faith and cultivate piety. God has said, "Behold! Verily in the friends (*awliyā'*) of God there is no fear, nor shall they grieve, those who believe and (constantly) guard against evil" (10:62). Al-Bukhārī and others have recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet said, "God says that whoever opposes a friend (*walī*) of Mine declares war against Me, or (as it is in another version) I declare war against him. My servant does not come close to Me through anything so much as he does by doing the duties I have laid upon him. However, My servant draws near to Me by doing supererogatory acts till I love him, and when I love him I become his ears by which he hears, his eyes by which he sees, his hands by which he strikes, and his legs by which he moves. He hears, sees, strikes and moves with My powers. When he asks Me I give him, and when he seeks My protection I protect him. I do not hesitate to do what I decide upon, except in taking out the soul of My servant who is faithful. He does not like death and I do not like to displease him, but he cannot avoid it."⁶⁵¹ This is the most authentic *ḥadīth* regarding the friends of God. It says very clearly that one who opposes a friend of God declares war against God. In another

ḥadīth we have God saying, “I take action for My friend like a fearless lion;”⁶⁵² that is to say, God avenges for His friend just as an angry lion attacks his pray.

This is because the friends of God are those who believe in Him and side with Him, who love what He loves, and hate what He hates, like what pleases Him and dislike what displeases Him, enjoin what He commands and forbid what He prohibits, give to the one He would like and withhold from the one He would not like. At-Tirmidhī and others have recorded that the Prophet said, “The strongest link in the chain of faith is love for the sake of God and hatred for the sake of God.”⁶⁵³ In another *ḥadīth* which Abū Dāwūd has recorded, the Prophet said, “He who loves for God, hates for God, gives for God and withholds for God, perfects his faith.”⁶⁵⁴

Walāyah, friendship, is the opposite of *‘adāwah*, enmity. The essential idea in *walāyah* is love and intimacy, and the essential idea in *‘adāwah* is hatred and keeping at a distance. It has been said that *walī* is called *walī* because he is steadfast in obedience and devoted in it. However, the first explanation is more correct. *Walī* is one who is close. We say *hādhā yalī*, ‘it is close’... Now, if the *walī* is one who wills what God wills, does what He enjoins and abstains from what He forbids, the one who is his enemy will also be the enemy of God. God has said “You who believe! Take not My enemies and yours as friends offering them (your) love” (60:1). Those who oppose the friends of God oppose God, and those who oppose Him war against Him. That is why He has said, “He who opposes a friend of Mine declares war against Me.”

The best friends (*awliyā’*) of God are His prophets, and the best of the prophets are the messengers, and the best of the messengers are the *ulū al-‘azm*, steadfast in their determination: Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad, peace be upon them all... and the best of the *ulū al-‘azm* is Muḥammad, the Seal of the Prophets, the leader of the pious, the greatest son of Adam and the

chief of the prophets and messengers... By sending him God has drawn a dividing line between His friends and His enemies. No one will be a friend of God who does not believe in him and in what was revealed to him, and who does not follow him in letter as well as in spirit. Those who claim to love God and enjoy His friendship but do not follow Muḥammad, peace be upon him, cannot be God's friends; in fact if they oppose him they are His enemies and friends of Satan. God Himself has declared, "Say (Muḥammad!) If you do love God follow me; God will love you" (3:31). Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī⁶⁵⁵ (raa) said, "Some people claimed that they loved God, so God revealed this verse as a test for them. He made it clear that they only love Him who follow the Messenger, and those who do not follow the Messenger cannot be friends of God"...

Whatever heights a person may rise to in his abstinence, worship and knowledge, if he does not believe in all that was revealed to Muḥammad (pbuh) he is neither a Believer nor a *walī* of God. This is true for everyone, be he a scholar of religion or a devotee from among the Jews and Christians, or a so-called gnostic and votary from among the pagans of Arabia, Turkey, India, or any other country. All the saints of India and Central Asia who are known for their knowledge and devotion in their religion but who do not believe in all that was revealed to Muḥammad (pbuh) are infidels and enemies of God, even if some may think that they are His friends.

[*Fatāwā* 11:159-71]

(12.2) Friends of God are found in every section of the *ummah*.

The awliyā' of God have nothing visible to distinguish them from others. They are found in all sections of the ummah, scholars of the Qur'ān, masters of knowledge, men of war and jihād, traders, industrialists, farmers, rich and poor.

The *awliyā'* of God have no visible signs to distinguish them from others. They do not have to wear any particular clothing and avoid others which are permissible. They do not have to shave their heads, cut their hair short or trim it if it is within the limits permitted. The saying goes that there are many pious men in plain clothes and many heretics in religious garb. The friends of God may belong to any section of the *ummah* of Muḥammad (pbuh). What is required is that they keep away from every doctrine which is unjustified and eschew every practice which is immoral. They may be scholars of the Qur'ān, masters of knowledge, men of the sword and *jihād*, traders, craftsmen, industrialists, farmers, and so on. God has mentioned different sections of them in the verse, "Your Lord knows that you stand forth (to pray) nigh two-thirds of the night, or half of the night, or a third of the night, and so does a party of those with you. But God does appoint night and day in due measure. He knows what you are unable to keep count thereof. So He has turned to you (in mercy). Read, therefore, of the Qur'ān as much as may be easy for you. He knows that there may be some among you in ill health, others traveling through the land seeking God's bounty, yet others fighting in God's cause. Read, therefore, as much of the Qur'ān as may be easy for you" (73:20).

The *Salaf* used to call the men of religion and learning *qurrā'* (sing. *qārī*), which besides scholars (*'ulamā'*) also included devotees (*nussāk*). Then the word *ṣūfīyyah* (singular *Ṣūfī*) and *fuqarā'* (sing. *faqīr*) came to be used. The *Ṣūfī* was one who wore wool (*ṣūf*); this is the correct derivation of the term. The word *fuqarā'* later come to mean the people of *sulūk*, who followed a particular *ṭarīqah*.. But this is a more recent use of the term. The question arose as to what is the better word to use, *Ṣūfī* or *faqīr*? People also debated the issue of who is better, the rich person who gives thanks to God or the poor one who is patient. The controversy over this issue goes back to Al-Junayd⁶⁵⁶ and Abū Al-

‘Abbās Ibn ‘Aṭā’.⁶⁵⁷ Both views have been ascribed to Aḥmad. The correct view, however, is the one which God has stated in this verse: “Mankind! We created you from a single (pair of) male and female, and made you into nations and tribes that you may come to know one another. Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you” (49:13). An authentic *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah (raa) says that the Prophet was asked, “Who are the most honored people?” He said, “The most God-fearing among them.” He was told that such was not the question. He said, “Then it is Joseph, the prophet of God, son of the prophet Jacob, son of the prophet Isaac, son of the most intimate friend (*khalīl*) of God, Abraham.” He was again told that such was not the question. “Are you then inquiring about the original tribes of the Arabs? Look, people are like mines, such as the mines of gold and silver. The best of them in the period of Ignorance (*al-Jāhiliyyah*) will be the best in Islam, provided they learn Islam.”⁶⁵⁸

The word *faqr* in the language of the *shar‘* means either lack of money and property or the dependence of created beings on the Creator. In the Qur’ān we have, “The alms (of *zakāh*) are for the poor and the needy” (9:60); “Men! It is you who depend upon God” (35:15). God has singled out two kinds of poor men (*fuqarā’*) for praise, those people deserving charity (*ṣadaqah*), and those people sharing in booty (*fay*). The former He has mentioned in this verse: “(Charity is) for those in need (*fuqarā’*) who in the cause of God are restricted (from travel) and cannot move about in the land, seeking (trade or work). The ignorant, because of their modesty, think that they are free from want. You shall know them by their (unfailing) mark: they beg not from all and sundry” (2:273). The latter, who are better, God has mentioned in this verse: “...to the indigent immigrants (*al-fuqarā’ al-muhājirīn*), those who were expelled from their homes and their property while seeking grace from God and His Messenger. Such are indeed the true ones (in their faith)” (59:8).

This is the description of those *muhājirūn* who refrained from evil deeds and fought the enemies of God, open and hidden. The Prophet has said, “The *mu'min* is one whom men can trust with regard to their lives and property; the *muslim* is one from whose tongue and hands people are secure; the *muhājir* is one who eschews what God has forbidden; and the *mujāhid* is one who exerts himself most in the affairs of God.”⁶⁵⁹

As for the *ḥadīth* reported by some people that on the way back from Tabūk the Prophet said, “We now turn from the lesser *jihād* to the greater *jihād*,”⁶⁶⁰ it has no basis. No one versed in the words and deeds of the Prophet has reported it. Moreover, *jihād* against the infidels is one of the most honorable deeds, rather the best of all the supererogatory works one can engage in. God has said, “Not equal are those Believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of God with their goods and their persons. God has granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than those who sit (at home). Unto all (in faith) has God promised good. But those who strive and fight has He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward” (4:95). He has also said, “Do you make the giving of drink to pilgrims, or the maintenance of the Sacred Mosque equal to (the pious service of) those who believe in God and the Last Day, and strive with might and main in the cause of God? They are not comparable in the sight of God. And God guides not those who do wrong. Those who believe and suffer exile and strive with might and main in God’s cause with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God. They are the people who will achieve (happiness). Their Lord does give them glad tidings of a mercy from Himself, of His good pleasure and of gardens for them wherein are delights that endure. They will dwell therein forever. Verily in God’s presence is a reward, the greatest (of all)” (9:19-20).

The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have a *ḥadīth* that ‘Abdullah Ibn Mas‘ūd asked the Prophet what work was best in the sight of God. He replied,

“*Ṣalāh* in its time.” “Then what?” ‘Abdullah asked; the Prophet said, “Good behavior to parents.” “Then what?” he asked again. The Prophet said, “*Jihād* in the cause of God.” ‘Abdullah Ibn Mas‘ūd says that it is absolutely true that the Prophet said this, and that if he had continued in his questioning the Prophet would have said many more things.⁶⁶¹ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* also have the *ḥadīth* that the Prophet was asked what action was the best. He replied, “Faith in God, and *jihād* in His cause.” “Then what?” the questioner asked; he said, “The *ḥajj* which is accepted (by God).”⁶⁶² There is a third *ḥadīth* also in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. Someone said, “Messenger of God, tell me of a deed which is comparable to *jihād* in the cause of God.” He said, “You could not do it, or could barely do it.” The man said, “Please tell me.” The Prophet said, “Is it possible for you to fast and not eat, to offer *ṣalāh* and not take a rest from the time the *mujāhid* goes out on *jihād*?”⁶⁶³

[*Fatāwā* 10:194-9]

(12.3) The friends of God are of different levels.

The friends of god are of different levels according to their faith and piety. Broadly speaking, they come under two categories, one, the front-runner favorites; the other, the middle-ranking “People of the Right Hand”.

Since God’s friends are those who are faithful and pious, their ranks as friends will differ according to their faith and piety. Those who are more perfect in faith and piety will be the greater friends of God. The strength of their faith and the quality of their piety will determine their rank in God’s friendship. Similarly, the faithlessness and hypocrisy of a person will determine his status in his enmity with God...

God’s friends come under two categories, one, the front-runner favorites; and two, the middle-ranking People of the Right Hand. God has mentioned them at various places in His Book, in the

beginning and at the end of Sūrat Al-Wāqī‘ah (56), in Sūrat Al-Insān (76), Al-Munāfiqūn (63), and Fāṭir (35). In Al-Wāqī‘ah, for example, He has said, “When the inevitable comes to pass, no soul will entertain falsehood concerning its coming. Many will it bring low; many will it exalt; when the earth shall be shaken to its depths, and the mountains shall be crumbled to atoms, becoming dust abroad. And you shall be sorted out into three classes: the People of the Right Hand, and what will be the People of the Right Hand! and the People of the Left Hand, and what will be the People of the Left Hand! and those Front-Runners, the Front-Runners, they will be the ones nearest to God” (56:1-11)...

These two categories of God’s friends have been mentioned in the sublime words that the Prophet has quoted from God: “Whoever opposes a friend of Mine declares war against Me. None of my servants comes closer to Me through anything than by doing what I have enjoined upon him. And My servant draws nearer and nearer to Me by doing supererogatory works, till I love him. And when I love him I become his ears by which he hears, his eyes by which he sees, his hands by which he strikes, and his legs by which he moves.”⁶⁴ In light of this *ḥadīth*, the righteous servants (*abrār*) of God are the People of the Right Hand, who approach Him by performing their duties, doing what God has enjoined on them and refraining from what He has forbidden. They do not take up supererogatory works nor abstain from things that are superfluous though permitted.

The Front-Runner favorites are those who seek God’s favor by doing supererogatory works after they have fulfilled their duties. They do what is incumbent upon them as well as what is desired of them and refrain from the forbidden as well as the undesirable. So when they seek God’s favor through everything they can do for the sake of God, God gives them His love. He has said, “My servant comes closer and closer to Me by doing supererogatory works till I love him.” This is the most perfect love... For these favorites that which is permissible becomes an act of devotion by which they

seek the favor of God. All their actions become worship; they will be given the pure drink to take, as the service that they had rendered was pure. The middle-rankers, on the other hand, do those things also which are only for themselves; they will neither be punished for them nor rewarded for them. They will have a drink which will not be completely pure; it will be something mixed. Just as they had mixed in their work things of the world, their drink shall also be mixed...

In Sūrat *Fāṭir* (35), too, God has mentioned the front-runners and the middle-rankers. He has said, “Then We gave the Book for inheritance to such of Our servants as We have chosen. But there are among them some who wrong their own souls, some who follow a middle course, and some who are, by God’s leave, foremost in good deeds. That is the highest grace” (35:32)... The middle-rankers are those who fulfill their duties and refrain from forbidden things, and the foremost in good deeds are those who do both the obligatory and the supererogatory works.

[*Fatāwā* 10:175-83]

(12.4) Prophets are greater than saints (*awliyā'*).

Prophets are greater than the friends of God (awliyā') who are not prophets. A walī cannot have a way to God in which he may dispense with Muḥammad (pbuh). Whoever says that Muḥammad was sent with exoteric knowledge but not with esoteric knowledge believes in one part of Islam and rejects the other.

The *Salaf*, the *a'immah* and all the *awliyā'* of the *ummah* are agreed that prophets are greater than the *awliyā'* who are not prophets. God has classified the people who deserve His favor in four categories. He says, “All who obey God and the Messenger shall be in the company of those upon whom God has bestowed His blessings: the prophets, the *ṣiddiqūn* (who are most true to

their faith) the *shuhadā'* (who lay down their lives for truth), the *ṣāliḥūn*; and how goodly a company are these!" (4:69)...

The best of Muḥammad's (pbuh) *ummah* are the people of the first generation (*qarn*). In an authentic *ḥadīth* reported through more than one channel, the Prophet said, "The best generation (*qarn*) is the one in which I have been sent, then those who come after them, and then those who come after them."⁶⁶⁵ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded in both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections and narrated by more than one set of narrators.

Of the Companions of the Prophet, the first group of *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār* are better and more honorable than the others. God has said, "Not equal among you are those who spend (freely) and fought before the victory (with those who did so later). They are the higher in rank than those who spent (freely) and fought afterwards. But to all has God promised a goodly (reward)" (57:10). Victory here means victory in the form of the truce of Ḥudaybiyyah which came before the conquest of Makkah and regarding which God has said, "Verily We have granted you a manifest victory, that God may forgive you your faults of the past and those that may follow" (48:1-2). When people asked the Prophet whether it was really a victory he said, "Yes, it was."⁶⁶⁶

The best among the first Muslims were the four caliphs, and the best of them was Abū Bakr and then 'Umar. This was well known among the Companions, their righteous Successors, the *a'immaḥ* of the *ummah* and the Muslims in general. The evidence that supports this is multiple; we have discussed them at length in our book *Minhāj as-Sunnah An-Nabawīyyah fī Naqd Kalām Ash-Shi'ah wa al-Qadarīyyah*⁶⁶⁷...

A group of mistaken people has claimed that the Seal of the Saints" is the best of all the friends (*awliyā'*) of God. They proffer the concept of the "Seal of the saints" on the pattern of "the Seal of the Prophets." However, no one among the early Ṣūfī masters put forward the idea before Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Al-Ḥakīm At-

Tirmidhī.⁶⁶⁸ He wrote a book on the subject and expounded therein all sorts of erroneous ideas. After him, many a Ṣūfī in later ages claimed that he was the Seal of the Saints; some even said that “the Seal of the Saints” was higher in rank than “the Seal of the Prophets” since he had a better knowledge of God, and that the prophets received their knowledge of God through him. This is what Ibn ‘Arabī, the author of *Al-Fuṭūḥāt al-Makkīyyah* and the *Fuṣūṣ* has claimed, in opposition to both revelation and reason, and in opposition to all the prophets and the friends *awliyā*’ of God...

Everyone who comes to know of Muḥammad’s message cannot become a friend of God unless he follows Muḥammad (pbuh). All that is part of the true religion and divine guidance can only be had through Muḥammad (pbuh). The general rule in this regard is that whoever gets the message of the prophet who is sent to him will not be entitled to the friendship of God unless he follows that prophet.

Whoever says that there have been friends of God who got the message of Muḥammad yet approached God in a way in which they did not need his guidance is a heretic and an infidel. If he claims that he needs Muḥammad’s guidance only in matters exoteric but not in matters esoteric, or in matters of the Sharī‘ah but not in those of the *ḥaqīqah*, he is worse than the Jews and the Christians who said that Muḥammad was sent to the Gentiles, not to the People of the Book, who only believed in one part of the religion and rejected the other parts, and therefore became infidels. Similarly, anyone who says that Muḥammad was sent with exoteric knowledge but not with esoteric knowledge also believes in one part of the Muḥammadan revelation and rejects the other. In fact, he is a worse rejecter and a greater infidel than the others, for esoteric knowledge is knowledge of things of the heart, faith, knowledge, feeling and sentiments which reside in the heart, and which constitute the real faith; this knowledge is better than knowledge of external action and behavior.

Hence, if anyone says that Muḥammad taught about external actions only, not about the realities of faith, and that these realities are not to be learned from the Qur'ān and Sunnah, he declares in effect that he believes only in part of Muḥammad's revelation and not the rest. He is worse than the one who says that he believes in one part of his revelation and not in another but does not say that the part he rejects is inferior than the one he accepts.

These heretics believe that sainthood (*walāyah*) is better than prophethood (*nubūwwah*) and endear the view to the people by saying that the *walāyah* of a prophet is better than his prophethood.⁶⁶⁹ They say:

The stage of prophethood is in between,

Above the messenger and below the saint.

They claim that they participate in the *walāyah* of the Prophet which is higher than his messengerhood (*risālah*). This is their biggest error; no one participates in the *walāyah* of Muḥammad, not even Abraham or Moses, not to speak of these heretics.

[*Fatāwā* II:221- 61]

(12.5) Friends (*awliyā'*) of God who are not prophets are not infallible.

A friend (walī) of God does not have to be infallible. He may not be even aware of certain truths of the religion or may not be clear about them. People are not required to believe in all that he says, and he himself should not rely on the ideas he gets in his heart unless he ascertains that they agree with the shar'.

A *walī* does not have to be infallible, above error or mistake. He may not be aware of some truths of the religion, or be clear about them; he may even imagine some things to be commanded by God or forbidden by Him whereas they are not commanded or forbidden. He may also consider some miracles to be a grace from

God whereas they are actually the tricks which Satan plays against imperfect people. It is not necessary that he know that they are the tricks of Satan. However, this does not prove that he is not a *walī*, for one of the graces of God which have been bestowed on this *ummah* is that He will overlook the errors which its members inadvertently commit, the things they forget, or the wrongs they are compelled to do...

Since a *walī* may commit errors, people are not required to believe in all that he says, for that would be making him a prophet. The *walī* himself should not rely upon what comes into his mind unless he ascertains that it is in agreement with the *shar'*. This is true of all the ideas that he considers to be inspired, communicated, or spoken by God. He should test all these ideas with the touchstone of what has been given to Muḥammad (pbuh). If it agrees with the latter, he may accept it; if not, he must reject it; and in case he is not clear whether it agrees or does not agree he should suspend judgment.

On this issue people are divided into three groups; two of them are on either extreme, and the third group steers a middle course between them. One group of people thinks that when they have believed a particular person to be a *walī* they are to accept whatever they think that person receives in inspiration from God, and justify whatever he does. The second group, when they find something a person says or does to be contradicting the *shar'*, rules out the possibility that he may be a *walī* and refuses to consider that he may be a *mujtahid* who has committed a error in judgment. The third group, which steers a course between these two and which is correct, says that we should not believe anyone to be infallible or innocent when he acts as a *mujtahid*. He is not to be followed in each and every thing he says, nor is he to be charged with unfaith (*kufṛ*) or transgression (*fisq*) if he errs or sins.

What is necessary is that one follow what God has revealed to His Messenger. If someone's view agrees with it and another's view does not agree, one should not plead for the view which does

not agree, and should have the courage to say that it is against the *shar'*. It is only the prerogative of a prophet that we should believe in whatever he says of God and obey whatever he commands. As for other friends (*awliyā'*) of God, we are not required to obey them in everything they prescribe or to believe in everything they say. Their prescriptions and statements will be examined in light of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and whatever agrees with them should be accepted and what does not should be rejected even if its author is a friend (*walī*) of God. If he is a *mujtahid* he will be forgiven for his mistakes and rewarded by God for the effort that he has put in. But his view which is opposed to the Qur'ān and Sunnah will be called error, though it will be an error which will be forgiven provided he tried his best to find out the will of God...

The points I have made here are that all the *awliyā'* must abide by the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, that none of them is infallible, that neither they nor anyone else should follow whatever comes into their mind without referring it to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. This is agreed upon by all the *awliyā'* of God and whoever disagrees with it is certainly not a *walī* whom God would like us to follow. Either he is an infidel or he is utterly ignorant. This has been clearly endorsed by a number of great Ṣūfīs. Abū Sulaymān Ad-Dārānī,⁶⁷⁰ for example, says, "When some idea of our people comes into my mind I do not accept it unless it is supported by two witnesses: the Qur'ān and the Sunnah." Abū Al-Qāsim Al-Junayd⁶⁷¹ (raa) said, "This knowledge of ours is governed by the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Whoever does not read the Qur'ān or write *ḥadīth* should not talk of our ideas;" or, according to another version, "should not be obeyed." Abū 'Uthmān An-Nishāpūrī⁶⁷² said, "Whoever puts his words and actions under the control of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah speaks wisdom, and whoever puts his words and actions in the control of his desires only, speaks heresy, for God has said in His eternal speech, "If you follow it you shall be on the right path. Abū 'Āmr Ibn Nujayd⁶⁷³ said, "All ecstatic

experiences which are not supported by the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are vain.”

[*Fatāwā* 9:201-210]

(12.6) The status of a *walī* depends upon his imitation of the Prophet.

The greatest friends of God are those who follow the Prophet best.

Leading personalities of the religion who have a deep insight into the religion and follow sincerely its straight path, whether Ṣūfis or non-Ṣūfis, advise everyone engaging in austerity, devotion and pursuing gnosis and illumination to abide by the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Al-Junayd Ibn Muḥammad⁶⁷⁴ said, “This knowledge of ours is governed by the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Whoever does not read the Qur'ān or cite the *ḥadīth*, should not talk of our ideas.” Abū Sulaymān Ad-Dārānī⁶⁷⁵ said, “When an idea of our people comes to my mind, I do not accept it unless it is supported by two witnesses, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. He has also said, “One who receives inspiration to do something should not act upon it unless he has a tradition in that regard.” Abū ‘Uthmān An-Nishāpūrī⁶⁷⁶ said, “Whoever gives the Qur'ān and the Sunnah full control over his words and actions speaks wisdom, but whoever gives himself to his desires speaks only heresy (*bid'ah*), for God has said of His eternal speech, ‘If you follow it you will be on the right path’” (24:54). Another Ṣūfī said, “Whoever does not examine his ideas every moment is not to be counted among the Ṣūfis.”

When Abū Yazīd Al-Bisṭāmī⁶⁷⁷ was told that a certain Ṣūfī was visiting the town, he went to see him. But when he saw him spitting in the direction of the *qiblah*, he said to his companion, “Let us go back. This man cannot be trusted in the external manners of the Sharī‘ah; how can he be trusted in its internal

matters.” What Abū Yazīd did may be supported from a *ḥadīth* reported in the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd and other collections. There was an imām one of the mosques of the *Anṣār* (of Madinah), and every *Anṣārī* tribe had its own mosque. One day the Prophet visited the mosque of that imām, and found that the wall towards the *qiblah* had some sputum on it. He asked who had spit there, and was told that it had been done by the imām. On hearing that, he asked the people not to pray behind him. When the imām came and went to lead the prayer, people stopped him and said that the Prophet had advised them not to pray behind him. He then went to the Prophet and asked about it. The Prophet said, “Yes, they are right. You annoyed God and His Messenger.”⁶⁷⁸

A number of *Ṣūfī shaykhs* and ‘*ulamā*’ have said, “If You see a person flying in the air or walking on water, do not be deceived. You have to ascertain whether he follows the commands of the Shari‘ah. Many more sayings of the *Ṣūfī shaykhs* and a ‘*immaḥ*’ of the religion can be cited. In the eyes of all the greatest *walī* of God is the one who follows the Prophet best. That is the reason why Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddiq⁶⁷⁹ is regarded the greatest *walī* after the Prophet. To be sure, the sun has never seen a man greater than Abū Bakr except the prophets and the messengers of God. This is because he followed the Prophet more truly than anyone else. There is also full agreement on the point that there is no way for people to approach God except through following the Prophet, who is the link between them and God.

However, in the *ṭarīqah* of these great *Ṣūfis* there entered in later times many people along with their innovations, heresies and undesirable practices. To be sure, they are condemnable in the sight of God, His Messenger, and His *awliyā*’ who are pious. They put forward the idea that the friends (*awliyā*’) of God have a way to God in which following the way of the Prophet is not required, that a *walī* may be equal to a prophet even greater than he, that someone of them may be the “seal of the saints” and greater than

all the preceding *awliyā'*, even more knowledgeable than the Seal of the Prophets. These and like ideas have been uttered by heretics who entered the fold of the *Ṣūfīs*. It is these mistaken *Ṣūfīs* who became theosophists and came up with mystical philosophies.

[*Ar-Radd 'alā al-Manṭiqiyyīn* 514-516]

(12.7) Miracles

The wall may work miracles, which may be of two kinds, one cognitive and intuitive and the other effective and efficient. Whether one or the other, if the miracle serves any religious purpose it will be regarded as a righteous act enjoined by the shar' as something either obligatory or desirable. However, if it accomplishes something which is only permissible, it will be regarded as a thing of the world and the walī will be required to thank God for it. But if it involves anything wrong, it will expose the walī to God's punishment and wrath. If a Muslim is lacking in miracles it does not mean any defect in his religion, nor does it degrade him in the sight of God.

The word *mu'jizah* refers to everything which causes a violation of the ordinary phenomena of nature. This is the meaning of the word in common language as well as in the language of the first *a'immaḥ*, Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl and others. Usually they call them *āyāt*, signs. However, most of the scholars in later ages have distinguished between *mu'jizah* and *karāmah*; the former, they reserve for the wonders of the prophets, and the latter for those of the *awliyā'*. The common element between the two is their violation of the ordinary phenomena.

Perfection lies in knowledge, power or self-sufficiency. You may further reduce them to two, knowledge and power; for power is either power to do something or to avoid something, which is the same as self-sufficiency. In any case, these three qualities are found in their most perfect form only in God; He it is who knows

all things, can do anything, and can dispense with everything. He has asked the Prophet (pbuh) to declare that he owns none of these things by himself, “Say: I tell you not that with me are the treasures of God, nor do I know what is hidden, nor do I tell you that I am an angel. I but follow what is revealed to me” (16:50)...Thus he has asked him to state that he does not know the hidden, that he does not have the treasures of God with him, that he is not an angel who needs no food, drink or money, that his duty is to follow what is revealed to him, which is what religion is, and to carry out God’s commands and adore Him, in knowledge and action, inside the heart and out in the external behavior. Of these three things he has only the part which God has given him: he only knows what God reveals to him, does what He empowers him to do, and dispenses with what He enables him to dispense with from among the things people usually or generally need.

Cognitive miracles are of various kinds. For example, one may hear what others may not hear; see in waking or in dream what others may not see; and know what others may not know. He may know through revelation (*waḥī*), inspiration (*ilhām*), extraordinary illumination, or true insight (*firāsah*) - ways which are usually called disclosure (*kashf*); vision (*mushāhadah*); conversation (*mukhāṭabah*), audition (*simāʿ*), all together often called *kashf* or *mukāshafah* since things are disclosed to the *walī* by these means. Efficient miracles produce something. They are called intention (*himmah*), strong will (*ṣidq*), and prayer which is granted (*daʿwah mujābah*). They may also be a pure gift of God, with which the *walī* has nothing to do at all. For example, He may kill the enemy of His *walī* without his doing anything in the matter. The words in the sacred *ḥadīth* are: “Whoever works against a friend of Mine declares war against Me, and I avenge for My friend as a lion attacks its prey.”⁶⁸⁰ Or He may soften the hearts for him, create love in them for him, and so on. Again, things which are revealed to him may be revealed to him through someone else. “Good news,” the Prophet says, “may be revealed in dreams, which either

the person himself sees or someone else sees for him.”⁶⁸¹ The Prophet also referred to it when he said, “You are witnesses of God on earth.”⁶⁸² In short, miracles, cognitive or effective, may proceed either from the *walī* himself or from someone else in his place. God may also let others know about him or do things for him which he may not even imagine... However, when a miracle proceeds from someone else on his behalf, he will be one of its causes, and will be contributing to it...

If a miracle, cognitive or effective, accomplishes anything useful in the religion it is a righteous act commanded by the *shar‘as* something obligatory or at least desirable. But if it produces something which is only permissible it will be one of the worldly goods for which the *walī* should be grateful to God. But if they produce or involve anything unlawful, whether forbidden or undesirable, they will call for God’s wrath and punishment. Bal‘am Ibn Bā’ūrā⁶⁸³ is a case in point. He was given miracles but, as the Qur’ān says, “he passed them by; therefore Satan followed him and he went astray” (7:175). Sometimes the person is to be excused, since he may err in his judgment or may be influenced by someone, or does not reflect on the issue properly, or does not have sufficient knowledge, or is passing through an abnormal state of mind, or is an invalid, or cannot dispense with the thing. His case will then be like that of Baraḥ Al-‘Ābid.⁶⁸⁴

A miracle is censured either on account of the cause which produces it or the purpose for which it is performed. An example of the former is if you pray to God in some way which is forbidden, transgressing the limits you should observe in calling upon God. He has said, “Call on your Lord with humility and in private. For God does not love those who trespass beyond bounds” (7:55). An example of the latter is if you pray to God against someone for what he does not deserve, or pray to Him to help one who is a wrongdoer, or help him with your own will (*himmah*). Some intoxicated mystics, for example, assist and help wrongdoers. if they are mad or emotionally ill or insane they will

not be taken to task for what they do. I have elsewhere discussed those things for which one may be excused and those things for which one may not. But if, on the other hand, they are sane and can exercise their will knowingly they will be acting like Bal'ām. For whoever works a miracle in a wrong way or with a wrong purpose will be either forgiven like Baraḥ or punished like Bal'ām.

To sum up, from the point of view of religion miracles are of three kinds: commendable, reprehensible and permissible, neither to be praised nor to be condemned. Of the permissible, those that serve a good purpose will be considered a blessing, but those that do not will be like any permissible thing which serves no serious purpose, like a game or play... It should also be noted that if a Muslim works no miracles, cognitive or effective, it will not cause any harm to his religion. If he is not given the knowledge of something hidden or not given power over some object of nature, it is no dishonor to him. It may even prove better for his religion unless he were asked to perform it as a duty or as something commended. On the other hand, if he fails to do something of the religion, obligatory or commended, he will be imperfect and will be liable to blame and punishment or will be deprived of a reward. By acquiring knowledge of the religion or imparting it to others, or enjoining its learning upon people, one wins the pleasure of God, His reward and blessing; but by acquiring knowledge of nature or gaining power over it one does not secure God's pleasure or reward except when it is part of the religion. One should be thankful to God for it and should see that it does not involve him in any sin.

[*Majmū'at ar-Rasā'il wa al-Masā'il* 5:2-9]

(12.8) Satanic experiences

The evil ones attend un-Islamic acts, such as whistling, clapping, and instrumental music. They move people and cause them to whirl around in ecstasy, dance, shout, rend their clothes,

and engage in many more satanic acts.

Those who say that angels and prophets attend whistling and clapping sessions and love them are certainly wrong and mistaken. In fact, it is the evil ones who attend these sessions, and it is they who descend upon those who participate in them and make them shout. Aṭ-Ṭabarānī has recorded a *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn ‘Abbās that the Prophet said, “Satan asked God for a house, and God said, ‘Your house is the bathroom (of the people).’ He then asked for a book to recite. God said, ‘You shall recite poetry.’ He said ‘Lord, give me something to issue calls.’ God said the thing that will issue calls for you is the musical instrument (*mizmār*).”⁶⁸⁵ He has also told Satan in His Book, “Lead to destruction those whomsoever you can from among them with your (seductive) voice” (17:64). Commenting on this verse, a number of Elders have said that voice here means music. To me it means music as well as all other sounds which lead people away from God. In another *ḥadīth*, the Prophet said, “I have been forbidden two evil and foolish sounds of seductive entertainments and musical instruments that are produced by Satan, and sounds of beating one’s face, rending clothes and saying, how unfortunate! how sad! how helpless.”⁶⁸⁶

Many people that have mystical revelations (*kashf*) have seen the evil ones attending unlawful sessions where people engage in whistling and clapping. They come upon them and lead them into rapture and satanic frenzy, till they indulge in dance under the very nose of the audience. Some mystics have also seen that the evil ones join people in their dancing and whistling but when they call them for help they just leave them and let them fall to the floor.

The truth about these experiences is known only to him who has faith and conviction. However, one who follows the Sharī‘ah and refrains from unjustified ventures (*bid‘ah*) will be on the right path and attain the good of this world and the next, even though he may not know the truth about these experiences. He will be like one who takes a proper guide to Makkah and reaches there along

with his water, food and other goods he has taken with him. But one who takes a guide who does not know the road or misleads him will either perish on the way or return to the place whence he started after experiencing a lot of suffering. The right guide is the Prophet, whom God sent as one who gives good tidings, issues warnings, acts as a lamp shedding light, guides people to the straight path of God, the Lord of the heavens and the earth, and leads them to His grace by His leave.

Satan is active in un-Islamic poetry sessions. He causes people to foam and froth at the mouth, bray and scream and make fearful sounds. They come to feel within themselves an urge to shout, to do things that are wrong, such as bursting into anger, tearing clothes, beating one's face, heaving and sighing and many other devilish acts as drunken and mad people do. The frenzy and intoxication which music generates is like the intoxication which people get by drinking wine. Both turn them from remembering God, offering prayers, reading the Qur'ān, reflecting on its verses, and following its instructions. They act like those who spend money on frivolous songs and music which divert them from God and excite anger and enmity among them, setting one against the throat of another. You can see that when a sorcerer kills a man with his magic.

To the same category belong the champions of unbelief (*kufṛ*), heresy and evil, even though they may not be lacking in austerity, devotion and miracles, as you have among the pagans and the People of the Book. You may also have them among the Muslims, among the Khawārij for example, about whom the Prophet has said, "You will find your prayers far inferior to their prayers, your fasting and reading the Qur'ān far inferior to their fasting and reading. But they will read the Qur'ān and it will hardly go down their throats; they will go out of Islam as an arrow goes out of the bow. Kill them wherever you find them; you will be rewarded for it on the Day of Judgment."⁶⁸⁷

[*Fatāwā* 11:64104]

PART V

ISLAMIC SOCIETY

13. GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

(13.1) Caliphate and monarchy

“The caliphate (khilāfah) will last thirty years, when it will turn into monarchy.” But the transfer of power to kings and their deputies will be due to the faults of both the rulers and the ruled.

The Prophet (pbuh) said, “The caliphate (*khilāfah*), on the pattern of the prophetic government (*khilāfat an-nubūwwah*) will last for thirty years, thereafter God will give His Kingdom or the government to whom He wills,”⁶⁸⁸ In a *ḥadīth* which Abū Dāwūd has recorded on the authority of ‘Abdul-Wārith and Al-‘Awwām the words are, “The *khilāfah* will last thirty years, then there will be monarchy,” or “The *khilāfah* will last thirty years, then it will turn into monarchy.”⁶⁸⁹ This *ḥadīth* is well known (*mashhūr*); it has been narrated by Imām Óammād Ibn Salmah, ‘Abdul-Wārith Ibn Sa‘•d, and Al-‘Awwām Ibn Óawshab and others through Sa‘•d Ibn Jam‘ān and then Saf•nah, a client (*mawlā*) of the Prophet, and recorded by the compilers of the Sunan collections such as Abū Dāwūd and others. Imām Aḥmad and others have based their support on the caliphate of the four rightly-guided caliphs (*al-khulafā’ ar-rāshidūn al-arba‘ah*) on this *ḥadīth*, which Aḥmad has verified. He has also argued from it against those who have wavered about the caliphate of ‘Alī on the grounds that people were divided over him. He has said that those who do not count him as the fourth rightly-guided caliph are further more removed from truth than their donkeys; he has even forbidden marital relations with them. That the rightly-guided caliphate lasted for thirty years is agreed upon by various groups, the *fuqahā’*, the scholars of the Sunnah, and the leaders of Šūfism. This is also the belief of the common Muslim.

Only some groups of heterodox theologians have differed. The Rāfīdah, for example, disown the first three caliphs; the Khawārij find fault with the two sons-in-law of the Prophet, ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī; and the Nāsibah⁶⁹⁰ disapprove of ‘Alī. Even some self-styled Ahl as-Sunnah have abstained from taking sides with regard to the caliphate of ‘Alī. The Prophet died in the month of Rabī‘ al-Awwal, 11 A.H., and the peace that was brought about between the two factions of the Believers by the abdication of Al-Ḥasan Ibn ‘Alī,⁶⁹¹ the grandson of the Prophet, went into effect in the month of Jumādā 1, 41 A.H., known as the year of unification since the whole community was united under the rule of Mu‘āwīyah.⁶⁹² He was the first king in Islam.

The words that occur in the *ḥadīth* recorded by Muslim are, “There will be *khilāfat-nubūwwah* (a government on the pattern of prophetic government) and blessing; then there will be kingship and blessing; then there will be kingship and coercion (*jabrīyyah*); then there will be a kingship which is cruel (*‘adūd*).”⁶⁹³ In another *ḥadīth*, authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*) and well known (*mashhūr*), recorded in the *Sunan* collections, the Prophet said, “Those of you who live after me will see a number of controversies coming up, but you must follow my practice (*sunnah*) and the practice of the right-minded and rightly-guided caliphs after me. Stick to it and hold it fast. Beware of innovations, for every innovation is wrong.”⁶⁹⁴

However, one may call *khilāfah* those rulers also who came after the Righteous Caliphs even though they acted as kings and not as deputies of the Prophet. We have a *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah and recorded by both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim that the Prophet said, “The people of Israel were ruled by their prophets. Whenever a prophet died another prophet took his place. But there will be no prophet after me; there will be only deputies (*khulafā*’), and they will be many.” Thereupon people asked him, “What do you advise us to do?” He said, “Keep the pledge you make to the

one who comes first and then to the one who comes next, and give them their due, for God will call them to account for the people He puts under them.”⁶⁹⁵ The words, “and they will be many”, show that there will be caliphs besides the rightly guided caliphs, who will be few. Again the words, “keep the pledge you give to the first caliph and then to the one who comes next,” show that caliphs will be differing among themselves, though the rightly guided among them will not. Furthermore, the words, “Give them their due for God will call them to account for the people He puts under them,” support the view of the Ahl as-Sunnah that we should give the rulers what is their due in money and booty.

I have said at more than one place that if the government passes into the hands of the kings and their deputies whom they appoint as judges and governors, it is not only because of anything wrong in them but also because of the evils of the people under their rule. The Prophet has said, “As you are so will be the rulers over you,”⁶⁹⁶ and God has said, “Thus do We put the wrong-doers one above the other” (6:129)... What I want to underline is that a number of things, good and bad, happened during the period following the caliphate on the pattern of prophetic government, and that whether one mentions them or ignores them, both stances are fraught with difficulty. For the Prophet’s words that the *khilāfat nubūwwah*, government on the pattern of prophetic government, would come to an end is a kind of censure against the monarchy that followed. This is particularly clear in the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Bakr which says that the Prophet had a vision and then said, “There will be a *khilāfat nubūwwah*, a government on the pattern of prophetic government, then God will give the kingdom to whom He wills.”⁶⁹⁷ This is also supported by the texts which say that the appointment of the imām and other office bearers (*umarā’*) is a great obligation, and which speak of the rewards which are due on the performance of the duties which these offices involve. Hence one has to distinguish between the governments that are good and the governments that are bad, and

see what one would say about those which are both. It has been reported that the Prophet said, “God gave me the choice to live like a servant and messenger or to live like a prophet and king; and I chose to be a servant and messenger.”⁶⁹⁸

Since kingship comprises various governmental offices (*walāyāt*), judicial and administrative, the question arises whether monarchy may be considered lawful and *khilāfah* commendable by comparison, or whether it is essentially unlawful and is only justified in case the knowledge and authority required for the caliphate is lacking. In our view monarchy is essentially unlawful, and our duty is to set up a government on the pattern of the prophetic government (*khilāfat nubūwwah*). This is because the Prophet said, “You must follow my practice and the practice of the rightly guided caliphs after me; stick to it and hold it fast. Refrain from unjustified innovations and remember that every (such) innovation is an error.”⁶⁹⁹ The Prophet prefaced these words, with the observation, “Whoever of you lives after me will see a lot of dissension.” This *ḥadīth* is therefore a command; it exhorts us to follow necessarily the practice of the *khilāfah* (of the Prophet), enjoins us to abide by it, and warns against deviation from it. It is a command from him and definitely makes the establishment of *khilāfah* a duty... Again, the fact that the Prophet expressed his dislike for the monarchy that will follow the *khilāfat nubūwwah* proves that monarchy lacks in something which is compulsory in religion.

Those who Justify monarchy argue from the words which the Prophet said to Mu‘āwīyah. “If you get the rule be good and kind.”⁷⁰⁰ But there is no argument in it. They also argue from the words which ‘Umar spoke to Mu‘āwīyah when the latter justified the pomp and show of royalty which he had adopted in Syria. He said, “I neither approve of this behavior of yours nor disapprove of it.”⁷⁰¹ They say that this means that ‘Umar neither forbade it nor permitted it. Mu‘āwīyah gave his reason for adopting those things, but ‘Umar was not satisfied with them. Hence the issue is a matter

of opinion.

However, there are two views on the subject. One is that the establishment of *khilāfah* is an obligatory duty, and exemption from it may be permitted only on grounds of necessity. The other is that monarchy is acceptable on the grounds that it promotes the objectives of the government (*wilāyah*) rather than retarding their realization, and the rule is that when the lack of something makes the realization of a desired end difficult, that thing may be permitted. The question whether the setting up of a government is in itself something obligatory or desirable is a matter of discussion. There are two extreme views on the subject. One is that it is incumbent upon everyone whatever be the situation, and exemption on any grounds, of necessity or otherwise, is to be condemned. This is the view of the unorthodox sects like the Khawārij and the Mu'tazilah, as well as some groups of self-styled Ahl as-Sunnah and ascetics. The other view is that monarchy is in principle lawful and the condition that it must follow the pattern of the (rightly guided) caliphs is not at all necessary. This is the view of the unjust rulers, libertarians and some Murji'ah. We will discuss this point in more detail later.

To sum up: The change from *khilāfat nubūwwah* to monarchical rule (*mulk*) may occur either because the society is unable to set up the *khilāfat nubūwwah* because it holds monarchy to be lawful or it prefers monarchy even though it has the knowledge and the power to set up the *khilāfah*. If it is the first case, that is, if the society does not have the knowledge and power to set up the *khilāfah*, the king who establishes his rule will have an excuse. For even though the establishment of *khilāfat nubūwwah* is a duty when society has the necessary ability, it would not be incumbent, like other duties when one does not have the capability. A case in point is Najāshi, the ruler of Abyssinia who embraced Islam (in private) and could not declare it openly. The case of Joseph, the Righteous One, too, is also somewhat relevant. To be sure, monarchical rule was lawful in case of some

prophets like David, Solomon and Joseph. However, if monarchy is established in place of *khilāfah* when society has the knowledge and power to set up *khilāfah*, and if people are of the view that *khilāfat nubūwwah* is only something desirable, not obligatory, and that monarchical rule is lawful in our Sharī‘ah, too, as it was lawful in earlier codes, then a just king will not be guilty of any sin. But this is so only when the people are correct in this view of theirs... But if the establishment of the establishment of *khilāfat nubūwwah* is a duty as well as being within the powers of society, then to ignore it is to call for condemnation and punishment. Would that be committing a major sin or only a minor sin? If it is a minor sin it will not affect the credibility (*‘adālah*) of the people in that society; but if it is a major sin there are two opinions on the subject of credibility. However, one may say that if the king who rules does the good which is enjoined and refrains from the evil which is forbidden and by so doing earns more reward than the penalty he incurs by ignoring what is obligatory or committing what is forbidden, it is possible that his good deeds outweigh his evil deeds...

[*Fatāwā* 35:18-20]

(13.2) The purpose of government

The purpose of political authority is to establish the religion of God in its entirety and make His word supreme.

The purpose of political authority is to subject the whole of human life to God and to make His word supreme. It is to accomplish this purpose that God has created man, revealed Books, and sent Messengers. It is for this purpose also that the Messengers and those who believed in them have striven and waged wars. God has said, “I have only created jinns and men that they may serve Me” (51:56); “Not a messenger did We send before you without this inspiration sent by Us to him: that there is no god

but I; therefore worship and serve Me” (21:25); “We assuredly sent amongst every people a messenger (with the command): serve God, and eschew evil” (16:36). God has put the message of all the messengers in these words, “Worship and serve (*i‘budū*) Allah, you have no other god but Him” (7:59, 63, 73, 85; 11:50, 61, 84).

We worship and serve God when we obey Him and obey His Messenger. This idea is also conveyed by words such as good, virtue, piety, equity, devotion, righteousness and noble conduct. To be sure, these words differ to some extent in their meanings, but we cannot go into it at the present. It is with the same object in view that the Believers have been asked to fight the people. God has commanded, “Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in God altogether and everywhere” (8:39). The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have a *ḥadīth* reported by Mūsā Al-Ash‘arī that the Prophet was asked which one fights in the cause of God, the one who fights to demonstrate his bravery, the one who fights to defend the honor of his tribe, or the one who wants to earn a name. He replied, “The one who fights in order to make the word of God supreme.”⁷⁰²

People cannot secure the good of this world or the next unless they work together, cooperate among themselves and strive together for their cause. Through cooperation and mutual assistance they achieve the good they want and ward off the evil they hate. That is why man is social by nature. When they join hands they secure what is good for all and avoid what is evil for all. For the same purpose they submit together to an authority, without which they cannot live.

God has sent His Messenger, Muḥammad (pbuh), to mankind, guided him to the best Way, given him the best Law, and revealed to Him the best Book. He has sent him to the best of the people whom He has raised for mankind, whom He has given the most perfect of all religions, and upon whom He has completed His blessings. He has reserved His Paradise for those who believe in Him and in His revelation. He will not be accepting any religion

from anyone other than the religion of Islam that He has brought. Every other religion will be rejected by God and its adherents will only be losers.

God has said in His Book that He has sent down the Book and iron so that the people may pursue the path of justice. His words are “We sent down Our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the Book and the Balance (of right and wrong) that men may stand forth in justice; and we sent down iron in which is (material for) mighty war, as well as many benefits for mankind, that God may test who it is that will help Him unseen and His messengers. For God is full of Strength, Exalted in Might” (157:25).

That is why the Prophet has commanded his community to appoint rulers who can manage their affairs, and has enjoined upon the rulers to assign various offices to those who deserve them, and to rule over the people with justice. He has also commanded the masses to obey their rulers when they obey God. He has said, “Whenever three of you are traveling, let one of you be the leader (*amīr*).”⁷⁰³ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded by Abū Dāwūd in his *Sunan*, on the authority of Abū Sa‘īd, as well as Abū Hurayrah. Aḥmad has noted in his *Musnad* another *ḥadīth* on the authority of Ibn ‘Umar. The Prophet said, “If three of you are in an open land you must put a leader upon yourselves.”⁷⁰⁴

Now if the Prophet has commanded us to put up a leader when we are a very small party of three, we are to do so all the more when we are more. That is why to accept a government office, considering it as a religious obligation and discharge its duties to the best of one’s abilities, seeking only the pleasure of God, is one of the noblest and most meritorious acts. Imām Aḥmad has noted in his *Musnad* that the Prophet (pbuh) said, “The most beloved of all to God is the ruler (imām) who is just, and the most detestable of all to Him is the ruler who is unjust.”⁷⁰⁵

[*Fatāwā* 28:61-5]

(13.3) Setting up public offices (*wilāyāt*) and discharging the duties thereof is one of the great acts that win God's favor.

To look after public offices is a great religious duty, and to manage their affairs according to the will of God and His Prophet is one of the noblest acts which win God's favor.

To administer the affairs of society is one of the greatest duties of religion; without performing that duty we can not secure the good of this life or the good of the next. Men cannot be happy unless they form a society and cooperate with one another to fulfill their needs. And they cannot manage their society unless they put up an authority over them. The Prophet has instructed, "If three of you go out on a journey make one of yourselves your leader."⁷⁰⁶ Abū Dāwūd has recorded this *ḥadīth* on the authority of Abū Sa'īd as well as Abū Hurayrah. Imām Aḥmad has noted in his *Musnad* the *ḥadīth* reported by 'Abdullah Ibn 'Āmr that the Prophet said, "If any three of you are in open land appoint a leader from among you and obey him."⁷⁰⁷ He has thus made it incumbent on us that we establish a leader over the smallest social group, even though it is temporary and lasts only for a short time. Obviously, it is all the more incumbent on larger and more permanent communities. Further, God has commanded us to enjoin the good and forbid the evil, and this duty cannot be rendered without power and authority. Likewise, all other social duties such as *jihād*, maintaining peace and order, justice, organizing *hajj* and 'īd festivals, redressing abuses, helping the oppressed, enforcing the *ḥudūd*, and so on, cannot be carried out without political power and authority. That is why a prophetic *ḥadīth* says, "The ruler (*sultān*) is the shadow of God on earth,"⁷⁰⁸ and the saying goes that sixty years under an unjust ruler is better than one night without a ruler. History is a sufficient witness to this truth.

This is also the reason why the Elders like Fudayl Ibn ‘Iyād⁷⁰⁹ and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal used to say, “Had we only one prayer which God would like to grant we would have prayed for a good ruler.” The Prophet said, “God loves three things: that you worship Him and associate none with Him, that you hold together the rope (i.e. religion) of God and divide not into groups, and that you wish well for those to whom God has entrusted your affairs.”⁷¹⁰ (This has been recorded by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*.) The Prophet also said, “No Muslim should ever make light of three things: seeking the pleasure of God in all that one does, wishing well for those who manage the people’s affairs, and solidarity with the community since its prayers protect those who adhere to it.”⁷¹¹ This *ḥadīth* has been reported by the compilers of the *Sunan* works. In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections we have it that the Prophet said, “Religion is well-wishing, religion is well-wishing, religion is well-wishing.” “For whom, Messenger of God?” people asked. He said, “For God, for His Book, for His Messenger, and for the leaders of the Muslims, as well as the masses.”⁷¹²

Political authority (*imārah*) must, therefore, be taken as a religious matter and sought as a means to secure God’s pleasure and favor. Seeking God’s pleasure through it by pursuing His will and complying with the injunctions of His Messenger in its exercise is one of the most meritorious acts. It proves detrimental only to those people who seek by it nothing but power and money. Ka‘b Ibn Mālīk narrates that the Prophet once said, “Two hungry wolves will not cause more havoc to a flock of sheep than a man can do to religion who seeks through it money and honor.”⁷¹³ At-Tirmidhī, who has recorded this *ḥadīth*, observes that it is authentic or fairly authentic (*ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ*). The Prophet has made it very clear that greed for money and power plays havoc with religion just as or more than the havoc which two hungry wolves may cause to a flock of sheep. God has depicted the sorrowful fate of the one who will be given his scroll of deeds in his left hand. “(He

will say:) Of no profit to me has been my wealth (and) my authority has gone away from me” (69:29-9).

The end of one who runs after power will be like the end of Pharaoh, and the fate of one who hankers for money will be like the fate of Qārūn. God has referred to the end of both men in His Book, where He has said, “Do they not travel through the land and see what was the end of those before them? They had even much more power, and (had left) greater impressions on the land, but God did call them to account for their sins, and naught had they to defend themselves against God” (40:21); and, “That home of the Hereafter We shall give to those who intend not highhandedness or mischief on earth. And the (best) end is only for the righteous” (28:83).

People are of four kinds. First are those who try to dominate others and create mischief on earth which is certainly a sin against God. They are the mischief makers among kings and rulers like Pharaoh and his party; they are the worst people on earth. God has said of them, “Truly Pharaoh elated himself in the land and broke up its people into sections, and depressed one of its groups: their sons he slew, but kept alive their daughters, for he was indeed a maker of mischief” (28:4). Muslim has recorded in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet which Ibn Mas‘ūd has reported: “No one will enter Paradise who has a particle of arrogant pride in his heart, nor will anyone enter Hell who has a particle of faith in his heart.”⁷¹⁴ Hearing that, a person asked, “Messenger of God, I like to wear good clothes, and put on fine shoes. Is this arrogance? The Prophet said, “No. God is beautiful and loves beauty. Arrogance is to deny the truth (*baṭr al-ḥaqq*) and to despise the people (*ghamṭ an-nās*)”⁷¹⁵ *Baṭr al-ḥaqq* is to deny and reject the truth, and *ghamṭ an-nās* is to disdain people and belittle them. This is the picture of those who try to dominate others and create mischief on earth.

The second kind of people are those who create mischief on earth but do not try to dominate others, such as thieves, miscreants, riffraff. The third group are those who grab power but abstain from

mischievous; they have a religion which they want to see prevail over the people. The fourth group are those destined for Paradise, who try neither to dominate others nor create mischief, and they are far better than others. It is for them that God has said, "So lose not heart, nor fall into despair. You will gain mastery if you are true in faith" (3:139); and, "Be not weary and faint-hearted, crying for peace; you shall be uppermost, for God is with you, and will never put you in loss for your (good) deeds" (47:5); and, "Honor belongs to God and His Messenger, and to the Believers" (63:8)...

When power and money are put at the service of God and to further His cause they will bring happiness in this world as well as the next. But if power is dissociated from religion or religion from power, the condition of the people is bound to deteriorate. The difference between the righteous and the wicked, the God-fearing and the God-defying, concerns intention as well as action. The Prophet said, "God will not look at your faces, nor at your property and wealth; He will look at your hearts and deeds."⁷¹⁶

When money and honor become the moving force for the people in authority, they deviate from faith and fortify themselves in their jurisdiction. Many people think that there is necessarily a conflict between power on the one hand and faith and honest religious life on the other. Of them, some prefer religion and keep away from things without which religion cannot be complete. Others consider those things to be necessary and discard religion in the belief that they cannot have both together. They just discard religion to become an object of pity and disdain, devoid of any honor and authority. This is why when many men of religion are not able to live up to their religion and have to suffer in their struggle to establish it. They begin to think that their approach is not right or cannot be effective, and that they cannot secure their own well-being or the well-being of others.

Both groups are wrong: those who choose the path of religion but fail to take it to completion, since they do not have power, or cannot carry out *jihād*, or do not have money for it, as well as those

who strive for power and money, and wage war for it, but have no plan to establish religion (*iqāmat ad-dīn*) with it. Both these ways are pursued by people who incur the wrath of God and stray from truth: the former being the way of the Christians that strayed from truth, and the latter the way of the Jews who had the wrath of God as their portion. The right path is the path of the prophets, the most true (in their faith), the martyrs, and the righteous. It is the path of Prophet Muḥammad, the (rightly guided) caliphs who succeeded him, his Companions, and those who followed in their footsteps. It is the path of the first *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār*, and of those who followed them truly and correctly. May God be pleased with them and may they be pleased with God, and may He give them the gardens of Paradise under which rivers will flow to live in them forever; that is really the great success.

Every Muslim should work for this end as much as he can. If he is appointed to a position of authority and uses his powers to serve God, to establish His religion, and promote the well-being of the Muslims as much as he can by performing sincerely the duties which are enjoined upon him and by refraining from the things which are forbidden, he will not be questioned for what he could not do. Certainly it is good for the *ummah* to appoint to public office people who are righteous rather than wicked. Those who are not able to establish the religion with the power they have or through a *jihād* they can organize, but do wish in their hearts the good of the *ummah*, pray for its well-being, and do whatever they can, they will not be asked about what they could not do. To establish religion and maintain it on the correct lines two things are needed, the Book that guides and the iron that defends, as God has said.

It is, therefore, the duty of every Muslim to bring the Qur'ān and the iron together in the cause of God, as well as pray for His help. Goods of the world may be used for religion. Mu'ādh Ibn Jabal⁷¹⁷ said, "Son of Adam, you need the good of this world, but you need much more the good of the next world. Hence, if you

begin with the good of the next world, you engage also in the good of this world and accomplish it properly. But if you begin with the good of this world you will miss the good of the next world and will also risk the good of this world.” This is endorsed by a *ḥadīth* of the Prophet recorded by At-Tirmidhī: “One who begins his day caring first for his next life, God will set his affairs right, grant him peace and tranquility of the heart, and the world will come to him with its head down. But if one begins the day thinking first for this world, God will let his efforts go in different directions, and let poverty stare him in the eye, and nothing of the world will come to him except what is written for him.”⁷¹⁸ The essence of this truth has been stated in the Qur’ān: “I have only created jinns and men that they may serve Me. No sustenance do I require that they should feed Me. For God is He who gives (all) sustenance, Lord of Power, Steadfast (for ever)” (57:56-8).

[*Fatāwā* 28:390-7]

(13.4) Consultation

Men in authority must hold consultation. When there is disagreement among the Muslims on an issue each should be asked to give his opinion, and whichever opinion is closest to the Qur’ān and Sunnah should be adopted.

A man in authority (*walī al-amr*) cannot dispense with consultation. God has commanded His Messenger, “Pass over (their faults) and ask for God’s forgiveness for them, and consult them in affairs. Then, when you have taken a decision put your trust in God, for God loves those who put their trust (in Him)” (3:159). Abū Hurayrah says that no one consulted his companions more than the Prophet did.⁷¹⁹ Some people have said that God commanded His Prophet to hold consultation in order that he might win over his Companions and set an example for the people to come later. He asked him to do so in matters in which he was not

given any specific instructions, such as matters concerning war or other worldly affairs.

God has praised the Believers who hold consultation. He has said, "That which is with God is better and more lasting for those who believe and put their trust in their Lord: those who avoid the greater crimes and shameful deeds, and when they are angry even then forgive; those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation; and who spend out of what We bestow on them for sustenance" (42:36-38). When the person in authority consults people and as a result comes to know the will of God's Book or the Prophet's Sunnah or the consensus of the Muslims, he should follow it and act upon it. No one can ask for obedience in things which are opposed to them, however great he may be in religion or in worldly affairs. God has said, "You who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you" (4:59). But if the matter is something in which Muslims differ, everyone should be asked to give his opinion and state the reasons for it, and whichever view is closest to the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet should be adopted; for God has said, "If you differ in anything among yourselves refer it to God and His Messenger, if you do believe in God and the Last Day. This is best and most suitable for final determination" (4:59).

People who have authority (*ulū al-amr*) are of two kinds: rulers (*umarā'*) and scholars (*'ulamā'*). "If they are right, the masses will also be right. Both should obey God and His Messenger and adhere strictly to His Book in all that they say and do. In the new issues that come up, they must consult the Qur'ān and Sunnah and try to find out what they are required to do. It is only in cases where they are unable to form an opinion either because they do not have time for it or because they are not able to find out the will of God and His Prophet, or because arguments in favor or against are equally strong, they may follow the opinion of an earlier scholar in whose knowledge and piety they have confidence. This is the best view in

this regard. However, some people say that they are not allowed to follow in any case anyone's opinion without discussion. A third group says just the opposite - that they can follow in every case. All these three views have been held by different scholars in the school of Aḥmad as well as other schools.

[*Fatāwā* 28:386-7]

(13.5) Obeying government authorities.

To obey the authorities and to wish them well is a duty incumbent upon all Muslims unless they are asked to do something sinful. They are not to rise up against them so long as they establish ṣalāh among them.

Muslim and other compilers of *ḥadīth* have noted that 'Ubādah Ibn Aṣ-Ṣāmit (raa) said that they pledged to the Messenger of God that they would listen to him and obey him in prosperity as well as adversity, in joy as well as sorrow, even when they were not given their due, that they would not dispute anyone for a post he was worthy of, that they would tell the truth and work for it wherever they were, and that they would not care for any adverse remark in doing the will of God."⁷²⁰ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have also the *ḥadīth* reported by 'Abdullah Ibn 'Umar that the Prophet said, "Every Muslim should listen (to the authorities) and obey their commands whether he likes it or not except if he is asked to do something sinful, in which case he is not to listen or obey."⁷²¹ Muslim has noted the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet said, "You must listen (to the authorities) and obey them in prosperity and in adversity, whether you like it or not, even when you are not given your due (*atharatan 'alayka*)."⁷²² The phrase *atharatan 'alayka* means that one should obey the people in authority even when one does not get justice and receive what is his due. This is explained in another *ḥadīth* recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* on the authority of 'Usayd Ibn Ḥuḍayr (raa). A man from the *Anṣār* came

to the Prophet and said, “Will you not appoint me to some post as you have done with that other man?” The Prophet said, “You may not get justice after me, but you will have to bear it patiently till you see me at the Fount.”⁷²³ Look also at the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn Mas‘ūd and recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. The Prophet said, “After me you will see that some people are favored over others, and you will not be approving of various things which may happen.” People asked him what he would then advise them to do. He said, “Render what you owe to others, and ask God to give you your due”⁷²⁴...

This is what God and His Messenger have said regarding obedience to men in authority and loyalty to them. It is certainly a duty incumbent upon every Muslim. He should do so even if he does not receive justice from them; however, he should not comply with their commands even though he may be compelled to do so if it means violating the will of God or His Messenger, for disobedience to God and His Messenger is a sin, strictly forbidden. To be sure, obedience to men in authority and wishing them well is a duty even if one has not pledged it to them or sworn fealty to them. It is incumbent on him just as prayers five times a day, or *zakāh*, or fasting (in Ramaḍān) or pilgrimage to the House of God, or any other duties which He and His Messenger have made incumbent upon him. If he pledges and swears to obey them in compliance with the command of God and His Messenger regarding obedience and loyalty to men in authority, he is not permitted to violate his oath, whether he swears in the name of God or not. Obedience to men in authority and loyalty to them are duties which God has made obligatory, even if one does not pledge fealty or swear obedience and loyalty to them. If one pledges or swears, it is all the more obligatory on him. Certainly God and His Messenger have strictly forbidden disobedience and disloyalty to them, even if he has not taken any oath of obedience or loyalty...

If anyone has pledged to be obedient and loyal to the men in authority as God and His Messenger want people to do, or to offer *ṣalāh*, pay *zakāh*, fast during Ramaḍān, keep the trust, do justice,

etc., no one should advise him to violate his pledge or break his oath, nor should he himself seek advice from anyone to that effect. If anyone advises him to violate his pledge and act against his oath he lies against God and alleges against Islam what is definitely wrong. If he advises a commoner to break a contract of everyday life concerning, for example, trade, marriage, or a service which he has pledged and which he must observe even if he has not sworn it, he definitely lies against God and lies against Islam. If he advises one who has pledged it on oath, he will be committing something very, very grave. Now if this is the case in matters of everyday life, it is much graver if the advice concerns the pledge given to the men in authority which is so much more important in the sight of God... If the men in authority force people to submit to their rule, carry out their orders, and be loyal to them as they should and take an oath to that effect, no one is justified in advising them to withhold their obedience and loyalty, defying the will of God and His Messenger, and go back on the pledge they have sworn. What is an ordinary duty in other circumstances becomes more rather than less incumbent when one swears it, and the fact that one has been forced to do so does not alter that...

People distinguished in their knowledge, piety and honor in society have never allowed anyone to defy authorities or cheat them or rise up against them in any form, and sin against God thereby. This has been the practice of the scholars of the Ahl as-Sunnah, past and present, as well as others. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have noted the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn ‘Umar (raa) that the Prophet said, “On the Day of Judgment, every traitor will carry a flag on his back as big as his treachery.”⁷²⁵ He has also said, “The most heinous treachery is that against the leader-ruler (imām) of the Muslims.”^{723a} ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar narrated the latter *ḥadīth* when a group of people of Madinah rose up against their ruler and wanted to break the pledge they had given to him. Muslim has recorded in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* on the authority of Nāfi‘ that when the incident of Ḥarrah⁷²⁶ occurred during the reign of Yazīd Ibn

Mu‘āwīyah, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar went to ‘Abdullah Ibn Mu‘tī‘. When the latter offered him a chair, ‘Abdullah said, “I did not come to sit with you; I came to narrate a *ḥadīth* of the Prophet I have heard. He said, “Whoever withdraws from a pledge he has sworn will not be able to offer any excuse to God on the Day of Judgment, and whoever dies without swearing a pledge of fealty (to any imām) dies the death of the pre-Islamic days of Ignorance.”⁷²⁷ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have also the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn Abbās that the Prophet said, “If anyone of you finds his ruler (*amīr*) doing something he does not like, he should bear it patiently, for one who rises up against the ruler (*ṣulṭān*), even to the span of a hand, and dies in that state dies the death of the days of Ignorance.”⁷²⁸

Muslim has noted the *ḥadīth* reported by Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet said, “Whoever defies (the authority) and leaves the unified community (*jamā‘ah*) dies the death of Ignorance. Whoever fights under the banner of Ignorance and is moved by tribal solidarity, or calls for a tribal cause, or defends only tribal interests, and is killed, dies the death of Ignorance.”⁷²⁹ In another version of the *ḥadīth* the words are, “He is not of my *ummah* who rises against my *ummah*, kills people good and bad, and spares neither a Believer nor any of our clients (*dhimīs*). He is not of us, nor are we of him.”⁷³⁰

Of these three people, the first revolts and rises against the ruler and secedes from the *jamā‘ah*. The second fights for tribal reasons or to gain power, but not for any cause of God; he acts like the people of Qays and Yaman. The third robs people, loots travelers, kills Believers and *dhimīs* alike, and grabs their property like the Ḥarūrīyyah⁷³¹ who rose against the Imām, and against whom ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib declared war. It is about this group of Harurīyyah that the Prophet said, “You will scorn our *ṣalāh*, your fasting and your reading of the Qur’ān when you compare it with their *ṣalāh*, fasting and reading. But their reading of the Qur’ān

will hardly go down their throats. They will dart out of Islam just as an arrow passes out through a prey. Kill them wherever you find them; you shall be rewarded for killing them on the Day of Judgment.”⁷³²

The Prophet has asked us to obey every man of authority (*amīr*), even if he is a black slave. His words that have been recorded by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* are, “Listen to your *amīr* and obey him, even if he be a black slave with hair like raisins.”⁷³³ Abū Dharr says that his friend the Prophet gave him the advice, “Listen to your *amīr* and obey his orders, even if he is black with broken ears.”⁷³⁴ In another version of the *ḥadīth* which Al-Bukhārī has noted, the last words are, “even if he be a black African with (hair on the) head like raisins.”⁷³⁵ Umm Al-Ḥaṣīn narrated that she heard the Prophet say in his famous address on the occasion of his last pilgrimage, “If a slave is put over you who rules according to the Book of God, listen to him and obey him.”⁷³⁶ In a different version of the *ḥadīth* the words are, “Even if he be black with a broken nose or ears cut off.”⁷³⁷ Both these *aḥādīth* have been reproduced by Muslim. He has also recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by ‘Awf Ibn Mālik (raa) that the Prophet said, “The best of your leaders/rulers (*a’immah*) are those whom you love and who love you, for whom you pray and who pray for you; and the worst of your imāms are those whom you hate and who hate you, whom you curse and who curse you.”⁷³⁸ Hearing that someone said, “Messenger of God, should we not then fight them with the sword?” He said: “No, as long as they establish the *ṣalāh*. No, as long as they establish the *ṣalāh*. Beware! If you have a ruler whom you find doing something sinful, hate the sin he commits, but do not refuse to obey his orders.”⁷³⁹

Muslim has noted a *ḥadīth* reported by ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar that the Prophet said, “The rulers who are just shall be seated on the pulpits of light on the right hand of (God) the Merciful and both His hands are right. They acted with justice among their

people, among their families and in everything that was entrusted to them.”⁷⁴⁰ Muslim has also noted another *ḥadīth* which ‘Ā’ishah (raa) has narrated from the Prophet. She says that she heard him praying, “Lord! Whoever is put in charge of any affair of my *ummah* and is hard on the people under him, be You also hard on him; and whoever is kind to them be You also kind to him.”⁷⁴¹ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* mention that ‘Abdullah Ibn Zayd visited Ma‘qal Ibn Yasār who was lying on his deathbed. Ma‘qal said that he would relate to him what he had heard from the Prophet. He said, “If anyone whom God puts in charge of His people dies while he is not sincere and fair to them he shall not enter Paradise.”⁷⁴² The words that occur in the *ḥadīth* which Muslim has recorded are slightly different; they say, “If anyone is put in charge of any affair of the Muslims, and does not do the best he can, and is not sincere to them, he will not be allowed to enter Paradise with them.”⁷⁴³

The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn ‘Umar that the Prophet said, “Know that every one of you is a shepherd, and every one of you shall be asked about his sheep. The man is shepherd over the people in his family, and shall have to answer for them. The woman is shepherd over the house of her husband and shall have to answer for it. The servant is shepherd over the property of his master, and shall have to answer for it. Know that every one of you is a shepherd, and every one of you is responsible for his sheep”⁷⁴⁴ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have also reported by ‘Alī that the Prophet dispatched a contingent and put a man over it. The man lit a fire and asked his men to enter it. Some got ready to enter the fire, but others refused saying, “We embraced Islam to avoid the fire!” When the incident was reported to the Prophet he said to those who were ready to enter the fire, “Had you entered it you would have remained in it till the Day of Judgment. Then he turned to the others and praised them. Finally he said, “Do not submit to a command that involves sinning against God, only to one that is right.”⁷⁴⁵

[*Fatāwā* 35:8-15]

(13.6) The limits of obedience.

No one is infallible except the Messenger, and no one else can command absolute obedience. Obedience is only in things that are right.

God has said, “You who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves refer it to God and His Messenger” (4:59). Thus has God commanded us to obey the men in authority, be they religious scholars or rulers, as long as they do not differ among themselves. It follows that when they agree on something it must be complied with. But when they differ the matter must be referred to God and His Messenger. He has not allowed it to be referred to one who is a blind follower (*muqallid*) of any person, or to one who argues only on the basis of reason.

The Qur’ān says, “Mankind was one single nation; then God sent messengers with glad tidings and warnings, and with them sent the Book in truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed” (2:213). This means that differences should be resolved by referring them to the Book of God. He has reiterated this truth in another verse: “Whatever it be wherein you differ, the decision thereof is with God” (42:10), as well as in the verse, “a Book revealed unto you - so let your heart be oppressed no more by any difficulty on that account - that with it you may warn (the erring) and teach the Believers. Follow the revelation given unto you from your Lord, and follow not as friends or protectors other than Him” (7:2). In other words, it is necessary that we follow the Book and the wisdom that God has revealed, and eschew following any other person.

God has said, “All who obey God and the Messenger are in the company of those on whom is the grace of God, namely the prophets, the sincerely dedicated to truth, the martyrs, and the

righteous” (4:69; and, “Those who obey God and His Messenger will be admitted to gardens with rivers flowing beneath, to abide therein (forever), and that will be the supreme achievement. But those who disobey God and His Messenger and transgress the limits set by Him will be admitted to a Fire to abide therein, and they shall have a humiliating punishment” (44:13-14). God has reiterated this idea at many places in His Book and made it perfectly clear that obedience to Him and His Messenger guarantees happiness and disobedience spells misery...

Our duty is to obey God, but there is no way to know what He wants us to do or to believe except through His messengers. So whoever says anything on His behalf and conveys His words or communicates His commands must be believed and obeyed in whatever he conveys or commands. If he does not, he can only be obeyed in some cases and not in others. One must obey the words of the scholars in whatever they enjoin, communicating the word of God or interpreting it or deriving from it; a commoner must submit to their verdict. Similarly, one must obey religious leaders (*mashā'ikh*) and secular rulers (*ru'asā'*) such as the imāms in *ṣalāh* or in *ḥajj*, commanders of armies in war, governors of states, and other officers, and follow the instructions and practices of the spiritual leaders and...

The point I am making is that if anybody takes someone as leader and believes that he deserves unqualified obedience, or gives him absolute obedience he is as much mistaken as the Imāmī Rawāfiḍ, who raise in every period someone to the status of an infallible imām and believe that he deserves unqualified obedience. One must know that no one else besides the Prophet is infallible, that no one other than he is to be obeyed in everything. Of the family of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*) those whom they have called imām, one was a righteous caliph (*khalīfah rāshid*), who was to be obeyed just as other righteous caliphs before him. I mean 'Alī. Some of them were leading religious scholars (*a'immah fī al-'ilm wa al-dīn*), such as 'Alī Ibn Al-Ḥusayn, Abū Ja'far Al-Bāqir, and

Ja'far Ibn Muḥammad Aṣ-Ṣādiq; they deserved the same treatment as other leading religious scholars do. Others occupy a position lower than them.

Somewhat similar is the case of those who call for unqualified following of any Ṣūfī preceptor whom they are prone to exalt over all others, such as Shaykh 'Adīy,⁷⁴⁶ Shaykh Aḥmad,⁷⁴⁷ Shaykh 'Abdul-Qāḍī,⁷⁴⁸ Shaykh Ḥayāt,⁷⁴⁹ or those who call people to follow a particular religious scholar (imām) in all that he has said, enjoined or forbidden without any qualification, such as the four *a'immaḥ*. The same is almost true of those who call people to submit to kings, governors, judges and other authorities, and carry out all their orders without qualification or exception, though they do not believe in the infallibility of these authorities as do the extremists among the followers of Ṣūfī masters like Shaykh 'Adīy, Sa'd Al-Madīnī Ibn Ḥammawayh⁷⁵⁰ and the like. These extremists attribute to their *mashā'ikh* something similar to what the Imāmīyyah attribute to the *a'immaḥ* of Banū Hāshim. They believe them to be infallible, exalt them over prophets, even attribute to them a kind of divinity.

Many people who follow a leading scholar (imām) or *shaykh* feel and act like those who believe that people must follow their leaders, though they do not say so in so many words or hold it as a part of their belief. Their behavior conflicts with their belief like a sinner who runs after his desires. To be sure, they are better in a sense than those who believe that one has to follow their leader. The same is true of many people who follow one ruler/chief or the other. God has described their condition in these words, "They would say: Our Lord! we obeyed our chiefs and our great ones, and they misled us as to the (right) path" (33:67). They submit to their authority and carry out their command; however most of them do not hold it as a matter of faith, though some of them do.

To obey the Prophet, on the other hand, you are first required to know what his teachings are, and second, you have to be able to act upon them. When the knowledge of his teachings and the

power to act upon them wane, we have a period of religious decline. It is time then for a fresh missionary effort (*da'wah*) (in our *ummah*) or (in other communities) a new prophethood. Think over this point; it is very important. Philosophers, theologians, and Sūfis who elevate analogy, reasoning or mystical experience into an absolute principle or who put them at par with prophethood are like those who raise up a particular person and submit to him without qualification. They must know that unqualified submission is for the Prophet only and for no one else.

[*Fatāwā* 19:67-71]

(13.7) Lawful and unlawful following (*taqlīd*).

The following (taqlīd) which God and His Messenger have forbidden is if one follows a person other than the Messenger in what he says in opposition to the Messenger. A scholar who exerts his mind, reasons out and arrives at the truth should not blindly follow the opinion of a person who says something different. But whether he may follow the opinion of someone while he has the power and competence to reason for himself, there are two different views. However, with regard to the person who cannot himself reason there is no difference that he may follow the one who can.

In His Book, God has condemned those people who leave His messengers and follow the religion of their forefathers. This is the blind following which He and His messengers have forbidden. No one should follow any person other than the Messenger in things in which he differs from the Messenger. This is clearly forbidden, and there is absolutely no difference on this point among the Muslims. He cannot submit to anyone's view which involves defying the will of God. God has made obedience to the Messenger incumbent on everyone, the common man as well as the elite, at every time and place, openly and in secret, and in every situation.

This is part of our faith. God has made it clear on different occasions. For example, He has said, “No, by your Lord, they can have no real faith, unless they make you judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance against your decisions but accept them with the fullest conviction” (4:65); “The answer of the Believers, when summoned to God and His Messenger, in order that he may judge between them, is none other than this: They say: ‘We hear and obey’” (24:51); “It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by God and His Messenger, to have any option about their decision” (33:36); “Then let those beware who oppose the Messenger’s command, lest some trial befall them, or a grievous penalty be inflicted on them” (26:63); and, “Say: If you do love God, follow me; God will love you” (3:31). Thus God has made it absolutely incumbent upon everyone to submit to the Messenger and follow Him; He has reiterated it at forty places in His Book. To obey the Messenger is to obey God; this is serving (*‘ibādah*) God, the One without any partner; this is the religion of God, Islam.

Everyone whom God has asked us to obey, whether scholar, ruler, father, or husband, is because obedience to him is obedience to God. That is why if his commands conflict with the commands of God he must not be obeyed. If a father or a husband orders something permissible, he should be obeyed; similarly, if a ruler orders something not known to be forbidden, or if a scholar gives some instruction which one does not know goes against the will of God, one will not be disobeying God if one carries it out. But if one knows that the order of the ruler or the counsel of the scholar is against God’s commands, compliance with such an order or counsel is definitely a sin against God.

This is also the reason why more than one person has mentioned that there is consensus on the point that no scholar should blindly follow another scholar if he can himself argue and find out the correct view consistent with the teachings of the Prophet. If he arrives at a view of his own he should not follow any

other's view; there is no difference of opinion on this point. People have differed only with regard to the person who has the power to reason and whether he may follow anyone else's view. Ash-Shāfi'ī, Aḥmad and some others say that he should not, and Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥasan is reported to have said that he may, as is well known. Some people have also attributed this view to Aḥmad, but they are not aware, I am afraid, of Aḥmad's view. I have discussed it elsewhere in detail. On the other hand, for anyone who cannot argue himself, it is perfectly lawful to follow any scholar; this is the generally accepted view. To be sure, there are differences with regard to details about the qualifications of the people whose views are to be followed but we cannot go into them here.

The point I am making is that the following (*taqlid*) which is forbidden by the texts and the consensus is the one which conflicts with the word of God or His Messenger irrespective of how great the person is whose view one is called upon to follow. God has said, "The Day that the wrongdoer will bite at his hands and say, 'Oh! Would that I had taken a (straight) path with the Messenger! Ah! Woe to me! Would that I had never taken such a one for a friend! He did lead me astray from the Message (of God) after it had come to me! Ah! The Evil One is but a traitor to man.' Then the Messenger will say, 'My Lord! Truly my people took this Qur'ān for just foolish nonsense'" (25:27-30).

He has also said:

The Day that their faces will be turned upside down in the Fire, they will say: 'Woe to us! Would that we had obeyed God and obeyed the Messenger!' And they will say: 'Our Lord! We obeyed our chiefs and our great ones, and they misled us as to the (right) path. Our Lord! Give them double penalty and curse them with a very great curse!' (33:66-8). Or, "Then will those who are followed clear themselves of those who follow (them). They will see the penalty, and all relations between them will be cut off. And those who followed will say, 'If only we had one more chance, we could clear ourselves of them, as they

have cleared themselves of us.’ Thus will God show them the fruits of their deeds as (nothing but) regrets. Nor will there be a way for them out of the Fire. You people! Eat of what is on earth, lawful and good; and do not follow the footsteps of the Evil One, for he is to you an avowed enemy. For he commands you what is evil and shameful, and that you should say of God that of which you have no knowledge. When it is said to them, ‘Follow what God has revealed,’ they say, ‘No, we shall follow the way of our fathers.’ What! Even though their fathers were devoid of wisdom and guidance! The parable of those who reject faith is as if one were to shout like a goatherd to things that listen to nothing but calls and cries. Deaf, dumb, and blind, they are devoid of wisdom” (2:166-71). This will be the attitude of the leaders towards their followers; they will clear themselves of them, in all matters in which God’s will is defied. God has described this condition after He has declared, ‘Your God is one God’ (2:163).

Hence, the one and the only God is alone to be worshiped and obeyed, and those who obey others will deserve the same condemnation...

Furthermore, these people ascribe to God things of which they have no knowledge. When they are asked, “Follow what God has revealed,” they say, “No, we will follow the ways of our fathers (2:170). They have no knowledge at all; they simply follow their forefathers; this is all that they have been trained in and taught... God has also mentioned those who conceal the clear statements and definite instructions which He has revealed in His Book. He has said, “Those who conceal God’s revelation in the Book, and purchase for them a miserable profit, they swallow into themselves naught but Fire. God will not address them on the Day of Resurrection, nor purify them; grievous evil be their penalty” (2:174). This will be the lot of those who conceal the knowledge they receive from the Prophet; the former was the lot of those who turned away from that knowledge to something else. To this category also belong these who follow the view of any scholar knowing that it goes against the words of the Prophet. It makes no

difference whether the person whose view he follows came from the earliest times or from a later period, whether he was a Companion, a Successor, any of the four renowned imāms of *fiqh*, or anyone else.

However, if he thinks that the view of the person, whom he follows agrees with the words of the Prophet, and arrives at that conclusion by pursuing the approved academic method, he is a *mujtahid*, and will be treated as such. But if he comes to it without procuring proper knowledge, he is to be censured.

If anyone claims that he knows of a consensus which goes against a particular word of the Prophet and has no other reason in its support, he is one of those who say that the people whose opinion is counted in consensus can oppose the Prophet on the basis of their reason, or that consensus can abrogate a text, as is held by some theologians and jurists. But if he thinks that the consensus refers to a text which unfortunately did not reach us and therefore can abrogate the first text, he is acting as a *mujtahid* even though he is not correct. It may be explained to him that his view is incorrect, and that he is like one who opposes a weak *ḥadīth* he thinks to be authentic in favor of one which is really authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*). It may also be shown to him that there is no consensus against the text, and that the *ummah* has not agreed on opposing any text except when it knows of another text which abrogates the first. Hence his claim that there is a contradiction between the text and the consensus is wrong. He will be told that this is not possible. The texts are known and well preserved, and the duty of the *ummah* is to pursue the texts and follow them. As for the claim that there may be a consensus against a text even if there is no text in support of the consensus, it is nearly impossible to ascertain whether all Muslim scholars have actually opposed the text.

[*Fatāwā* 19:260-7]

(13.8) Calling people to God

Calling people to God is calling them to believe in Him, submit to Him, worship Him the best one can, and obey Him in all that He has commanded and all that He has forbidden. It also means enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. To carry on this comprehensive call (da‘wah) is an obligation on the ummah, a collective duty such that if a group of people perform it others will be exonerated from the responsibility. Everyone in the ummah must participate in this mission to the extent he can if others are not carrying it out. For the men that take up this mission it is necessary to have thorough understanding and deep insight in what they enjoin and what they forbid, and to bear patiently the sufferings they may have to encounter.

The call to God is a call to believe in Him and in what His messengers have communicated, believe in what they have said, and to do what they have commanded, which involves testifying to the unity of God and the prophethood of Muḥammad, establishing *ṣalāh*, paying *zakāh*, fasting during Ramaḍān, and making pilgrimage to the House of God. It is a call to faith in God, His angels, His books, His messengers, in resurrection after death, and in the fact that everything good or bad is ordained by God. It is also a call to people to serve God as if they see Him. These are the three stages of the call: *islām*, *īmān*, and *iḥsān*. All of them are part of the religion (of Islam) as the Prophet said at the end of the famous *ḥadīth* which records Gabriel’s questions about these things and his answers to them: “That was Gabriel, who came to you to teach you your religion (*dīn*).”⁷⁵¹

Dīn is an infinitive which is sometimes ascribed to the subject, and sometimes to the object. It is said, “A *dāna* B,” that is, A submitted to B and obeyed him. It is also said, “X *dāna* Y,” that is, X subdued Y. Hence *al-‘abd yadīnu Allāh* means that man submits to God and obeys His commands. Here *dīn* is ascribed to man as its

subject, on the grounds that he is the servant (of God) and under His command. But when it is ascribed to Allah it is because He is God and the Lord Who is to be obeyed. The Qur'ān says, "Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and *dīn* is exclusively for Allah" (2:193).

Hence the call to God is a call to follow His religion (*dīn*), which is to worship Him and serve Him without associating anyone with Him. This is the message of all the messengers God has sent and all the books He has revealed. He has said, "He has established for you the same religion which He enjoined on Noah, which We have sent by inspiration to you, and which We enjoined on Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, namely that you should establish the religion and make no divisions therein" (42:13)... He has also said, "We assuredly sent among every people a messenger (with the command, 'Serve God and eschew evil.' Of them there were some whom God guided, and some on whom error became inevitably (established))" (16:36).

In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections we have a *ḥadīth* which Abū Hurayrah has reported, in which the Prophet said, "We prophets have a single religion. To be sure, prophets are sons of a common father by different mothers. Certainly the one who is closest to the son of Mary is I. There is no prophet between him and me."⁷⁵² Religion (of all the prophets) is therefore one; only their codes of law (*sharā'i*) and their ways (*manāḥij*) have been different. from each other. God has said, "To each among you We have prescribed a Law (*sharī'ah*) and an open Way (*minḥāj*)" (5:51). Thus the prophets are one in the matters of religion, in the basic principles of faith and practice: faith in God, His messengers, and the Last Day, and practices such as those which have been mentioned in the *sūrahs* Al-An'ām (VI), Al-A'rāf (VII) and Banū Isrā'il (XVII). In *Sūrat Al-An'ām*, for example, he says:

Say: Come, I will rehearse what God has (really)
prohibited you: join not anything as equal with me; be

good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of want - We provide sustenance for you and for them; come not nigh to shameful deeds, whether open or secret; take not life, which God has made sacred, except by way of justice and law. Thus does He command you that you may learn wisdom. And come not nigh to the orphan's property, except to improve it until he attains the age of full strength; give measure and weight with full justice. No burden do We place on any soul but that which it can bear. Whenever you speak, speak justly even if a near relative is concerned; and fulfill the covenant of God. Thus does He command you that you may remember. Verily this is My way leading straight. Follow it; follow not (other) paths; they will scatter you about from His (great) path. Thus does He command you that you may be righteous (6:151-3).

In Sūrat Banū Isrā'īl, God has said:

Your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him, and that you be kind to your parents. Whether one or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of contempt, nor repel them, but address them in terms of honor, and out of kindness lower to them your wing of humility and say, 'My Lord! Bestow on them Your mercy even as they cherished me in childhood.' Your Lord knows best what is in your hearts. If you do deeds of righteousness, verily He is Most Forgiving to those who turn to Him again and again (in true penitence). And render to the kindred their due rights, as (also) to those in want, and to the wayfarer. But squander not (your wealth) in the manner of a spendthrift. Verily spendthrifts are brothers of evil ones; and the Evil One is to his Lord ungrateful. And even if you have to turn away from them in pursuit of the mercy from your Lord which you expect, speak to them a word of easy kindness. Make not your hand tied (like a niggard) to your neck, neither stretch it forth to its utmost reach so that you become blameworthy and destitute. Verily your Lord does provide sustenance in abundance for whom He pleases, as He provides in a just measure. For He does know and regard all His

servants. Kill not your children for fear of want. We shall provide sustenance for them as well as for you. Verily the killing of them is a great sin. Nor come nigh to adultery; for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil opening the road (to other evils). Nor take life which God has made sacred except for just cause. And if anyone is slain wrongfully We have given his heir authority (to demand *qisas* or to forgive); but let him not exceed bounds in the matter of taking life, for he is helped (by the Law). Come not nigh to the orphan's property except to improve it, until he attains the age of full strength; and fulfill (every) engagement, for (every) engagement will be inquired into. Give full measure when you measure, and weigh with a balance that is straight. That is the most fitting and the most advantageous in the final determination. And pursue not that of which you have no knowledge, for every act of hearing or of seeing or of (feeling in) the heart will be asked about. Nor walk on the earth with insolence, for you cannot rend the earth asunder, nor reach the mountains in height. Of all such things the evil is hateful in the sight of your Lord. These are among the (precepts of) wisdom which your Lord has revealed to you. Take not with God another object of worship, lest you should be thrown into Hell, blameworthy and rejected (17:3-39).

In Sūrat Al-A'rāf He has said "Say: My Lord has commanded justice; and that you set your whole selves (to Him) at every time and place of prayer, and call upon Him, making your devotion as in His sight" (7:29); and, "Say: The things that my Lord has indeed forbidden are shameful deeds, whether open or secret, sins and trespasses against truth or reason, assigning of partners to God, for which He has given no authority, and saying things about God of which you have no knowledge" (7:33).

These things are part of the perennial religion, common to all the codes (*sharā'i*) which God has sent down to man. They have been stated in the Makkan *sūrahs* of the Qur'ān which discuss basic principles every prophet has taught. They have been addressed to those who do not believe in any prophethood at all.

The Madinan *sūrahs*, on the other hand, address those who believe in one prophet or another, who have been given a book, but who only believe in one part of it and reject the other. Or they address the Believers who believe in all the books of God and in all His messengers. That is why He has given in these *sūrahs* the instructions which complete religious instructions about the *qiblah*, *ḥajj*, fasting, *i'tikāf*, *jihād*, marriage, divorce, and transactions which are based on justice such as trade and commerce, or on compassion like charity, or which are based on injustice such as usury and interest, and so on...

Hence the call to God involves also the call to all the commands He has issued enjoining or forbidding anything. It is a call to do all that is good and to eschew all that is evil. This was the call which the Prophet gave to the people; he commanded whatever God had commanded and forbade whatever He had forbidden. He enjoined everything good and prohibited everything evil. God has said, "My mercy extends to all things, and I will ordain it for those who do right and practice regular charity, and those who believe in Our signs - those who follow the Messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own (scriptures), in the Torah and the Gospel - for he commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil; he allows them as lawful what is good (and pure) and forbids them from what is bad (and impure); he releases them from their heavy burden and from the yokes that are upon them." (7:15)

The call to God should be in His name and according to His will; never should anyone say anything which is not authorized by Him. He has introduced the mission of the Prophet in these words: "Truly We have sent you as a witness, a bearer of glad tidings, and a warner, and as one who invites to God's (grace) by His leave, and as a lamp spreading light" (33:45-6). Condemning the pagans He has said, "What! Have they partners (in godhead) who have established for them some religion without the permission of God?" (42:21); or, "Say: See you what things God has sent down

to you for sustenance? Yet you hold forbidden something thereof and (something) lawful. Say: Has God indeed permitted you, or do you invent (things) to attribute to God?” (10:59).

The point I am making here is further supported by the fact that God has sometimes asked the Prophet to call men to God Himself and sometimes to His way, for example, “Invite (all) to the way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching” (16:125). He knows that when a preacher calls someone to something he calls to the thing itself, or to the way that leads to it. That is why God has described the preaching sometimes as a call to Himself and sometimes as a call to His way. However, in either case He is the one who is to be worshiped (*al-ma‘būd*) the goal and the end of preaching.

Ibādah is the name for perfect love and absolute submission with humility. Thus, if you submit to someone humbly but hate him, you do not worship him; on the other hand, if you love him but do not submit to him in humility, you do not worship him. God deserves perfect love; in fact, He is the only One Who is to be loved for Himself, and everything else is to be loved for His sake. He alone commands profoundest reverence and absolute submission, and nothing else is to be revered or submitted to except for His sake. If you associate anyone else with Him in one respect or another, you neither love Him truly nor adore Him truly. Association means that your love is incomplete. God has said, “Yet there are men who take (for worship) others besides God, as equal (with God). They love them as they should love God. But those of faith are overflowing in their love for God” (2:165). In other words, they love God more than others love the deities they associate with God. Arrogance is opposed to humble submission to God; in fact, it is a great impediment to His love. Love at its perfection is submission and obedience; when you love someone you submit to him completely...

The person who calls people to God must call them to all of the things that are loved by God and His Messenger, whether

obligatory or commendable, whether visible to the eyes or hidden in the heart. Similarly, things that are disliked by God and His Messenger, whether open or hidden, he must call people to eschew. The call to God will never be complete without calling people to do the things that He loves and eschew the things that He hates, whether they are beliefs or actions, or whether they are visible to the eyes or not. It applies to all that the Prophet has taught about the names and attributes of God, about resurrection and the life hereafter, or what he has said about created things such as the Throne, the Footstool, the angels, the prophets, the people who believed in them and those who opposed them. It also applies to what he has said about sincerely devoting oneself to God, loving Him and His Messenger more than anything else, trusting Him, hoping for His mercy, fearing His chastisement, carrying out His commands patiently, and other similar things, or what he has said about speaking truth, keeping trusts, fulfilling promises, kindness to kin, good behavior to neighbors, *jihād* in His way with the heart, tongue and hand.

The call to God is a duty on all those who believe in the Prophet and constitute his community. They should call people to God as the Prophet called them to God. They should enjoin upon them what he has enjoined, forbid them what he has forbidden, and expound to them the truths he has stated. Calling people (*da'wah*) to God implies enjoining (*amr*) upon them His commands, which amounts to charging them with doing all that is good and eschewing all that is bad. God has described this mission of the *ummah* at many places, for example, "You are the best of the peoples that have been evolved for mankind, you enjoin what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God" ((3:110); and, "The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another; they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil" (9:91).

This duty is a duty on the *ummah* as a whole, one which the '*ulamā*' call collective duty (*farḍ al-kifāyah*), which is deemed fulfilled if some from among the *ummah* perform it. To be sure, the

whole *ummah* is responsible for the task, but if a group accomplishes it others will not be called to account for it. God has said, "Let there arise out of you a band of people to invite to all that is good, enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong. They are the ones to attain felicity" (3:104). The *ummah* as a whole stands in place of the Prophet so far as *da'wah* is concerned. That is why the consensus of the *ummah* is an evidence sure and certain of truth. The *ummah* does not unite on anything wrong; and in case it differs on some issue it has to refer it to God and the Messenger. Every member of the *ummah* is required to carry on *da'wah* the best he can if others do not engage in it. If someone else performs the task, his responsibility is finished; he will not have to answer for not doing it himself. But if no one else does it, and he has the power and ability to do it, he must do it. This is also the reason why a part of *da'wah* is incumbent on one person, and another on another person, and to the extent one or the other performs his task the *ummah* is exonerated from its responsibility. Some may preach the faith which is necessary, others may call to actions of the body which are obligatory, and a third group may teach virtues of the heart. Hence different groups will be responsible for different parts of the mission and will be engaged in them.

It is now clear that *da'wah* means enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong. The *da'i* preaches, persuades and demands of people what he calls them to. In other words, he enjoins (*amr*), for to enjoin something is to call people to it, to invite them to it, and ask them to do it. Calling to God, therefore, is calling to His Way which He has at times specifically mentioned, and His way is nothing other than believing in whatever He has revealed, and obeying Him in whatever He has commanded.

We have said that both things are incumbent on every individual Muslim as a collective duty, not as a personal duty like the five daily prayers, but as *jihād*. The performance of a duty, whether it is *da'wah* or anything else, depends upon certain conditions. A *ḥadīth* says, "Whoever enjoins the right and forbids

the wrong must have good knowledge and a clear understanding of what he enjoins and what he forbids; he must also be polite in expounding the things which he enjoins and which he forbids, and above all he has to be forbearing in enjoining and in forbidding.”⁷⁵³ You must understand the thing very well before you call to it, so that you can convince people with regard to what you enjoin or what you forbid. You should also know that politeness and leniency in this matter is the way to success. You have to be prepared to bear with patience the reactions of people that may be unpleasant. God has said, “Enjoin what is just and forbid what is unjust and bear with patience whatever betide you.” (31:17). To His Prophet He has issued this advice: “Await in patience the command of your Lord, for verily you are in Our eyes” (52:39); “The Messengers before you were (also) rejected, but they bore with patience and constancy their rejection and their wrongs until Our aid reached them” (6:34)... On many occasions He has also mentioned patience and piety together. For example, “If you are constant and do right that is certainly a great thing” (3:120). Joseph also combined the two in the words he said to his brethren: “Behold! He that is righteous and patient, never will God suffer the reward to be lost of those who do right” (12:90). This is because piety entails obedience to God, of which enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong is a part, and patience entails patience in troubles and calamities, of which patiently bearing the painful reactions of the people one preaches to and the troubles they cause is one.

However, the person who enjoins and forbids should defend himself against the harm that may befall him as he would defend himself against any attack. If, for example, anyone tries to beat him or take his property and he has the power to stop him, he may do so; but if he is harmed and turns to God in that situation, he exercises patience and forbearance. The perfect example in this regard is the Prophet himself. ‘Ā’ishah (raa) has this observation about him: “The Prophet,” she said, “did not beat anyone with his

hand, whether a servant, a woman, an animal, or anything else, except when he was engaged in *jihād* for the cause of God. Nor did he take revenge on anybody for the harm he caused him. Only when someone indulged in things which God had forbidden would he get furious and would not rest until he had avenged him for the sake of God.”⁷⁵⁴ This shows that the Prophet never avenged any harm caused to his person, but he did so when God’s injunctions were violated, and no one could stop him from doing that.

[*Fatāwā* 15:157-69]

(13.9) Bidding the right and forbidding the wrong

Bidding the right and forbidding the wrong is a collective duty like jihād, which is its completion. If no one fulfills this duty, everyone who is competent will be guilty to the extent he was capable, for it is incumbent upon everyone according to his ability. This is true of all duties. They produce more good than evil, for if the evil consequences of a thing outweighed its good consequences God would not make it obligatory. The duty of bidding the right and forbidding the wrong is sometimes performed by hand, sometimes by tongue, and sometimes only by the heart, and that is the weakest form of faith one can have. Those who are to take up this duty should have a very good understanding of the things they enjoin and the things they forbid, they should be polite and lenient in performing it, and they should be prepared to suffer patiently the harms that might be inflicted on them by the people to whom they preach.

God has introduced His Prophet in these words: “He commands them what is just, and forbids them what is unjust, allows them as lawful what is good and prohibits them from what is bad” (9:157). This is the description of his mission. It is through him that God bids every good and forbids everything evil. The Prophet himself has described his mission in this way: “I have

been sent to perfect all the noble virtues.”⁷⁵⁵ In another *ḥadīth* reported in both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections he has said, “I and other prophets form a house which was built by someone who completed the whole structure, but left just the place for a brick. Anyone who goes around the house is caught by its beauty, but wonders why one brick has not been placed. Know that I am that brick.”⁷⁵⁶ With him God completed His religion which commands all that is right and forbids all that is wrong, allows all that is good and pure, and prohibits all that is bad and foul...

God has introduced the *ummah* in a manner similar to how He introduced the Prophet. He has said, “You are the best of the peoples, evolved for mankind. You bid the right and forbid the wrong, and believe in God” (3:110); and, “The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another; they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil.” (9:71). Abū Hurayrah⁷⁵⁷ put it in his own way when he said, “You are the best of the peoples for mankind. You bind them up in chains and lead them into Paradise.” God has made it very clear that this *ummah* is the best *ummah* for mankind and their greatest benefactor because they tell them what is right and what is wrong for them, and ask them to act upon that. They also strive with all their power and resources to establish the rule of justice and virtue and do that for no purpose but to please their Lord. This is the best they can do for mankind...

When we say that the good should be enjoined and the evil should be forbidden, we do not mean that every individual in the world should be addressed. This was not the part of the duty of the Prophet; how could it be the duty of his followers! What is required is that conditions should be created that people receive the message. If they themselves do not try to know the message while those responsible to preach it have done their duty, it is the people who are guilty...

Furthermore, the duty to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong is not an individual duty, it is a collective duty, as the Qur’ān has said, and since *jihād* is the completion of that duty, it is also a

collective duty. Hence, if those who have the power and ability to perform that duty fail to render it, every individual who has the ability will be guilty to the extent of his ability, for it is a duty on every person according to his or her ability. The Prophet said, “Whoever sees an evil should remove it with his hand. If he cannot do that he should speak against it; if he cannot do that, he should hate it in his heart, and that is the lowest degree of faith.”⁷⁵⁸

So this duty is sometimes performed with the heart and sometimes with the tongue, and sometimes with the hands. As for the heart, it must render that duty in every situation, since it involves no harm at all. Hence, if anyone fails in that, too, he is not a Believer. The Prophet has said, “That is the lowest or the weakest degree of faith,” or “Beyond that there is not a particle of faith there.” Ibn Mas‘ūd⁷⁵⁹ was asked, “Who are the dead among the people who are living?” He answered, “Those who neither approve of the right nor condemn the wrong.”

Two groups of people have gone wrong in this regard. One group abstains from enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong. They try to find justification for their action in the verse, “You who believe! Guard your own souls. If you follow (right) guidance, no hurt can come to you from those who stray” (5:08). In his time, Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddiq⁷⁶⁰ found some people behaving in the same wrong manner. He addressed them and said, “You read this verse and interpret it in the wrong way. I have heard the Prophet saying, ‘When people see wrong being done and do not try to remove it God is likely to inflict punishment on them all.’”⁷⁶¹ The second group wants to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong but they do not know how to do it, nor do they have the patience and forbearance required, or the understanding of what should be done and what should not, or what is feasible and what is not. Abū Tha‘labah says that he asked the Prophet concerning this, and he said, “You should work together and enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, till you see people turning greedy, running after their desires, self-conceited, each defending his own whims, knowing

nothing about the truth. At that time you should mind yourself, leave the people to themselves. You will be seeing days when to hold on to the right will be as difficult as to hold fire in the hand. Whoever does a right thing in those days shall have the reward of fifty people doing the same (in our days).”⁷⁶² This means that some people will be engaged in bidding the right and forbidding the wrong, believing all the while that they are serving God and obeying His Prophet but they will only be transgressing the limits He has set. A number of heretical sects like the Khawārij, the Mu‘tazilah, the Rāfiḍah and others do a lot of things wrong while performing the duty of bidding the right and forbidding the wrong; they do more evil than good. That is why the Prophet has advised the Believers to bear patiently the injustices which their rulers commit, and refrain from fighting them so long as they establish the *ṣalāh*. His words are, “Give them their due, and ask God for what is your due.”⁷⁶³

That is why one of the principles of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah is that one should adhere to the body of Muslims (*jamā‘ah*) and refrain from fighting the rulers. Heretical sects such as the Mu‘tazilah, on the other hand, believe that people should fight the rulers; they consider it one of their basic principles... I have discussed in detail elsewhere the issue of fighting against rulers. The guiding principle in this regard, as in other similar cases, is this: whenever there is a conflict between the good and the bad consequences or between the right and the wrong aspects of a course of action, one must choose the course which is the better of the two. Even though the right we enjoin or the wrong we forbid is only meant to secure some good or ward off some evil, we have to see what consequences follow otherwise. If the good one loses or the loss one incurs is greater, then such a course of action will not be desirable. In fact, if the evils of an action outweigh its good, it will be forbidden. However, both good and the evil consequences have to be measured by the standards of the Shari‘ah. The best policy in the matter is: Follow the texts, and do

not go beyond them; when you do not have texts, exercise your mind, and take help from instructions in similar cases. It rarely happens that texts fail a person if he is aware of them and is versed in inferring from them.

Hence, if a person or a group of people faces a situation that has both aspects, good and evil, and are not able to isolate one from the other, and have either to accept them together or leave them together, they will not be asked to do the good alone or avoid the evil alone; they will have to study the case thoroughly. If the good outweighs the evil they will be required to do it, even though it involves some evil; they will not be asked to refrain from it, for that would involve the loss of greater good. To ask them to refrain from it would be blocking the way to God, obstructing the fulfillment of His will or the will of His Prophet, and undermining the realization of so much good. But if the evil outweighs the good they must refrain from it, even though it will mean the loss of some good, for to ask one to accomplish a good that involves greater evil is to ask him to sin against God and His Prophet. If the good and the evil balance each other one will not be asked to do either. This means that situations differ. One time it may be better to bid an action, another time to forbid it, and a third time to refrain from both, that is to say in case the good and the evil balance each other...

It was a situation of the last kind in which the Prophet abstained from doing anything with ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubayy and other hypocrites who had a large number of supporters. Had he done anything to remove the evil they were causing he would have risked a greater good. Their peoples would have come out in their support and would have shouted that Muḥammad (pbuh) was killing his own friends and supporters. That was why when he addressed people at the occasion of the slander (against his wife ‘Ā’ishah) he excused ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubayy, and Sa’d Ibn Mu‘ādh^{761a} spoke to him the good words that he said, and Sa’d Ibn ‘Ubaydah^{761b} defended him even though Sa’d was a good Muslim.

The important thing here is that one's love for the good and hatred for the evil and one's willingness to do the former and eschew the latter should be subject to God's likes and dislikes, love and aversion, which He has expressed in His revelations, and that he should work for the good and against the evil as much as he can. God does not require from a soul more than it can do. He has said, "Fear God as much as you can" (64:16). As for love or hate, desire or aversion, it should be perfect, and deficiency in it will mean deficiency in fait; but as for action, it should be according to one's ability and power. If your love for the good or your hatred for the evil is perfect and you act as much as your powers allow, you will have the reward of a perfect worker.

Often the like or dislike, love or aversion of the people for a particular thing is determined by their natural love and aversion for the thing rather than by the love and aversion which God and His Prophet have for it. This may amount to self-indulgence, and if they proceed on that road they will only be pursuing their own desires. God has said, "And who is more astray than one who follows his own lusts, devoid of guidance from God?" (28:50). For lust in its essence is love of the self and aversion is only dependent upon it. Neither desire as such, which is the basis for love, nor aversion as such, which we have in ourselves, is something objectionable; people often do not have control over either. What may be objectionable is their translation into action. It is against them that God cautioned David when He said, "David! We did indeed make you a vicegerent on earth; so judge between men in truth (and justice) and never follow the lusts (of your heart) for they will mislead you from the Path of God" (38:26)...

Man's duty, therefore, is to see whether his love and aversion are subject to God's commands and the commands of His Prophet, and in the same measure as they would like. For it is these commands which constitute God's guidance, commands which He has revealed to His Prophet, and to which one should subject one's likes and dislikes, and never ever exceed... Hence, one must

acquire knowledge of the good and the bad, must be able to distinguish between them, and must know what things have been commanded and what have been forbidden... One must also be polite and considerate in calling men to them, and mind what the Prophet has said: “Politeness only adds to the beauty of a thing you do, and rudeness only adds to its ugliness.”⁷⁶⁴ He has also said, “God is lenient and loves leniency in everything, and gives to the lenient what He does not give to the harsh.”⁷⁶⁵

One must also be patient and forgiving of the wrongs one suffers; you just cannot escape them. If you cannot forbear and forgive, you will do more harm than good. Luqmān taught that truth to his son when he said, “Enjoin what is just, and forbid what is wrong; and bear with patience whatever befalls you” (31:17). This is also the reason why God instructed His messengers, who were masters in this art to be patient and forgiving. To the Seal of the Prophets, for example, He has said, “Have patience with what they say, and leave them with noble (dignity)” (73:10), and “Patiently persevere, as did (all) messengers of inflexible purpose” (46:35).

To sum up: One must have knowledge and understanding, must be polite and lenient, and must be patient and persevering. Knowledge must be acquired before bidding the good and forbidding the evil, leniency must go along with it, and patience must follow it. All three must go together. This is stated in a tradition which has come down from the Elders, even believed to have emerged from the Prophet: “No one really bids the right and forbids the wrong except one who knows very well what he bids and what he forbids, who is polite and lenient in bidding as well as in forbidding, and who is forbearing and forgiving on both occasions.” Qāḍī Abū Ya‘lā has noted this tradition in his book, *Al-Mu‘tamad*.

[*Fatāwā* 28:121-37]

(13.10) Jihād

Whoever receives the message of Islam and refuses to accept it we are to fight, so that the obstruction (in the way of truth) is removed and the religion of God prevails. Similarly, if any group of Muslims refuses to comply with any ruling of the Islamic Sharī'ah which is definite, categorical and firmly established (az-ẓāhirah wa al-mutawātirah) our duty is to fight them till they submit completely to God. The texts that describe the merits of jihād are too many to be counted. Scholars of Islam are agreed that jihād is better than ḥajj and 'umrah, and better than non-obligatory ṣalāh and fasting. The reason that jihād is so meritorious an act is that its benefits reach the doer as well as other people, in this life and the next, and because it comprehends all kinds of devotion, manifest and hidden, such as love, sincerity, trust, sacrifice of life and property, patience, renunciation, and remembering God, which are not comprehended by any other act.

Whoever gets the message of the Prophet to believe and practice the religion of God which He has revealed to him, but does not respond to it, we are to fight him "till obstruction is removed and the religion of God prevails" (2:193). When God sent His Messenger and commanded him to call people to His religion, He did not allow him to fight or kill anybody for it or wage war against him, until he migrated to Madinah. At that time He allowed it to him and to the Muslim community saying, "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight) because they are wronged; verily God has all the powers for their aid. They are those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, (for no cause) except that they say, 'Our Lord is God.' Had not God checked one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure. God will certainly aid those

who aid (His) cause. For verily God is Full of Strength, Exalted in Might. They are those who if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid the wrong. With God rests the end (and decision) of all affairs” (22:39-41).

Sometime later God made fighting incumbent on them in these words: “Fighting is prescribed for you, and you dislike it, for it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and that you love a thing which is bad for you. But God knows, and you know not” (2:216). In other Madinan *sūrahs* He underlined its imperative character, emphasized its importance, and condemned those who did not participate in it, dubbing them hypocrites and sick in the heart, for example, “Say (Prophet): If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your spouses, or your kindred, the wealth that you have gained, the commerce in which you fear a decline, or the dwellings in which you delight, are dearer to you than God or His Messenger, or the striving in His cause, then wait until God brings about His decision; and God guides not the rebellious” (9:24). Or, “Only they are Believers who have believed in God and His Messenger, have never since doubted, but have striven with their belongings and their persons in the cause of God. Such are the sincere ones” (49:15). Or, “When a *sūrah* of basic and categorical meaning is revealed, and fighting is mentioned therein, you will see those in whose hearts is a disease looking at you with a look of one in a swoon at the approach of death. But more fitting for them were it to obey and say what is just, and when a matter is resolved upon, it were best for them if they were true to God. Then is it to be expected of you, if you were put in authority that you will do mischief in the land, and break your ties of kith and kin” (47:20-22). And so on and so on.

God has also applauded those who engage in *jihād* and he has honored them. In Sūrat Aṣ-Ṣaff, for example, He says, “You who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty? That you believe in God and His Messenger, and

that you strive (your utmost) in the cause of God, with your property and your persons. That would be best for you if you but knew. He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in gardens of eternity; that is indeed the supreme achievement. And another (favor will He bestow) which you do love - help from God and speedy victory. So give the glad tidings to the Believers” (61:10-3). Or, “Do you make the giving of drink to pilgrims, or the maintenance of the Sacred Mosque equal (to the pious service of) those who believe in God and the Last Day, and strive with might and main in the cause of God. And God guides not those who do wrong. Those who believe and suffer exile and strive with might and main in God’s cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God. They are the people who will achieve (salvation). Their Lord gives them glad tidings of mercy from Himself, of His good pleasure, and of gardens for them, wherein are delights that endure. They will live therein forever. Verily in God’s presence is a reward, the greatest (of all)” (9:19-22). Or, “If any from among you turn back from his faith, soon will God produce a people whom He will love as they will love Him, lowly with the Believers, mighty against the rejecters, fighting in the way of God and never afraid of the reproaches of such as find fault. That is the grace of God which He will bestow on whom He pleases, and God encompasses all, and He knows all things” (5:57)...

Verses and *aḥādīth* that speak of *jihād* and its merits are too many to be counted. This is the reason why *jihād* is the best of all the supererogatory works. Scholars are agreed that it is better than *ḥajj* and *‘umrah*, and better than supererogatory *ṣalāh* and fasting, as you find in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. The Prophet, to quote a few *aḥādīth*, said, “The important thing is *islām*, (submission); its pillar is *ṣalāh* on which it stands, and *jihād* is its pinnacle.”^{763a} Or, “Paradise has an hundred stories, and the distance between one story and the next is like the distance between earth and sky. God

has prepared it for those who carry on *jihād* for His sake.”⁷⁶⁶ This *ḥadīth* is recorded by Al-Bukhārī and Muslim. The former has also recorded the *ḥadīth* in which the Prophet has said, “One whose feet are covered with dust from traveling in the cause of God, God will not allow the Fire to touch them.”⁷⁶⁷ He has also said, “To spend one day and night in *jihād* for the cause of God is better than fasting one whole month and praying all its nights. If the *mujāhid* dies on *jihād* the acts that he used to perform (daily) will continue to be credited to his account. He will also be receiving his sustenance and will be secure from the guiles of Satan.”⁷⁶⁸ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded by Muslim. In the *Sunan* collections we have, “To spend a day in the way of God is better than a thousand days at home;”⁷⁶⁹ and, “The Fire will not touch two eyes: one that weeps fearing God, and the other that wakes up guarding (a post) in a war for the cause of God.”⁷⁷⁰ This is recorded by At-Tirmidhī with the remark that it is fairly authentic (*ḥasan*). Aḥmad in his *Musnad* has noted the words of the Prophet: “To watch a post for a night (in war) for the sake of God is better than fasting one whole month and praying all its nights.”⁷⁷¹ The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have recorded that a person once asked the Prophet if there was anything equal to *jihād* in the way of God. The Prophet said, “Is it possible that, from the time the *mujāhid* goes out on *jihād*, you fast without break and engage in *ṣalāh* without taking a rest? The man said, “One cannot.” “That would be equal,” the Prophet said, “to *jihād*.”⁷⁷² The *Sunan* collections have these words of the Prophet: “Every community has its form of *siyāḥah* or pious traveling; the *siyāḥah* of my community is *jihād* in the way of God.”⁷⁷³

There are numerous *aḥādīth* on the merits of *jihād*. On no other subject will you find so many *aḥādīth* as on *jihād*. This is nothing to wonder about for the benefits of *jihād* are not limited to its doer; they reach others also, in this life as well as in the next. *Jihād* comprehends all kinds of devotion, manifest and hidden, such as love, sincerity, trust, sacrifice of life and property, patience,

renunciation, remembering God, and many more which other works do not comprehend...

War has been instituted only in the form of *jihād*, for it seeks to put the entire life in control of God's religion and make His word prevail over all other words. That is why those who refrain from Islam expose themselves to war; this is completely agreed upon among the Muslims. However, those who are not belligerents and do not participate in war, such as women, children, hermits, old men, the blind, the chronically ill, and the like, shall not be killed, except when they participate in war with their words or actions... God has allowed the taking of lives only to the extent necessary for the well-being of people. He has said, "Insult and oppression are worse than slaughter" (2:191), that is to say, killing people is certainly evil, but the mischief that the unbelievers create is far worse. Those who do not create obstructions for the Muslims in practicing their religion, their evil is limited to themselves. That is why the jurists say that those who propagate heretical ideas opposed to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah shall have the punishment which ordinary men will not. A *ḥadīth* says, "The sin which is done in secret harms only the sinner, but that which is done in open and is not condemned harms also the general public."⁷⁷⁴ This is the reason why the Sharī'ah has proscribed those who openly deny Islam (and fight), but not those who are caught from among them... However, war will be carried out against the People of the Book and the Zoroastrians till they either accept Islam or pay the *jizyah*, submitting (to the Islamic authority). As for others, jurists differ whether *jizyah* should be levied on them or not; the Arabs, however, are exempted by the majority.

If from among the Muslims any group defies any rules of the Sharī'ah which are categorical and well established (*az-ẓāhirah wa al-mutawātirah*) they are to be fought till the whole religion of God comes into force. Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddiq and with him all other Companions fought those who refused to pay *zakāh*. To be sure, some Companions did waver about it at first, but they soon agreed

with Abū Bakr. ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb, for example, first argued with him: “How will you fight a Muslim? Has the Prophet not said that he has been commanded to fight people till they confess that God is one and Muḥammad is the Messenger, and that the moment they confess it they will save their lives and property from him except when it is required by the law and God alone will call them to account for their deeds?”⁷⁷⁵ Abū Bakr said that *zakāh* is one of those things which are required by the law. He further said, “By God if they refuse to pay even for the rope by which they tie their camels and which they used to pay for in *zakāh* at the time of the Prophet I will fight them for it.” When ‘Umar heard that he said, “God has made the mind of Abū Bakr very clear about war; I see that Abū Bakr is perfectly right.”

There are many authentic *aḥādīth* which say that the Prophet commanded war against the Khawārij. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, for example, record that ‘Alī Ibn Abī Tālib heard the Prophet say, “At the end of times there will emerge a people young in age and weak of intellect. In talk they will surpass the best of mankind, but their faith will not go down deeper than their throats; they will shoot out of the religion just as an arrow passes through the animal it kills. Kill them whenever you find them; you shall be rewarded for it on the Day of Judgment.” In the *ḥadīth* as Muslim has recorded it the words are, “A group of people will emerge from my community who will devote themselves to the Qur’ān. Your reading of the Qur’ān will not stand comparison to their reading, nor will your *ṣalāh* bear comparison with theirs. They will be reading the Qur’ān for their own benefit but it will go against them. It will hardly pass down their throat. They will move out of Islam just as an arrow passes out of the prey it kills. If the army that would attack them knew what reward is promised to them by their Prophet they would leave all other tasks.” Abū Sa‘īd, who has narrated this *ḥadīth*, adds the words, “They will fight the Muslims and leave the heathens. If I were to find them I would kill them just like the

people of ‘Ād.”⁷⁷⁶ This *ḥadīth* has been recorded by Muslim and Al-Bukhārī. In another version of the *ḥadīth*, which we have in Muslim, the words are, “My community will divide into two factions, and in between them a group will arise who will leave Islam. They will be killed by the faction which will be on the right”⁷⁷⁷

The people who have been referred in the *ḥadīth* are those whom *Amīr al-Mu’minīn* ‘Alī killed when the people of Shām had separated from the people of ‘Irāq. They are called Ḥarūrīyyah. The *ḥadīth* also makes it clear that both factions (the ‘Irāqīs and the Shāmīs) are part of the *ummah*, that those (‘Irāqīs) who were with ‘Alī were on the right, and that ‘Alī fought the renegades because they went out of Islam, left the party of the Muslims, and had no scruples in killing Muslims or plundering their property.

From the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the *ummah*, it is clear that we may fight those who go out of the Islamic Sharī‘ah, even though they may be confessing to the unity of God and the prophethood of Muḥammad. Jurists have differed only with regard to the *sunnah rātibah* (the supererogatory works which the Prophet did very regularly and recommended to us in strong words, without, however making them obligatory) such as offering two *rak‘āt* before the dawn prayer, whether we should fight those who refuse to offer them. But as for duties which are obligatory or things which are clearly forbidden and known to all, everyone agrees that those who do not offer them should be fought till they submit, establish regular prayers, pay *zakāh*, fast during Ramaḍān, make *ḥajj*, and refrain from forbidden things like marrying two sisters, eating foul things, or taking the life and property of a Muslim, and so on.

War against such people is a duty and may be initiated after they are told why the Prophet has called for war against them. But if it is they who start a war against the Muslims, it becomes all the more necessary to fight them. I have already said that we should

fight against those who do not submit to Islamic authority, commit mischief and rob the wayfarers. *Jihād* against the infidels who reject Islam and those (Muslims) who refuse to comply with any part of the Islamic Sharī‘ah, like the refusers of *zakāh* or the Khawārij, is much more incumbent. We can go on the offensive in the war as well as repulse their attack. In the case of the former, *jihād* will be a collective duty (*farḍ al-kifāyah*), that is, if some people perform the task others will be exempted from the responsibility. The honor will, however, go to those who participate in *jihād*. God has said, “Not equal are those Believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of God with their goods and their persons. God has granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than those who sit at home). Unto all (in faith) has God promised good. But those who strive and fight have distinction above these who sit (at home) with a special reward” (4:95).

If an enemy attacks the Muslim community, fighting them is a duty on all those who are directly attacked, as it is a duty of others that are not attacked to aid them. God has said, “If they seek aid in the religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual alliance” (8:72). The Prophet has also asked the Muslims to help a brother Muslim, whether or not they are part of a paid army. It is incumbent upon all Muslims according to their ability; they are to carry it out with their persons and properties, whether they are few or many, and whether they have to go on foot or take transportation. To give an example, at the Battle of the Ditch, when the enemy surrounded the Muslims, God did not allow anyone to take leave, though he had allowed people in the early years either to fight the enemy or to sit at home. This time He condemned those who asked for leave from the Prophet. He said, “A band of them ask for leave of the Prophet saying, ‘Truly our houses are bare and exposed,’ though they were not exposed. They intended nothing but to run away”

(33:13). This was a matter of defending the religion, honor, and life, a matter in which war was thrust upon the people. It was different from the war which is taken up voluntarily in order to promote the religion and make it prevail or to frighten the enemy with a view to forestalling his attack, as happened in the campaign of Tabūk.

As for the Muslims in Islamic lands who have no excuse, they should be compelled to observe the duties of Islam, the five basic ones as well as the others, such as returning deposits, fulfilling contracts, and so on. Hence, those who do not offer prayers (*ṣalāh*), whether men or women, should first be commanded to offer them. If they resist, they should be punished till they comply. There is perfect consensus on this point among the *ummah*. Many are of the view that first they will be asked to repent, and if they repent (and offer *ṣalāh*) they will be left alone, otherwise they will be killed. Should a rejecter (*kāfir*) or apostate (*murtadd*) or intransigent (*fāsiq*) be killed? Both views have been advanced in the school of Aḥmad. However, the majority of the Elders, it is said, are of the view that a persistent rejecter turns infidel, *kāfir*; this is if he admits that the act is an obligatory duty. But if he denies that it is at all an obligatory duty, he is definitely a *kāfir*; everyone agrees on this point. Guardians must ask their children to offer *ṣalāh* when they are seven, and spank them for it when they are ten. The Prophet has said, “Ask them to pray when they are seven, and spank them for it when they are ten, and put them in separate beds.”⁷⁷⁸ They should likewise be asked to do what is required for offering such as ablution and bath.

[*Fatāwā* 28:349-60]

(13.11) The *ummah* will divide into various sects, of which only one will be saved.

The ummah will divide into seventy-three sects, of which only one, the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah will be saved. They will

constitute the great majority of the ummah. Other sects will have their own strange views, will indulge in heresies and follow vain desires. The common element between them will be their deviance from the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the consensus (of the ummah). However, they will be a small minority.

Ibn Taymīyyah was asked about the Prophet's *ḥadīth*, "My *ummah* will divide into seventy-three sects..." In reply he wrote:

Praise be to God. This is an authentic and well-known (*ṣaḥīḥ wa mashhūr*) *ḥadīth*, recorded in *Sunan* and *Masānid* collections, such as the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd, At-Tirmidhī, An-Nasā'ī and others. It runs like this: "The Jews divided into seventy-one sects (*firqah*), all of which will go to Hell except one; the Christians divided into seventy-two sects, all of which will go to Hell except one; this *ummah* will divide into seventy-three sects, all of which will go to Hell except one."⁷⁷⁹ In another version of the *ḥadīth* the words are, "seventy-three *millah*, communities."⁷⁸⁰ In a third version we also have this addition, "Some people asked the Prophet about the sect which will be saved. He said, "The one which will follow the way I and my companions follow today."⁷⁸¹ In a fourth version the last part is like this: "It will be the *jamā'ah*, and the hand of God will be on the *jamā'ah*."⁷⁸² This is the reason why the people that will be saved are called Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah, the People of the Sunnah and the Community. They will constitute the overwhelming majority and the common masses.

The remaining sects will expound strange views and heresies and will indulge in vain desires. But even taken together they will neither be equal to nor nearing the number of the people who will be saved. In fact, they will be very few; the common element between them that will distinguish them will be their deviation from the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the Consensus, for had they adhered to the Sunnah and Consensus, they would have been part of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah.

As for the identification of these sects, a number of people have written on the subject and mentioned their names in their works on views and doctrines (*maqālāt*). But the point that a particular sect named by them is one of those seventy two deviant sects has to be proved. Let us recall that God has forbidden saying anything without knowledge, particularly in matters like this. He has said, “Say: The things that my Lord has instead forbidden are shameful deeds, whether open or secret, sins and trespasses against truth or reason, assigning of partners to God, for which he has given no authority, and saying things about God of which you have no knowledge” (7:33). And, “You people! Eat of what is on earth lawful and good; and do not follow the footsteps of the Evil One, for he is to you an avowed enemy. He commands you what is evil and shameful, and that you should say of God that of which you have no knowledge” (2:168). Pursue not that of which you have no knowledge” (17:306).

Many people talk about these sects merely on the basis of conjectures and predilections. The sect they belong to or the people that follow their leaders, they call Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah, and those who oppose them, they call heretics. This is plainly wrong. For the people of Truth and Sunnah will have no leader other than the Prophet (pbuh), of whom God says, “He does not say anything of (his own) desire, (and) what he says is inspiration (*wahī*) which is sent down to him- (53:3). What he says is to be believed and what he commands is to be obeyed. No one else enjoys this position, and no one else is to be followed in all that he says. The Prophet (pbuh) is the only exception...

It is clear from this that the people who will be saved are the people of *ḥadīth* and Sunnah, who do not have any leader other than the Prophet. Of all the people they are those who know his life and words best, who are aware which reports about him are authentic and which are not. Their scholars have a better knowledge and understanding of these things and follow them best. More than anyone else they believe in the Sunnah of the Prophet

and act upon it, love those who love him, and oppose those who oppose him. They think over the issues in the light of the Qur'ān and the wisdom (*ḥikmah* of the Prophet) and do not raise anything to the status of a principle or advocate it unless it is derived from what has come down from the Prophet. In fact they base their ideas and doctrines on the Qur'ān and the wisdom that the Prophet has given. They refer the issues which people have debated, such as Divine attributes, fore-ordainment (*qadr*), reward and punishment, the interpretation of terms, the duty of enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong... to God and His Prophet. The words that are ambiguous and have been interpreted in different ways by different people, they interpret in the sense which is closest to the Qur'ān and Sunnah, and reject all the other senses which are opposed to them. They neither run after conjectures nor follow vain desires, for they believe that indulgence into conjecture is ignorance and pursuance of desires without any clear guidance from God is folly...

It may be noted, however, that those who follow one scholar or the other in matters regarding the principles of religion and theology (*kalām*) fall into different categories. Some oppose the Sunnah on major principles, others oppose the Sunnah on minor issues. Furthermore, it is possible that those who refute the views of others which are far more removed from the Sunnah than their own views may be right in what they say in refuting wrong doctrines or supporting the right ones, but they may have gone too far in their refutation and rejected some part of the truth and defended some untruth. That is to say, they may have a great heresy (*bid'ah*) through a lesser heresy and demolished a greater untruth through a lesser untruth. This is the condition of most of the theologians (*ahl al-kalām*) within the fold of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah.

If people like these do not sever their relations from the Muslim community (*jamā'at al-Muslimīn*) on the basis of the heresies they expound, taking them as the criterion for friendship

or enmity, they are only guilty of saying something wrong. We hope that God will forgive mistakes like this and pardon those who commit them... But if they take as friends those who agree with them and as enemies those who disagree with them, and divide the Muslim community into their supporters and opponents, and call the latter *kāfir* or *fāsiq* even though they differ from them in matters in which opinions may differ, and think that they should fight them, they will then be called schismatic and secessionist.

That is why the first group of people who seceded from the Muslim community were the Khawārij; they went out of the boundaries of Islam... The *ḥadīth* which we have about them has come down to us through ten different channels all of which have been noted by Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. Some of them have also been noted by Al-Bukhārī in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. The Companions of the Prophet fought them under the command of *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* 'Alī Ibn Abī Tālib, and were one with regard to them... When they seceded from the Muslim community and regarded its members as *kāfir* and justified taking up the sword against them, the Prophet's word about them proved true. He said, "You will look down upon your *ṣalāh* in comparison to their *ṣalāh*, your fasting in comparison to their fasting, and you reading the Qur'ān in comparison to their reading. But they will read the Qur'ān and their reading will not go down their throat. They will move out of Islam as an arrow moves out of the prey it kills. Kill them whenever you get them, you will be rewarded for killing them on the Day of judgment."⁷⁸³

As for identifying those sects condemned to Hell, the first man who discussed the issue was Yūsuf Ibn Aṣbāt,⁷⁸⁴ then 'Abdullah Ibn Al-Mubārak.⁸⁰⁹ Both are outstanding scholars and imāms. They have said that all heresies have proceeded from four sects: Rawāfiḍ, Khawārij, Qadarīyyah, and Murji'ah. "What about the Jahmīyyah?" Ibn Al-Mubārak was asked. He said, "They are not part of the *ummah*." He used to say, "We do not quote the words of the Jews and the Christians, nor do we quote the words of the

Jahmīyyah.” A number of scholars from the school of Aḥmad agree with this assessment. They say that the Jahmīyyah are infidel; they cannot, therefore, be included in the seventy-two sects, just as the hypocrites who have no faith in their hearts, who only pay lip service to Islam and are nothing but *zindīqs*, are not included in them. Other Ḥanbalī scholars, however, include them in the list; consequently they count the sources of heresy to be five.

The reason for this difference lies in the answer that these two group give to the question whether the people expounding heretical ideas (*ahl al-bid‘ah*) may be excommunicated as *kāfirūn*. Those who exclude the Jahmīyyah from the list of seventy-two sects do excommunicate the expounders of heresies, for everyone who comes out with a heresy cannot be excommunicated. They rather categorize them with the people that deserve punishment in ‘*alā* (*ahl al-wa‘īd*) like the intransigent (*fussāq*) and the sinners (‘*uṣāṭ*). The words of the Prophet that “they will go to Hell,” they point out, should be understood in the same sense in which it is said about other sinners, such as those who misappropriate the property of orphans. God has said, “Those who unjustly eat the property of orphans, eat up a fire into their own bodies” (4:10). Those, on the other hand, who include the Jahmīyyah in the list are of two kinds, those who call no one *kāfir* and those who call all of them *kāfir*. The latter group is comprised of some scholars of later periods from among the followers of the *a‘immah* or the theologians.

However, in case of the Murji‘ah and the Shi‘ah Mufaḍḍilah (i.e. those who simply assert that ‘Alī was superior to the other three righteous caliphs) and others, the Elders and the *a‘immah* are one that they cannot be called *kāfir*. Aḥmad’s statements with regard to them are quite clear that they cannot be called *kāfir*. However, there are within his school scholars who have indiscriminately dubbed all heretical sects including these as *kāfir*, some have also said that they are condemned to Hell forever. This

is wrong, and certainly opposed to the principles of Aḥmad as well as the Sharī'ah.

Those who do not excommunicate any heretical sect do so because they put the heretics (*ahl al-bid'ah*) with the sinners. They say that just as the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah do not call anyone *kāfir* because of his sin, they would not like to call anyone *kāfir* on account of his heresy (*bid'ah*)

The Elders and the *a'immaḥ* are reported to have excommunicated only the Jahmīyyah, who deny God's attributes, who say that God neither speaks nor sees, that He is not separate from the world, that He has no knowledge, no power, no hearing, no sight and no life, that the Qur'ān is a created object, that the people of Paradise like the people of Hell will not see God, and so on. With regard to the Khawārij and the Rawāfiḍ there is no clear word from Aḥmad and others that they are *kāfir*. As for the Qadarīyyah, who deny God's fore-knowledge of (human actions) as well as their fore-ordainment and writing, they have called them *kāfir*; however, with regard to those who affirm God's fore-knowledge but not His creation of human actions, they have abstained from this verdict.

I will state here two principles which, I hope, will clarify the issue. First, of those who offer *ṣalāh* no one would be *kāfir* unless he is a hypocrite, for since the time Muḥammad (pbuh) was sent as a messenger, given the Qur'ān, and compelled to migrate to Madinah, people were divided into three groups, those who believed in him, those who rejected him and did so openly, and those who were hypocrites and concealed their rejection of him. When this is the case we may have among the heretical sects (*ahl al-bid'ah*) those who are hypocrites and enemies of Islam (*zindīq*); they are *kāfir*. Such people are mostly found among the Rawāfiḍ and the Jahmīyyah. Their leaders were hypocrites and *zindīqs*, just as the man who invented *rafd* was a hypocrite. The school of the Jahmīyyah, too, was raised on the basis of hypocrisy and

zandaqah. This is the reason why *zindīqs* who come from the Karmathian esoterics and pose as philosophers incline towards the Rawāfiḍ and Jahmīyyah with whom they have great affinity.

Among the heretical sects we may also have people who have faith in their heart but are guilty of ignorance, wrongdoing, and mistakes with regard to the Sunnah. Such people are neither *kāfir* nor hypocrites. They may be doing things that render them transgressors (*fāsiq*) and sinners, (*‘āṣī*). Some of them may be doing so by mistake, erroneously interpreting the texts; such people will hopefully be forgiven. Some may also have faith and piety to a degree which earns for them a kind of God’s love and support (*walāyah*) commensurate with their faith and piety. This is the first principle.

The second principle is that the doctrine that one expounds may be in itself a faithlessness. For example, one may deny that *ṣalāh*, *zakāh*, fasting or *ḥajj* is obligatory, or assert that adultery, drinking wine, gambling or marrying within the prohibited circle is lawful. However, it is possible that the expounder of these doctrines may not have knowledge about them or may not have gotten the words of the Prophet regarding them. Such a person will not be called *kāfir*. This may happen with a person who has embraced Islam new, or who is born and brought up in a place that Islam has not reached. He cannot, therefore, be called *kāfir* on the grounds that he denies something revealed to the Prophet, for he does not know that it was revealed to him.

The doctrines of the Jahmīyyah belong to this category, because they negate the attributes with which God is qualified and which He has revealed to the Prophet. There are three reasons why they have been condemned so strongly. First, the texts which contradict their doctrines are in abundance in the Qur’ān, *ḥadīth* and the Consensus, and are well known, and they just reject them by misinterpreting them. Second, their doctrines amount to negation of the Creator; however, it is possible that some of them may not have realized that their doctrines negate the Creator. Just

as the basis of faith is belief in God, the basis of unfaith (*kufr*) is the denial of God. Third, they contradict truths which are agreed upon in all religions and testified to by human nature.

In spite of this, many Muslims are not able to see the real import of their doctrines; some even think that the truth is with them since they put forth their objections quite forcefully. These Muslims do have faith in God and in His Messenger and sincerely believe in them in their hearts, but the argument which these heretics advance confuse them as they confuse themselves. Certainly these Muslims are not *kāfir* at all; some of them may be transgressors and wrongdoers; some may be mistaken and God may hopefully forgive them; and some may even have, along with their erroneous ideas, the faith and piety which earns them God's support, and love (*walāyah*) commensurate with their faith and piety.

[*Fatāwā* 3:345-55]

(13.12) People of *bid'ah* are not to be excommunicated

Those who excommunicate the exponents of heresy and fancy (ahl al-bid'ah wa al-ahwā'), like the Shi'ah, the Mu'tazilah and others, go against the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, the Consensus of the Companions and the Successors.

The proof that the Companions did not declare the Khawārij *kāfir* is that they offered *ṣalāh* behind them. 'Abdullah Ibn 'Umar and other Companions, for example, offered *ṣalāh* behind Najdah Al-Ḥarūrī.⁷⁸⁵ They discussed with them various issues, gave them their opinions on religious matters put to them, and addressed them as a Muslim addresses another Muslim. 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbās, for example, would answer the questions which Najdah Al-Ḥarūrī sent to him. Al-Bukhārī has recorded the *ḥadīth* which Najdah has related. Similarly, Nāfi' Ibn Al-Azraq⁷⁸⁶ answered many of his

questions, and used to argue with him on different issues quoting from the Qur'ān just as he did with any other Muslim. This was the practice of Muslims throughout the ages; they did not consider them apostates like those against whom Abū Bakr declared war. They did this even though the Prophet had commanded to fight them, as is reported in authentic *aḥādīth*. The *ḥadīth* that they are the worst people under the sky to be killed and that the men whom they kill are the best men, which Abū Umāmah has reported and At-Tirmidhī has recorded,⁷⁸⁷ only means that they are more harmful to the Muslims than others. And it is true that they have done greater harm to the Muslims than the Jews and the Christians. They were zealous to kill any Muslim who did not agree with them, since they believed that it was quite lawful for them to take his life and property or kill his children, for he was a *kāfir* in their view. They considered it to be an act of devotion, as they were immersed in ignorance and heresy. But in spite of that the Companions or their righteous Successors did not declare them *kāfir* or apostate (*murtadd*), nor did they cause them any wrong in word or deed. They feared God with regard to them and were never unfair to them.

This was their practice with all the other exponents of *bid'ah*, the Shi'ah, the Mu'tazilah, and others. Hence, if anyone declares *kāfir* any of the seventy-two sects, he goes against the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the Consensus of the Companions and their righteous Successors. It may also be noted that the *ḥadīth* which speaks of seventy-two sects does not occur in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. Ibn Ḥazm and others consider it to be a weak *ḥadīth*, others rate it as *ḥasan*, still others like Al-Ḥākim rate it as *ṣaḥīḥ*, though the compilers of the *Sunan* collections mention more than one channel through which it has been transmitted. Furthermore, the words of the Prophet, "seventy-two of them will go to Hell and only one will be saved" are not stronger than many words of God such as "Those who unjustly eat up the property of the orphans eat up a fire into their own bodies, they will soon be entering a blazing Fire" (4:10); or,

“If any do that in rancor and injustice soon shall We cast them into the Fire, and easy it is for God” (4:30). There are many such verses that threaten with Fire those who commit evil deeds, but they do not do so with regard to any particular person, for it is possible that he may repent or that his good deeds may outweigh his evil deeds, or that God may wash out his sin by subjecting him to one or another tribulation.

[*Minhāj as-Sunnah* 3:62]

(13.10) *Ṣalāh* may be offered behind an proponent of *bid‘ah* when no one else is available.

One of the principles of the Ahl as-Sunnah is that ṣalāh may be offered behind any Muslim, pious or wicked. The Friday prayer and the ‘īd prayers may also be offered behind a heretic if no one else is available. Again, no Muslim should be denounced as kāfir on account of any sin he or she may commit or any mistake he or she may make in matters which the ummah has debated.

One of the principles of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah is that they offer the Friday prayer, the ‘īd prayers, and the regular daily prayers, and never suspend them as do the proponents of *bid‘ah* like the Rawāfiḍ and others. If the conduct of the imām is not known or his *bid‘ah* or wickedness is not open, the Friday prayer and all daily prayers in assembly may be offered behind him. All the four imāms of the Muslims as well as others are agreed on this point. None of them has ever said that *ṣalāh* is not valid except behind an imām whose private life is known. In fact, Muslims have been praying behind persons whose lives have not been known.

However, if *ṣalāh* is offered behind a person who is known to be guilty of *bid‘ah* or an open sin (*fājir*) while an alternative imām is available, many scholars say that the *ṣalāh* of those who pray

behind him will still be valid. This is the view of Ash-Shāfi‘ī and Abū Ḥanīfah, and this is also one of the two views ascribed to Mālik and Aḥmad. However, when there is no other alternative available and prayer has to be offered behind a heretic or a sinner (*fājir*), as, for example when you do not get anyone other than a heretic or a sinner to lead the Friday prayer, and there is no other place where it is conducted, then you must offer the Friday prayer behind that heretic or sinner. This is the view of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah in general. Abū Ḥanīfah, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl and all other imāms of the Ahl as-Sunnah are agreed on this.

The Companions used to offer prayers behind those whose sins they were aware of. For example, ‘Abdullah Ibn Mas‘ūd and other Companions prayed behind Al-Walīd Ibn ‘Uqbah Ibn Abī Mu‘īt,⁷⁸⁸ who used to drink, and who once, while leading the *Fajr* prayer said four *rak‘āt*, for which ‘Uthmān Ibn ‘Affān punished him with lashes. ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar and other Companions prayed behind Ḥajjāj Ibn Yūsuf,⁷⁸⁹ similarly, many Companions and Successors prayed behind Ibn Abī ‘Ubayd,⁷⁹⁰ who was charged with blasphemous views (*ilhād*) and of preaching them.

No Muslim should be excommunicated on grounds of any sin or mistake in controversial issues which he commits. God has said, “The Messenger believes in what has been revealed to him from his Lord, as do the men of faith. Each one (of them) believes in God, His angels, His books and His messengers. (They say): ‘We make no discrimination between one and another of His messengers.’ They say: ‘We hear and We obey. Your forgiveness, Lord (we seek), and to You is the end of our journey’” (2:285). A *ḥadīth* in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections says that in response to this prayer God forgives the mistakes of the faithful.⁷⁹¹

The Prophet commanded fighting the Khawārij as they were renegades. *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn* ‘Alī, one of the four rightly-guided caliphs, fought against them, and all the *a‘immah* of the religion from among the Companions, the Successors and those that

followed them were agreed upon fighting them, even then neither ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib nor Sa‘d Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ⁷⁹² nor any other Companion declared them *kāfir*. They waged war against them, but they treated them as Muslims. ‘Alī did not start war against them until they had shed the blood of Muslims and plundered their properties. He fought them only to save the Muslims from their atrocities and not because they were *kāfir*. This is why he did not take their women captive or their properties as spoils. These were the people whom the Scripture and the consensus have declared wrong and mistaken, and whom God and His Messenger have commanded to fight. Even then they were not pronounced *kāfir*. How then can those be pronounced *kāfir* who could not see the truth on issues in which people more learned than they went wrong! How would anyone of these groups be justified in calling the others *kāfir*, or killing them or confiscating their property, even if they were guilty of a real *bid‘ah*! How could it be when those who pronounce others to be *kāfir* are also committing *bid‘ah*, which is even worse than the *bid‘ah* of others! The fact is that all of them are equally ignorant of the truth in the matters they debate.

The fundamental principle is that the life, property and honor of a Muslim are inviolable and cannot be taken by anyone except by the leave of God and His Messenger. In his farewell address on the occasion of *ḥajj* the Prophet said, “Your blood, your property, your honor, everything is sacred just as this day of yours, this city of yours and this month of yours are sacred.”⁷⁹³ He pronounced, “The whole of a Muslim is inviolable for another Muslim: his blood, his property, and his honor.”⁷⁹⁴ He declared, “Whoever prays like us, faces our *qiblah* and eats of the animals we slaughter, is a Muslim and is under the protection of God and His Messenger.”⁷⁹⁵ He warned, “When two Muslims take out swords against each other, both the killer and the killed go to Hell.” People asked him, “This is true of the killer, but why of the one who is killed, Messenger of God?” He said, “He was trying to kill his companion.”⁷⁹⁶ He also issued these warnings: “After me don’t

turn *kāfir*, one killing the other;”⁷⁹⁷ and, “When one Muslim calls a brother Muslim *kāfir*, one of the two is *kāfir*.”⁷⁹⁸ All these *aḥādīth* have been recorded in collections.

But when a Muslim fights a Muslim or calls him *kāfir* in the light of his interpretation of a text, he will not be *kāfir*. We know that when ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb said with regard to Ḥaṭīb Ibn Al-Balta‘ah, “Messenger of God, let me kill this hypocrite,” the Prophet said, “He participated in the battle of Badr. You don’t know if God has looked at the people of Badr and said: ‘Do whatever you like; I have forgiven you.’”⁷⁹⁹ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned in both *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections. It has also been reported in them that Usayd Ibn Khuḍayr,⁸⁰⁰ said to Sa‘d Ibn ‘Ubādah,⁸⁰¹ “You are a hypocrite, you are defending hypocrites!” Then there was a quarrel between them and the Prophet had to intervene and make peace between them. All of them had participated in the battle of Badr, but one called the other a hypocrite. However, the Prophet pronounced neither one nor the other *kāfir*; on the contrary, he gave both of them the glad tidings of Paradise.⁸⁰² We also have in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* that ‘Usāmah Ibn Zayd⁸⁰³ killed a man after he had confessed that there was no god except Allah. When the Prophet came to know of it he was shocked. He asked, “‘Usāmah, did you kill him after he had said ‘There is no god except Allah?’” and repeated the words time and again, till ‘Usāmah cried out, “I wish I had embraced Islam only today.”⁸⁰⁴ But in spite of that the Prophet did not prescribe vengeance, or order any ransom, or any expiation, because ‘Usāmah only erred in his judgment. He killed him because he thought he had made the confession only to save himself from his sword.

The Elders fought each other at the battles of the Camel, Ṣiffīn and other occasions. They all were Muslims and men of faith, as God has said, “If two parties from among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make peace between them. But if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, fight against the one that

transgresses until it complies with the command of God. If it complies make peace between them with justice and be fair, for God loves those who are fair (and just)” (49:9). Thus God has made it very clear that in spite of the fact that they fought each other and wronged each other, they were brother Muslims. He has further asked them to restore peace and amity between themselves and to live together with justice. This is why the Elders made peace among themselves and helped each other even if they had fought among themselves earlier. They did not treat each other like enemies as they did the infidels. They accepted the testimony of one for another, learned knowledge from one another, married among themselves, inherited from one another, and treated one another as Muslims even though they had fought and cursed each other earlier.

In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections we have a *ḥadīth* that Prophet prayed to his Lord not to destroy his *ummah* through a widespread famine, and God granted that; then he prayed to Him not to place over them an enemy from another people, and He granted that, to; but when he prayed to Him not to punish them at the hands of their own men, He did not grant that.⁸⁰⁵ Thus he told the *ummah* that God will not put over them enemies from other nations to suppress them, but they will themselves be killing and suppressing each other. The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* have also the *ḥadīth* that at the revelation of the words, “Say: He has power to send calamities on you from above,” as well as the words, “from under your feet,” the Prophet sought protection in God. But at the last part of the verse, “or to cover you with confusion in party strife, giving you a taste of mutual vengeance, each from the other” (6:65), the Prophet said, “These two are lighter (punishments).”⁸⁰⁶

This is true in spite of the fact that God has commanded maintaining unity and solidarity and has forbidden indulgence in innovations and schisms. “Those who divide their religion,” He has said, “and break up into sects, you have no part in them in the least” (6:159). And the Prophet said, “You must stick to the

community (*jamā'ah*) for God's hand is on the community."⁸⁰⁷ And, Satan is close to one, but away from two."⁸⁰⁸ "Satan is to a single person as a wolf is to lambs, and you see that the wolf readily pounces on a solitary lamb removed from the flock."⁸⁰⁹

So whenever a Muslim passes through a city of the Muslims he should offer with them all the daily prayers, as well as the congregational prayer on Fridays, meet them like friends, not like enemies even if he finds some of them mistaken. If possible he should show them the right path and call them to truth. If they do not listen to him he will not be held responsible, for God charges a soul only with what he can do. Let him put on them, if he can, the best among them to lead their prayers, and let him check the spread of *bid'ah* and shameful practices among them. But if that is not possible let him offer *ṣalāh* behind one who is more learned in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and more obedient to God and His Messenger. The Prophet said, "From among the people the one should lead the *ṣalāh* who knows the Book of God most; if they are equal in it, then the one who knows the Sunnah most; if they are equal in it, too, then the one who has migrated first; and if they are equal in that also, then the one who is older than others."⁸¹⁰ However, if one thinks that one would do a better service if one shunned those who are committing *bid'ah* or evil one may do so. The Prophet dissociated himself from those three men who stayed behind (at the time of the campaign of Tabūk) till God turned to them with His mercy. However, if someone else is made imām of whom one does not approve, and if one does not expect greater good by abstaining from the Friday prayer or the daily prayers in assembly one will only be doing something rash and silly if one abstains, and will be countering one *bid'ah* through another *bid'ah*..

[*Majmū'at ar-Rasā'il wa al-Masā'il* 5: 198-202]

(13.14) Fighting Muslims who openly flout an established rule of Islam.

Muslims are fully agreed that they should fight against those people from among themselves who openly flout an established and well-known rule of Islam. They differ, however, in details. Some take it as a war against mischief-makers, nevertheless considering them to be ‘adū, for they think that they have only committed an error in judgment in matters of practical details. Others consider them to be fāsiq. The first view is the view of the majority of Muslims.

Muslims are agreed that it is their duty to fight every group that openly flouts an established and well-known rule of Islam, even if they make both confessions (that God is one and that Muḥammad is His Messenger). If any group makes these confessions but refuses, for example, to offer the five daily prayers, they should fight them till they offer *ṣalāh*. Similarly, they should fight those who refuse to pay *zakāh* till they pay it, or those who refuse to fast in Ramaḍān or make *ḥajj* to the House of the Lord. They should also fight those who do not recognize that adultery, gambling, drinking wine, and other shameful acts are prohibited, or who refuse to judge cases against life, property, honor and sex, according to the rules of the Shari‘ah laid down in the Qur’ān and Sunnah, or who are not prepared to enjoin the good and forbid the evil, or fight against the unbelievers till they surrender and pay *jizyah* and keep low. Similarly, they should fight those who preach heresies (*bid‘ah*) in opposition to the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and the traditions of the Elders and the *a‘immah* of the *ummah*, such as deliberate misinterpretation of God’s names and words, falsification of His names and attributes, denial of His foreordination, rejection of the agreed-upon practices of the Muslims in the age of the rightly guided caliphs, finding fault with the first Elders, the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* and those who came after

them and correctly followed them, fighting Muslims till they submit to them against the law of Islam, and so on.

God has said, "Fight them until there is no more disturbance and oppression, and there is complete and unqualified submission to God" (8:39). Hence, if they submit to God in some part of life and submit to others in other parts they should be fought till they submit to God exclusively. God has also said, "You who believe! Fear God, and give up what remains of your demand for interest, if you are indeed Believers. If you do it not, take notice of war from God and His Messenger" (2:279). This verse, as revealed in the case of the people of Ta'if who had embraced Islam, offered prayers and fasted Ramaḍān, but had not abstained from taking interest. So God sent down this verse and commanded them to relinquish what remained of their demand for interest, warning them that if they did not comply God and the Prophet would wage war against them...

Interest was the last thing to be prohibited by the Qur'ān. It is money which is taken with the consent of the parties. If those who do not abstain from interest are served notice of war by God and His Messenger, you may think of those who do not abstain from other prohibited things which were prohibited earlier and in more emphatic terms...

Scholars are divided in their opinion with regard to war against the *ahl al-qiblah* (i.e., those who offer *ṣalāh* with their faces towards the Ka'bah). One section considers the battles of Ḥarūrā', the Camel, and Ṣiffīn to be wars fought against the rebels (*ahl al-baghī*). Abū Bakr's war against the refusers of *zakāh* as well as all other wars against the *ahl al-qiblah*, they put in the same category. This is the view of the followers of Abū Ḥanīfah and Ash-Shafi'ī, and of various scholars in the school of Aḥmad and others. All are agreed that the Companions are not *fāsiq*; on the contrary they are '*adū*', that is, their testimonies are to be trusted. In the same way they say that the *ahl al-baghī* are '*adūl*', even though they are to be

fought; they are erring only in their judgment as do the *mujtahids* on issues regarding practical details.

Another section of scholars, like Ibn ‘Aqīl and others, have a different view. They say that the *ahl al-baghī* are *fāsiq*, for they had before them the rebels (*bughāt*) of their times whom they found to be *fāsiq*. To be sure, they do not include the Companions in this category. It is only some heretics like the Mu‘tazilah who consider some of the Companions to be *fāsiq*, as do the Khawārij and the Rawāfiḍ. No imām or *faqīh* of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah holds this view. They do not say that their property is inviolable as before, that the part of it which is not destroyed should be returned to its owner, but the one which is destroyed during the war should not be compensated. The majority of scholars believe that neither they nor others should be compensated. The words of Az-Zuhri⁸¹¹ are, “Wars occurred when the Companions of the Prophet were still present in great numbers. They agreed that the life and property which is destroyed as a result of any (wrong) interpretation of the Qur’ān is void.”

However, they have differed on the issue whether those who are taken captive from among them can be killed or those who flee from the battleground can be pursued, or those who are wounded can be attacked when they return to their supporters. Abū Ḥanīfah allows it, but Ash-Shāfi‘ī forbids it. The second view is the one which is commonly held by the Ḥanbalī scholars. Some of them, however, say that those who flee from the battle in its early hours may be pursued but if they do not have supporters will not be killed when caught, and not attacked when found wounded. This is what Sa‘īd and others have narrated from Marwān Ibn Al-Ḥakam.⁸¹² He said that in the battle of the Camel ‘Alī announced that those who fled would not be killed, those who were wounded would not be attacked, those who shut themselves in their houses would not be touched, and those who lay down their arms would be secure...

The second view is that the war against the refusers of *zakāh* or against the Khawārij and others like them is not like a war against a section of the Companions in the battles of the Camel or Şiffin. This is the recorded view of the majority of the earlier *ummah*, and this is what is believed to be the view of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah. The scholars of Madinah such as Mālik and others, and the scholars of *ḥadīth* such as Aḥmad and others, hold the same view.

Scholars have pointed out the differences between these two views on various issues including the issue of property. For example, some believe, they have said, that taking the property of the Khawārij as spoils of war is quite lawful. Abū Ṭālib mentions that Aḥmad says that some Ḥarūrīyyah had property in a village. They fought with the Muslims, who killed them and took their land as *fay* and divided it into five parts, and stipulated that four parts could be distributed among the Muslim soldiers who fought against them, or the *amīr* might declare it a *kharājī* land for the benefit of all the Muslims instead of distributing it among the soldiers, just as ‘Umar made the land of ‘Irāq a *waqf* for the benefit of the Muslim masses, which his army conquered in war. For Aḥmad, therefore, the land of the Khawārij to be taken in war should be treated as spoils (*ghanimah*) just like the property of the unbelievers who are captured in war. This is the correct view on the whole in this matter.

The texts of the Qur’ān, the Sunnah and the Consensus certainly differentiate between the two cases. The same was the practice of ‘Alī (raa). He waged war against the Khawārij on the basis of the Prophet’s statement, and was happy to follow it. No Companion disputed that. On the other hand, he was unhappy over the battle he engaged in at Şiffin, and expressed his dislike over it. With regard to the people who fought against him at the battle of the Camel, he said, “They are our brothers who rose against us;

now the sword has made them clean,” then he prayed for the dead from among both parties.

[*Fatāwā* 28:510-516]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ Al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaḡīr* (Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, Beirut, 1988, 4559, with reference to the *Musnad* of Abū Ya'lā and *Al-Jāmi' al-Kabīr* of Aṭ-Ṭabarānī. In the *ḥadīth* reported by At-Tirmidhī we have the word *millah* instead of *fiṭrah*. (see Al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaḡīr*). With some change in the wording the *ḥadīth* also occurs in Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz 80, qadr: 3; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 22, 23, 24, 25; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 11:315, 316, 111: 435, IV:24.

² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz 80, 93; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 23; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 17; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā'*, janā'iz 53.

³ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 63; *Musnad* IV:162

⁴ By the People of Ḥadīth (*ahl al-ḥadīth*) Ibn Taymīyyah only means the scholars of *ḥadīth* who devote themselves to the study of the *ḥadīth* and its various sciences. He does not have in mind any other meaning of the sort which has been given to the later such as the people who claim not to follow any particular school of *fiqh*.

⁵ Originally the term Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah referred to the majority of Muslims other than the Shi'ah and the Khawārij, who seceded from the community. Later on, sects like the Jahmīyyah, who opposed the community on some very fundamental and established issues, were excluded from it. Still, the term comprises people of various schools of thought that differ on theological and juristic issues. [See also the text on pp. 654-5.]

⁶ The Karrāmīyyah were the followers of Abū 'Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Karram (d. 255/355). They conceived of God as a substance (*jawhar*) or a body (*jism*), without human members, of course, but placed on the Throne, located in space. Faith means for them simply the utterance of the two *shahādahs* involving neither conviction nor deeds. Ibn Taymīyyah has refuted this doctrine in his *Kitāb al-Īmān* (Cairo, 1325 A.H. p. 57f). The Karrāmīs found a fertile field for their doctrine in Khurasan; however, they were exterminated when Ghengiz Khan's forces overran the country.

⁷ Mu'tazilah is the name which was given to Wāṣil Ibn 'Aṭā' and his friends and followers when he differed from his teacher, Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī and left (*i'tiazala 'an*) him on the issue regarding the position of one who commits a

major sin (*kabīrah*). Wāṣil (d. 131/748) said that such a person is neither a Muslim nor a *kāfir*; he has a position in between faith and faithlessness. The Mu'tazilah also developed the doctrine that knowledge of good and evil is rational, that human actions are not created by God, that things are not pre-ordained, that it is incumbent on God to do justice, to reward the righteous and punish the wicked, and that the Qur'ān is created.

⁸ The Ashā'irah are the followers of Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash'arī (260/873-324/935). A pupil of the famous Mu'tazilī theologian, Al-Jabbā'ī, Al-Ash'arī realized at the age of forty that the Mu'tazilī theology was in conflict with Islamic faith, gave it up, and developed a new theology which goes by his name, and which, because of the works of some great thinkers and writers in the following centuries, became the dominant theology of the Islamic world. The Ashā'irah asserted that good and evil are known only through revelation, that nothing is incumbent on God, that things are pre-determined, that human actions are determined by God, that men do not perform their actions but only acquire them. They upheld the belief that the Qur'ān is the word of God and uncreated, but interpreted that belief in a particular way.

⁹ There are two aspects of the issue: one concerns God's power, whether He pre-determines things including the destinies of men and creates their actions, and two asserts that man is completely free in his will and choice and that he is the creator of his acts.

¹⁰ The word Qadariyyah refers to the sect originating from the pre-Mu'tazilī time which denied the fore-ordainment of things by God and His creation of human actions, and asserted that man is completely free in his will and choice and that he is the creator of his acts.

¹¹ *Ta'dīl* literally means to justify someone's action, hold him fair and just; *tajwīr* is just the opposite. The question of *ta'dīl* and *tajwīr* is therefore, the question of divine Justice. As discussed in Islamic theology, the question involves various issues, such as fore-ordainment, reward and punishment, and whether divine Will is subject to any kind of ethical judgment.

¹² Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qadr: 18; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II:169.

¹³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 1, bad' al-khalq: 6, qadr:1, tawḥīd:28; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr:1; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, Sunnah 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qadr: 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 16.

¹⁴ Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullah Ibn Sa'īd Ibn Kullāb Al-Qaṭṭān (d.ca. 240/845), leader of the Ahl as-Sunnah in his age. His followers were later absorbed in the Ashā'irah (Al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan at-Taqāsīm*, Leiden, 1885, p. 37)

¹⁵ Jahmīyyah are the followers of Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān, who was executed by Ibn ‘Ajwān Al-Muzanī in 123/746. They believe that man has no freedom and is absolutely determined, that faith means knowledge of God and involves no action, that God is not qualified with attributes shared by men such as knowing, living, hearing, speaking, etc., although He can be said to be Creator and Powerful, and that Qur’ān is created (Al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, Beirut, 1980, pp. 199-200).

¹⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd:2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawbah:35; li’ān:17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV:248.

¹⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā’: 51; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zuhd: 10.

¹⁸ Usually the term *ḥukamā’* (sing. *ḥakīm*) is used for the philosophers. But here it is used in its original apparent meaning, the people of wisdom and knowledge.

¹⁹ The Salīmīyyah are the followers of Abū ‘Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Salīm (d. 297/909) and his son Aḥmad Abū al-Ḥasan (d. 350/961). The former was a student of the famous Ṣūfī scholar, Sahl Ibn ‘Abdullah At-Tustārī (note 87). However, the most outstanding figure of the school was Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī (d. 386/996), the author of the famous book on Ṣūfism, *Qūt al-Qulūb*. The Salīmīyyah try to incorporate in their theology various elements from the doctrines of the Ahl as-Sunnah, the Mu’tazilah, and the Ṣūfis with monistic leanings. [See As-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-Luma’* (Cairo, 1960) pp. 472-6; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt as-Ṣūfīyyah* (Cairo, 1372/1953) pp. 414-6; Al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq* (ed. M. Muḥiy ad-Dīn ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd, n.d.). pp. 157, 202; Massignon article on the Salamīyyah in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.]

²⁰ Abū Al-Faraj ‘Abdul-Walīd Ibn Muḥammad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Aḥmad Ash-Sha’rānī, commonly called Al-Maqdisī, was leader of the Ḥanbalīs of his times in Shām. Born at Shiraz, he learned *fiqh* from Qādī Abū Ya’lā at Baghdad, settled at Jerusalem where he died in 486/1093. His writings include *At-Tabṣīrah fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn* in theology, and *Al-Manḥāj* and *Al-Īdāḥ* in *fiqh*. [See Ibn Abī Ya’lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Hanābilah*, 2:248-9; Ibn Rajab, *adh-Dhayl ‘alā Ṭabaqāt al-Hanābilah*, 1:68-73; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A’lām*, 4:327.]

²¹ Abū ‘Umar Ḍiā’ ad-Dīn Uthmān Ibn ‘Īsā Ibn Dirbās (516/1123-602/1206). a great Shāfi’ī scholar of his time, born in Banū Marān at Al-Marūj (near Mūṣal in Iraq), moved to Damascus and then to Egypt where he was appointed *qādī* in 566/1171 by Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Al-Ayyūbī (Saladdin). When retired, he took up teaching at Cairo where he died. His writings include *al-Istisqa’ li Madhāhib al-Fuqahā’* in 20 volumes in *fiqh* and *Sharḥ al-Luma’* in principles of jurisprudence. [See Brock. SI. 530; Ibn Shākir Al-Kutubī, *Fawāt al-Wafayāt*, 2:31; Ibn Ḥajar Al-‘Asqalānī, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 4:150; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A’lām*,

4:375.]

²² ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ṣafī ad-Dīn Ash-Shaybī (d. 622/1225) commonly known as Ibn Shukr was born in Dirah al-Bahīyyah in Western Egypt, and distinguished himself in jurisprudence, and wrote on the subject. He served in the government at Cairo where he died. [See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A’lām*, 4:243.]

²³ Abū Al-Faraj Ṣadaqah Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Bakhtiyār Ibn Al-Ḥaddād Al-Baghdādī (477/1084-573/1170, historian and a man of letters, was under the influence of philosophers. He wrote an addendum (*zayl*) on the *Tārīkh* of Az-Zaghūnī, from the year 527 to his death. [See Ibn Al-‘Imād, *Ash-Shadharāt*, 4:245; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 10:276; Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 11:170; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A’lām*, 3:290.]

²⁴ Abū Al-Faraj ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Al-Jawzī (d. 597/1202) a great Ḥanbalī scholar and prolific writer, wrote on the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, biography, and history. His works that exceed three hundred volumes include *Zād al-Masīr fī ‘ilm at-Tafsīr*, a voluminous commentary on Qur’ān, *Ṣifat as-Ṣafwah*, a work on the biography of pious men, *Al-Mawḍū‘āt* on fake ḥadīth, *Talbīs Iblīs*, a review of the alterations of various sections of the society, *Al-Muntaẓam*, in general history. [See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A’lām*, IV:89-90; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāt al-A’yān*, 2:321-2; Ibn Rajab, *Adh-Dhayl ‘alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:399-433; Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10:228, 12:67.]

²⁵ Abū Al-Ḥasan ‘Alī Ibn Muḥammad Sayf ad-Dīn Al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), is famous for his work *Al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām* in jurisprudence, and *Abkār al-Afkar fī ‘ilm al-Kalām* in theology. He was born and brought up in Baghdad, taught in Egypt, and died at Damascus. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāt al-A’yān*, Cairo, 1367/1948, 2:455-6; As-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt Ash-Shāfi’iyyah*, Cairo, 1383/1964, 5:129-30; Ibn Al-‘Imād, *Shadhrāt* 3:323-4.]

²⁶ Abū ‘Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn ‘Umar Ibn Al-Ḥasan Fakhr ad-Dīn Ar-Rāzī (544/1150-606/1210), the great Ash‘arī theologian, philosopher, Shāfi‘ī *faqīh*, and commentator of the Qur’ān, was born at Rayy, lived in various places, Khawarizm, Mawara an-Nahr and Khurasan, and died at Ḥirat. He wrote in both Arabic and Persian. His works, which became very popular in his own lifetime, included *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*, a commentary on the Qur’ān in eight volumes, *Arba‘in fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, *Asās At-Taqdīs*, *Al-Maṭālib al-‘Alīyyah*, in theology, *Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa al-Mutakkhkhirīn*, commentary on the *Ishārāt* of Ibn Sīnā in philosophy, and *Al-Maḥṣūl fī ‘ilm al-Uṣūl* in principles of jurisprudence among others. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:474; As-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi’iyyah*, 5:33; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A’lām*, 7:203.]

²⁷ ‘Alī Ibn Ismā‘īl Ibn Ishāq, Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash‘arī (260/873-324/935), the

founder of the Ash'arī school of theology (see note 8), has presented his views in a small work, *Al-Ibānah*, and expounded them in *Kitāb al-Luma'* and other works. His *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn* is a compendium of theological ideas and schools that had appeared by his time in Islam and is one of the most important and precise sources on the subject. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:326; Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, 11:187; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:263, Brock, S.I. 345.]

²⁸ Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Muḥammad, Abū Ya'lā (380/990-458/1060), a very distinguished Ḥanbalī *faqīh* and writer, served as judge at Baghdad and other places. He has books on the Ḥanbalī *fiqh*, *Uṣūl*, and theology, of which the *Al-Aḥkām As-Sulṭāniyyah* on the principles of government is very famous, besides *Al-'Adl* and *Al-Kifāyah* in principles of jurisprudence, and *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* in Qur'ānic studies. [See Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, 4:306-7; Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:193-230; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:331; Broc. I:502 (398).]

²⁹ 'Alī Ibn Ubaydullah Ibn Naṣr Ibn As-Sarīy, Abū Al-Ḥasan Ibn Az-Zaghūnī (455/1063-527/1132), an eminent Ḥanbalī scholar of Baghdad, *fiqh*, and historian has books on *fiqh*, principles of jurisprudence, and principles of faith (*Uṣūl ad-Dīn*). [See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, V:124; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt Adh-Dhahab*, 4:80-81; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 10:320.]

³⁰ Abū Al-Wafā' 'Alī Ibn 'Aqīl Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 'Aqīl (431/1040-513/1119), a great scholar of *fiqh*, *uṣūl* and *kalām* from Baghdad, was the leader of Ḥanbalīs in his time. His writings include an encyclopaedic work, *Kitāb al-Funūn*, and *Al-Fuṣūl*, *Kifāyat al-Muftī* in Ḥanbalī *fiqh*, and a work on principles of jurisprudence in three volumes. [Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, V:129; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt adh-Dhahab*, 4:35-40; Ibn Rajab, *Adh-Dhayl 'alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:142-163.]

³¹ Abū Al-Khaṭṭāb Maḥfūz Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Al-Ḥasan Al-Kaludhānī (432/1041-510/1116), born and brought up in Baghdad, was the leader of Ḥanbalīs in his time. He wrote on Ḥanbalī *fiqh*, *uṣūl* and theology. His book, *At-Tamhīd* on principles of jurisprudence has been mentioned (Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:178). [See also Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, ed. M. Ḥāmid Al-Fiqī, Cairo a.d. 2:258; Ibn Rajab, *Adh-Dhayl*, 1:116-127; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, 4:27-88.]

³² Abū Ḥanīfah An-Nu'mān Ibn Thābit Ibn Zutī (80/699-150/767), the great founder of Ḥanafī school of *fiqh* was born and brought up at Kūfah in a family that had come to 'Iraq from Afghaniṣtān. Besides *fiqh*, Abū Ḥanīfah also contributed considerably towards the development of orthodox theology. The book *al-fiqh al-Akbar* is attributed to him, but it is not his work. However, judging from the various statements that have been proved of him in different sources, his views on *īmān*, and *islām*, fore-ordainment, and status of the Qur'ān

can be ascertained. These views were later developed by propels of his school, particularly by Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 332/943). [See A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, Frank Cass & Co. 1965 ch. VI-VIII; and Zurāh, Abū Ḥanīfah, *Ḥayātuhu wa 'Asruhu, Ara'uhu wa Fiqhuhu*, Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, Cairo, a.d. pp. 168-188.)

^{32a} Muḥammad Ibn Zakarīyyah Abū Bakr Ar-Rāzī (251/965-311/923), an outstanding physician, was born at Rayy. At the age of thirty he went to Baghdad and devoted himself to alchemy where he took up the studies of medicine and philosophy. He was a very prolific writer; his books and tracts reach 232. *Al-Ḥawī* is his most famous book on medicine. He was the head of the hospital at Rayy, and another at Baghdad. His philosophical tracts have also been collected and published. [See, Ibn An-Nadīm, *Al-Fihrist*, 1:299; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:78; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:364-5.]

³³ Abū Al-Ma'ālī 'Abdul-Malik Ibn 'Abdullah Al-Juwaynī, commonly known as *Imām al-Ḥarāmī* (419/1028-478/1085), an erudite scholar and eminent Shāfi'ī jurist and a great Ash'arī theologian, came from Juwayn, a small town in the vicinity of Nishapur in Iran. His works on theology include *Kitāb al-Irshad*, a classic of Ash'arī theology, *Ash-Shāmil fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, and *Al-'Aqīdah an-Niẓāmīyyah*, his last word on the subject. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:287. As-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt Ash-Shafi'iyyah*, 3:249; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:306; Brock. 1:486, S.I. 671.]

³⁴ Sulaymān Ibn Khalaf Ibn Sa'd, Abū Al-Walīd Al-Bājī (403/1012-474/1082), an eminent Mālikī jurist and scholar of *ḥadīth* was born in Baya (Spain). In 426/1037 he went to Hijaz, spent some time at Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus, and Halb, and finally returned to Spain where he served as a judge at various places. He died at Almeria. Among his books we have *Al-Muntaqā*, a commentary on the *Muwatṭa'* of Mālik, and another one the *Al-Mudawwanah* in Mālikī *fiqh*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:215; Al-Khaṭābī, *Fawāt al-Wafayāt*, 1:175; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:186.]

³⁵ For Ar-Rāzī see note 26.

³⁶ 'Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs Ibn Al-'Abbās Ash-Shāfi'ī (150/767-204/819) was born in Shām (Palestine), brought up and educated at Makkah, studied *fiqh* with Imām Mālik at Madīnah and Imām Muḥammad Ash-Shaybānī in Iraq, and settled in Egypt in 199/814 where he developed his own school of *fiqh*. His *Risālah* is an exposition of the basic principles of his *fiqh* and underlines the importance of *ḥadīth* in *fiqh*, while *Al-Umm* incorporates his legal views in detail. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:447; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifāt aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 2:140; Abū Nu'mān, *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, 9:63; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:250; Brock. 1:188 (178), S.I. 303.]

³⁷ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah:5; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 4:131. In the *Musnad* we have both words, al-Qur'ān and al-Kitāb.

³⁸ This *ḥadīth* has been noted by Ad-Dārimī (*Sunan*, 1:60) as well as Abū Dāwūd and At-Tirmidhī. But it is weak. Ibn Ḥazm has pointed out (*Al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*, Cairo, Maṭba'at al-Imām, n.d. p. 773) that one of the narrators of the *ḥadīth*, Al-Ḥārith Ibn 'Āmr, is an unknown person and hence the *ḥadīth* cannot be the basis of argument. However, the point for which Ibn Taymīyyah has quoted the *ḥadīth* is valid and agreed upon.

³⁹ Abū Mas'ūd 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd (d. 32/652), one of the earliest six to embrace Islam, was in the service of the prophet for many years. He was the most knowledgeable Companion on the Qur'ān. 'Umar Al-Fārūq, the second caliph, sent him to Kūfah to teach the Qur'ān, where he also served as a *qāḍī* and the head of the government treasury. [Ibn Hajr Al-'Asqalānī, *Al-Iṣābah*, 4955; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣīfat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 1:154; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyah*, 1:124; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:280.]

⁴⁰ See Ibn Jarīr, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Tā'wīl Ayn al-Qur'ān*, (Cairo, Al-Ḥalābī, 1373 A.H.), 1:80.

⁴¹ 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbās (d. 68/687), one of the most eminent scholars of the Qur'ān among the Companions of the Prophet, known as 'the Commentator of the Qur'ān', and the fourth most prolific narrator of the *ḥadīth*, and a distinguished *faqīh*. His comments on the Qur'ān form part of all the commentaries on the Qur'ān. However, many comments attributed to him are not genuine. The so-called Commentary of Ibn 'Abbās compiled by Abū Tahir Muḥammad Ibn Ya'qūb Al-Firozabādī is not his work. [See Adh-Dhahabī, *At-Tafsīr wa al-Mufasssīrūn*, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1396/1967.]

⁴¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, wuḍū':10; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah:138; Aḥmad, *Musnad*. 1:266, 314, 328, 335.

⁴² Mujāhid Ibn Jubayr Al-Makkī (21/642-104/722) was the most eminent student of the great commentator of the Qur'ān, 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbās. His comments on the Qur'ān have been put together and published under the title *Tafsīr Mujāhid* by 'Abdur-Raḥmān At-Tahir Muḥammad As-Suratī (Majma' al-Buḥūth, Islamabad, Pakistān) in two volumes.

⁴⁴ Abū 'Abdullah Sufyān Ibn Masrūq Ath-Thawrī (97/716-101/778) called the *amīr al-mu'minīn fī al-ḥadīth* was born and brought up at Kūfah, refused to accept *qadā*, the post of judge, offered by the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr, left Kūfah in 144/761, and passed the rest of his life in Makkah and Madinah. Among his books we have two collections of *ḥadīth*, one large and one small.

⁴⁵ Abū ‘Abdullah Sa‘īd Ibn Jubayr (45/665-95/714), by origin an Abyssinian, a client of Banū Asad, settled in Kūfah. A student of Ibn ‘Abbās and ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar in the Qur’ān, he was the most knowledgeable among the Successors on the Qur’ān. When the people of Kūfah would go to Ibn ‘Abbās and ask for his views and counsel, he would wonder why they went to him while Sa‘īd was there among them. Sa‘īd sided with ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Al-Ash‘ath when he rose against ‘Abdul-Malik Ibn Marwān; for that reason Ḥajjāj killed Sa‘īd though everyone on earth was in need of his knowledge. (See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 3:145; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:204; Abū Nu‘aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā’*, 4:272; Ibn Al-Kathīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 4:220, Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 8:93.)

⁴⁶ Abū ‘Abdullah ‘Ikramah Ibn ‘Abdullah (d.105/723), a Berber slave of Ibn ‘Abbās freed after the death of the master by latter’s son, ‘Alī, distinguished himself as a scholar of the Qur’ān. Ash-Sha‘bī has said, “There is no one on earth more knowledgeable on the book of God than ‘Ikramah” (Adh-Dhahabī, *At-Tafsīr wa al-Mufasssīrūn*, vol. I, p. 111). [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:319; Abū Nu‘aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā’*, 3:326; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 4:244].

⁴⁷ ‘Aṭā’ Ibn Ribāḥ (27/280-114/732) a student of ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abbās in *tafsīr*, was the most distinguished jurist (*faqīh*) of his time at Makkah.

⁴⁸ Abū Sa‘īd Al-Ḥasan Ibn Yasār al-Basārī (21/642-110/728), an outstanding scholar, a great narrator of *ḥadīth*, a scholar of the Qur’ān, a *faqīh*, orator and ascetic was the *shaykh* of the Baṣrīs of his time. Ḥasan ‘Abbās wrote a book on his life. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:69-73; Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-‘Itidāl*, 1:254; Abū Nu‘aym, *Hilyah*, 2:131; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 2:242.]

⁴⁹ Abū ‘Ā’ishah Masrūq Ibn Al-Ajda’ (d. 63/683) has been regarded as the most knowledgeable student of ‘Abdullah Ibn Mas‘ūd at Kūfah.

⁵⁰ Abū Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ibn Al-Musayyib (13/634-94/712), a great scholar of *ḥadīth*, *fiqh* and the Qur’ān is hailed as the leader of Successors (*Sayyid at-Tābi‘īn*). [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:206; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwa*, 2:44; Abū Nu‘aym, *Hilyah*, 2:161; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 3:155.]

⁵¹ Abū Al-‘Alīyah Rāfi‘ Ibn Mihrān Ar-Riyyāḥī (d. 90/709) was a distinguished Successor and scholar of the Qur’ān.

⁵² Ar-Rubay‘ Ibn Anas, a distinguished scholar of the Qur’ān, died in 139/756.

⁵³ Abū Al-Khaṭṭāb Qatādah Ibn Ḍiyamah (d. 118/736), scholar of the Qur’ān and a man of extraordinary memory of *ḥadīth* at Baṣrah. [Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 1:115; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:427; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, VI:27.]

⁵⁴ Abū Al-Qāsim Aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Muzāḥim Al-Balkhī (d. 105/723), a scholar of

the Qur'ān, learned tafsīr from Sa'īd Ibn Jubayr (d. 95/714) and wrote a book on the subject [Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-I'tidāl*, 1:471; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:310.]

⁵⁵ Shu'bah Ibn Al-Ḥajjāj Ibn Al-Warad Al-Anṭākī (82/701-160/776), one of the leading scholars of ḥadīth at Baṣrah, wrote a book, *Al-Gharīb in ḥadīth* [Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 111/242.]

⁵⁶ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr (*fī al-tarjumah*); Aḥmad, *Musnad*, vol. I, 233, 269, 323, 327. Al-Albānī considers it to be a weak ḥadīth (*Ḍa'if al-Jāmi' al-aṣ-ṣaghīr*, 5738). But Shaykh Aḥmad Shākir regards it as authentic [See *Sunan At-Tirmidhī*, Hims, vol. 8 p. 146]. See also Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, 1:77-78, Al-Khaṭṭābī, *Ma'ālīm as-Sunan*, 5:249.]

⁵⁷ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr, 1; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'ilm, 5. Al-Albānī rates this ḥadīth as weak. [See *Ḍa'if al-Jāmi' al-aṣ-ṣaghīr*, 5736.]

⁵⁸ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, 'ilm, 3; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'ilm, 9; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah, 24; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II:263, 305, 244, 353, 495.

⁵⁹ See Ibn Jarīr Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Tā'wīl Ayn al-Qur'ān*, (Cairo, Al-Ḥalābī, 1372 A.H.), 1:75.

⁶⁰ Abū Ja'far Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr Aṭ-Ṭabarī 224/839-310/923), a great historian, an eminent *faqīh* of the rank of *mujtahid*, and a very outstanding commentator of the Qur'ān, was born in Tabristān and settled in Baghdad where he died. His commentary, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* is the most eminent commentary based on the tradition of the *Salaf* available to us. Among his other works we have *Tārīkh al-Umam wa al-Mulūk*, 7 volumes in history, *Tahdhīb al-Athar in ḥadīth*, *Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā' in fiqh*, and *Adab al-Qaḍāt* on judicial conduct.

^{60a} Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr: 6:2, i'tisām:11; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr:6:2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III:29; Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm*, Beirut, Dār al-Ma'rifah, n.d. vol. II: p. 140.

⁶¹ This man vowed that he would divorce his wife, if it was true that the Qur'ān is sound and letters, and that "God ascends the Throne" taking the words on their *ẓāhir*, or face value, and as people understand them. Ibn Taymiyyah was asked whether this man had to carry out his oath or not.

⁶² Dāwūd Al-Jawāribī was a Rāfiḍī and an anthropomorphist. He believed that God was a body though not something solid within (see Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-I'tidāl*, Maṭba'at As-Sa'ādah, Cairo, 1325/1907, entry 2661; also Al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, ed. M. Muḥiy ad-Dīn 'Abdul-Ḥamīd, Cairo 1950, p. 209; Al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, Beirut, 1393/1973,

p. 320).

⁶³ Abū Al-Ḥasan Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān Ibn Bashīr (d. 150/767), a distinguished commentator of the Qur'ān, originally from Balkh, settled at Baṣrah. His writings include *Nawādir At-Tafāsīr*, *Mutashābih al-Qur'ān*, *An-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh*, in Qur'ānic studies, and *Ar-Radd 'alā al-Qadariyyah* in theology [see Az-Zarkālī, *Al-A'lām*, 7:281].

⁶⁴ Hishām Ibn Al-Ḥakam (d. 190/805), theologian and dialectician, was the leader of the Imāmīyyah Shi'īs of his time. He was born at Kūfah, brought at Wāsiṭ, and settled at Baghdad. He joined the company of Yaḥyā Ibn Khālīd Al-Barmakī, the vizier of the Abbasids and exercised considerable influence on him. He wrote in defense of the Shi'ah doctrines of *imāmah* and *qadr* and in refutation of the Mu'tazilī views on Talḥah and Az-Zubayr. When the Barmakids came under the fire he went into hiding but died shortly afterwards. [See Az-Zarkālī, *Al-A'lām* 9:82, Ibn An-Nadīm, *Al-Fihrist*, 1:75; Al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 1:31-34; Ash-Sharistānī, *Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 1:396-402. Al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, 41-3].

⁶⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hisāb:38, jihād:34, 46, 50, 55, 82, 116, 117, 165, ādāb:39, 116; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il:48, 49; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb:79; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jihād:14; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād:9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III:163, 171, 180, 185, 202, 261, 271, 274, 291.

⁶⁶ Ḥamād Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm, Abū Sulaymān Al-Khaṭṭābī (319/931-288/998), a *faqīh* and *muḥaddith* of distinction from Best in the district of Kabul, descended from Zayd Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb, the brother of the second caliph, 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb. He is famous for his commentary, *Ma'ālīm as-Sunan* on the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd. His other works are: *Bayān I'jāz al-Qur'ān*, *Iṣlāḥ Ghalāt al-Muḥaddithuūn*, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, etc. [See Az-Zarkālī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:304; Ibn Khallikān; *Wafayāt* 1:166.]

⁶⁷ Aḥmad Ibn 'Alī Ibn Thābit, Abū Bakr Al-Khaṭīb (392/1002-463/1072) a scholar of *ḥadīth*, and an eminent historian was born at Ghazīyah between Makkah and Kūfah, and brought up at Baghdad where he lived and died. He is known for his *History of Baghdad* which is in fourteen volumes; his other work *Al-Kifāyah fī 'ilm Ar-Riwāyah*, in *ḥadīth* is also very popular. [See Ibn Khallikān; *Wafayāt* 1:37; As-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt Ash-Shāfi'iyyah*, 3:12; Ibn Taghrī, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, 5:87; Az-Zarkālī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:166.]

⁶⁸ Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullah Ibn Muslim Ibn Qutaybah Ad-Dīnawārī (213/828-277/889), a distinguished man of letters and a prolific writer, was born at Baghdad, settled at Kūfah, served as judge at Dinawar, and died at Baghdad. Among his books we have *Adab al-Kātib*, *As-Shi'r wa al-Shu'rā'*, *Al-Mā'ārif*, in

Arabic literature, *Mukhtalaf al-Ḥadīth*, in *ḥadīth*, *Mushkil al-Qur'ān*, in Qur'ānic studies, and 'Uyūn al-Akhhbār and Radd 'alā al-Shu'ūbiyyah, *Faḍl al-'Arab 'alā al-'Ajam* in history. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*:1:251, Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, Hyderabad, 1329, 3:357; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:280.]

⁶⁹ Umm Salamah (28 B.H./596-62/681) the daughter of Abū Umayyah, embraced Islam in the early days in Makkah, migrated with her husband Abū Salamah to Abyssinia where their son Salamah was born. After the Prophet's migration to Madinah, the family also migrated to Madinah where Abū Salamah died. Umm Salamah was a lady of wisdom and virtue. She consented to marry the Prophet when he proposed to her. At Hudaibiyyah when Muslims were unhappy with the terms of the agreement between the Prophet and the Quraysh and were not ready to sacrifice their animals, she advised the Prophet to go ahead and offer the sacrifice first, then the rest of the people followed suit. [See *Wafayāt*, 61; *Ṭabaqāt Ibn Sa'd*:8:60-68; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 1309; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 9:104.]

⁷⁰ Abū 'Uthmān Rabī'ah Ibn 'Abdur-Raḥmān (d. 136/735) commonly known as Rabī'at al-Rai', was a learned jurist of independent views (*mujtahid*). [See Adh-Dhahabī *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 1:157-58; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:50-52; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:42.]

⁷¹ Mālik Ibn Anas Ibn Mālik (d. 179/795), the founder of the Mālikī School of *fiqh*, was the leader of the *ḥadīth* scholars in his times. Besides *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, a collection of *ḥadīth* which also contains the words of the Companions and Successors, and forms the basis of the *fiqh* he developed, his writings include a work on the Qur'ān: *Tafsīr Gharīb al-Qur'ān*, which is no longer extant.

⁷² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hibah:38, jihād:34, 46, 50, 55, 82, 116, 117, 165, ādāb:39, 116; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il:48, 49; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb, 79; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jihād:14; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād:9; Aḥmad, *Sunan*, III:147, 163, 171, 180, 185, 202, 261, 271, 274, 291.

⁷³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣḥāb an-nabī:25, maghāzī: 44; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zakāh:5, 14; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib:49; Aḥmad, I:8, 204, IV:90, V:299, 301.

⁷⁴ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad* VI:87, 114.

^{74a} Al-'Ajlūnī, Ismā'il Ibn Muḥammad wrote in his book *Kashf al-Khifā* (Cairo, Al-Qudsī, 1351 A.H.), 1:348-49 that Aṭ-Ṭabarānī has noted this *ḥadīth* in his *Mu'jam*, and that Abū 'Ubayd has mentioned it in his *Musnad* and ascribed it to the Prophet. He has also produced other chains through which the *ḥadīth* has been reported. Ibn Ad-Dibā' Ash-Shaybānī says in his "*Tamyīz Aṭ-Ṭayyib min al-Khabīth* (ed. al-Kawtharī, Cairo, 1368 A.H., p. 65) that it has been reported as

the word of Ibn 'Abbās. Mūllah 'Alī Qarī counts it as fabricated (*mawḍū'*). but the editor of his book *Al-Mawḍū'at*, (Beirut, 1391) Muḥammad As-Sabbagh says, p.113) that though it is a weak *ḥadīth* it is supported by other similar traditions.

⁷⁵ Abū Maḥraz Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān, the leader of Jahmiyyah, was born in Khurasan, passed his early life at Tirmidh, entered into a debate with some Buddhists, who led him to complete skepticism. After forty days he regained his faith in God, but towing the line of Al-Ja'd Ibn Dirham, he denied that God has attributes over and above His essence. He also denied freedom of will and the eternity of Paradise and Hell. He was killed along with al-Ḥārith Ibn Surayj in a battle against the Ummayyads. [See Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-Umam wa al-Mulūk*, Dār Iḥyā At-Turāth al-'Arabī, Beirut, n.d. vol 7, 220-2, 236-7]

⁷⁶ Abū Al-Hudhayl Muḥammad Ibn Al-Hudhayl Al-'Allāf (135/752-235/849), leader of the Mu'tazilah of Baṣrah in his time, and an astute dialectician, is credited with the formulation of the five principles of the school, and commanded respect from the Abbasid caliphs, al-Māmūn, Al-Mu'taṣim, and Al-Wāthiq. Among his students was Ibn Abī Dāwūd, the powerful vizier of the Abbasids.

⁷⁷ This *ḥadīth* is not found in any known collection of *aḥādīth*; its wording indicates that it originated in Ṣūfī circles and is fabrication of the Ṣūfis.

⁷⁸ What is true of the earlier *ḥadīth* is also true of this *ḥadīth*.

⁷⁹ The Karamathians (*al-Qarāmaṭah*) are an extremist off-shoot of the Ismā'īlīs who have caused havoc and destruction in the Islamic world. For the Ismā'īlīs, see note 80.

⁸⁰ Ismā'īlīs are those Shi'īs who separated from others when they put up Ismā'il instead of his brother Mūsā Kāẓim as their seventh imām after their father Ja'far Aṣ-Ṣādiq, the sixth imām, died. Today the Ismā'īlīs are found in southern and eastern Africa, Syria, India and Pakistān. Like other Shi'īs they believe in the doctrine of *imāmah*: that the imām is infallible, that he is the right interpreter of the faith and the *shar'*, that belief in him is necessary for salvation, and that the last imām has gone into hiding, will appear at the end of the world as the promised Mahdī, and will establish the reign of faith and peace.

⁸¹ Nuṣarīyyah are an extremist Shi'ah sect who believed that God appeared in the form of 'Alī and the other imāms, and therefore take them as divine beings. [See Ash-Shahristānī, *Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 1:168-69; Ar-Rāzī, *I'tiqādāt firaq al-Muslimīn*, ed. Dr. Sāmī Nashshār, Cairo, 1365/1938), p. 61; 'Abdur-Raḥmān Al-Badawī, *Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn*, Beirut, 1971, vol II. Ibn Taymiyyah has refuted their doctrines in a tract included in the *Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām*, vol. 35,

as well as in *Minhāj as-Sunnah*, Ed. Dr. Rashād Sa'īm, Riyadh, 2:409.]

⁸² The term *Rawāfiḍ* or *Rāfiḍah* refers to the majority of the Shi'is who refuse (*rafḍ*) to follow the line of Zayd Ibn 'Alī Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib in abstaining from condemning Abū Bakr and 'Umar, since his grandfather, 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib did not condemn them. They insist on denouncing them and the third caliph, 'Uthmān.

⁸³ Zaydiyyah are those Shi'is who believe in the *imāmah* of Zayd Ibn 'Alī Ibn Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib who rose against Yūsufībn 'Umar Ath-Thaqafī, the governor of the Ummayyad ruler Hishām Ibn 'Abdul-Malik (106/724-126/743) in Iraq. The Zaydis later divided into three major sects: *Jarudīyyah*, *Sulaymānīyyah*, and *Butrīyyah*. [See *Al-Baghdādī, Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥiy ad-Dīn 'Abdul-Ḥāmid, Cairo, Subayh, n.d. pp. 25, 34-6.]

⁸⁴ Probably he is Ibrāhīm Ibn Ishāq Ibn Bashīr Ibn 'Abdullah Al-Ḥarbī (178?794-225/839), a distinguished scholar of *ḥadīth*, originally from Marwah, settled later at Baghdad where he taught and wrote. His books include *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, *Manāsik al-Ḥajj*, and *Dalā'il an-Nubūwwah*. An ascetic, he lived on small means and refused the grant which al-Mu'taḍḍī sent him. [See Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 2:147; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 2:228; Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:86; Al-Khaṭīb, *Tārikh*, Baghdad, 6:27; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:24.]

⁸⁵ Abū Bakr Muḥiy ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Aṭ-Ṭā'ī, Commonly known as Ibn Arabī/Ibn Al-'Arabī (560/1165-638/1240) was born in Murcia (Spain) and died in Damascus. A mystic of vast learning, great intellect, and fertile imagination, he expounded and elaborated the philosophy of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, Unity of Being, which dominated the Islamic world for centuries and still exercises considerable influence, for his biography see Sayed Ḥusayn Naṣr, *Three Muslim Sages*, (Harvard, Cambridge, 1964), pp. 92-102. The best work on his philosophy is by Dr. A. E. 'Affifi: *The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥiyid Din Ibnul 'Arabi* (Lahore, Ashraf, reprint from C. U. P. edition).

⁸⁶ Abū Al-Qāsim Al-Junayd Ibn Muḥammad (d. 297/909) Al-Baghdādī, the most outstanding Ṣūfī of his time, highly learned, extremely balanced and sober, strictly observed the Sharī'ah. Ṣūfīs hail him as the leader of the Ṣūfī community (*Sayyid aṭ-Ṭā'ifah*) and trace their *ṭarīqah* from him. Dr. 'Alī Ḥasan 'Abdul-Qādir has published his *Rasā'il* in his book, *The Life, Personality and Writings of Al-Junayd* (London, Luzac & Co. Gibb Memorial Series, 1962) [See As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt Aṣ-Ṣufīyyah*, ed. Nur ad-Dīn, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabī, 1953, pp. 155-63; Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, pp. 110-119.]

⁸⁷ Abū Muḥammad Sahl Ibn 'Abdullah At-Tustārī (d. 283/897) was from Tustār

in the Persian province of Khuzistān, where he taught Islamic sciences and instructed in Šūfism before he came to Baṣrah and settled down. He was known for his abstinence, renunciation, fasting throughout the year, and miracles. Walter De Gruyter has studied his commentary on the Qur'ān in *The Mystic Vision of Existence in Classical Islam* (Berlin and New York, 1980). [See also As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt As-Šūfīyyah*, op.cit. pp. 206-211; Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, 92-95.]

⁸⁸ Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ismā'il Al-Khawwaṣ (d. 291/904), a famous Šūfī of his times and contemporary of Junayd was from Rayy where he lived and died. He is said to have written some books. [See Al-Khaṭīb Al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Al-Baghdad*, Cairo, 1349/1931, vol. VI p. 7. See also Ash-Sha'ranī, *Aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, Cairo, n.d. vol I. p. 83; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt Aṣ-Šūfīyyah*, op. cit. 284-86; Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, 146-48]

⁸⁹ Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, ed. Dr. 'Abdul-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd ī Maḥmūd Ibn Ash-Sharīf, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, n.d. pp. 28-29.

⁹⁰ Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Mūsā As-Sulāmī (330/94-412/1021), the leader of the Šūfīs in Khurasan is the author of a commentary on Qur'ān, *Haqā'iq at-Tafsīr*. The book is not however a commentary in the common sense of the term, it is rather a collection of what Šūfīs like Ibn 'Aṭā' Allah Al-Iskandarī, Al-Junayd, Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyāḍ and Sahl Ibn 'Abdullah At-Tustārī have said regarding different verses of the Qur'ān. He is best known for his *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Šūfīyyah*, an authoritative source on the life and views of the early Šūfīs.

⁹¹ Ja'far Ibn Muḥammad Al-Bāqir Ibn 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidīn (80/699-148/765), known with the title Aṣ-Šādiq, the True, is held the sixth imām by the Ithnā 'Ashrī Shi'īs. He was a renowned scholar and teacher. Among his students mention may be made of two great imāms of *fiqh*, Abū Ḥanīfah and Mālik. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, I:105, Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Šafwah*, II:94; Abū Nu'aym: *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, III:192; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, II:121.]

⁹² Abū Bakr Aḥmad Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Alī Al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066), a leading scholar of the ḥadīth, from Khurasan. Among his works mention may be made of *As-Sunan al-Kubrā* (first ed. Hyderabad, India, 1352 A.H.) *Al-Asmā' wa al-Ṣifat* (ed. Muḥammad Zāhid Al-Kawtharī, Maṭba'at as-Sā'ādah, Cairo, 1358) and *Dalā'il an-Nubūwwah* (ed. Dr. 'Abdul-Mu'tī Al-Qal'ājī, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmīyyah, Beirut, 1405/1985).

⁹³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād:171; dīyat:24, 31; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, dīyat:16; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, dīyat:5; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, qasamah:14.

⁹⁴ Al-Ghazālī has mentioned this ḥadīth in *Iḥyā*. Commenting on it, Al-'Irāqī has

said that Abū Nu'aym has mentioned it in his *Hilya* but counted it as weak (*ḍa'īf*). [See *Ihyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, vol. I. p. 121.]

⁹⁵ See Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 287, 289; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, zakāh: 3; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd: 32; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 53:7

⁹⁶ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ḥudūd:1, jihād:117; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, taḥrīm:14.

⁹⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb:96; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr:165; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, zuhd:5, da'wat:98; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq:71; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:292, III:104, 110, 159, 165, 167, 168, etc.

⁹⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣḥāb an-nabī:20, 27, isti'dhān:38; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib:37; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:449, 451.

⁹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm:42. As for Abū Hurayrah (d.58/678), he was 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Ṣakhar Ad-Dawsī. Abū Hurayrah is the name by which the prophet called him. According to a cautious recent study, he has narrated some 1236 *aḥādīth*. [See Muṣṭafā 'Azamī, *Studies in Ḥadīth Methodology and Literature*, Indianapolis, American Trust Publication, 1977 p. 20.] He came to Madinah in the year 7 A.H. and joined the group called *Aṣḥāb aṣ-Ṣuffah*, and devoted himself to remembering the sayings of the Prophet. During his caliphate, 'Umar appointed him governor of Bahrain for a period. Thereafter Abū Hurayrah returned to Madinah where he died. He used to give opinions on legal issues. [See Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*:1179; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*:1:285; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyah*:1:276; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*:4:80-81.]

¹⁰⁰ 'Abdullah Ibn 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb (d. ca. 74/693), one of the most outstanding younger Companions, and a learned scholar known for his piety and strict imitation of the Prophet, distinguished himself as a narrator of *ḥadīth*, next only to Abū Hurayrah.

¹⁰¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah:6, anbiyā':54; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah:23; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib:17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:55.

¹⁰² At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr:15:6. Al-Albānī considers this *ḥadīth* to be weak (*ḍa'īf*) [See his *Ḍa'īf Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, *ḥadīth* 127.]

¹⁰³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, riqāq:38; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:256; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan:16.

¹⁰⁴ See Al-Haythamī, *Majma' az-Zawā'id wa Manba' al-Fawā'id*. (Beirut, Al-Ma'ārif, 1406/1986), 9:67.

¹⁰⁵ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'aqidah:3; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, aḥkām:1; Aḥmad

Musnad, III:118, 220.

^{105a} This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 101.

¹⁰⁶ The treaty of Hudaibīyyah, which the Prophet signed with the Quraysh, appeared to many Companions to be unequal and somewhat detrimental to the Muslims. 'Umar felt it very strongly and talked to the Prophet about it in a way he later felt very sorry for. He never talked to Abū Bakr in the same angry tone. Abū Bakr pacified him and defended the Prophet. [See Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr:48:51.]

¹⁰⁷ When the Prophet died, 'Umar was so shocked that he lost control of himself and was not ready to believe that he had died. Abū Bakr, on the other hand, was composed. Reciting verse 3:14, he reminded the people that the Prophet was a human being and had died. His words brought 'Umar to his senses and led him to accept the death of the Prophet. [See Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, vol. I. p. 40.]

¹⁰⁸ After the death of the Prophet a number of tribes who had surrendered to him refused to pay *zakāh*. Abū Bakr, was elected *khalīfah* after the Prophet, declared he would fight the renegade tribes till they paid *zakāh* to the government. 'Umar had a different view, but when Abū Bakr argued the case and expressed his firm determination, 'Umar realized that he was right. [See also the text on p. 649.]

¹⁰⁹ During his reign 'Umar once tried to limit the amount of dower money (*mahr*) which the bridegroom pays to the bride. Speaking from the pulpit of the Prophet's mosque, he fixed the maximum amount at four hundred dirhams. Thereafter, a woman reciting verse 4:20 drew his attention to this proposal being against the Qur'ān. 'Umar realized it and admitted his mistake. [See Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, vol. I. p. 467.]

¹¹⁰ Abū 'Alī Ḥusayn Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Sīnā (730/980-428/1037), a most outstanding physician and philosopher, was born and brought up at Bukhara, served as minister at the court of Ḥamadān, where people became his enemy, so he went into hiding, moved to Isfahan, and in the end returned to Ḥamadān where he died. He and his father were Karmathian missionaries. He is known for his *Al-Qānūn*, a most distinguished work on medicine, and for his works on logic and philosophy, such as *An-Najāt*, *Ash-Shifā'*, in four volumes, *Al-Ishārāt*, among many others. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:152; Al-Qiftī, *Tārīkh al-Ḥukamā'*, Leipzig, 27-22; Az-Zarkālī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:261-2.]

^{110a} The reference is probably to Ash'arī theologian and philosopher, Fakhr ad-Dīn Ar-Rāzī, for whom cf. note 35.

¹¹¹ Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī (450/1058-550/1111) is known as *Hujjat al-Islām* for

his profound criticism of Greek philosophy and defense of Islamic faith. He was born at Tus, studied *fiqh* and *kalām* with Imām al-Ḥaramayn Al-Juwaynī (see note 33), took up teaching at Nizāmiyyah College, Baghdad, gave it up later, pursued the Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*, finally settled down at his home town and devoted himself to writing and teaching. His writings include many books on Shāfi'ī *fiqh*, a great work on principles of jurisprudence, an exposition of Islam as faith and life under the title, *Ihyā 'Ulūm ad-Dīn* which is his *magnum opus*; an incisive criticism of Greek philosophy *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*; a brilliant exposition of the Ash'arī theology, *Al-Iqtisād fī al-I'tiqād*; and many books on Ṣūfism. Ghazālī's writings, however, are not free from undesirable philosophical and mystical influences.

¹¹² Abū Al-'Abbās 'Abdullah Ibn Muḥammad An-Nāshī (d. 293/906) a gifted poet of the rank of Ar-Rūmī and Al-Buḥtarī, and a theologian and logician was from Al-Anbār, settled first at Baghdad, then went to Egypt where he died. He was known as Ibn Shar Shir. Ibn Khallikān has said that he was the author of many fine books. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:263; Al-Khaṭīb Al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, Cairo, 1349/1931, 10:92; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:261.]

^{112a} For Al-'Āmidī, see note 25.

¹¹³ Muḥammad Ibn Ja'far Ibn Az-Zubayr's view has been quoted by Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq (d. 150/767), which means that he must have preceded him, for a discussion on the point see Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm*, Riyadh, Maktabat al-Ma'ārif, n.d. vol. I. pp. 346-7

¹¹⁴ Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq Ibn Yasar al-Makhramī (d. 150/767) is famous for his biography of the Prophet. In fact, the *Sīrah* of Ibn Hishām, the most authentic and earliest biography of the Prophet, is an edition of the *Sīrah* of Ibn Ishāq.

^{114a} For Ibn Qutaybah see note 68.

¹¹⁵ 'Abdur-Razzāq Ibn Rizq Allah Ibn Abī Bakr, Abū Muḥammad 'Izz ad-Dīn (589/1193-660/1262) a scholar of ḥadīth, Ḥanbalī *fiqh*, and the Qur'ān was born at Ras 'Ayn al-Khabur, traveled to Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo in search of ḥadīth. He headed the Dār al-Ḥadīth at Muṣal and died at Sanjar. His Commentary on the Qur'ān is in four big volumes. [See Ibn Rajab, *Adh-Dhayl 'alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:274, ed, Ḥāmid Al-Fiqī, Cairo, Al-Muḥammadiyyah, 1952; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:125.]

¹¹⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd:35, bad' al-khalq:8, tafsīr:33:1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān:313, jannah:3-5; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jannah:15, tafsīr:33:2, 56:1; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd:39; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq:98, 105; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III:313, 370, 407, 416, 438, 463, 466, 495, 506, V:234.

¹¹⁷ Abū Al-Ḥasan ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ibn Al-Ḥārith Ibn Asad At-Tamīmī (317/929-371/982), a Ḥanbalī jurist of Baghdad, very knowledgeable on the differences of the jurists, wrote a book on the principles of jurisprudence and another on inheritance. [Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 7:110; Al-Khaṭīb Al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, 10:461; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 4:139.]

¹¹⁸ He is Qāḍī Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Aṭ-Ṭayyib Al-Baqillānī (d. 403/1013). One of the most outstanding Ash‘arī theologians, he was born at Baṣrah in 388/949, settled at Baghdad where he died. His writings include *At-Tamhīd fī ar-Radd ‘alā al-Malāḥadah al-Mu‘ttilah*, and *Al-Inṣāf* in theology, *Kash Asrār al-Bāṭinīyyah* in comparative religion, and *I’jāz al-Qur’ān* on the inimitability of the Qur’ān.

¹¹⁹ Abū Al-Faṭḥ Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Barhan (479/1087-518/1124) a renowned jurist of Baghdad was the author of many works on *fiqh* such as *Al-Basīṭ*, *Al-Wasīṭ*, and *Al-Wajīz*. He was of the opinion that a laymān does not have to adhere to a particular school of *fiqh*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:29; Ibn Al-‘Imād, *Shadhrāt adh-Dhahab*, 4:61; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 1:167.]

¹²⁰ Abū Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ibn Al-Mubārak Ibn ‘Alī Al-Anṣārī (494/1100-569/1174), commonly known as Ibn Ad-Dahhān, was a scholar of Arabic language and literature and a poet. He was born and brought up at Baghdad, later on he settled at Muṣal where he died. His writings include a commentary in four volumes on the Qur’ān, another on the *Al-Īdāḥ* of Abū ‘Alī Al-Farsī in forty parts, a third on the *Al-Luma’* of Ibn Jinnī, a collection of poems and some smaller works on language. [Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:209; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 3:154.]

¹²¹ Most probably he was Qāḍī Abū Bakr Al-Baqillānī. For him see note 18.

^{121a} For Ibn ‘Aqīl see note 30.

¹²² Probably he was Hishām Ibn Al-Ḥakām Ar-Rāfiḍī. See note 64 for him.

¹²³ Muḥammad Ibn Karrām Ibn ‘Irāq Ibn Kharābah, Abū ‘Abdullah As-Sijzī (d. 255/869), the leader of the Karramīyyah (see note 6) was born at Sijistān, spent five years at Makkah, then went to Nishapur where the governor of the city Ṭāhir Ibn ‘Abdullah put him in jail. When released he went to Syria, but returned again to Nishapur and was put in jail again. In 251 when he was released the second time he went to Jerusalem where he died, [Ash-Shahristānī, *Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 1:158; Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 2:106; Ibn Al-Ḥajr, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 5:353; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 7:236.]

¹²⁴ Abū Sa‘īd Al-Asmā‘ī, Abdul-Mālik Ibn Qurayb Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Asmā’ Al-Bāhili

(126/740-216/831), a renowned narrator of Arabic poetry, and an outstanding scholar of Arabic language, poetry and places, was born at Baṣrah where he lived and died. Akhfash says that he has not seen anyone more knowledgeable on Arabic poetry. He himself used to say that he remembered 10,000 Arabic couplets. He has books with titles like *Camels, Horses, Synonyms*, and poems in a book called *Al-Asmā'iyyāt*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:288; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:308; Brockmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*, Leiden, 1:104, S.I.:763.]

¹²⁵ Abū Zayd Sa'īd Ibn Aws Ibn Thābit Al-Anṣārī (119/734-215/930) another renowned scholar of Arabic language and literature, was born at Baṣrah where he lived and died. Among his works we have *An-Nawādir*, *al-Hamz*, *Al-Matar*, *al-Mīyyah*, etc. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:207; Az-Zarkalī, 3:144.]

¹²⁶ Abū Sahl As-Sa'lukī, Muḥammad Ibn Sulaymān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Hārūn (296/908-369/980), a Shāfi'ī jurist, man of letters, and scholar of the Qur'ān, comes from the tribe of Banū Ḥanīfah. He was born at Isfahan, taught at Baṣrah for some years, and died at Nishapur. Ath-Tha'lābī has noted many of his couplets, and said that he composed many more. [See As-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shafi'iyyah*, Cairo, Al-Ḥalābī, 1964, 2:161-164; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:460; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 7:20.]

¹²⁷ For Ibn 'Umar see note 100.

¹²⁸ Abū 'Uthmān 'Āmr Ibn 'Ubayd (80/699-144/761) initiated, along with his brother in-law, Wāṣil Ibn 'Aṭā' (d. 131/748), the Mu'tazilī theology. 'Āmr was known for his devotion and asceticism. He was born at Baṣrah and died on the road while returning from Makkah. His writings include a collection of the comments of Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī on the Qur'ān, his teacher from whom he broke away later, and a book on divine unity and justice.

¹²⁹ He is Abū Al-Ma'ālī Imām al-Ḥarāmayn Al-Juwaynī, for whom see note 33.

¹³⁰ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 17.

¹³¹ Abū Al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Aṭ-Ṭayyib Al-Basārī (d. 430/1044), a renowned Mu'tazilī theologian and jurist, lived and died at Baghdad. His writings include *Al-Mu'tamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* in principles of jurisprudence, *Tasaffuh al-Adillah fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah*.

¹³² Abū Al-Barakāt Hibatullah Ibn 'Alī Ibn Malka (d. ca 457/1065), a physician and outstanding philosopher of Iraq, originally a Jew, later embraced Islam. He is known for his *Al-Mu'tabar, fī al-Ḥikmah*, first published from Hyderabad in 1357. [See Ibn Abī Usaybī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā'*, Beirut, Dār al-Fikr, 1956, 3:296-300; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 9:63.]

¹³³ For Abū Abdullah Fakhr ad-Dīn Ar-Rāzī see note 35.

¹³⁴ Abū 'Abdullah Al-Ḥārith Ibn Asad al-Muhasibī (d. 243/857), a leading Ṣūfī of Baghdad, is known for his writings on Ṣūfī psychological ethics, particularly motivation. *Ar-Ri'ayah li Ḥuqūq Allah* is his best work. Margret Smith has studied his ideas in her *Al-Muhasibi: an Early Mystic of Baghdad* (Amsterdam, Philo Press, 1935).

¹³⁵ Abū Al-Ḥasan Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Sālīm (d. 350/961) was the son of a renowned Ṣūfī Abū 'Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Sālīm (d. 297/909), the founder of the Salīmīyyah sect in theology, to whose development Abū Al-Ḥasan has also contributed a lot. For the Salīmīyyah see note 19.

¹³⁶ Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Aṭīyah Al-Ḥārithī Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī (d. 386/996), an ascetic and Ṣūfī, was born at Al-Jabal between Baghdad and Wasit, passed most of his life at Makkah where he delivered sermons and achieved fame. Then he went to Baṣrah and from there to Baghdad where he expounded some strange ideas which people disapproved of and refrained from his sermons. He belonged to the Salīmīyyah school of the Ṣūfīs, and is known for his very popular work on Ṣūfism, *Qūt al-Qulūb*, (Cairo, Al-Ḥalābī, 1381/1961) in two volumes.

¹³⁷ 'Abdul-'Azīz Ibn Ja'far Ibn Aḥmad Al-Baghwī, Abū Bakr (285/898-363/974), a scholar of the Qur'ān, ḥadīth and Ḥanbalī *fiqh* of Baghdad, was a pupil of the renowned Ḥanbalī scholar and *muḥaddith* Abū Bakr Al-Khallāl, and was given the same name after him. His writings include *Ash-Shāfi* and *Al-Muqni* and *Al-Khilāf ma'a Al-Shāfi'i* in *fiqh*, as well as a commentary on the Qur'ān and a book on ḥadīth, *Mukhtaṣar as-Sunnah* [see Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:119-127; Al-Khaṭīb Al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh al-Baghdad*, 10:459; Ibn Taghir, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, Cairo, 1963, 4:106; Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, 1:278; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:139.]

¹³⁸ Abū 'Abdullah Al-Ḥasan Ibn Ḥāmid Ibn 'Alī Ibn Marwān (d. 403/1012) Al-Baghdādī, leader of the Ḥanbalīs of his time died after a long life while returning' from *hajj*. His writings include a compendium of Ḥanbalī *fiqh*, *Al-Jāmi'*, besides *Sharḥ Uṣūl ad-Dīn* and *Taḥdīd al-Ajwibah* [Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:171-7; Ibn Taghrī, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, 4: 232; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 7:263; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:201.]

¹³⁹ Abū Muḥammad 'Alī Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Sa'id Ibn Ḥazm (d.456/1064), a renowned Spanish scholar of jurisprudence, ḥadīth, theology and comparative religion, and leader of the Zahirīs was born at Cordova. His father was in a high post in the government, but Ibn Ḥazm devoted himself to the service of

knowledge. The best of his works are *Al-Muḥalla bi al-Athar* in eleven volumes, *Al-Faṣl fī al-Mīlāl*, *Al-Ahwā' wa al-Niḥāl*, and *Al-Ḥikam li Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*. [See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:330; Al-Kaḥḥālāh, *Mu'jam al-Muwallifin*, 7:16.]

¹⁴⁰ Abū Muḥammad 'Abdul-Ḥaqq Ibn Ghālib Ibn 'Aṭī'ah (481/1088-546/1151), a man of letters, poet, grammarian, *faqīh* and *qāḍī* from Granada (Spain) wrote a commentary on the Qur'ān entitled *Al-Muharrar al-Wajīz fī Tafsīr al-Kitāb al-'Azīz* in two volumes which is still unpublished.

¹⁴¹ For Ibn Mas'ūd see note 3:39.

¹⁴² Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān:34, 35, 36; Abū Dāwūd, *ādāb*:124; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, birr: 30; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 120.

¹⁴³ Shaykh al-Islām Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān 'Abdullah Ibn Al-Mubārak Ibn Waḍīḥ Al-Marwazī (118/736-181/787), a great scholar of *ḥadīth*, a warrior (*mujahid*) and writer passed his life in traveling, collecting *ḥadīth*, participating in jihād, making *hajj* many times or doing business. He was also very knowledgeable in *fiqh*, Arabic literature and history. He lived in Khurasan and died at Bahit at the bank of Furāt while returning from a jihād campaign against the Romans. He wrote a book on jihād and another with the title *Ar-Raqā'iq*. [See Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*:1:253; Abū Nu'aym, *Al-Ḥilyah*, 8:162; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, 1:295; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:256.]

¹⁴⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā':10; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, da'wat:54:55; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṭibb:19. sunnah:20; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ṭibb:18, da'wat:40, 90, 112; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṭibb:35, 36, 46; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān:48; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā'*, shar':9-12, isti'dhān:34; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III:181, 290, 275, II:430, VI:6.

¹⁴⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm:45, jihād:15, khums:10, tawḥīd:28; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah:149-151; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād:24; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*,; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād:3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV:393, 397, 402, 405, 415.

¹⁴⁶ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zuhd:64; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV:332, 333, VI:15, 16.

¹⁴⁷ Abū Sulaymān 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Aḥmad Ibn 'Aṭīyah Ad-Darānī (d. 215/830), a renowned Ṣūfī from Darān, a village in the suburbs of Damascus, is held in esteem by Ibn Taymiyyah. He is said to have said, "I often have an idea from the ideas of the Ṣūfīs in my mind; I reflect on it for days, and never accept it unless it is testified to by two just witnesses: the Qur'ān and the Sunnah." [See Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, ed. Dr. 'Abdul-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd, ḥ Maḥmūd Ibn Ash-Sharīf, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, Cairo, n.d. pp. 96-8; see also As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣufiyyah*, pp. 75-82; Jamī', *Nafaḥat al-Uns*, Lucknow, Nawalkishore, 1910, pp. 40ff.]

¹⁴⁸ For Qāḍī Abū Bakr Al-Baqillānī see note 118.

¹⁴⁹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 5.

¹⁵⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm:20; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il:15;15; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV:299.

¹⁵¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawbah:1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II:524, 535.

¹⁵² For Ibn Az-Zaghūnī see note 29.

¹⁵³ For Al-Juwaynī see note 33.

¹⁵⁴ For Al-Bājī see note 34.

¹⁵⁵ For Ibn 'Aqīl see note 30.

¹⁵⁶ In the text the surname is pronounced Abū Hāzim, but as Ibn Rajab has clearly stated, it is Abū Khazim. He is Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad Khāzīm Ibn Al-Farrā' (527/1132) the brother of Abū Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Abī Ya'lā, the author of *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*. [See Ibn Rajab, *Adh-Dhayl 'alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:184-5; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*:4:82; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*: 10:24; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 7:249.]

¹⁵⁷ Muḥammad Ibn Al-Haytham Al-Karramī, one of the leaders of the Karramīyyah who, as Ash-Shahristānī has said [*Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 1:8, 102], tried to defend every idea of Ibn Karram. [For the Karramīyyah see note 6.]

¹⁵⁸ He is Qāḍī Abd Bakr Al-Baqillānī, for whom see note 118.

¹⁵⁹ See the Qur'ān, 4:69.

¹⁶⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāt:30, 33; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāt:148, witr, 5; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, allifīn:75, 113; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṭahārah:119, ṭaḥbīq:47, 71, sahw:89, qiyām al-layl:51; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah:117, du'a':3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:96, 118, 150, VI:58, 201.

¹⁶¹ See the references in note 144.

¹⁶² The followers of Hishām Ibn Al-Ḥakam Ar-Rāfiḍī. for Hishām and his ideas see note 64.

¹⁶³ Abū Muḥammad Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Mas'ūd Ibn Muḥammad Al-Farrā' or Ibn Al-Farrā' Al-Baghawī (436/1044-510/1117), called *Muḥīy as-Sunnah*, The Reviver

of Sunnah, was a renowned jurist, *muḥaddith*, and commentator of the Qur'ān. He came from Bagha, a village in Khurasan, between Hīrat and Marwa. His writings include *At-Tahdhīb* in Shāfi'ī *fiqh*, *Sharḥ as-Sunnah*, *Maṣābiḥ as-Sunnah al-Jam' bayn aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn* in *ḥadīth*, and a popular commentary on the Qur'ān *Ma'ālīm at-Tanzīl*. He died at Marwa. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:145; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, 4:345; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:284.]

¹⁶⁴ Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Kalabādhi (d. 380/990), a scholar of *ḥadīth* and a Ṣūfī from Bukhara, is the author of *Bahr al-Fawā'id*, and *Ma'ānī al-Akḥbār* in *ḥadīth* and a very popular introduction of *taṣawwūf* under the title, *At-Ta'arruf li Madhāhib ahl at-Taṣawwūf*, which has been commented upon by many scholars, and translated by A. J. Arberry into English under the title, *The Doctrine of the Sufis* (C.U.P. 1935). [See Hāji Khalīfah, *Kashf az-Zunūn*, 225; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:186.]

¹⁶⁵ Al-Bukhārī's book is known with the title, *Khalq Af'āl al-'Ibād*. It was first published along with other books by Dr. 'Alī Sāmī An-Nashshār and 'Ammār Jam'ī Aṭ-Ṭālibī in a collection called *'Aqā'id as-Salaf* (Alexandria, Al-Ma'ārif, 1971). It has now been published along with another tract of Al-Bukhārī, *Ar-Radd 'alā al-Jahmīyyah* from Maktabat At-Turāth al-Islāmī, Cairo, 1408/1987.

¹⁶⁶ For Ibn Al-Barr see note 492.

¹⁶⁷ Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Hārūn, Abū Bakr Al-Khallāl (d.311/923), a great scholar of *ḥadīth*, Qur'ān and literature, and a leading figure among the Ḥanbalīs of Baghdad, delivered lectures to the students in the Mosque of Al-Mahdī. He is the author of *Tafsīr al-Gharīb*, *Ṭabaqāt Aṣḥāb Ibn Ḥanbāl*, *As-Sunnah*, *Al-'Illal*, and *Al-Jāmi' li 'Ulūm al-Imām Aḥmad*, the like of which, it is said, has not been written in any school. [See Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:12; Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah wa An-Nihāyah*, 11:148; Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Huffāz*, 3:7; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad*, 512; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:196.]

¹⁶⁸ Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Abī Ḥātim Ar-Rāzī d. 327/ 839), a scholar and a critic of *ḥadīth* wrote many books including a big collection of *ḥadīth*, two works, *'Ilāl al-Ḥadīth* and *Al-Jarḥ wa at-Ta'līl* in *ḥadīth* criticism, and a commentary on the Qur'ān. [See Kaḥḥalah, *Mu'jam al-Muwallifīn*, Beirut, At-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1376/1957, V:170.]

¹⁶⁹ Ṣāliḥ Ibn Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥanbal (203/818-265/878) was born in Baghdad, learned *ḥadīth* and *fiqh* from his father, Imam Aḥmad. He served as *qāḍī* of Baghdad, and then of Isfahan where he died. [See Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, 1:149; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, 6:362; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:274.]

¹⁷⁰ 'Abdullah (213/828-290/903), another son of Imām Aḥmad, was also a scholar of *ḥadīth*. He has added to the *Kitāb az-Zuhd* as well as to the *Musnad* of

his father some thousand *aḥādīth*. [See Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, 5:41; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:189; Brock, S.I. 310.]

¹⁷¹ Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān Ibn Al-Ash'ath Ibn Ishāq As-Sajistānī (202/817-275/889), the leader of the *ḥadīth* scholars in his age, and the author of one of the six foremost collections of *ḥadīth*, was born at Sajistān, traveled to various places for *ḥadīth*, and died at Baṣrah. Besides the *Sunan* in two volumes in which he has put 4800 *ḥadīth* out of 500,000 *ḥadīth* which he had collected, he has also a collection of *marasil ḥadīth*. [See Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, 6:224; Adh-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Ḥuffāz* 1:214; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:182.]

¹⁷² Abū Bakr Al-Athram Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥāmī Al-Askāfī (d. 261/883) a scholar of *ḥadīth*, learned *ḥadīth* from Imām Aḥmad and others. He has a book, *'Ilal al-Ḥadīth* and another, the *Sunan*. [Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:66-74; Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 2:135; Al-Khaṭīb, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, 5:110; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:194.]

¹⁷³ Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Ibn Sa'īd Al-Marwazī (d. 292/905), a scholar of *ḥadīth*, served as *qāḍī* at Hims and then at Damascus where he died. He wrote on *ḥadīth* and compiled a *Musnad* of *ḥadīth*. [Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz* 2:211; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:164.]

¹⁷⁴ Abū Zur'ah 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn 'Āmr Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Ṣafwān (d.280/893), a great scholar of *ḥadīth* and *rijāl*, was born at Damascus where he taught and died. He has a book *Tārīkh wa 'Ilal ar-Rijāl*, and another, *Al-Masā'il* in *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*. [See Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:205; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:94.]

¹⁷⁵ Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs Ibn Al-Mundhir Ibn Dāwūd Ar-Rāzī (195/810-277/891), one of the most eminent scholars of *ḥadīth*, a contemporary of Al-Bukhārī and Muslim, was born at Rayy and died at Baghdad. [See Al-Khaṭīb, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, 2:73-77; Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:283-286; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:205.]

^{175a} Abū Muḥammad Ibn Ismā'il Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Bukhārī (194/809-256/870) is the most outstanding compiler of *ḥadīth*. His *Ṣaḥīḥ*, the most authentic collection of *ḥadīth*, contains 2,602 *aḥādīth*. His other works include a smaller collection of *ḥadīth*, *Al-Adab al-Mufrad*, and a great biographical work on the transmitters of *ḥadīth*, *At-Tārīkh al-Kabīr*.

¹⁷⁶ Abū Sa'īd 'Uthmān Ibn Sa'īd Ad-Dārimī As-Sajistānī (200/815-280/894), was the leading scholar of *ḥadīth* in his time. His works include a collection of *ḥadīth*, *Sunan Ad-Dārimī*, and a book on the refutation of the Mu'tazilī theologian, Bishr Al-Marīsī (included in the *'Aqā'id, As-Salaf*, compiled by 'Alī Sāmī Nashshār and 'Ammār Jamī' Aṭ-Ṭālibī, Alexandria, Al-Ma'ārif, 1971, pp.

253-5661.

¹⁷⁷ For Ibrāhīm Al-Ḥarbī see note 84.

^{177a} ‘Abdul-Wahhāb Ibn Hazawwar Abū Bakr Al-Warrāq (d.450/1058), a Ḥanbalī in *fiqh*, was called Warrāq, because he used to provide paper (*waraq*) to the scholars of *ḥadīth*. [See Ibn Abī Ya‘lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:19.]

¹⁷⁸ ‘Abbās Ibn ‘Abdul-‘Azīm Ibn Ismā‘il, Abū Al-Faḍl Al-‘Anbarī (d.246/860) was a student of imām Aḥmad in *ḥadīth*. He also learned *ḥadīth* from Yahyā Ibn Sa‘īd Al-Qaṭṭān ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Mahdī and others. ‘Abdul-Ḥātim Ar-Rāzī, Muslim and Abū Dāwūd have taken *ḥadīth* from him. [See Ibn Abī Ya‘lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:235.]

¹⁷⁹ Ḥarb Ibn Ismā‘il Ibn Khalaf al-Uanzālī Al-Kirmanī (d. 280/893), a disciple of imām Aḥmad, was a distinguished Ḥanbalī scholar. [See Ibn Al-‘Imād, *Shadhrāt adh-Dhahab*:2:176; Ibn Abī Ya‘lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 1:145-461.]

¹⁸⁰ For ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Ḥātim see note 168.

¹⁸¹ For Abū Bakr Al-Khaṭṭāb see note 167.

¹⁸² He probably was ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ibn Muḥammad Al-Banānī Al-Isfahānī, a poet and a man of letters, settled down at Qazwīn, and wrote commentaries on books on Arabic literature. He was alive in the year 581/1185. [See Kaḥḥalah, *Mu‘jam Al-Muwallifīn*, 5:258.]

¹⁸³ *Uṣūl* literally means principles. Technically, it means both principles of faith (*uṣūl ad-dīn*), theology or *kalām*, and principles of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). *Fur*, on the other hand, refers to practice, or *fiqh*.

¹⁸⁴ Abū ‘Īsā Muḥammad Ibn ‘Īsā Ibn Samrah At-Tirmidhī (209/824-279/892), one of the six most outstanding compilers of *ḥadīth*, comes from At-Tirmidh (near river Jayhun), was a student of Al-Bukhārī, but also took *ḥadīth* from his teacher. He traveled to Khurasan, Iraq, Hijaz and many places for *ḥadīth*. He possessed an extraordinary memory. Besides his *Sunan* or *Al-Jāmi‘ al-Kabīr* in two volumes, his writings include *Ash-Shamā‘il an-Nabawīyyah*, *At-Tārīkh*, and *Al-‘Ilal fī al-Ḥadīth*. [See *Adh-Dhahabī*, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 2:187; Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, 9:387; Ibn An-Nadīm, *Al-Fihrist*, 233; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:484; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 7:213.]

¹⁸⁵ Abū ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Sha‘b Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Sinān An-Nasā‘ī (215/830-303/915), another figure among the six outstanding compilers of *ḥadīth*, came from Nasā‘ in Khurasan, first settled down in Egypt, then went to Palestine where he was tortured for not speaking in praise of Mu‘āwīyah, and

died. Besides his famous work *As-Sunan al-Kubrā*, he has also *As-Sunan aṣ-Ṣuḡhrā*, and *Aḍ-Ḍuʿafā wa al-Matrukūn*, the last on the narrators of *ḥadīth*. [See Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 2:241; As-Subkī, *Aṭ-Ṭabaqāt Ash-Shāfiʿī*, 2:83; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*: 1:21; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-Aʿlām*, 1:164.]

¹⁸⁶ For Ibn Qutaybah see note 68.

^{186a} This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier, note 65.

^{186b} For Abū Al-ʿAbbās An-Nāshī see note 112.

¹⁸⁷ Ḥarurīyyah is another name for the Khārijīs or Khawārij. They are the people who left the camp of ʿAlī Ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth caliph, after he agreed to arbitration (*taḥkīm*) between him and his opponent Muʿāwīyah following their battle at Ṣiffīn (361/656). They condemned *taḥkīm* as an act of faithlessness (*kufr*) and called both parties who agreed to it as infidels. They went further and dubbed everyone who committed a major sin infidel and thought it incumbent on every Muslim to fight against them. Afterwards they developed other theological and political views which set them at war with the majority of the *ummah*. Most of their sub-sects have now vanished; however some remnants are still found in the southeastern part of the Arabian peninsula. They are called Harurīyyah because they held their first meeting at Harurāʾ, a place two miles away from Kūfah after they left ʿAlī.

^{187a} For Rabīʿah Ibn Abī Abdur-Raḥmān see note 70.

¹⁸⁸ The supplication runs as follows: “There is no god but Allah, the Great, the Forbearing. There is no god other than Allah, the Lord of the Great Throne. There is no god besides Allah, the Lord of the heavens and the earth, and the Lord of the Glorious Throne.” [Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, daʿwat:27; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *dhikr*:83; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, daʿwat:80; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:228, 254, 259, 268, 280, 284, 339, 356.]

¹⁸⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, badʾ al-khalq:1; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr:5:3, ʿ11:9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 313, 501, IV:431.

¹⁹⁰ Abū Al-Muẓaffar Yaḥyā Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Hubayrah Ash-Shaybānī, (499/1105-560/1165), a renowned Abbasid vizier and distinguished scholar, was born in a village in the district of Dujail (Iraq), went to Baghdad where he completed his studies and joined the service of Al-Muqtafi bī Amr Allah, who promoted him to the post of vizier in 544/1149, and honored him with the title of “Awn ad-Dīn.” Abū Al-Muẓaffar held that post under later rulers till his death in 560/1165. Along with rendering his ministerial duties he was also able to write a number, of books in *fiqh* and literature, such as *Al-Īdāḥ wa al-Tabayīn fī ikhtilāf al-Aʿimmah al-Mujtahidīn*, *al-Ifṣāḥ ʿan Maʿānī aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ* (2 volumes), and *Al-*

Muqtaṣid fī al-Naḥw which has been commented on by Ibn Al-Khashshāb in four volumes. The famous Ḥanbalī scholar, Ibn Al-Jawzī, was his student and collected his sayings in a book. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Al-Wafayāt*, 2:246; Ibn Al-‘Imād, *Ash-Shadhrāt*, 4:191; Ibn Taghrī, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, 5:369; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 9:222; Brock. S.I. 687-8.]

¹⁹¹ Al-Khalīl Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ‘Āmr Ibn Tamī’m Abū ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Al-Azudī (100/718-170/786), one of the greatest men of Arabic letters, the creator of the science of Arabic prosody, and the teacher of the most outstanding grammarian, As-Sibawayh, was born at Baṣrah, passed his life on small means, and died at Baṣrah. Naḍr Ibn Shumayyil said, “People have not seen anyone like Khalīl, nor has Khalīl seen anyone like himself.” His writings include *Kitāb al-‘Ayn*, *Ma‘ānī al-Hurūf*, *Kitāb al-‘Arūd an-Nuqaṭ wa ash-Shakal*, *Ash-Shawāhid*, *al-Qinā*, *An-Nagham* and *Jumlat Ālāt al-‘Arab*. See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:172; Ibn An-Nadīm, *Al-Fihrist*, 1:43, Yaqut, *Mu‘jam al-Udabā’* (ed.) Magoleoth, Cairo, 1925, 11:72-73; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 12:363, Kaḥḥalah, *Mu‘jam Al-Muwallifīn*, 4:112.]

¹⁹² Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah:18; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah:13; Aḥmad, *Musnad* I:206.

¹⁹³ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, dhikr:61; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb:109; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da‘wat:67; Ibn Mājah, du‘ā’:3, 10, 15, 19, 63; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II:381, 404, 536.

¹⁹⁴ For Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī see note 136.

¹⁹⁵ Ibn Barrajan is Abū Al-Ḥakam ‘Abdus-Salām, Ibn ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Al-Lakhmī (d. 536/1141) from Ishbilīa (Spain). A Ṣūfī and a poet, he has a commentary on the Qur’ān on Ṣūfī lines which he could not complete, and another book, *Sharḥ Asmā’ Allah al-Ḥusnā*. He died in Morocco. [See Ibn Shākir Al-Kutubī, *Fawāt al-Wafayāt*, ed. M. ‘Abdul-Ḥamid, Cairo, An-Naḥḍah, 1951, I:274; Ibn Ḥajar Al-‘Asqalānī, *Lisān al-Mizān*, Hyderabad, IV:13; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 4:129.]

¹⁹⁶ He is Shaykh al-Islām Abū Ismā‘īl ‘Abdullah Ibn Abī Manṣūr Muḥammad Al-Anṣārī Al-Harwī (39/ 1006-481/1088), from Herat in Afghanistan. A highly learned Ḥanbalī scholar, great mystic and theorist of Ṣūfism, and the author of a biographical work on Ṣūfīs, his fame primarily rests on a small but very concise treatise on the states and the stages of sulūk, *Manāzil As-Sā‘irīn*, on which a number of commentaries have been written. S. De Langier de Beaurecueil, D.P. has edited two of them, one by Al-Firkāwī, and the other by Al-Iskandarī (Cairo: Institute Francais d’Archeologie Orientale, 1953 and 1954) and has also published *Khawāja ‘Abdullah Anṣārī Mystique Ḥanbalī* (Beirut, Imprimare Catholique, 1965) and other studies. Ibn Al-Qayyīm (d. 751/1350), the distinguished disciple of Ibn Taymīyyah, wrote a lengthy commentary on the

Manāzil under the title: *Madārij as-Sālikīn* in three volumes (ed. M. Ḥāmid Al-Fiḳī, Cairo, 1956).

¹⁹⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ḥajj:425; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād, 72; At-Tirmidhī, allifīn:41, 46; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, isti'ādh'ah:43; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān, 42; Mālik, *Al-Muwatta*, isti'dhān:34; Aḥmad, *Musnad* I:256, 300, II: 144, 150, 401, 433, V:83.

¹⁹⁸ Al-Bukhhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd: 50, tawbah: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, dhikr: 2, 3, 20, 21, 22; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, allifīn: 131; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 58; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 215, 216, 412, 435, 480, 482, 500, 509, 524, 534, III: 40, 127, 130, 138, 272, V:153, 155, 169.

¹⁹⁹ The *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier. See note 103.

²⁰⁰ 'Abdullah Ibn Muḥammad Al-Miyānjī Ḥamadānī (d. 525/1131), a judge of Ḥamadān, hence his title, 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, was a Ṣūfī and disciple of Aḥmad Al-Ghazālī, the brother of Imām Ghazālī. A distinguished writer in both Arabic and Persian, he had discussed his theosophic ideas in his books, most famous of which is *Zubdat al-Ḥaqā'iq*, for his biography see A. J. Arberry: *A Ṣūfī Martyr: The Apologia of 'Ayn al-Quḍāt Al-Ḥamadānī* (London, Allan and Unwin, 1969); see also Hellmut Ritter, *Da Meer der Seele* (Leiden, Brill, 1955).

²⁰¹ By Ibn Al-Khaṭīb, Ibn Taymīyyah means Fakhr ad-Dīn Ar-Rāzī, the famous Ash'arī theologian, philosopher, and commentator of the Qur'ān. [See his *Minḥāj as-Sunnah*, ed. Dr. Rashād Sa'īm, Imām University, Riyadh, 1406/1986, vol. VII: 214, V: 433.] For Ar-Rāzī see note 35.

²⁰² Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl, *Kitāb Az-Zuhd*, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmīyyah, 1398/1978.

²⁰³ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan: 95; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 56.

²⁰⁴ Abū Al-Qāsim 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Aḥmad As-Suhaylī (508/1114-581/1185), historian, *muḥaddith*, grammarian, and a man of letters was born at Suhayl, near Malta in Spain. He was a student of Ibn Al-'Arabī, the famous Mālikī scholar and author of the *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. When the ruler of Morocco came to know about him he called him and honored him. Three years later, however, As-Suhaylī died. His writings include *Ar-Rawd al-Anif* a commentary on the *Sīrah* of Ibn Hishām, *Al-Īdāh wa at-Tabyīn limā Ubhima min Tafsīr al-Kitāb al-Mubīn*, and *Natā'ij al-Fikr*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*: 1:280; Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz*, 4:137; Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah*, 12:318-9; Kaḥḥalah, *Mu'jam Al-Muwallifin*, 5:147.]

²⁰⁵ See Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, op. cit. p. 24; Hujwirī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, p. 360.

²⁰⁶ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 285.

²⁰⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 287.

²⁰⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 284.

²⁰⁹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 291; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 53:7, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 157, 171, 175

²¹⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib al-anṣār: 43, tafsīr: 17:9; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 17:5.

²¹¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, mawāqit: 16:6, adhān: 129, tafsīr: 50:2, riqāq: 52, tawḥīd: 24, Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 19; At-Tirmidhī, *jannah*: 16; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 3:16, 17, 26, 27.

^{211a} For Al-Khaṭṭābī see note 66.

²¹² ‘Urwah Ibn Mas‘ūd Ibn Mu‘tab Ath-Thaqafī (d. 9/630), a distinguished Companion from Ṭa‘if, embraced Islam at Makkah in early days, asked the Prophet for permission to return to his people and call them to Islam. The Prophet said that he had fears about his life. However, he returned to Ṭa‘if and called his people to Islam, but they opposed him and one of them killed him. [See Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz ash-Shabah*, Cairo, 1939, 5528; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 5:18.]

²¹³ Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddīq (50/573-13/634), the closest friend of the Prophet before and after Islam, the greatest of all the Companions and the first caliph, suppressed the apostasy of the Arabs after the Prophet’s death, reestablished the rule of Islam over Arabia, and at the suggestion of ‘Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb got the Qur’ān collected and written in one volume (*muṣḥaf*).

²¹⁴ Ziyād (1/622-53/672), one of the great Umayyad governors, and a distinguished orator, was from Ṭa‘if. The son of a slave woman, he embraced Islam during the reign of Abū Bakr, was secretary (*kātib*) to Mughīrah Ibn Shu‘bah, and then to Abū Mūsā Al-Ash‘arī, the governor of Baṣrah. ‘Alī, the third caliph, appointed him governor of Faras (Iran). After ‘Alī, Mu‘āwīyah wrote to him that he was the son of Abī Sufyān, and hence his brother, and won him to his side. Mu‘āwīyah made him governor over Baṣrah, Kūfah and the whole of Iraq. Ziyād held this post till his death. Ash-Sha‘bī regards him the best orator in Arabic, and Aṣmā‘ī credits him with introducing Islamic coins of dirham and dinar with “Allah” on the face. [See Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 3:195;

Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 6:163; Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-I'tidāl*, 1:355; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:89-90.]

²¹⁵ Mu'āwīyah Ibn Abī Sufyān Ibn Ḥarb Ibn Umayyah (d. 60/680), the founder of Umayyad rule and a great administrator, embraced Islam in 8 A.H. when Makkah was conquered. As a scribe of the Prophet, he wrote down some parts of the Qur'ānic revelations. He served as governor of Jordan at the time of 'Umar, and of the whole of Ash-Sham at the time of 'Uthmān. When 'Alī became caliph he did not submit to him, which led to the battle of Ṣiffīn. After 'Alī, his son Al-Ḥasan handed over the government to him in 41 A.H. Mu'āwīyah ruled till his death in 60/680.

²¹⁶ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 18; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ādāb al-quḍāt: I; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 11:166.

²¹⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd: 55, 15, 23, 28, bad' al-khalq: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawbah: 14-16; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd: 35, muqaddamah: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 243, 255, 260, 313, 358, 381, 397, 423, 466.

²¹⁸ The reference is to the *ḥadīth* which begins with the words, "Lord, You are the light of the heavens and the earth and what is there in them..." For the *ḥadīth* see Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, taḥajjud: I, da'wat: 9, tawḥīd: 8, 24, 25; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, musāfirīn: 199; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, witr: 25, ṣalāh: 119; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da'wat: 29; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, qiyām al-layl: 9; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 18; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣalāt: 169; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, Qur'ān: 34; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:298, 308, 385, IV:269.

^{218a} The *ḥadīth* runs as follows, "God will uncover His shin, and the (true) Believers, men and women, will prostrate themselves before it. Only those who used to prostrate in the world just to show or win fame would be left. They will try to offer prostration but their back would be like a board." [See Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd, 24, tafsīr: 68:2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 302; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, riqāq: 83; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 17.]

²¹⁹ For discussion see the extracts I: 9, 2: 23, 3: 1, 2.

²²⁰ The tradition has appeared earlier; see note 74a.

²²¹ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 7:541.

²²² 'Abdullah Ibn Qays Ibn Salīm Abū Mūsā Al-Ash'arī (d. 44/665) an eminent Companion, was born at Zābid in Yemen in 602 A.D., came to Makkah, embraced Islam, and took part in battles. The Prophet appointed him the governor of Yemen, and later caliphs, 'Umar and 'Uthmān, appointed him

governor at Baṣrah. He served on the tribunal appointed to decide the case between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah. He died at Kūfah. He has narrated 355 *aḥādīth*.

²²³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib: 1, maghāzī: 74; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 82, 84, 88-90; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 71; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, muqaddamh: 14; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 235, 253, 258, 267, 270, 277, 280, 474, 480, 488. 503, 541.

²²⁴ 'Uways Ibn 'Āmir Ibn Jāz' Ibn Mālik Al-Qarnī (d. 37/657), from the Banū Qarn tribe of Yemen was a great devotee and ascetic who lived away in the deserts. He was present at the time of the Prophet but could not see him. He visited Madinah at the time of 'Umar Ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph, went to Kūfah, lived there for some time, then fought on the side of 'Alī at the battle of Ṣiffīn, and probably was killed there. [See Ibn Sa'd, *Aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, Beirut, Dār Ṣādir, 1968, 6:111; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, 3:157, Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-I'tidāl*, 129; Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, 2:79, Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 1:471; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, I: 375; Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 1:471; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, I: 375.]

²²⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jumu'ah: 48; -Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 223, nikāḥ 32; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 256, 379.

²²⁶ Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān: 63; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārat: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 72, 392. See also Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 8; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 76; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 384, 394, 398.

²²⁷ For Ibn 'Arabī see note 85. His *Fuṭūḥāt al-Makkīyyah* has been published from Dār Ṣādir, Beirut, in four large volumes; Dr. 'Uthmān Yaḥyā is editing this large work, a small part of which has been published so far. His tracts have been published under the title, *Rasā'il Ibn 'Arabī* (Hyderabad, 1361 A.H.).

²²⁸ The most authentic exposition of Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine of the Unity of Being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*) we have in his *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, for this passage see 'Affifī's edition of the book (Cairo, Al-Ḥalābī, 1365/1946) p. 72.

²²⁹ *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, op. cit. p. 187.

²³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 179.

²³¹ *ibid.*, p. 76.

²³² *ibid.*, p. 183.

²³³ *ibid.*, p. 192.

²³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 207.

²³⁵ Ṣadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq Al-Qunāwī, or Ar-Rūmī (d. 672/1273), the most outstanding disciple of Ibn 'Arabī and interpreter of his philosophy, is the author of a number of books including *Miftāḥ al-Ghayb*, *Fukūk*, *An-Nafahāt al-Ilāhiyyah*, besides a commentary on Sūrat Al-Fātiḥah [Jāmi', *Nafahāt al-Uns*, op.cit. pp. 504-6]

²³⁶ Sulaymān Ibn 'Alī At-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291), a talented poet and a Ṣūfī, firmly believed in *waḥdat al-wujūd*. His *Diwān* consists of beautiful poems in which he sings of union and unity. He also wrote a commentary on the *Manāzil As-Sā'irīn* of Shaykh 'Abdullah Al-Anṣārī al-Harwī. He was charged with *zandaqah* and blasphemy (*ilhād*); Jāmi', however, defends him on the grounds that what he has composed or said reflects his experience of union (*jām'*) rather than his faith. (Jāmi', *Nafahāt al-Uns*, op. cit. 517-18]

²³⁷ Ibn 'Arabī's compatriot, Ibn Sab'īn (614/1217-669/1269) has a significantly different formulation of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. (See Dr. Abū Al-Wafā Al-Ghanīmī At-Taftāzānī, *Ibn Sab'īn wa Falsafatuhu*, Beirut, Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 19734.)

²³⁸ 'Umar Ibn 'Alī Ibn Rushd Ibn 'Alī Sharf ad-Dīn Ibn Al-Fāriḍ (576/1181-632/1235), the greatest Ṣūfī poet is called the king of the lovers (*sultān al-'āshqīn*). His father moved from his home in Ḥumat in Syria to Egypt and settled down there. He was a man of learning and piety. Ibn Al-Fāriḍ was brought up in a religious family, studied Shāfi'ī *fiqh*, and learned *ḥadīth* from Ibn 'Asākir, then took up a life of renunciation and practiced the Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*. He spent some years in deserted mosques and hills, then went to Makkah and lived in its suburbs away from the public. After fifteen years, he returned to Egypt and lived in the lecture hall of Al-Azhar where people visited him. A man of good looks and clothing, he was very elegant in speech, generous and loving. Often he would visit small girls singing and beating drums, and would dance and abandon himself in ecstasy. Adh-Dhahabī says that he was the king of the poets of his time and leader of the monists. The collection of his poems has been commented upon by Ḥasan Al-Burīnī and 'Abdul-Ghanī An-Nāblisī. Nicholson wrote a long chapter on his poetry and translated a famous ode of his in his *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (reprint, Idara Adbiyat, Delhi, 1976), and Dr. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Al-Hilmī has brought out a book on his life and thought, *Ibn Al-Fāriḍ wa al-Ḥubb al-Ilāhī*, Cairo, Dār Al-Ma'ārif, 1971. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, i:383; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, 5:149-53; Adh-Dhahabī, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 4:317; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*: 5:216.]

²³⁹ 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Al-Ḥusaynī Al-Balyānī (d. 686/1288), a Ṣūfī and an adept in geomancy, is the author of *Miftāḥ al-Kunūz* and *Riyād aṣ-Ṣaliḥīn*. [See Kaḥḥālāh, *Mu'jam al-Muwallifīn* 6:150; Ḥajī

Khalīfah, *Kashf az-Zunūn*, 1770; Ismā'īl Baghdādī, *Hadyat al-Ārifīn*, Istanbul, 1371/1951, 1:463.]

²⁴⁰ For Sa'īd Ibn Al-Musayyib see note 50.

²⁴¹ 'Umar Ibn 'Abdul-'Azīz Ibn Marwān Ibn Al-Ḥakam Al-Qārshī (61/681-101/720), the pious Umayyad caliph, often called the fifth righteous caliph, was born and brought up at Madinah, appointed governor of Madinah by Al-Walīd, and then governor of Syria by Sulaymān Ibn 'Abdul-Malik, whom he succeeded as caliph, according to the latter's will in 99/718. His reign was marked by peace and prosperity within the caliphate. He stopped the practice of abusing 'Alī in public and improved the religious life of the people. His reign was, however, very short, lasting only two and a half years. It is said that he died of poisoning. A number of writers have written on his life and reign, such as Ibn Al-Jawzī, Abdur-Ra'ūf al-Munnāwī, Aḥmad Zakī Ṣafwat, etc. [See Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā'*, 5:253-353; Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 5:22; Ibn Khaldūn, *History*, 3:76; Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 8:137; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 5:209.]

²⁴² Mālik Ibn Anas Ibn Mālik (d. 179/795), the founder of the Mālikī school of *fiqh*, was the leader of the *ḥadīth* scholars of Madinah in his times. Besides a *muwaṭṭa'*, a collection of *ḥadīth* which also contains the words of the Companions and the Successors, and forms the basis of the *fiqh* which he developed, his writings include a work on the Qur'ān, *Tafsīr Gharīb al-Qur'ān* which is no longer extant.

²⁴³ Abū 'Umar Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn 'Āmr Al-Awzā'ī (88/707-57/774), the leader of the Syrians in *ḥadīth* as well as *fiqh*, lived and died at Beirut. He compiled a book on *ḥadīth*, and his *fiqh* dominated Spain upto the time of Al-Ḥakam Ibn Hishām (d. 207/822).

²⁴⁴ Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm Ibn Adham Ibn Manṣūr (d. 160/777), a renowned ascetic and devotee came from an Arab family of Kūfah belonging to the tribe of Bakr Ibn Wā'il. The story that he was a prince of Balkh in Central Asia heard a heavenly voice admonishing him on his involvement in the world, left the palace and embarked upon the path of renunciation and devotion, is one of the legends which have grown around many a Ṣūfī. Ibrāhīm was a friend of the ascetic *ḥadīth* scholar Sufyān Ath-Thawrī (d. 161/778) and the Ṣūfī Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyāḍ (d. 187/803), and is said to have participated in different jihād campaigns. [See for his life and ideas 'Abdur-Raḥmān Badawī, *Tārīkh at-Taṣawwūf al-Islāmī min al-Bidāyah*, Kuwait, Wakālat, pp. 218-39.]

²⁴⁵ Abū 'Abdullah Sufyān Ath-Thawrī (97/716-161/778) called the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* in *ḥadīth*, was born and brought up at Kūfah, refused to accept the post of judge offered by the Abbasid caliph Al-Manṣūr, left Kūfah in 144/761

and lived in Makkah and Madinah. Among his works there are two collections of *ḥadīth*, one large and one small.

²⁴⁶ 'Abū 'Alī Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyād (d. 187/803), one of the great *mashā'ikh* of Khurasan, had a profound spiritual experience, gave up brigandry, came to Kūfah and devoted himself to learning *ḥadīth*. A number of *ḥadīth* scholars including Sufyān Ibn 'Uyanah and Yahyā Ibn Sa'īd Al-Qaṭṭān have narrated *ḥadīth* from him. Intensely pious, profoundly conscious of death, humble and sincere, Fuḍayl lived an admirable life of simplicity and devotion. He is an example of the early piety of *zuhd* and *'ibādah*, unaware of the experience of *fanā'* and *baqā'* which later Ṣūfīs began to have. [For his life and ideas see Abdur-Raḥmān Badawī, *Tārīkh Taṣawwūf al-Islāmī*, op. cit. 264-80.]

²⁴⁷ Abū Maḥfūz Ma'rūfībn Fīroz Al-Karkhī (d. 200/815) whose Christian parents embraced Islam at the hands of 'Alī Ibn Mūsā Ar-Riḍā, came from Karkh in the suburbs of Baghdad. Ibn Taymīyyah places him in the group of sober Ṣūfīs like Fudayl Ibn 'Iyād, Sariy As-Saqatī and Junayd whom he calls *mashā'ikh al-Islām* and *ā'immaḥ al-Hudā*. [See *Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām*, Riyadh, vol. X, pp. 516-17.] [See also Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, op. cit. pp. 65-8; Ḥujwirī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, pp. 136 H; 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkirat al-Awliyā'*, (Tehran, n.d.), vol. I pp. 241-51.]

²⁴⁸ For Ash-Shāfi'ī see note 36.

²⁴⁹ For Abū Sulaymān Ad-Dārānī see note 14.

²⁵⁰ Imām Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥanbal (164/721-241/855), born at Marwa, brought up in Baghdad, devoted himself to the study and collection of *ḥadīth* from 179/795. Aḥmad laid down the foundation of a separate school of *fiqh*, expounded and defended the views of the Elders (*Salaf*) on basic issues of faith. His *Musnad* is the greatest collection of *ḥadīth*, containing more than thirty thousand *aḥādīth* and traditions. Besides, he has a book on *tafsīr*, another on *An-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh*, and a third on the refutation of the Jahmīyyah.

²⁵¹ Abū Naṣr Bishr Ibn Al-Ḥārith Ibn 'Alī Ibn Abdur-Raḥmān Al-Ḥāfi (150/767-227/841) a renowned ascetic and devotee and a reliable narrator of *ḥadīth*, was born at Marwa, lived at Baghdad and died there. Al-Māmūn, the famous, Abbasid caliph, said there was no one on earth of whom one should feel awe except Bishr Al-Ḥāfi. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, I:90; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 2:183; Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, 8:336; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣufiyyah*, 39-47; Az-Zarkalī *Al-A'lām*, 2:26.]

²⁵² For 'Abdullah Ibn Al-Mubārak see note 143.

²⁵³ Abū 'Alī Shaqīq Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Alī Al-Azudī Al-Balkhī (d. 194/810), a renowned Ṣūfī from Khurasan, was perhaps the first to expound Ṣūfī states and stages. He also participated in various jihād campaigns and died at the battle of Kolan in Transoxania. [See As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣuḥufiyyah*, 61-66; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā'*, 8:58; Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-I'tidāl*, 1:449; Ibn Hajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 3:151; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:249.]

²⁵⁴ For Junayd see note 86.

²⁵⁵ For Sahl At-Tustārī see note 87.

²⁵⁶ Abū 'Abdullah 'Āmr Ibn 'Uthmān Ibn Karab, Al-Makkī (d. 297/ 910), a scholar of the Qur'ān and Sunnah and a Ṣūfī of renown from Makkah, visited Isfahan and died at Baghdad. He wrote on Ṣūfism. [See As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣuḥufiyyah*, pp.200-6; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā'*, 10:291; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntazam*, b:93; Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, p. 132; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 5:252.]

²⁵⁷ For Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī see note 136.

²⁵⁸ Shaykh Muḥīy ad-Dīn 'Abdul-Qāḍir (471/1079-561/1164-6), the founder of the earliest and most popular Ṣūfī order, was born at Jilān in Iran. He came to Baghdad at the age of eighteen, devoted himself to the study of the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, and completed his *sulūk* under the direction of Shaykh Ḥammād Ad-Dabbās (d. 525/1130). He started delivering sermons at the age of fifty to which thousands of people thronged. His works include *Ghunyat At-Ṭālibīn*, *Futūḥ al-Ghayb*, and *Al-Faṭḥ ar-Rabbānī*. Ibn Taymīyyah wrote a commentary on a part of the *Futūḥ al-Ghayb* [*Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām*, Riyadh, vol. X pp. 482-9]; Shaykh 'Abdul-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dehlawī (d. 1052/1642) translated and commented on it in Persian (Lucknow, Nawalkishore), and Prof. Walther Braune translated and studied it: *Die Futuh al-ghayb des 'Abdul-Qāḍir* (Berlin, Leipzig, 1933.)

²⁵⁹ Shaykh 'Adīy Ibn Musafir Ibn Ismā'il Al-Hakkarī (467/1074-557/1162), the leader of the 'Adawīyyah Ṣūfīs, was born at Qār in the district of Bā'lbak, lived at Madinah for four years, and built a monastery in the hills of Hakkarah in the district of Mosul in northern Iraq, and devoted himself to worship and remembrance till his death. His *ṭarīqah* spread in Sudan and Iraq. Some people in his *ṭarīqah* have extreme views about him. See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1:316; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, 4:179; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 5:111.]

²⁶⁰ Shaykh Abū Al-Bayān Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥawrānī (d. 551/1156), a learned Ṣūfī, was known for his remuneration. [See Aṣ-Ṣafaḍī, *Al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, Germany, 1959-62.]

²⁶¹ Shaykh Abū Madyan Shu'ayb Ibn Al-Ḥasan At-Tilimsānī (d. 590/1194), a Spanish Ṣūfī of renown, passed his life at Fas and Hayah, and died at Tilimsan at the age of eighty. He had so many followers that Sulṭān Ya'qūb Al-Manṣūr feared him. Muḥiy ad-Dīn Ibn Al-'Ara'ī, the famous mystic and expounder of *wahdat al-wujūd* was among his disciples, and has talked about him a lot in his *Fuṭūḥāt Makkīyyah*. [See Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, 4:303; Az-Zarkalī *Al-A'lām*, 3:244; Jāmi', *Nafahat al-Uns*, pp. 473-5.]

²⁶² I have not been able to trace him.

²⁶³ He probably was Abū Al-Wafā Ṭāhir Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Aḥmad (390/1000-476/1083), a scholar of Ḥanbalī *fiqh*, who used to teach *fiqh* and Qur'ān in the Mosque of Manṣūr at Baghdad. He was known for his piety and devotion, and remembered for his sermons. [See Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:24.]

²⁶⁴ Shaykh Arsalān Ibn Ya'qūb Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abdur-Raḥmān, commonly known as Shaykh Raslān, an ascetic and Ṣūfī from Damascus, is the author of a book *At-Tawḥīd*. He was a sawyer and lived on his income from sawing wood of which he would give one third in charity. [See Ash-Sha'arānī, *At-Ṭabaqāt*, 1:132; Ḥajī Khalīfah, *Kashf az-Zunūn*, 1:867; Az-Zarkalī *Al-A'lām*, 1:277.]

²⁶⁵ Shaykh 'Abdur-Raḥīm Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajūn Ibn Muḥammad Al-Qinayī (d. 592/1196), a Ṣūfī and ascetic of repute, was born at Ceuta in West Africa, lived at Makkah for seven years and then settled at Qinā in upper Egypt where he is buried. He is known for his sayings on *tawḥīd* and mystical experiences. [See Az-Zarkalī *Al-A'lām*, 4:118.]

²⁶⁶ Shaykh Mūsā Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 'Abdullah Al-Yuninī (460/1242-726/1326) a Ḥanbalī scholar of *ḥadīth* and history and a Ṣūfī, was born at Damascus and died at Baalbek. He abridged Abū Al-Muẓaffar's work *Mir'āt az-Zamān* and added another four volumes to it. He also wrote a book on the famous founder of the Qāḍirīyyah Ṣūfī order under the title, *Ash-Sharf al-Bāhir fī Manāqib ash-Shaykh 'Abdul-Qāḍir Al-Jilānī*. [See Aṣ-Ṣafaḍī, *Al-Wāfī bi al-Wafayāt*, 26:145; Ibn Ḥajar, *Ad-Durar al-Kāminah*, (ed. M. Sayyid Jād Al-Ḥaqq, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1966), 4:382; Ibn Al-Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah*, 14:126; Al-Yāfi'ī, *Mir'āt al-Jinān*, 4:75; Kaḥḥalah, *Mu'jam al-Muwallifin*, 13:45-61.]

²⁶⁷ Most probably he is Abū Zakarīyyah Yaḥyā Ibn Zakarīyyah Ibn Maḥjūbah Al-Qurasī (d. 677/1278), a jurist, Ṣūfī and a poet. He is credited with two books, *Sharḥ Asmā' Allah al-Ḥusnā*, and *Taqayid Kathirah fī al-Taṣawwūf*, besides a collection of poems. [See Kaḥḥalah, *Mu'jam al-Muwallifin*, 13:198.]

²⁶⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb:77, fitan:26, tawḥīd:17, jihād:178, anbiyā':3; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan 95:101, 109, malāḥim:14, sunnah:26; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan:56, 62; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan:33; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 1:176, 183, II:27,

149, VI:140.

²⁶⁹ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 203.

²⁷⁰ He is Fakhr ad-Dīn Ar-Rāzī; see note 35 and 201.

²⁷¹ For the *ḥadīth* see Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *anbiyā'*: 31, *tafsīr*: 30:3, *qadr*:11, *tawḥīd*:7; Muslim, *qadr* 13-15; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *sunnah* 16; At-Tirmidhī, *qadr* 2; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, *muqaddamah*: 10; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, *qadr*:1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II:248, 264, 287, 314, 398.

²⁷² See An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *ṭaḥbīq*: 30, 31. See also Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *witr*: 7, *jihād*: 184, *maghāzī*: 28, *da'wat*: 58; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *masājīd*, 301, 303, 304, *witr*: 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 162, 167, 180, 191, 204, 207, 216, 218, 252, 259, 278, 282.

^{273a} Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *jihād*: 81; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, *siyar*: 15; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 308, 368, V: 268, 310.

²⁷³ Al-Bukhārī, *Sunan*, *aḥkām*: 1; *jihād*: 109; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *imārah*: 32, 33; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *bay'a*: 27; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 244, 253, 270, 313, 343, 386, 416, 467, 471, 511.

²⁷⁴ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, *da'wat*: 69. At-Tirmidhī has rated this *ḥadīth* as *ḥasan*, fairly good.

²⁷⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *ṣalāh*: 48, 54, *janā'iz*: 70, *manāqib al-anṣār*: 37; Muslim, *masājīd*: 16; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *masājīd*: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:51.

²⁷⁶ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, *qiyāmah*: 56.

²⁷⁷ For Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyād see note 247.

²⁷⁸ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 403.

²⁷⁹ Nafīṣah bint Al-Ḥaṣan Ibn Zayd Ibn Al-Ḥaṣan Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Abī Ṭālib (d. 145/760-208/824), a great granddaughter of 'Alī, known for her piety and knowledge of the Qur'an and Sunnah, was born at Makkah, brought up in Madinah, and married Iṣḥāq Al-Mu'tamin Ibn Ja'far Aṣ-Ṣādiq, and settled in Cairo where she died and is buried. She knew a number of *ḥadīth* for which scholars of *ḥadīth* including Imām Shāfi'ī would visit her. She had memorized the Qur'ān, and had made *ḥajj* thirty times; Egyptians hold her in great esteem and visit her grave. [See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 9: 16-17; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:169; As-Safadī, *Fawāt al-Wafayāt*, 2:310.]

²⁸⁰ Probably he is Shaykh Aḥmad Ibn 'Alī Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Ḥusaynī, Abū Al-'Abbās Al-Badawī (d. 596/1200-675/1276). A renowned Ṣūfī of Egypt, he was born at Fāss in western Africa, traveled to various places, lived for some time at Makkah and Madinah, and entered Egypt at the time of King Az-Zāhir Al-Babaras who went out along with his army to welcome him and kept him as his guest. Shaykh Aḥmad also visited Syria and Iraq, but most of his followers were in Egypt, where he died. He was buried at Tanta where his birth is celebrated every year. He did not write any book, however his teachings and the litanies he taught to his disciples have been compiled under the names *Hizb*, *Waṣaya*, and *Ṣalawāt*. Muḥammad Fahīm wrote a book on his life under the title, [See As-Sayyid Al-Badawī. [See Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:170; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, 5:354; Ibn Taghrī Bardī, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, 7:252; Ash-Sha'rānī, *Aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, 1:158.]

²⁸¹ For Shaykh 'Adīy see note 260.

²⁸² For Shaykh 'Abdul-Qāḍir Al-Jilānī see note 259.

²⁸³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, istisqā': 3, faḍā'il aṣḥāb an-nabī: 11.

²⁸⁴ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 326, 330; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 3; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 8; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 281, 295.

²⁸⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 48; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 68; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 23, 24, 47, 55.

²⁸⁶ Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭa*, safar: 85; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 367.11 367.

²⁸⁷ Abū Dāwūd, manāsik: 96; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 367.

²⁸⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājid: 19, 23; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 72; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, masājid: 13, janā'iz: 106; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 120; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭa*, madīnah: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 218. II: 260, 284, 285, 296, 396, 454, 518, V: 184, 186, 204, VI: 34, 80, 121, 146, 229, 252, 255, 274, 275.

²⁸⁹ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 214, 224, 284, 347. See also Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 76; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān: 63; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 284, 294, 298.

²⁹⁰ Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān: 63; Ibn Mājah. *Sunan*, kaffārat: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 72, 292.

²⁹¹ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, nikāḥ: 4; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, nikāḥ: 400; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ridā: 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 281, V: 228, VI: 76; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 159.

²⁹² Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, nikāḥ: 40.

²⁹³ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 73, 64; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 105, qiblah: 11; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 97, 98; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 57; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 135.

²⁹⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 28, 31; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, imān: 19; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, nudhūr 2; An-Nasā'ī, imān: 27, 28; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārat: 16; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, nudhūr: 8; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 36, 41, 224.

²⁹⁵ Al-Bukhārī, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 7, II: 11, 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 142, III: 487, 26; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 118. See also Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 6; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nadhar: 4, 6; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*: 18; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, imān: 24; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārat: 15; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 69, 86, 235, 301.

²⁹⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib al-anṣār: 26, ādāb: 74, imān:4, tawḥīd:13; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, imān:4; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, nudhūr 9; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan* Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārat: 2; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, nudhūr: 14; Ad-Dārimī, nudhūr.

²⁹⁷ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 9; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*,: 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārat: 2; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*: 6; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 47, II: 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 152.

²⁹⁸ 'Amr Ibn Luhayy Ibn Ḥārithah Ibn 'Āmr Ibn 'Amīr from the Azd branch of the Qahtanī clan, or from the Muḍar branch of the 'Adnānī clan, according to the others, is said to be the first man to change the monotheistic religion of Ismā'īl and call the Arabs to worship idols. 'Amr was the grandfather of Khuzā'ah, the head of that tribe, and the Custodian of the Sacred Mosque at Makkah. He went to Jordan where he found people worshipping idols, liked the idea, brought some idols from there, put them in the Ka'bah and urged people to worship them, and seek God's mercy through them. [See Ibn Al-Kalbī, *Kitāb al-Asnām* (ed. Aḥmad Zākī, Cairo, Al-Amīriyyah, 1332/1914), p. 8; Al-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 5:25.

²⁹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr: 5:13, manāqib: 9, al-'amal fī aṣ-ṣalah: 2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 51, kusūf: 9, 10, 3; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, kusūf: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 46, II: 275, 366, III: 318, 353, 374, V: 137.

³⁰⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājīd: 19, 20, 21, 22, 23; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 106; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 120.

³⁰¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh: 48, 54, janā'iz: 70, manāqib al-anṣār: 37; Muslim, masājīd: 16; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, masājīd: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:51.

³⁰² This *ḥadīth* has occurred earlier; see note 288.

³⁰³ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājid: 19, 22; Al-Bukhārī janā'iz: 61, 96:

³⁰⁴ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 405, 435, 454; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan: 5.

³⁰⁵ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 289.

³⁰⁶ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 286a.

³⁰⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 93; Abū Dāwūd, janā'iz, 68; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 56; An-Nasā'ī, janā'iz, 99; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 96, 129.

³⁰⁸ For both the traditions see Ibn Sa'd, *Aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, 2:16; 'Abdur-Razzāq, *Al-Muṣannaf*, 2:118; Ibn Abī Shaybah, *Al-Muṣannaf* Bombay, Dār as-Salafīyyah, 1309/1902. 2:375; Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī* (Cairo, Dār al-Rayyān, 1407/1986), 7: 448. Ibn Ḥajar has testified to the authenticity of these traditions.

³⁰⁹ See note 308.

³¹⁰ 'Abdullah Ibn Qays Ibn Sulaym Ibn Ḥīdar Ibn Ḥarb, Abū Mūsā Al-Ash'arī (22 B.H./602-44/665), a distinguished Companion from the Ash'ar branch of the Qaḥṭānī clan, and an eminent army commander and administrator, was born at Zubayd in Yemen, came to Makkah and embraced Islam. He migrated along with others first to Abyssinia and then to Madinah, and participated in various battles. The Prophet appointed him governor at Zubayd and Aden, and 'Umar appointed him governor at Baṣrah in 17 A.H. In those days he conquered Isfahan and Ahwāz. 'Uthmān appointed him governor of Kūfah, but 'Alī removed him from the post when he declined to join him against Mu'āwīyah. He died at Kūfah. He has narrated 355 *aḥādīth*. [See Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, 4:79; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 4889; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 1:125, Abū Nu'aym, *Al-Hilyah*, 1:256; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4: 255.]

³¹¹ For Ibn 'Umar see note 100.

³¹² For Ibn Mas'ūd see note 39.

³¹³ Abū 'Abdur-Raḥmān Mu'ādh Ibn Jabal Ibn 'Āmr Ibn Aws Al-Anṣārī (d. 18/639), a great Companion of the Prophet from the Khazraj tribe of Madinah, participated in all the battles of Islam beginning with Badr. The Prophet appointed him *qāḍī* in Yemen. He died in Jordan and was buried at Al-Qasīr. He narrated 157 *aḥādīth*.

³¹⁴ Ubayy Ibn Ka'b Al-Anṣārī, one of the scribes of the Qur'ān who wrote down

some parts of the Book at the Prophets bidding, taught the Qur'ān to many students at Madinah who distinguished themselves later, such as Zayd Ibn Aslam (136/753), Abū Al-'Alīyah (d. 90/709) and Ka'b Al-Qarzī (d. 118/783).

³¹⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Sunan*, tafsīr, 2:1, riqāq:51, tawhīd: 19; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 327; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, 37.

³¹⁶ This *ḥadīth* is noted by Ibn An-Najjār at the report of Anas. Al-Albānī has counted it as weak (*ḍa'īf*); see his *Ḍa'īf al-Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ*, *ḥadīth* 3889.

³¹⁷ Musaylamah Ibn Thumamah Ibn Kabīr Ibn Ḥabīb (d. 12/133) was born at a village now called Jubaylah in the district of Yamaamah in the Banū Ḥanīfah tribe of Najd. After the conquest of Makkah when a delegation of Banū Ḥanīfah came to Madinah, Musaylamah was most probably with them, but he did not go to see the Prophet. The delegation embraced Islam, and the Prophet honored them. When they returned to their country Musaylamah wrote to the Prophet that he has been appointed prophet and that half of the earth has been given to his men just as the other half has been given to the Quraysh. The Prophet wrote in reply that the earth was God's and He gives it to whom He likes, and that he was simply a liar (*kadhdhāb*). Hence his title *Kadhdhāb*. This was in the year 10 A.H. When Abū Bakr was appointed caliph, he sent a great army under the command of Khālīd Ibn Walīd, and after a most bloody battle in which twelve hundred Muslims were killed, Banū Ḥanīfah surrendered. Musaylamah was killed in the battle. [Ibn Hishām, 3:74; Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, (Beirut, Dār Ṣādir, 1399/1979), 2:137-40; Al-Bawdhurī, *Futūḥ al-Buldān*, (ed. Ridwān Muḥammad Ridwān, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1398/1928): pp. 94-100; Az-Zarkalī, 8:125.]

³¹⁸ 'Usayhalah Ibn Ka'b Ibn 'Awf, Al-Aswad Al-'Anasī (d. 11/632), a Yemeni, was the first man to claim prophethood at the time of the Prophet. He used to perform wonders with which he won over the tribe of Madhhaj, and established his authority over Najrān, San'ā, Aden, Hadhramawt, Ṭā'if, Aḥsā and Bahrain. The Prophet sent a letter to the people in Yemen who were still loyal to him and believed in him. One of them rose up and killed Al-Aswad a month before the death of the Prophet. Al-Aswad called himself Raḥmān Al-Yaman, as Musaylamah called himself Raḥmān Al-Yamamah. [See Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, op. cit.; Al-Balādhūrī, *Futūḥ al-Buldān*, op. cit. 111-13; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 5:299]

³¹⁹ Muḥammad Ibn Muslim Ibn 'Ubaydullah Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Shihāb Az-Zuhrī (51/671-124/741), a man of extraordinary memory and the most outstanding narrator and scholar of *ḥadīth* among the Successors, was the first to compile *ḥadīth*. He also wrote a book on the life of the Prophet which has been recently published. Al-Zuhrī was born and brought up in a Qarshī family of Madinah. Later he settled in Syria and died there.

³²⁰ For the first part that the dream of the Prophet is a waḥī, see Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, wuḍū': 5, adhān: 161; for the second part that the dream of a Believer is forty-sixth part of prophethood, see Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ta'bīr: 2, 4, 10, 26; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, rū'ya: 6, 7, 8, 9; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 88; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, rū'ya: 1, 3, 6, 10; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, rū'ya: 1, 3, 6, 9; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, rū'ya: 2; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, rū'ya: 1, 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 10, 50, 219, 20, 233, 269, 314, 343, -369, 438, 495, 507, IV: 10, 1, 11, 12, 13, V: 216, 219.

³²¹ This *ḥadīth* has been noted by Aṭ-Ṭabarānī in *Al-Kabīr* at the report of 'Ubādah Ibn Thābit. However, Al-Albānī has rated it as weak (*ḍa'īf*); see his *Ḍa'īf al-Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, *ḥadīth* 3078.

³²² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah 6, anbiyā': 54; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 23; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:55.

³²³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 6, *ḥadīth* no. 3689.

³²⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, bad' al-waḥī: 2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il: 8 7, An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, iftitāḥ: 37; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, Qur'an: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 158, 257.

³²⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, bad' al-waḥī: 3; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 1; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, iftitāḥ: 37; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, Qur'an: 7.

³²⁶ Dihyah Ibn Khalīfah Ibn Farwah Ibn Fuḍalah Al-Kalbī (d. 45/665), a Companion of the Prophet and a very handsome man, was sent by the Prophet to the Roman Caesar with his letter inviting him to embrace Islam. Dihyah participated in many battles, settled down at Mazzah in Damascus, and died during the caliphate of Mu'āwīyah. [See Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, 4:374; Ibn Hajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 1:473; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:14.

³²⁷ *Mishkāt al-Anwār* is a work of Imām Ghazālī in which, commenting on the light verse (241:35), he develops his own mystical philosophy. [See 'Affīfī's edition of the book (Cairo, Dār al-Qayyūmiyyah, 1382/1964) with his introduction.]

^{327a} *Khaṭ' an-Na'layn* is the work of Ibn Qīssī, Abū Al-Qāsim Aḥmad Ibn Al-Ḥusayn, a Spanish Ṣūfī who (exercised great power over his followers, lead them against the ruling class, the *murabiṭūn*, but was defeated and killed in 546/1151. Ibn 'Arabī held him in great esteem and commented on his book. [See 'Affīfī, *Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*, op. cit. II:56.]

³²⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 79, jihād: 178, ādāb: 97, qadr: 14; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan: 87, 95; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, malāḥim: 15; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 280, II: 148,

III: 268.

³²⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, bad' al-khalq: 6, 11.

³³⁰ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān:124; At-Tirmidhī, tafsīr, 34:3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 218.

³³¹ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 218.

³³² For Al-Aswad Al-'Ansī see note 18.

³³³ For Musaylamah see note 317.

³³⁴ Hārith Ibn Sa'īd or Hārith Ibn 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Sa'd Ad-Dimashqī was an ascetic given to worship and devotion. Later on he attracted followers showing them miracles, such as presenting the fruits of summer in winter and vice-versa, and claimed that he was a prophet. Abdul-Malik the Umayyad caliph (66/685-86/705) caught hold of him and hanged him for that sin. (See *Tahdhīb Tārikh Ibn 'Asākir* (Rawdat Ash-Shām, 1330 A.H.), 3:442-45.

³³⁵ Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Tarkhan Ibn Awzalugh, Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, (260/874-339/950) the greatest, or the second greatest Muslim philosopher was Turkish by origin, born at Farab (near the river Jahone), went to Baghdad where he devoted himself to reading and writing. Al-Fārābī visited Egypt, and then went to Sayf Ad-Dawlah at Damascus where he died. He knew various languages, probably including Greek. He expounded on and interpreted Aristotle's ideas and was therefore called the Second Teacher, Aristotle being the first. He was versed in almost all the sciences of the time, including music on which he wrote a big book, as well he invented a new musical instrument, the *kanūn*. His books go up to one hundred of which the most important are *Ara Ahl al-Madinah al-Fāḍilah* in which he expounded his own basic philosophy, and *as-siyasat al-Madanīyyah*, *Iḥṣā al-'Ulūm*, etc. A number of writers have written on his life and thought, such as Muṣṭafā 'Abū Ar-Razzāq, (*Faylasūf al-'Arab*), Ilyās Farah, Abbās Maḥmūd, M. Abdul-Haqq Anṣārī (Ethical Philosophy of Al-Fārābī, 'Aligarh, 1964). [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:76; Ibn Abī Usaybah, *Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā*, 2:134-40; *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1:407-12; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 7:242-43].

³³⁶ For Ibn Sīnā see note 113.

³³⁷ Yaḥyā Ibn Ḥabash Ibn Abrak, Abū Al-Futah Shihāb ad-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1154-587/1191) an eminent logician philosopher, and the expounder of the philosophy of illumination was born at Suhraward a village in the district of Zanjan in 'Iriq, brought up at Muraqhah, and settled at Ḥalab where he was accused for his anti-Islamic ideas. Scholars of religion came out with a decree against him and condemned him. Al-Malik Az-Zāhir put him in jail and killed

him. He has expounded his ideas in a number of works such as *Hayakil an-Nūr*, *al-Mutaraht*, *Maqamat aṣ-Ṣufiyyah*, *At-Tanqihat*, *Ḥikmat al-Ishraq*, *Al-Ma'ārij*, *al-Lamhāt*, and *Risālah fī l'itiqād al-Ḥukamā*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:161; Ibn Abī Usaybiyyah, *Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭṭabbā*, 2:167-71; Al-Yāfi'ī, *Mir'at al-Jinān*, 3:434; Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 3:156, Adh-Dhahabī, *Siyar al-A'lām an-Nubalā'*, 4:292, Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 9:170, Brockalman, *Gesch.* I:564(437), S. I. 781.]

³³⁸ For Shaykh 'Adīy see note 260.

³³⁹ For Shaykh Aḥmad see note 281.

³⁴⁰ For Shaykh 'Abdul-Qāḍir Al-Jilānī see note 259.

³⁴¹ Shaykh Ḥayāt Ibn Qays Al-Ḥarranī (581/1185), a great Ṣūfī from Ḥarran (in northern Iraq) was known for his miracles and spiritual powers. Shaykh Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Farinī has said that he only knew four Ṣūfīs who would work wonders after their death just as they did in their life, Ma'rūf Karkhī, 'Abdul-Qāḍir Al-Jilānī, Shaykh 'Aqīl Manijī and Shaykh Ḥayat Ḥarranī. Shaykh Ḥayat lived and died at Ḥarran. [See Jāmi', *Nafaḥat al-Uns*, op. cit. pp. 481-4.]

³⁴² The name printed in the text is probably wrong. The correct name is Sa'd ad-Dīn rather than Sa'd Al-Madīnī. His full name is Sa'd ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Al-Mu'yyid Ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Abī Al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Hammamayh (d. 650/1252). Shaykh Sa'd ad-Dīn learned the *ṭarīqah* from Najm ad-Dīn Al-Kubrā, and had a great number of disciples. First he lived at Ṣafah Qāsiyūn and then moved to Khurasan where he died at the age of sixty three. He was known for his exoteric as well as esoteric knowledge and was the author of many books such as *Kitāb Maḥbūb* and *Sajanhāl*. Jāmi' writes that his books deal with abstruse ideas and are full of allusions, and figures. [See Jāmi', *Nafaḥat al-Uns*, op. cit. 383-386.]

³⁴³ He is Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, for him see note 111.

³⁴⁴ Abul-Faḍl Iyāḍ Ibn Mūsā Ibn 'Iyāḍ Ibn 'Āmrūn (477/1083-544/114b), a distinguished scholar of Spain, and the leading authority on *ḥadīth* in his time, served as *qāḍī* at Sibtah, then Granada, and died in Morocco. His writings include *Ash-Shifā'* on the Prophet's life, a commentary on the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, a popular selection of *ḥadīth*, a manual on the terminology of *ḥadīth*, *Al-Ilmā' ilā Ma'rifat ar-Riwāyah*, and some books on the Mālikī *fiqh*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, I:392; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*: 5:28.]

^{344a} For Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-'Āmidī see note 25.

³⁴⁵ The author of the article on the Ismā'īliyyah in the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of*

Islam (p. 179) thinks that the story that the sect was founded by ‘Abdullah Ibn Maymūn Al-Qaddāh (d. ca. 210/825) is a legend, for the genuine Ismā‘īlī literature preserves almost no memory of ‘Abdullah Ibn Maymun. I could not find any further information about him in the *Maqālāt* literature or other sources.

^{345a} For Rafḍ see note 82.

³⁴⁶ For Ibn Kullāb see note 14.

³⁴⁷ For Ibn Karram, see note 123.

³⁴⁸ For a full discussion of this point, see Abū Al-A‘lā Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qur’ān*, under the verse 22:52-54.

³⁴⁹ Mālik *Al-Muwatṭā*, sahḥ: 2

³⁵⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh: 31; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājīd: 90, 92, 93, 94; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 189, 190. An-Nasā‘ī, *Sunan*, sahḥ: 25, 26; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 129, 133; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 279, 42, 424, 438, 448, 455.

³⁵¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh: 11; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 36; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib, 1; An-Nasā‘ī, adhān: 37; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 168, 265, 365, III: 83.

³⁵² At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 43; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 37; iqāmah: 25; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 254.

³⁵³ An-Nasā‘ī, *Sunan*, adhān: 37, sahḥ: 55; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 168, 272, 275, 485.

³⁵⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, istisqā’: 3, faḍā’il aṣḥāb an-nabī: 11.

³⁵⁵ During *ḥajj*, the pilgrim stays for the night at Muzdalifah on his way from ‘Arafah to Minā, and offers prayers. The whole of Muzdalifah is the *mash’ar al-ḥarām*. [See Ibn ‘Umar’s statement on this in Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm*, op. cit. 1: 242.]

³⁵⁶ Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ja‘far Ibn Ḥamdan Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Qudūrī (362/973-428/1037), a renowned Ḥanafī jurist, and leader of the Ḥanafīs of Iraq in his time, was born at Baghdad where he lived and died. His fame rests on a short manual of Ḥanafī *fiqh* which is called after his name *Al-Qudūrī*, and is regarded as the most authentic exposition of the approved views of the school. His other works are *At-Tajrīd* in seven parts on the differences between the schools of Abū Ḥanīfah and Ash-Shāfi‘ī, and *Kitāb an-Nikāḥ*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1: 21; Al-Qarshī, *Al-Jawāḥir al-Muḍ’ah fī Ṭabaqāt al-*

Hanaḥīyyah, Hyderabad, 1332, 1:93; Ibn Taghrī Bardī, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, 5:24, Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām* I:206.]

³⁵⁷ See note 354

³⁵⁸ At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, da'wat: 118; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah 189; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 128.

³⁵⁹ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan* sunnah: 20; At-Tirmidhī, thawāb al-Qur'ān: 24; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 13; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 5; Aḥmad, *Musnad*: III: 322, 339, 390.]

³⁶⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 23; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, musāfirīn:228, 229; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Qur'ān: 8; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, iftitāḥ: 37; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 32, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 4; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:382, 417, 422, 439, 463.

³⁶¹ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, thawab al-Qur'ān: 18; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 223.

³⁶² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 129; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 92, 93, 94; 'Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 81; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 45; Mālik *Al-Muwattā*, jihād: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*: II: 6, 7, 10, 55, 62, 76, 128.

³⁶³ For Abū Bakr Al-Marwazī see note 173.

³⁶⁴ For Abū Bakr Al-Khallāl see note 179.

³⁶⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, bad' al-waḥī: 41. nikāḥ: 5, ṭalāq: 11, manāqib al-anṣār: 45. 'itq: 6. aymān: 23, hiyal: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 155; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṭalāq: 11; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-jihād:16; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṭahārah: 59, ṭalāq: 24. aymān: 19; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd: 26; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:25.

^{365a} Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd: 52; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, witr: 20; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, iftitāḥ: 83; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 176; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 34; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 282, 296, 304.

³⁶⁶ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier. See note 359.

³⁶⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd: 44; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, witr, 20; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 171, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 34; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 172, 175, 179. See also Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 176; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 146, 150, 153.

³⁶⁸ This is the first half of the first line of the famous ode of the greatest poet of pre-Islamic Arabia, Imrā' al-Qays.

³⁶⁹ He is Imām Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, for whom see note 111.

³⁷⁰ Ja'd Ibn Dirham (d. 118/736), believed that man had no freedom of will, that the Qur'ān was created, that God did not speak to Moses, nor took Abraham as His intimate friend (*khalīl*). On account of these blasphemies, Khālīd Al-Qasrī, the governor of Iraq killed him. Ja'd has exercised great influence on Al-Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān, the founder of the Jahmīyyah school of theology [See Ibn Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 5: 160; Ibn Taghrī, *An-Nujūm az-Zāhirah*, 1:322.]

³⁷¹ Abū Al-Haytham Khālīd Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Yazīd Ibn Asad Al-Qasrī (66/686-126/743), a renowned writer famous for his generosity, was born at Damascus in a Yemenī family. He was appointed governor of Makkah in 89 A.H. by Al-Walīd Ibn 'Abdul-Malik, and then governor of Iraq by Hishām Ibn 'Abdul-Mālīk in 105 A.H. In 120 A.H. Hishām replaced him by Ḥajjaj Ibn Yūsuf Ath-Thaqafī who put him in jail and killed him. {See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1: 243; Yāqūt Al-Ḥamwī, *Mu'jam al-Buldān*, Cairo, Maṭba'at As-Sa'ādah, 1323 A.H., 4:387; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:338.]

³⁷² For Ibn Kullāb see note 14.

³⁷³ Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Ibn Bundar, Abū Al-'Izz Al-Qalansī (435/1043-521/1127), an Iraqi scholar of Qur'ānic recitation, was, born at Wāsiṭ near Baṣrah where he lived taught and died. He wrote various books on the recitation of the Qur'ān, such as *Irshād al-Mubtadī wa Tadhkirat al-Muntahī fī Qir'āt Al-'Ashr*, *Risālah fī Qir'āt ath-Thalāth*, and *Al-Kifāyat al-Kubrā*. [See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2:69; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 9:90; Aṣ-Ṣafādī, *Al-Wāfi*, 3:3; As-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt Ash-Shafi'iyyah*, 3:56; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:333.]

³⁷⁴ For the Saḷīmīyyah see note 19.

³⁷⁵ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier. See note 359.

³⁷⁶ This *ḥadīth* has also appeared earlier. See note 365a

³⁷⁷ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 176; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 19,20.

³⁷⁸ For the Hishāmīyyah see note 162.

^{378a} For the Karrāmīyyah see note 6.

³⁷⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, wuḍū': 55, 56, janā'iz: 89, ādāb: 46, 49; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṭahārah:

³⁸⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājīd, 128-30; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da'wat: 114, 132; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 26; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 86; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 237.

³⁸¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 32; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 27; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 25; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 15; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 54; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, Janā'iz: 37; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 39, 107, 255.

³⁸² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, da'wat: 37; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājīd: 125; An-Nasā'ī: *Sunan*, janā'iz: 115; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 362.

³⁸³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr, 14:2; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 114; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III:4.

³⁸⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 68, 87; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 71, 72; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 74, sunnah: 24; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 108-110; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 272, 451, III: 126, 233, 234, IV: 296, V: 197, 453.

³⁸⁵ These are not exactly the words of the Prophet. But the idea that the grave is widened for the comfort of the Believer and narrowed to the discomfort of the non-believers is expressed in many *aḥādīth*. See for example the *ḥadīth* of Al-Barā' Ibn 'Āzib in Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, no. 47453, 4754; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 4: 287, 288; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, 1: 494; An-Nasā'ī, 4: 78. Similarly, the idea that the Believer and the non-believer will be interrogated in the grave is found in many *aḥādīth*. See for example: Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janazah: 67, 68; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, al-jannah: 70, 73.

³⁸⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 15, 16, 18, 19; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd: 39; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 104; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 222, 252, III: 216, 249, 254, 264, 284.

³⁸⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 8, tafsīr: 5: 14, 15, 21:2, riqāq: 45; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 58; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah: 3, tafsīr: 21:4; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 119; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V:3.

³⁸⁸ For Abū Bakr 'Abdul-'Azīz see note 137.

³⁸⁹ For Abū Al-Ḥasan At-Tamīmī see note 117.

³⁹⁰ For Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā see note 28.

³⁹¹ 'Umar Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn Ismā'il, Abu Ḥafṣ Al-Barmakī (d. 387/997), a Ḥanbalī jurist of Baghdad, wrote a number of books on the Ḥanbalī fiqh, such as *Al-Majmū'* and *Sharḥ ba'd Masā'il al-Kusaj*. [See Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:153; Al-Khaṭīb Al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, 11:268;

Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 5:196.]

³⁹² Abū Sulaymān has been mentioned along with Abū Ḥātim Al-Bistī (d. 354) as the followers of Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash'arī, the famous theologian. [See Ibn Taymīyyah, *Minhāj as-Sunnah*, (ed. Dr. Rashād Sa'īm, Imām Muḥammad Ibn Sa'ūd Islamic University, Riyadh, 1406/1986; vol. II. p. 3217.]

³⁹³ For Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī see note 136.

³⁹⁴ 'Abd Manāf Ibn 'Abdul-Muṭṭalib Ibn Hāshim, Abū Ṭālib (d. 3 B.H./620), father of 'Alī, the third caliph, and uncle of the Prophet was an eminent figure of Banū Hāshim. He looked after the Prophet since he was a young boy, took him on his trade journey to Ash-Shām, loved him like his own sons, defended him when he began preaching Islam, even suffered for him three years of social and economic boycott which the Quraysh had imposed on the Banū Hāshim, yet did not embrace Islam for fear that the Quraysh would taunt him. (See Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, 1:74, Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 2:34; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:315.]

³⁹⁵ 'Abdul-Uzza Ibn 'Abdul-Muṭṭalib Ibn Hāshim, Abū Lahab (d. 2/624), an eminent figure among the Quraysh, and an uncle of the Prophet, but dead against him and his religion. He and his wife opposed the Prophet tooth and nail, misled people about him, incited them against him and his followers, even asked their sons to divorce his daughters they had married. He was called Abū Lahab, the father of glowing fire, since he had a very fair complexion. He was very rich, but extremely miserly and cowardly. He did not participate with other Makkans in the battle of Badr, but met his death shortly after it. [See Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 2:25; Adh-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, 1:84; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4:135]

³⁹⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 3, janā'iz: 93; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr 23, 24, 26, 28, sunnah: 17; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 60; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā*, janā'iz: 52; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 244, 253, 259, 268, 315, 347, 393, 464, 471, 481, 518, V: 73, 410.

³⁹⁷ For Ibn Al-Jawzī see note 24.

³⁹⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ta'bi: 48 ḥadīth 7047.

³⁹⁹ Ibn Ḥabbān, *Aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ*, al-Madīnah al-Maktabah As-Salafiyyah), 9:226. See also Ibn Qayyīm, *Aḥkām Ahl adh-Dhimmah* (ed. Dr. Ṣabḥī Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ, Damascus, 1381/1961), 2:654; and *Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn wa Bab as-Sa'adatayn* (ed. Muḥiy ad-Dīn Al-Khaṭīb, Cairo, Al-Maktabah As-Salafiyyah, 1375/1955) p. 573; Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī*, (Cairo, Dār A-Rayyān, 1407/1986), 3:246.

⁴⁰⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, riqāq: 52

⁴⁰¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 18.

⁴⁰² Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 297; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jannah: 16, tafsīr, 10:1; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 13; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 81.

⁴⁰³ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 61; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 245.

⁴⁰⁴ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jannah: 18, 19; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq 74; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 153, 158, 169, 228, 236.

⁴⁰⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṭahārah: 14, 15; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, mawāqīt: 46; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṭahārah: 79, 106; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 229, 400, 414, 506 and also I: 402, 407.

⁴⁰⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, al-muḥsar, 9, 10; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ḥajj: 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, manāsik: 3; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, manāsik: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 229, 410, 484, 494.

⁴⁰⁷ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jumu'ah: 79, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 7, II: 11, 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 142, III: 487; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zakāh: 23; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 13, zuhd: 23; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 321, 396, V: 231, 237, 243.

⁴⁰⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'umrah: 119; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 220.

⁴⁰⁹ Abū Dāwūd *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 124.

⁴¹⁰ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 21; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 12; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 373, 441.

⁴¹¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, waṣīyyah: 14; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, waṣīyyah: 14; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, aḥkām: 36; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 372.

⁴¹² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, marda: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birra: 52; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 303, 335, IV: 18, 24, 48, 61, 81.

⁴¹³ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 51.

⁴¹⁴ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 21; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, janā'iz, 59.

^{415a} This ḥadīth has been mentioned earlier. See note 412.

⁴¹⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 105, 106; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 77; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, 101; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 48; Aḥmad, *Musnad*: 441.

⁴¹⁶ At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, janā'iz: 60; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ashribah: 7; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 100; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 47; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 145, 452, III: 28, 63, 237, 250, V: 350, 355, 357, 359, 361. See also Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, ḍaḥaya: 8.

⁴¹⁷ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 17.

⁴¹⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 93; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 68; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 56; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 99; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 96, 129.

⁴¹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb: 115; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 7, II: 11, 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 142, III: 487:

⁴²⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 358.

⁴²¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 7, II: 11, 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 142, III: 487. Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 27, 78. See also Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 1, riqāq: 51; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jahannam: 12; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 121.

⁴²² *Faḥāsh* literally means abominable, obscene, vile. In the Qur'ān it is used for adultery, fornication, homosexuality, nudity, slander, and marrying a step-mother. In *ḥadīth* it is used for theft, drinking wine, and begging. In short, it refers to all shameful deeds.

⁴²³ The name of imām Aḥmad's book is *Ar-Radd 'alā Az-Zanādiqah wa al-Jahmiyyah*. It was first published by Dr. 'Alī Sāmī An-Nashshār along with some other tracts by different authors under the title '*Aqā'id as-Salaf*' (Alexandria, Al-Ma'ārif, 1971). It was then edited by 'Abdur-Raḥmān Umayrah and published by Dār Al-Liwā', Riyadh, in 1397/1977.

⁴²⁴ I have not been able to trace him. Probably he was a Murji'ī, but his name is not mentioned among the Murji'ah in the *Maqālāt* literature.

⁴²⁵ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 233, 269, 323, 327; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr (fī at-tarjumah). Al-Albānī considers the *ḥadīth* to be weak (*ḍa'if*). See his *Ḍa'if al-Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ*, 5738. But Shaykh Aḥmad Shākir has discussed the issue at length and called the *ḥadīth* authentic. See *Sunan At-Tirmidhī* (Hims publication) 0:146.

^{425a} Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, shuḥ'ah: 2; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, buyū': 73; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, aḥkām: 33; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, buyū': 109; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, shuḥ'ah: 2, 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 389, 390, VI: 10, 390.

⁴²⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 3, hibah: 35' maẓālim: 24, 28, 'aqīqah: 2, birra: 38; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 57, 58; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 160, zakāh: 42, sunnah:

14; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, imān 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, d, *Musnad*, I: 7, II: 11, 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 142, III: 487. mad, *Musnad*, I: 7, II: 11, 24, 67, 69, 87, 98, 125, 142, III: 487.: 6; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah, 9, ādāb: 7, 9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 279, 445, V: 17.

⁴²⁷ See Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 37, tafsīr 31: 2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 57; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 27, 51, 53, 216, II: 107, 426, 1V: 129, 164.

⁴²⁸ See note 428 above.

⁴²⁹ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 135.

⁴³⁰ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier. See note 427.

⁴³¹ For example: “Bashfulness (*al-ḥayā*) is a part of *imān*” (Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān:59) People said, “God and His Prophet know better.” The Prophet said, “To witness that there is no god other than Allah, and that Muḥammad is the messenger of Allah, to establish *ṣalāh*, to pay *zakāh* to fast during Ramaḍān, and to give one fifth of the booty” (Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 40); and “To love the Anṣār is the sign of *imān*” (Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 128)

^{431a} For example, “He does not have faith whose neighbor is not safe from his trespasses (Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb 29; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 73), or “You will not have faith unless you love each other” (Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 93; Abū Dāwūd, imān, ādāb: 131).

⁴³² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, adhān: 95, Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh:34, 38, 40, 41; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 122.

⁴³³ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 135, 154, 210, 251.

⁴³⁴ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 135, 154, 210, 251.

⁴³⁵ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan 3.

⁴³⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb: 29; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 73; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah: 60; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 387, II: 288, 336, 373, III: 154, IV: 31, VI: 385.

⁴³⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 93; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 131; At-Tirmidhī, imān, ṣifat al-qiyāmah: 54, isti'dhān: 1; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 9, ādāb: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 165, 167, II: 391, 443, 477, 495, 512.

⁴³⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 8, aymān: 3; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 69, 70;

An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, īmān: 19, Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 177, 207, 275, 278. IV: 336.

⁴³⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 7; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 71, 72; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah: 59; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, īmān: 19, 33; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 9, janā'iz: 1; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān: 5, riqāq: 29; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 86, III: 176, 206, 251, 272, 278, 289.

⁴⁴⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 164; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, buyū': 50; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, buyū': 72; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, tijārat: 36; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, buyū': 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 50, 242, 417, III: 466, IV: 45.

⁴⁴¹ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 430.

⁴⁴² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 64, 65; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 2; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah: 52, īmān: 12; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, īmān: 8, 9, 11; Ad-Dārimī riqāq: 4, 8; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 160, 163, 187, 191, 192, 195, 205, 266, 209, 212, 215, 224, 309, III: 154, 372, 391, 440, IV: 114, 285, VI: 21, 22.

⁴⁴³ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 219, IV: 325.

⁴⁴⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 9, 14, ikrāh: 1, ādāb: 42; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 66; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, īmān: 3, 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 23; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 102, 114, 172, 174, 230, 248, 275, 288.

⁴⁴⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nikāḥ: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: 74, 79; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣawm: 36; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, ṣiyām: 9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 67, 122, 156, 226, 245.

⁴⁴⁶ The *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 439.

⁴⁴⁷ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 14; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, īmān: 6; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, riqāq: 74; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 250, 472, 527, VI 47, 99.

⁴⁴⁸ 'Āmr Ibn Ḥabīb is really 'Āmr Ibn Samrah Ibn Ḥabīb, as Ibn Ḥajar has mentioned in his *Al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz aṣ-Ṣaḥabah* (5808). Ibn Ḥajar has given no further details, nor could I get anything from other sources.

⁴⁴⁹ For Mu'ādh Ibn Jabal see note 313.

^{450a} The ninth and the tenth reasons have not been mentioned by Ibn Taymīyyah.

⁴⁵⁰ See Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'aẓim* (Beirut, Dār al-Ma'rifah, 1405/1984), vol. II: 61.

⁴⁵¹ He is 'Aṭā' Ibn Ribāḥ (27/280-114/732) a student of 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbās, the Commentator of the Qur'ān, in *tafsīr*. He was also a most distinguished *faqīh* of his time at Makkah.

⁴⁵² Muḥammad Ibn Naṣr Al-Marwazī (202/817-294/906), a great scholar of *fiqh* and *ḥadīth*, was most knowledgeable on the views of the Companions and the Successors on various issues. He was born at Baghdad, brought up at Nishapur, traveled a lot, and finally settled down at Samarqand and died there. He wrote many books such as *Al-Qasamah* about which Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣayrafī has said that if he had not written any other book he would have been regarded the most eminent *faqīh* on its basis. His other books are: a *Musnad* in *ḥadīth*, and another entitled, *Ma khalafa bihā Abū Ḥanīfah wa Ibn Mas'ūd*. Al-Maqrīzī has abridged his three other books *Qiyām Layl*, *Qiyām Ramadān* and *Witr* in one volume. [See Adh-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-Huffāz*, 2: 201; Al-Khaṭīb, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, 3:315; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 6:63; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb At-Tahdhīb*, 9: 489; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 7: 346.]

⁴⁵³ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān:197; At-Tirmidhī: *Sunan*, tafsīr, 6:4.

⁴⁵⁴ See Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm*, op. cit. vol. III p. 444.

⁴⁵⁵ Abū Dāwūd *Sunan*, ṭibb: 24; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, siyar: 46; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṭibb: 43; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 386, 438, 440.

⁴⁵⁶ Khurrāmīyyah are the followers of Babak Al-Khurrāmī, a leader of the Bāṭinīyyah. Babak was based in the hills of Al-Badīn in Azerbaijan. His followers, who were numerous, killed a number of Muslims and took away Muslim women. The Abbasid ruler Al-Mu'tasim waged war against them, killed Babak and took many of his followers captive. [See Ash-Shahristānī, *Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 1:216; Ibn An-Nadīm, *Al-Fihrist*, pp. 342-44; Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 8:11-55; Al-Badawī (ed.) *Fadā'ih al-Bāṭinīyyah* of Al-Ghazālī, pp. 14-16.]

⁴⁵⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, shahādat: 28; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 107, 109; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 14.

⁴⁵⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 24, jizyah: 17, maẓālim 17; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 102; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 14; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, imān: 20; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 189.

⁴⁵⁹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 158; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād 17; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, jihād: 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 374.

⁴⁶⁰ Al-Miqdad Ibn 'Āmr, Abū Ma'bad Al-Hadamī (37/653) was often known as Ibn Al-Aswad since he was adopted as son by al-Aswad Ibn 'Abd Yagūth of Makkah when he came there from Hadhramawt. An eminent Companion of the

Prophet and one of the seven first men to embrace Islam in Makkah, he was a brave soldier and horse rider, and participated in the battle of Badr and all other battles. He narrated 48 *ahādīth*. (See Ibn Hajar, *Al-Iṣābah*: 8185; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 1:167; Abd Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-Awaliyā'*, 1:172; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 8:208)

⁴⁶¹ For Qatādah see note 53. For the various names of the *sūrah* see Az-Zamakhshārī, *Al-Kashshāf 'an Haqā'iq At-Tanzīl*, (Beirut, Dār al-Ma'rifah, n.d.) vol. II:171.

⁴⁶² Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 21; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 302, 320.

⁴⁶³ For Muḥammad Ibn Naṣr Al-Marwazī see note 453.

⁴⁶⁴ For Ibn Qutaybah see note 68.

⁴⁶⁵ He is Ibrāhīm Ibn Aḥmad Ibn 'Umar Ibn Ḥamdān Ibn Shaqalla, Abū Ishāq Al-Bazzār (396/1018) [See Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2: 128-139.

⁴⁶⁶ Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā, Ibn Mundah Al-Isfahānī (310/922-395/1005), one of the great scholars of *ḥadīth* and its collectors, wrote a number of books on the subject such as: *Fath al-Bāb fī Kunṇā wa al-Alqāb*, *Ma'rifat aṣ-Ṣaḥābah*, and *At-Tārīkh al-Mustakhraj min Kutub An-Nās*, in which he wrote about 1,700 narrators of *ḥadīth*. In theology he wrote *Ar-Radd 'alā al-Jahmiyyah*, and *At-Tawḥīd wa ma'rifat asmā' Allah 'azza wa jalla wa ṣifatihi 'alā al-ittifāq wa al-taffarud*. See Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābilah*, 2:167; *Al-Mizān*, 5:7; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 6:253; Brockalman S.I. 281.]

⁴⁶⁷ I have not been able to trace him.

⁴⁶⁸ Ishāq Ibn Muḥammad, Abū Ya'qūb An-Nahrjūrī (d. 330/941), a learned Ṣūfī from Nahrjūr near Al-Aḥwaz in Iran, and a friend of Junayd Al-Baghdādī, passed years in Makkah beside the Sacred Mosque and died there. His words which have been preserved by Al-Qushayrī in his *Risālah* and As-Sulāmī in his *Ṭabaqāt* speak of his regard for the Shari'ah. [See Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, 167-9; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt As-Ṣūfiyyah*, 378-82; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1: 288.]

⁴⁶⁹ For Qādī Abū Ya'lā see note 28.

⁴⁷⁰ Abū Sa'id Aḥmad Ibn 'Īsā Al-Kharrāz (d. 277/890), one of the leading Ṣūfīs of Baghdad, learned Ṣūfism from Dhu Al-Nūn (d. 246/861 and Sarīy As-Saqatī (d. 257/871). According to Jāmi', he was the first Ṣūfī to discuss the concept of *fanā* and *baqā*. [See Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, p. 140; Jāmi', *Nafaḥāt al-Uns*, 75-8; Hujwirī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb* (ed. V.A. Zuckovsky, Tehran, 1926), pp. 180-82; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilya al-Awliyā'*, X: 246-9; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣūfiyyah*,

228-32.]

⁴⁷¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, i'tisām: 6; Muslim, faḍā'il: 130; ḥajj: 412; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ḥajj: 1, Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 1.

⁴⁷² For Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī see note 131.

⁴⁷³ For Ibn Al-Khaṭīb see note 201.

⁴⁷⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr: 92:4, 5, 7, qad; tawḥīd: 54; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qadr: 3; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 10.

⁴⁷⁵ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 160; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 27, IV: 67, VI: 441. See also Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 8; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 292.

⁴⁷⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr, 92: 2-5, 7, ādāb: 120, qadr: 4, tawḥīd: 54; Muslim, qadr: 6-8; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qadr 3, tafsīr, 11:3; Ibn Mājah, muqaddamah: 10, tijārat:2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 6, 29, 82, 129, 133, 140, 157, II: 52, 17, III: 293, IV: 67, 431.

⁴⁷⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 6, 7; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 92; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 82, 129, 133, 140, 157.

⁴⁷⁸ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ṭibb: 21, qadr: 12; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṭibb: 1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 421.

⁴⁷⁹ For Al-Jahm see note 75.

⁴⁸⁰ He probably was Ṣāliḥ Ibn 'Āmr Aṣ-Ṣāliḥī, one of the leaders of the Ṣāliḥiyyah sect of theologians who combined the ideas of the Qadarīyyah and the Murji'ah. [See Ash-Shahristānī, *Al-Milal wa An-Niḥal* (Cairo, Al-Ḥalabī, 1968), 1:145; and Al-Ash'arī, (ed. Helmut Ritter, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980), 1:198.]

⁴⁸¹ For Al-Ash'arī see note 27.

⁴⁸² For Ibn 'Arabī see note 85.

⁴⁸³ For Ibn Sab'īn see note 237.

⁴⁸⁴ Abū Ya'qūb As-Sajistānī, a great Ismā'īlī missionary, and philosopher is the author of *Kitāb Ithbāt an-Nubūwwah* (ed. 'Arif Tamir, Beirut, Catholic Press, 1966) in theology and *Al-maqālīd al-Malakutīyyah* which Ibn Taymīyyah has referred to at various places. Our sources, however, are silent about his life. It appears that he was alive in the year 360/971. [See the Introduction by 'Arif

Tamir to his publication of the *Ithbāt an-Nubūwwah*, p. z.]

⁴⁸⁵ Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā'*, op. cit. X:278; Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, op. cit. p. 106.

⁴⁸⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, riqāq: 38; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 256.

⁴⁸⁷ *Istikhārah* literally means to seek good, to ask for the best. *Ṣalāt al-istikhārah* is the prayer which the Prophet taught in order to seek God's guidance regarding a course of action one should take, or a thing one should strive for when one is bewildered or does not know what to do. For details see Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, taḥajjud: 25, da'wat: 49, tawḥīd: 10; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, witr: 18; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 188; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 3441.]

⁴⁸⁸ He probably was Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullah Ibn Muḥammad At-Tunisi (627/1230-699/1300), a Ṣūfī and devotee versed in the Mālikī *fiqh*, *ḥadīth* and *tafsīr*, went to Egypt and achieved fame. He died in Tunis. [See Ibn Muḥsin, *Ṭabaqāt al-Awliyā'* ed. Nūr ad-Dīn Sharībah, Cairo, Al-Khanjī, 1393/1973), pp. 430-31.]

⁴⁸⁹ I have not been able to trace him.

⁴⁹⁰ For Ibn Mundah see note 467.

⁴⁹¹ Shaykh al-Islām Abū 'Umar Yūsuf Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 'Abdul-Barr (368/978-463/1071), a distinguished scholar of *ḥadīth*, eminent Mālikī jurist, and historian from Cordova in Spain. His writings include *Al-Istī'ab fī ma'rifat al-Aṣḥāb*, a biographical work on the Companions of the Prophet, *At-Tamhīd li ma fī al-Muwaṭṭā' min al-Ma'ānī wa al-Asnād*, a commentary on Imām Mālik's *Al-Muwaṭṭā'*, and *Jāmi' Bayān al-'Ilm wa Faḍilah*.

⁴⁹² Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 55; At-Tirmidhī, da'wat: 88.

⁴⁹³ Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā'*, Qur'ān: 32, ḥajj: 246.

⁴⁹⁴ He is the famous monist Ṣūfī Ibn 'Arabī, for whom see note 85.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm*, op. cit. 4: 4 99 under tafsīr of Sūrat Al-'Alā, with reference to the *Musnad* of Aḥmad and the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd and Ibn Mājah.

⁴⁹⁶ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 147, 147, 149, 150; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 20; Ad-Dārimī, ṣalāh: 69; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 1:371, V: 382, 384, 389, 394, 397, 398, 400.

⁴⁹⁷ Al-Bukhārī *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān 19; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V:20.

⁴⁹⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 19; da'wat: 66, tawḥīd: 48; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, da'wat: 31; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da'wat: 59; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 56; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 232.

⁴⁹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, da'wat: 65; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, dhikr: 28, masājīd: 146; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, tasbīḥ, dhikr: 24, taṭawwū': 13, witr: 24; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, witr: 15, da'wat: 17, 47, 59; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, sahw: 96; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 56, iqāmah: 187; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, mass al-Qur'ān: 20, 21; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 35, 306, 375, 515.

⁵⁰⁰ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 499.

⁵⁰¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib al-anṣār: 26, ādāb: 90, riqāq: 29; Muslim, birr: 2-6; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ādāb: 70; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 41; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 248, 391, 393, 444, 458, 470, 481.

⁵⁰² Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, taṭawwū': 18, witr: 13; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, dhikr: 4; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da'wat: 5; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 175; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 30; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 323, III: 75.

⁵⁰³ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, witr: 26, manāsik: 50, ṭalāq: 7, janā'iz: 37, ādāb: 87; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, Qur'an: 24; At-Tirmidhī, da'wat 6; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 195, 239, VI: 447.

⁵⁰⁴ The following prayers have been called al-bāqiyāt aṣ-ṣāliḥāt (literally: good works which deserve lasting rewards) *la ilāha illā Allāh; Subḥāna Allāh; al-ḥamdu li Allāh; Allāhu Akbar*; and *la ḥawl wa lā quwwat illā bi Allāh*.. i.e: there is no god but Allāh; glory to Allāh; all praise is for Allāh; Allāh is great; and there is no power and no authority except with Allāh. [See Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 71, III: 75, IV: 268; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, Qur'an, 23.]

⁵⁰⁵ *Sayyid al-istighfār*, or the best word to seek God's forgiveness as taught by the Prophet is as follows: "O Allāh! You are my Lord, there is no god other than You. You have created me, and I am Your humble servant. I have tried to live according to Your commands and orders as much as I could. I seek Your protection against the evil consequences of the misdeeds I have done. I acknowledge the blessings that You have bestowed on me and I confess the sin I have committed. I beg You to forgive me, for no one can forgive any sin but You [See Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, da'wat: 1; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da'wat: 15; An-

Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, isti'ādah: 57: 63; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 122, 125.]

⁵⁰⁶ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 498.

⁵⁰⁷ At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, thawāb al-Qur'ān: 25; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 6.

⁵⁰⁸ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 135; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, iftitāḥ: 32; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 353, 356.

⁵⁰⁹ Reading the Qur'ān here means reading the Qur'ān while holding it in the hand. For that purpose one has to be clean as well as make ablution; this is what is meant by higher degree of cleanliness, or observing both kinds of cleanliness.

⁵¹⁰ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṭahārah: 4; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, wuḍū': 2; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, ṭahārah: 36; Aḥmad, V: 277, 280, 282.

⁵¹¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh: 211, 213, 220, 223, libās: 29-31; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, libās: 8; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 79, 80, libās: 12; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, rida: 28; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, adhān: 123, maghāzī: 51, tafsīr: 110:2; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, iftitāḥ: 77, ṭaḥbīq: 10, 11, 25, 64, 65; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 20; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 282, 284, 384, 394, 397, 398, 400, VI: 35, 43, 49, 94, 115, 148, 149, 176, 190, 192, 200, 244, 266.

⁵¹² For this *ḥadīth* see note 508.

⁵¹³ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, manāsik: 8; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ḥajj: 4; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 421, VI: 294, 303, 314.

⁵¹⁴ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 65.

⁵¹⁵ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 493.

⁵¹⁶ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 161.

⁵¹⁷ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 507.

⁵¹⁸ At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, da'wat: 84, 113; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 55, du'a': 5; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, Qur'an: 32, ḥajj: 246; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 127, 515.

⁵¹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *aḥkām*: 17, *zakāh*: 51; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *zakāh*, 110, 111; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *zakāh*: 94; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, *zakāh*: 19; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 17, 21, 40, 11: 99.

⁵²⁰ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 69.

⁵²¹ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *janā'iz*: 103, 104; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 103; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 36; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 300, 375, 408, V: 353, 360, VI: 71, 76, 111, 180, 221.

⁵²² Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *janā'iz*: 102; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *janā'iz* 19; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *ṭahārah*: 109, *janā'iz*: 103; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 36, *zuhd*: 36; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, *ṭahārah*: 28.

⁵²³ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *janā'iz*: 105; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 1: 77; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 105; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, *janā'iz*: 47-48; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 441.

⁵²⁴ Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, *safar*: 85.

⁵²⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *ṣalāh*: 48, *janā'iz*: 62, 96, *anbiyā'*: 50, *magāzī*: 81; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *masājīd*: 19, 23; Abū Dāwūd, *janā'iz*: 72; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, *masājīd*: 13, *janā'iz*: 106; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, *ṣalāh*: 120; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, *madīnah*: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 218, II: 260, 284, 2Z5, 296, 396, 454, 518, V: 184, 186, 204, VI: 34, 80, 121, 146, 229, 252, 255, 274, 275.

⁵²⁶ The *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 300.

⁵²⁷ See note 498, as well as 507.

⁵²⁸ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *'ilm* 11; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *sunnah*: 5; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 386. See also Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, *muqaddamah*: 19.

⁵²⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *tamannīy*: 9; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *ṣiyām*: 59, 60; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 124, 193, 200, -253.

⁵³⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *aymīn*: 31; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, *aymān*: 19; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, *kaffārat*: 21; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā*, *nudhūr*: 6; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 168.

⁵³¹ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 499.

⁵³² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'umrah: 8; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ḥajj: 127; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 42.

⁵³³ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, musāfirīn: 244; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 52; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 98, 170, 266.

⁵³⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nikāḥ: 1; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nikāḥ: 5; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, taṭawwu': 27, ṣawm: 45; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, nikāḥ 1; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣawm: 17; nikāḥ: 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 2 158, 165, 188, 210, III: 241, 259, 285, V: 409, VI: 7, 268, 332, 398.

⁵³⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 50, zuhd: 72; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, 'ilm: 13; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'ilm: 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 5, 46. At-Tirmidhī has rated this *ḥadīth* as fairly authentic (*ḥasan*) The second part of the *ḥadīth* is almost *mutawātir* [see Ibn Ḥajar: *Fath al-Barī*, (ed. Fūwād 'Abdul-Bāqī Muḥibb ad-Dīn Al-Khaṭīb, Cairo, Dār Ar-Rayyān, 1407/1986), 1: 161-1651.

⁵³⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, shahādat: 29, tafsīr, 2:11, i'tisām: 25, tawḥīd: 51; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'ilm 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 136.

⁵³⁷ Abū Nu'aym has noted this *ḥadīth* on the authority of Ibn 'Umar in his *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*. Al-Albānī has counted it as a weak (*ḍa'īf*) *ḥadīth*. See his *Ḍa'īf al-Jāmi' aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, op. cit. *ḥadīth* 3037.

⁵³⁸ Al-Khaṭīb, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, op. cit. 8:296. Al-Albānī consider it to be a fabricated (*mawḍū'*) *ḥadīth* (see his *Silsilah al-Aḥādīth aḍ-Ḍa'īf wa al-Mawḍū'ah*, Beirut, Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1398 1:4523. See also As-Suyūṭī, *Al-La'alī al-Maṣnu'ah fī al-Ḥadīth al-Mawḍū'ah*, (Beirut, Dār al-Ma'rifah, 1401/1981), 1:215.

⁵³⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb: 11; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr: 18, 19; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, zakāḥ: 45; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, birr: 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 14, IV: 80, 83, 84, 399.

⁵⁴⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 147, 148, 149; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, libās 26; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, birr: 61; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah 9, zuhd: 16; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 299, 412, 416, 451, 11 164, 215, IV 151.

⁵⁴¹ These are parts of one *ḥadīth* which has appeared earlier; see note 441.

⁵⁴² See note 541

⁵⁴³ The *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 436.

⁵⁴⁴ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 135, 154, 210, 251.

⁵⁴⁵ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 433.

⁵⁴⁶ See the *ḥadīth* with a little difference in words in Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 33; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 325; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, īmān: 17.

⁵⁴⁷ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V 350, 361, VI: 422.

⁵⁴⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, riqāq: 18; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 514, 527.

⁵⁴⁹ For Ubayy Ibn Ka'b see note 314.

⁵⁵⁰ The *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 334.

⁵⁵¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tahajjud: 20, ṣawm: 59, anbiyā': 37; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: I: 187, 188; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 78; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 189.

⁵⁵² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣawm: 56, 58; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: 181; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṣiyām 76, 77, 78, 80.

⁵⁵³ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 25, 26. See also Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣawm 57, 59; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: 186, 187; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 71, 78; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 28; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 164, 189, 190, 198, 199, 212, VI: 455.

⁵⁵⁴ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: 197, Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb 160; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 311.

⁵⁵⁵ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: 196, Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣawm: 53; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 31.

⁵⁵⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 37; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 181, 189, 191; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣawm: 53; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 75, 76; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 31; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 2: 158, 200, 201, 225, V: 297, 311.

⁵⁵⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣiyām: 90; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, ṣawm: 18; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 49.

⁵⁵⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, diyat: 22; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qasamah: 9; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ḥudūd: 1, 3; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, ṭahārah: 55, ḥudūd: 21; An-Nasā'ī,

Sunan, taḥrīm: 8, ' 12; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ḥudūd: 20; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 217, 247, 282, III: 121.

⁵⁵⁹ For Ibn Mas'ūd see note 39.

⁵⁶⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, īmān: 28, 31; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, īmān: 19; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 2, 3; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, aymān: 27, 28; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārāt: 16; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, nudhūr: 8; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 41, 224.

⁵⁶¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aymān: 26; At-Tirmidhī, nudhūr: 12; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, aymān: 29; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārāt: 18; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 1.

⁵⁶² With a little different wording the *ḥadīth* is recorded by Aṭ-Ṭabarānī, *Al-Mu'jam al-Kabīr* (Baghdad, Maṭba'at al-Ummah, 1981), 17:313, *ḥadīth* no. 866; 'Abdur-Razzāq Aṣ-Ṣan'ānī, *Al-Muṣannaf* (ed. Ḥabīb Ar-Raḥmān Al-A'ẓamī, Beirut, Al-Maktabah al-Islāmīyyah, 1970, 72), *ḥadīth* no. 15842, 15845.

⁵⁶³ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nadhar: 8; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, aymān: 12, 19; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, nudhūr: I; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, aymān: 17, 31, 41; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārāt: 16; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 207, 429, 432, VI: 247.

⁵⁶⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aymān: 31; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, aymān: 19; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārāt: 21; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, nudhūr: 6; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 168.

⁵⁶⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, sayd: 27, aymān: 30, Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nadhar: 11; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, aymān: 19; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 17; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, aymān: 32, 33; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, kaffārāt: 20; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 1, 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 239, 253, 310, 311, 345, IV: 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 152, 201.

⁵⁶⁶ See note 563.

⁵⁶⁷ See the above *ḥadīth* and note.

⁵⁶⁸ See the above *ḥadīth* and note.

⁵⁶⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, bad' al-khalq: 6, anbiyā': 6, tawḥīd: 28; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 1; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 16; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 10.

⁵⁷⁰ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 532.

⁵⁷¹ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan* ‘ilm: 9; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 5; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 14, 20.

⁵⁷² For Ibn ‘Umar see note 100.

⁵⁷³ At the end of the fast of Ramaḍān Muslims are required to help their poor with an amount of grain people use in their food or its cost in money to enable them to share in the joy of ‘Id al-Fitr. This charity is therefore called *ṣadaqat al-Fitr* and is expected to compensate for any shortcoming that might have occurred in one’s fasting.

⁵⁷⁴ This tradition has been mentioned earlier; see note 308.

⁵⁷⁵ Ṭalq Ibn Ḥabīb was a pious Successor (*Ṭab’ī*), and a reliable narrator of *aḥādīth*. Abū Zur’ah says that he related *ḥadīth* from Ibn ‘Abbās and is a reliable narrator, even though a Murjī’ī. [See Adh-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-ʿitidāl*, 4024.]

⁵⁷⁶ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, zakāh: 27; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, zakāh: 13; see also tafsīr 2: 177.

⁵⁷⁷ He is the renowned Iranian mystic, Sahl At-Tustārī; see note 87 for him.

⁵⁷⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣawm 26, imān: 15; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣawm: 39; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, ṣawm: 26; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṣiyām: 15, ṭalāq: 16; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ṣawm: 23; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 489, 491, 514.

⁵⁷⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, i’tisām: 20, 21, Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aqdīyyah: 15; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, aqdīyyah: 2; An-Nasā’ī, *Sunan*, aḥkām: 2, qudat: 3; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, aḥkām: 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 198, 204, 205.

⁵⁸⁰ See the *aḥādīth* quoted by Ibn Kathīr in his *Tafsīr* (vol. 4, pp. 31-32) under verse 38: 24-25.

^{578a} This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 534.

⁵⁸¹ See Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nikāh: 8; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nikāh: 6-8; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, nikāh: 2; An-Nasā’ī, *Sunan*, nikāh 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, nikāh: 2; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, nikāh: 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 176, 183.

⁵⁸² Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 34; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah:10, zuhd: 14; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 366, 370.

⁵⁸³ For Abū Ṭālib Al-Makkī see note 136.

⁵⁸⁴ For Ibn Ḥāmid see note 138.

⁵⁸⁵ For Sa'īd Ibn Al-Musayyib see note 50.

⁵⁸⁶ An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, nikāḥ: 5, jihād: 12; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, 'itq: 3.

⁵⁸⁷ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb: 12, dhikr: 31, 32, 59, 65, 74-76; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, ādāb: 2; Ibn Mājah, libās: 2, ādāb: 55, 56, *du'ā'*: 2, 16, 27.

⁵⁸⁸ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, dhikr: 89; At-Tirmidhī at'imah: 18; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 100, 117.

⁵⁸⁹ He is Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī; see note 48 for him.

⁵⁹⁰ Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr: 106; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 382, 383, V: 367.

⁵⁹¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aymān: 26; Muslim *Ṣaḥīḥ*, nadhar: 5; At-Tirmidhī *Sunan*, nudhūr: 11, qadr: 6 An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, aymān: 26.

⁵⁹² 'Abdur-Raḥmān Ibn Samrah Ibn Ḥabīb Ibn 'Abd Shams (d. 50/670), a Qarshī Companion of the Prophet, embraced Islam at the time of the conquest of Makkah, participated in the battle of Mawtah, and settled down at Baṣrah. He distinguished himself as a commander, conquered Sijistān, Kabul and Khurasan, and was appointed governor of Sijistān. He narrated 14 *aḥādīth*. He died at Baṣrah. [See Ibn Hajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 5125; Adh-Dhahabī, *Duwal al-Islām*, 1:26; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 4: 79-90.]

⁵⁹³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aḥkām: 5, 6, aymān 1, kaffārat: 10; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 13, imān: 19; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, imārah: 92; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 5; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, quḍāt: 5; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, nudhūr: 9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 62, 63.

⁵⁹⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hibah: 13, anbiyā': 54; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 66; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, madīnah: 22-24; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 201, 202, 206, 210, 212.

⁵⁹⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 112, 156; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 19, 20; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 89; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, siyar: 6.

⁵⁹⁶ For Mu'adh Ibn Jabal see note 313.

⁵⁹⁷ 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib, a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, one of the three earliest men to embrace Islam, the fourth caliph, a great soldier and commander, an eminent scholar of the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*. He died at Kūfah in 40/660.

⁵⁹⁸ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 477.

⁵⁹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr, 92:6, janā'iz: 82; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr: 6; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qadr: 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I:129.

⁶⁰⁰ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 479.

⁶⁰¹ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr, 9:8; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, masājid: 19; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 23; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 68, 76.

⁶⁰² Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ṭahārah: 4; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, wuḍū': 2; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā*, ṭahārah: 36; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 277, 280, 282.

⁶⁰³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, adhān: 36, riqāq: 24, zakāh: 16, ḥudūd: 19; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā*, Shi'r: 14; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, zuhd: 53; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, 2. quḍāt.

⁶⁰⁴ This tract is quite a book of more than two hundred pages. Dr. Rashād Sa'īm has produced it in the second volume of his collections of Ibn Taymiyyah's tracts, *Jāmi' ar-Rasā'il* (Jiddah, Dār Al-Madanī, 1405/1984), pp. 190-401.

⁶⁰⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zuhd: 46; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd: 21; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 301, 435.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 23; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, zuhd: 48.

⁶⁰⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 297-298; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 10; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 16.

⁶⁰⁸ Also quoted earlier; see note 403.

⁶⁰⁹ Ṣuḥayb Ibn Sinān Ibn Mālik Ibn Banī An-Namīr (32 B.H./592-38/659), a Companion of the Prophet, a distinguished *mujahid*, famous as an archer, was born at Mosul in Iraq where his father served as governor appointed by the Persians. When the Romans invaded the country they took Ṣuḥayb, a young boy then, as prisoner. Later some Arabs bought him, brought him to Makkah and

sold him to ‘Abdullah Ibn Jad‘ān, who set him free. Şuḥayb was engaged in trade when the Prophet began his mission. Şuḥayb embraced Islam and migrated to Madinah along with others, but was allowed to leave Makkah on condition that he would leave all the money he had made in Makkah. The Prophet praised this bargain and said, “Şuḥayb made a profit, Şuḥayb made a profit.” At Madinah Şuḥayb joined the battle of Badr and all other later battles. Known as Şuḥayb Ar-Rūmī, he died at Madinah and narrated 307 *aḥādīth*. [See *Ṭabaqāt Ibn Sa‘d*, 3:161; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Şifat aṣ-Şafwa*, 1:169; Abū Nu‘aym, *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā’*, 1:151; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 4099; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A‘lām*, 3:302.]

⁶¹⁰ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 403.

⁶¹¹ Also quoted earlier; see note 445.

⁶¹² Also quoted earlier; see note 439.

⁶¹³ Al-Bukhārī, *Şaḥīḥ*, aymān: 3.

⁶¹⁴ An-Nasā’ī *Sunan*, imān: 19; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 70, 130, 133, 249, V: 285, VI: 7.

⁶¹⁵ Muslim, *Şaḥīḥ*, imān: 130, 139; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 65; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 209, II: 419, 501, 527, III: 24, 45, 72, 93, 429.

⁶¹⁶ An-Nasā’ī *Sunan*, imān: 20; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 11.

⁶¹⁷ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 208, IV: 65. ‘Abbās was an uncle of the Prophet; he first supported him without embracing Islam, but later on declared his Islam. Hāshim was the great grandfather of the Prophet (Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abdul-Muṭṭalib Ibn Hāshim).

⁶¹⁸ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 31.

⁶¹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Şaḥīḥ*, şalāh: 80; manāqib al-anşār: 45, faḍā’il aṣ-şahābah: 3, 5, farā’id: 9; Muslim, *Şaḥīḥ*, masājid: 28, faḍā’il aṣ-şahābah: 2-7; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 14-16; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 11; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, farā’id: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 27, 359, III: 18, 478, IV: 4, 5, 212.

⁶²⁰ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib: 14; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 377, 389, 395, 408, 410, 412, 433.

⁶²¹ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, witr: 26; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, zuhd: 30; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā*, shi'r: 16; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 141, V: 229, 233, 236, 238, 245, 247.

⁶²² See the *ahādīth* 611 and 612.

⁶²³ Zayd Ibn Hārithah Ibn Sharaḥbīl (8/629) was caught as a small boy from his family in the Yemeni tribe of Banū Kalb, brought to Makkah and sold to Khadījah bint Khuwaylid, who after her marriage to the Prophet gave Zayd to him. The Prophet set him free, loved him a lot, took him as his son, and married him to his niece, Zaynab. He was called the son of the Prophet till the Qur'ān told the Muslims to call their adopted sons by the names of their real fathers. The Prophet appointed him commander of various campaigns, in one of which, the campaign of Mawtah, he was killed. [See Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 1:563; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwa*, 1:147; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:96.]

⁶²⁴ Usāmah was the son of Zayd, the adopted son of the Prophet. He was born at Makkah and was loved by the Prophet just like his father almost in the same way as he loved Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, the sons of his daughter, Fāṭimah. Usāmah migrated to Madinah along with the Prophet. When he was twenty the Prophet appointed him commander at the head of an army which had among others such great men as Abū Bakr and 'Umar. When the prophet died, Usāmah moved to Wādī al-Qurā, thence to Damascus, but finally returned to Madinah where he died in 54/674. [See *Ṭabaqāt ibn Sa'd*, 4:42, Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 1:29; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, I:282.

⁶²⁵ *Umm al-Mu'minīn* 'Ā'ishah bint Abī Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddīq, a great narrator of ḥadīth, a distinguished faqīh, and very knowledgeable in Arab history and literature, was married to the Prophet in the second year of the Hijrah, and of all his wives was most dear to him. She was not happy with the latter part of 'Uthmān's rule, but when he was killed she led the campaign calling for avenging his blood. This led her to the battle of the Camel against 'Alī. The last years of her life she passed quietly and died in 58/678. She narrated 2,270 *ahādīth*.

⁶²⁶ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 8.

⁶²⁷ Muslim, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 83.

⁶²⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 57-9; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, libās: 60; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 249, 288, 331, 440, 446, 531, 532, IV: 284, 292.

⁶²⁹ This *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier in note 617.

⁶³⁰ Bible, Deuteronomy: 6:5.

⁶³¹ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 615.

⁶³² Aḥmad, II: 323.

⁶³³ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, du'ā': 128.

⁶³⁴ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 15; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah: 60; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 438, 440.

⁶³⁵ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 286.

⁶³⁶ see note 439

⁶³⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aymān: 3

⁶³⁸ Dhū Al-Nūn, Thawbān Ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 245/859), was a famous Ṣūfī of Egypt. He was a friend and admirer of the renowned Ṣūfī Abū Yazīd Al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/874). Prof. Nicholson is of the opinion that he has influenced the course of Ṣūfism more than Abū Yazīd and more than any other Ṣūfī of his time. See his article, "A Historical Inquiry Concerning the Origin & Development of Sufism," JRAS, 1906, pp. 203-48.

⁶³⁹ He is Al-Ḥasan, the renowned scholar, writer and ascetic of Baṣrah; see note 48 for him.

⁶⁴⁰ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 207, VI: 16.

⁶⁴¹ Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 2.

⁶⁴² Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 55.

⁶⁴³ Samnūn Ibn Ḥamzah Al-Khawwās (d. 290/903), a Ṣūfī originally from Baṣrah, settled at Baghdad where he died. He learned Ṣūfism from Sariy As-Saqatī the preceptor of Junayd. He was a poet and has left some beautiful pieces of poetry [See Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilyat Awliyā'*, 10: 309; Al-Khaṭīb, *Tārīkh Baghdad*, 9: 234; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:304; Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, 133-4; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣūfīyyah*, 195-199.

⁶⁴⁴ Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Mūsā Al-Wasiṭī (d. ca 320/933), a learned Ṣūfī, originally from Khurasan, settled at Marwa where he died. He was a disciple of Al-Junayd. [See Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, 151-2; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣūfīyyah*, 303-306; Adh-Dhahabī, *Siyar An-Nubalā'*, 9: 240-1]

⁶⁴⁵ Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, 9: 234.

⁶⁴⁶ ‘Abdul-Karīm Ibn Hawāzin Al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072) a disciple of Abū ‘Alī Ad-Daqqāq (d. 405/1014) in Šūfism, is famous for his *Ar-Risālah* which is the most authentic and comprehensive introduction to Šūfī practices, experiences and concepts as developed by early Šūfīs. Al-Qushayrī has also a commentary on the Qur’ān, *Laṭā’if al-Ishārāt*, and other works.

⁶⁴⁷ Abū Muḥammad Ruwaym Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Yazīd Ibn Ruwaym (d. 303/915) one of the leading Šūfīs of Baghdad, was versed in the recitation of the Qur’ān (*muqrī*). In *fiqh* he followed the Zahirī school of Dāwūd. [See Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, 127-287; Al-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Šūfīyyah*, 180-184.]

⁶⁴⁸ As for the words of Ruwaym, we have them in the edition of Al-Qushayrī’s *Risālah* by Dr. ‘Abdul-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd and Maḥmūd Ibn Ash-Sharīf, (Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, n.d.) p. 424. But we do not have Al-Qushayrī’s remark there.

⁶⁴⁹ For Fuḍayl Ibn ‘Iyād see note 247.

⁶⁵⁰ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, da‘wat 81; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, dhikr: 23, 24; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 107, 288.

⁶⁵¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, riqāq: 38; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, thawāb al-Qur’ān: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI:256.

⁶⁵² This *ḥadīth* could not be traced.

⁶⁵³ See note 632

⁶⁵⁴ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 15; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah 60; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 428, 440.

⁶⁵⁵ For Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī see note 48.

⁶⁵⁶ For Al-Junayd see note 86.

⁶⁵⁷ Abū Al-‘Abbās Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Sahl Ibn ‘Aṭā’ (d. 309/921) a learned scholar and a renowned Šūfī, and contemporary of Junayd, was held in great esteem by Abū Sa‘īd Al-Kharrāz. He was a friend of Al-Ḥallāj and was killed for defending him. [See Jāmi‘, *Nafaḥāt al-Uns*, pp. 141-2; Al-Qushayrī, p. 14 6.]

⁶⁵⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā’: 8, 14, 19, manāqib: 1, 25, tafsīr: 12:2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā’il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 169:199; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 257 260, 391, 428, 431, 485, 498, 525, 539, III: 367.

⁶⁵⁹ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 12; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, imān: 8; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 206, 215, 379, III: 154, V: 224, VI: 21, 22.

⁶⁶⁰ This tradition has been mentioned by no compiler of *ḥadīth* except Al-Khaṭīb in his *Tārīkh* (see vol. 13, pp. 523-4). Mulla 'Alī Al-Qarī, considers it to be fabricated. [See Mulla 'Alī Al-Qarī, *Al-Asrār al-Ma'rifat fī al-Akḥbār al-Mawḍu'ah*, (ed. Muḥammad Aṣ-Ṣabbagh, Beirut, *Ar-Risālah*, 139/1971), p. 266 *ḥadīth* no. 211.]

⁶⁶¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 140; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 32.

⁶⁶² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 18, ḥajj: 4, jihād: 1, tawḥīd: 48, 56; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 135, 136, 137; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, witr. 12; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, mawāqīt: 13, birr: 2; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, manāsik: 4, imān: 1; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, manāsik: 16; Ad-Dārimī, jihād: 4; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 264, 287, 348, 388, 531, III: 411, IV: 342, V: 150, 171, 318, 368, VI: 272, 374, 440.

⁶⁶³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 110; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-jihād: 1; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, jihād: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 344, 424.

⁶⁶⁴ The *ḥadīth* has been mentioned earlier; see note 649.

⁶⁶⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah: 210, 211, 212, 214; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 9; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 45, shahādat: 4, manāqib: 56; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, shahādat: 9; faḍā'il al-aṣḥāb an-nabī: 1, riqāq: 7, imān: 10, 27; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, aḥkām: 27; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 378, 438, 442, II: 228, 410, 479, IV: 267, 277, 426, 427, 436, 440, V: 35, 57.

⁶⁶⁶ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 143.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibn Taymīyyah's *Minhāj as-Sunnah an-Nabawīyyah* has been edited by Dr. Rashād Salīm and published in nine volumes by Imām Muḥammad Ibn Sa'ūd Islamic University, Riyadh, 1406/1986.

⁶⁶⁸ He is Abū 'Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Al-Ḥākim At-Tirmidhī (d. 280/893), a disciple of Abū Turāb An-Nakhshabī (d. 245/859). He is famous for his theory of the Seal of the Saints. Among his books are *Khātim al-Walayah*, *Kitāb Nihaj*, and *Kitāb Ma'rifat al-Asrār*, ed. Dr. M. Ibrāhīm Al-Geyoushī (Cairo, Dār An-Nahḍah, 1977). See Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, P. 138; Jāmi', *Nafaḥāt al-Uns*, pp. 119-20; Attar, *Tadhkirat al-Awliyā'*, vol. II, pp. 77-84; Hijwirī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, pp. 177-9, 265ff; As-Sulāmī, *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-Ṣufiyyah*, 217-220.]

⁶⁶⁹ The reference is to Ibn ‘Arabī, for whom see note 85 and for the claim that *walāyah* of a prophet is better than his prophethood see his *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, op. cit. P. 135.

⁶⁷⁰ For Abū Sulaymān Ad-Darānī see note 147.

⁶⁷¹ For Abū Al-Qāsim Al-Junayd see note 86.

⁶⁷² Abū ‘Uthmān Sa‘īd Ibn Ismā‘īl (d. 298/910) was originally from Rayy, learned *taṣawwūf* from Shah Ibn Shuja’ al-Kirmānī and Yaḥyā Ibn Mu‘adh Ar-Rāzī, then went to ‘Abū Ḥafṣ Al-Ḥaddīd at Nishapur, married his daughter off and settled there. People used to say, “There are three persons in the world and there is no fourth of them: Abū ‘Uthmān at Nishapurī, Al-Junayd at Baghdad and Abū ‘Abdullah Ibn Al-Jala in Shām.” [See Al-Qushayrī, *Ar-Risālah*, 120-21.]

⁶⁷³ Abū Amr Ismā‘īl Ibn Nuḡayd Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Yūsuf As-Sulamī (d. 366/976) a leading Ṣūfī from Nisāhpur, learned ḥadīth from Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl, and *taṣawwūf* from Abū ‘Uthmān Al-Hirī (d. 298/910). One of his sayings is, “Mystical sites (*ḥāl*) which are not the product of religious knowledge (*‘ilm*) do more harm than good to one who experiences them.” He died at Makkah. [See Al-Qushayrī, *Risālah*, p. 182; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam*, 7:84, Az-Zarkalī *Al-A‘lām*, 1:326.]

⁶⁷⁴ For Junayd see note 86

⁶⁷⁵ For Abū Sulaymān Ad-Darānī see note 147.

⁶⁷⁶ For Abū ‘Uthmān An-Nishapurī see note 670.

⁶⁷⁷ Abū Yazīd Ibn Ṭayfur Ibn ‘Isā Al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/875), one of the founders of Ṣūfism, hailed from Bisṭam, a town in the Iranian province of Khamis. He is famous for his ecstatic experiences and *shaṭḥāt*. As-Sahlaḡī, a fifth century writer has collected his words in a book entitled *An-Nūr min Kalimāt Abī Ṭayfur*, which has been published by Dr. ‘Abdur-Raḥmān Badawī with some other writings under the name *Shaṭḥāt aṣ-Ṣufiyyah* [Kuwait, 1976.] R.C. Zaehner has a chapter on his experience and thought in his *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* [New York, Schocken, 1969]. I have also studied his *ṭarīqah*, experience and *shaṭḥāt* in a paper, “Abū Yazīd Al-Bisṭāmī’s Description of Mystical Experience” (Karachi, vol. VI, No. 2. Summer 1983), pp. 25-55.

⁶⁷⁸ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 56; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 22; An-Nasā‘ī *Sunan*, jumu‘ah: 20; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 88.

⁶⁷⁹ For Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddīq see note 214.

⁶⁸⁰ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 649.

⁶⁸¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, bad' al-waḥī: 3, tafsīr: 96:1-3, ta'bīr: 1, 5; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh: 207, 208, rū'ya: 3, 4, 6; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh:148; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, rū'ya: 2, 3, tafsīr: 10:22; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, taṭbīq: 8 62; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, rū'ya: 1; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 77, rū'ya: 3-5; Mālik, *Muwatṭā'*, rū'ya: 4.

⁶⁸² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 85; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz 60; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 63; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, janā'iz: 50; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 20, zuhd: 25; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 261, 499, 528, III: 179, 186, 197, 215, 281.

⁶⁸³ Commenting on verses 7:175-6, most writers have suggested that they refer to a Jewish scholar of the past called Bal'am Ibn Bawra; some authors have also suggested the name of two Arabs, Umayyah Ibn Abī Aṣ-Ṣalāt and Sayfī Ibn Ar-Rahib. Whoever he might have been, the important thing is that he represents a particular character: a person who was given the knowledge of true religion, even the power to do miracles, but he went after the good of this world, engaged in acquiring wealth, and satisfying his lusts, and eventually doomed himself. [See Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm*, 2:264-7; Abū Al-'A'la Al-Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*, 2:100-2.]

⁶⁸⁴ I have not been able to trace anything about Barah Al-'Abid. However, the character that he represents has been explained by Ibn Taymīyyah, and needs no further comment.

⁶⁸⁵ Aṭ-Ṭabarānī, *Al-Mu'jam al-Kabīr*, (Baghdad, (1403/1983), 11:103-4; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyah*, 3:278; Al-Haythamī, *Majma' az-Zawā'id*, (Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabīyyah, 1402/1982), 1:114.

⁶⁸⁶ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 25.

⁶⁸⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib: 25, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 36, istitābah:6, 7; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zakāh: 147, 148; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 12; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III 33,34.

⁶⁸⁸ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 8; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 48; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 44, 50, 404.

⁶⁸⁹ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 220, 221.

⁶⁹⁰ The Nāsibah are just the opposite of the Rāfiḍah. Whereas the Rāfiḍah refused to recognize the caliphates of Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān, denounced them, and considered 'Alī to be the only rightful caliph and extolled him, the

Nāsibah denounced 'Alī and did not count him among the rightly guided caliphs. [See Ibn Abī Al-'Izz, *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah at-Taḥāwīyyah* (ed. Dr. 'Abdullah At-Turkī and Shu'ayb Al-Arnawūṭ, Beirut, *Ar-Risālah*, 1987), p. 689.]

⁶⁹¹ Al-Ḥasan Ibn 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib (3/624-50/670), the grandson of the Prophet from his daughter Fāṭimah, became the fifth *khalīfah* when the people of Iraq pledged fealty to him after the murder of his father 'Alī in 40 A.H. Six months later, however, he abdicated the *khalīfah* in favor of Mu'āwīyah, the ruler of Ash-Shām and saved the *ummah* from another bloody battle. This led to the unification of the *ummah* under Umayyad rule. Al-Ḥasan settled thereafter at Madinah where he died. (See Ibn Hajar, *Al-Iṣābah*: 132; Abū Nu'aym, *Al-Hilyah*, 2:35; Ibn Al-Jawzī *Ṣifāt aṣ-Ṣafwāh*: 1:319; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:215)

⁶⁹² For Mu'āwīyah see note 215.

⁶⁹³ The *ḥadīth* is not found in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim. For supporting *ḥadīth* see Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, as-sunnah: 5, 30; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 5: 44, 50; Ibn Abī 'Āṣim, *As-Sunnah*, (ed. Al-Albānī, Beirut, 1400/1980), 1131; Aṭ-Ṭabarānī, *Al-Mu'jam al-Kabīr*, 1:55, 89.

⁶⁹⁴ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, 'ilm: 16; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 5; Ibn Mājah: *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 6; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 16; Aḥmad, *Musnad*: 4, 126, 127.

⁶⁹⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā' 50; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 44; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 42.

⁶⁹⁶ See As-Sakhawī, *Al-Maqāṣid al-Ḥasanah* (Cairo, Al-Khānjī, 1375/1956) p. 519; Al-Albānī, *Silsilat al-Aḥādīth ad-Ḍa'īfah*, 1: 328; Al-Munāwī, *Fayḍ al-Qāḍir* (Cairo, At-Tijāriyyah al-Kubrā, 1957/1938), 5:17 *ḥadīth* no. 6406.

⁶⁹⁷ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 686.

⁶⁹⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz: 84, tafsīr: 9:12; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 9:19; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, janā'iz: 69; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 14; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 16, III: 488, 489, VI: 263.

⁶⁹⁹ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 692.

⁷⁰⁰ Al-Haythamī, *Majma' az-Zawā'id* (Beirut, 1402/1982), 9:355-6; Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, (Cairo, 1408/1988), 8:123.

⁷⁰¹ Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah wa An-Nihāyah*, op. cit. 8: 124-125.

⁷⁰² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tawḥīd: 28, 45; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-jihād: 28; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 13; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 150, 151.

⁷⁰³ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 80.

⁷⁰⁴ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 177.

⁷⁰⁵ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, aḥkāṁ: 4; An-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, zakāh: 77; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 22.

⁷⁰⁶ This *ḥadīth* has appeared earlier; see note 701.

⁷⁰⁷ This *ḥadīth*, too, has appeared earlier; see note 702.

⁷⁰⁸ See Al-Albānī, *Silsilat al-Aḥādīth ad-Da'īfah*, op. cit. 4:159, *ḥadīth* no. 1661, 1662, 1663. See also Ibn Abī 'Āṣim, *Kitāb as-Sunnah*, op. cit. 2: 487, 492.

⁷⁰⁹ For Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyād see note 247

⁷¹⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'aqidah: 10; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, kalām: 20; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 327, 360, 367.

⁷¹¹ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 18, manāsik: 76; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 24; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 225, IV: 80, 82, V: 183.

⁷¹² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 42; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 95; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 59; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, birr: 17; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, bay'ah 31, 41; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, riqāq: 41; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 351, II: 297, IV: 102, 103.

⁷¹³ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, zuhd: 43; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, riqāq: 21; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 456, 460.

⁷¹⁴ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 147; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, du'ā': 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 133, 134, 151.

⁷¹⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 147; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, du'ā': 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 133, 134, 151.

⁷¹⁶ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr: 32; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, zuhd: 9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 285, 529.

⁷¹⁷ For Mu'ādh Ibn Jabal see note 313.

⁷¹⁸ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 183, At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, qiyāmah: 30.

⁷¹⁹ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jihād: 34.

⁷²⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aḥkām: 43, fitan: 2; Muslim, *Sunan*, imārah: 41, 43, 80; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, bay'ah: 1-5, 8; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 41; Mālik, *Al-Muwatṭā'*, bay'ah: 1, jihād: 5; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 62, 81, 101, 139, III 120, I72, 185, 204, 216, 284, 322, 323, 338, 441, IV: 47, 49, 51, V: 314, 318, 319, 321, 335.

⁷²¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 108, aḥkām: 4; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 34, 38; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād, 87; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jihād: 29, ādāb: 78; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, bay'ah: 34; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 40; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 17.

⁷²² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aḥkām: 43; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 5, 'ilm: 16, ādāb: 88; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 6, bay'ah: 3; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 130, 202.

⁷²³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib al-Anṣār: 8; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 16, 48; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, quḍāt: 4; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 351, 352.

⁷²⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan: 2, musaqat: 14, 15, khums: 19, jizyah: 4, manāqib: 25, manāqib al-ansar: 8, maghāzi: 56; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zakāh: 132, 139; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 25; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, quḍāt: 4; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 384, 428, 433, II: 57, 89, III: 166, 167, 171, 182, 224, IV: 42, 292, 351, 352, V: 304.

⁷²⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jizyah: 22, ādāb: 99, ḥiyal: 9, fitan 21; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 8, 10-12; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 150; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, siyar: 28, fitan: 26; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 42; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, buyū': 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 411, 441, II: 16, 29, 48, 56, 70, 75, 96, 103, 112, 116, 123, 136, 142, 156, III: 7, 19, 35, 46, 61, 64, 70, 84, 142, 150, 250, 270.

^{723a} At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 26; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 70. See also Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 17, Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 70, 126, III: 19, 46, 61, 70, 84.

⁷²⁶ During the caliphate of Yazīd Ibn Mu'āwīyah (d. 64/683) the people of Madinah rose against his rule. Yazīd sent a great army under the command of Mūsā Ibn 'Uqbah to suppress the revolt. The Madinans fought a pitched battle at the plane of Ḥarrah on the northeastern side of the city but were defeated, and the city was given to pillage for three days. [See *Ency. of Islam*, article, "Al-Ḥarra"; Al-Baladhurī, *Futūḥ al-Buldān*, 31: Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 2: 402.]

⁷²⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 58; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 446.

⁷²⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan: 2, aḥkām: 4; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 53-6, 58; An-

Nasā'ī taḥrīm ad-dam: 28; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, siyar: 75; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 83, 93, 95, 123, 154.

⁷²⁹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 53, 57; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 7.

⁷³⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 53, 54; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, taḥrīm: 28; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 296, 306, 488.

⁷³¹ For the Ḥarurīyyah see note 187.

⁷³² This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 685.

⁷³³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zakāh: 4, adhān: 54, 56, aḥkām: 4, manāqib al-anṣār: 3, ḥarth: 5; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 36, 49, 50, ḥajj: 141; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 30; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 39,

⁷³⁴ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, masājīd: 240, imārah: 35, 37; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 39.

⁷³⁵ See Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, adhān: 4. 5. 156, aḥkām: 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 39; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 114, 171.

⁷³⁶ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 36; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, bay'ah: 26; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 69, V: 381, VI: 402.

⁷³⁷ See note 734.

⁷³⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah, 65, 66; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, riqāq: 78; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 24, 28.

⁷³⁹ See note 736.

⁷⁴⁰ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 18; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, ādāb al-Qudat: 1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 160.

⁷⁴¹ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 19; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jumu'ah: 29, manāqib: 25, manāqib al-anṣār: 11; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, imārah: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 6, 289, III: 141, 480, V: 239, VI: 61, 93, 257, 258.

⁷⁴² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aḥkām: 8; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 227, 228, imārah: 21; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, 77; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 15, V: 25, 27.

⁷⁴³ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 22, imān: 229.

⁷⁴⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jumu'ah: 11, aḥkām: 1, janā'iz: 32, istiqrāḍ: 20, waṣaya: 9, 'itq: 17, 19, nikāḥ: 81, 90; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 20; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*,

imārah: 1, 13; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, jihād: 27; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 5, 54, 55, 108, III: 121.

⁷⁴⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aḥkām: 4, āḥād: 1, maghāzī: 59; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 39; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 87; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, bay'ah: 34; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 40; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 82, 94, 124, 129, 131, IV: 426, 427, 432, 436, V: 66, 67, 70.

⁷⁴⁶ For Shaykh 'Adiy see note 260.

⁷⁴⁷ For Shaykh Aḥmad see note 281.

⁷⁴⁸ For Shaykh Abdul-Qādir Al-Jilānī see note 259.

⁷⁴⁹ For Shaykh Ḥayāt see note 340.

⁷⁵⁰ For Shaykh Sa'd Al-Madyanī see note 341.

⁷⁵¹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 37, tafsīr: 31:2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 57; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 4; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 9; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 27, 51, 53, 319, II: 107, 426, IV: 129, 164.

⁷⁵² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 48; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il: 143-45; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 13; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 319, 406, 437, 463, 482, 541.

⁷⁵³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, aḥkām: 16.

⁷⁵⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib: 23, ādāb: 80, ḥudūd: 10; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il: 77, 79; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 4; Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā'*, ḥusn al-khulq: 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 32, 114, 116, 130, 182, 223, 232, 262, 281.

⁷⁵⁵ Mālik, *Al-Muwaṭṭā'*, ḥusn al-khulq: 8.

⁷⁵⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, manāqib: 18; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il: 218; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ādāb: 77; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 244, 256, 312, 398, 412, III: 9, 361.

⁷⁵⁷ For Abū Hurayrah see note 99.

⁷⁵⁸ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 78; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 11; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, imān: 67; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 242, malāḥim: 17; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, iqāmah: 155, fitan: 20; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 20, 49, III: 10, 54, 92.

⁷⁵⁹ For Ibn Mas'ūd see note 39.

⁷⁶⁰ For Abū Bakr Aṣ-Ṣiddīq see note 214.

⁷⁶¹ Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 20; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 8; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 2, 5, 9.

⁷⁶² Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, malāḥim: 17; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 5:18; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 21.

⁷⁶³ At-Tirmidhī, fitan: 25; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 384, 387, 428, 433.

^{761a} Sa'd Ibn Mu'ādh Ibn An-Nu'aym Ibn Imra' Al-Qays (d. 5/626) a distinguished Companion, the head of the Aws tribe of the Anṣār of Madinah, and their leader at the battle of Badr and Uḥud where he stayed firm along with the Prophet against the attack of the enemy. At the battle of Ditch he was hit by an arrow which proved fatal. Sa'd was thirty-seven at the time. The Prophet was very grieved at his death and said, "The Throne of God has moved at the death of Sa'd Ibn Mu'ādh." He was buried in Al-Baqi'. [See *Ṭabaqāt Ibn Sa'd*, 3:2, Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 1:180, Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*: 3197; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3: 139.]

^{761b} Sa'd Ibn 'Ubādah Ibn Ḍalīm Ibn Ḥārithah (d. 14/635 another Companion from the Anṣār of Madinah, and the head of the Khazraj tribe, was called *Kāmil*, the Perfect, because of his expertise in writing, archery and swimming. He was among those who pledged fealty to the Prophet at 'Aqabah and was invited to migrate to Madinah. The Prophet appointed him one of the twelve *Nuqabā'*, chiefs for the people of Madinah. Sa'd participated in all the battles. At the death of the Prophet he aspired to the *khalīfah* and abstained from pledging fealty to Abū Bakr when he was chosen *khalīfah*. When 'Umar was appointed *khalīfah*, he left for Shām and died at Hawrān, [See *Ṭabaqāt Ibn Sa'd*, 3:142; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 1:202; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:135.]

⁷⁶⁴ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr: 78; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, VI: 58, 112, 125, 171, 206, 222.

⁷⁶⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, istitābah: 4, isti'dhān: 22, da'wat 59, ādāb: 35; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr: 47, salām: 10; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ādāb: 10; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, isti'dhān: 12; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ādāb: 9; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, riqāq: 75; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā*, isti'dhān: 38; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 112, IV: 87, VI: 37, 85, 199.

^{763a} At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 8.

⁷⁶⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 4, tawḥīd: 22; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, jihād: 18 Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 335, 339.

⁷⁶⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jumu'ah: 18, jihād: 16; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-

jihād: 7; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, jihād: 9; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, jihād: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 367, 479, V: 225, 226, VI: 444.

⁷⁶⁸ An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, jihād: 39; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-jihād: 25; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 440, 441.

⁷⁶⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 73; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 136, An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, jihād: 39; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 7; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, jihād: 31; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 62, 65, 66, T5, II: 177, III: 468, V: 339, 440, 441.

⁷⁷⁰ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-jihād: 12.

⁷⁷¹ Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 61, 65; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, jihād: 8.

⁷⁷² Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, jihād: 1; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imārah: 110; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, faḍā'il al-jihād: 1, 2; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, jihād: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 344, 434, 438, 459, 465.

795 Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 6.

⁷⁷⁴ See Ibn Al-Qayyīm, *Al-Jawāb ash-Shāfi'i li man Sa'al 'an al-Imām Ash-Shāfi'i*, Cairo, 1346/1928, pp. 27-28.

⁷⁷⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 32-36; Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 17, 38, ṣalāh: 28, zakāh: 1, i'tisām: 2; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 95; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 88; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, zakāh: 3, Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 1-3; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, siyar: 10; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 4: 8.

⁷⁷⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, anbiyā': 6, manāqib: 25, faḍā'il al-Qur'ān: 36, ādāb: 95, tawhīd: 23, 57, istitābah: 95; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh, zakāh: 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 154, 156, 159; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 28; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 24; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, zakāh: 79, taḥrīm: 26; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 12; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 21; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā*, mass al-Qur'ān: 10 Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 88, 92, 131, 147, 151, 156, 160, 256, 404, III: 5, 15, 33, 52, 56, 60, 64, 65, 68, 73, 159, 183, 189, 224, 353, 355, 486, IV: 145, 422, 425, V: 42, 176.

⁷⁷⁷ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, zakāh: 151; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 45, 64.

⁷⁷⁸ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 26; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 2: 180, 187.

⁷⁷⁹ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: I; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 18; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 17; Ad-Dārimī, *Sunan*, siyar: 75; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 332, III: 120, 145.

⁷⁸⁰ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, īmān: 18; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, IV: 102.

⁷⁸¹ See *Tuhfat al-Aḥwadhī*, 7: 399; Al-Ḥākim, *Mustadrak*, 1: 128. However, various authors have rated the *ḥadīth* as weak. See Abū Bakr Al-Ajurrī, *Ash-Sharī'ah*, (Cairo, As-Sunnah al-Muḥammadiyyah, 1369/1950) 15, 16; Al-Lalkā'ī, *Sharḥ Uṣūl I'tiqād Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* (ed. Dr. Aḥmad Sa'd Ḥamdān, Ar-Riyāḍ, Dār Aṭ-Ṭayyibah, 1402A.H.), 1: 99; Ibn Baṭṭah, *Al-Ibānah 'alā Uṣūl as-Sunnah wa al-Diyānah* (ed. Riḍā Mu'ī' Maktabah Ar-Raysāliyyah, 1404/1984), 1: 368).

⁷⁸² Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 145, IV: 102.

⁷⁸³ This *ḥadīth* has been quoted earlier; see note 685.

⁷⁸⁴ Yūsuf Ibn Asbāṭ was known for his renunciation and devotion. 'Aṭṭār says that he belonged to the group of the Successors (*Tābi'in*) lived a solitary life away from society, and devoted himself to worship. See Farīd ad-Dīn 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkirat al-Awliyā'*, Tehran, n.d. II: 64 67.]

⁷⁸⁵ Najdah Ibn 'Āmir Al-Ḥarūrī (d. 69/686), from the tribe of Banū Ḥanīfah the leader of the Najdiyyah group of the Khawārij, differed from other Kharijīs on certain issues, went to Makkah, preached his ideas, and had a following. In the beginning he was associated with Nāfi' Ibn Al-Azraq, another Kharijī leader and superior to him, but later on left him and went to Yamāmah in 66 A.H., and then to Bahrain, where he established his authority and was called *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*. This was during the ascendancy of 'Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubayr over Makkah, who dispatched several contingents, one after the other, under the command of Maṣ'ab Ibn Az-Zubayr to crush Najdah, but he could not overthrow him. Najdah ruled over Bahrain, Yamamah, Oman, and Ḥajar for five years. In the end his followers disliked some of his practices, turned against him, and killed him. He is called Al-Ḥarūrī because he belonged to the Khawārij who held their first meeting at Ḥarūrah, two miles away from Kūfah, thereafter called Ḥarūrīyyah. [See Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 4:78; Ibn Ḥajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, 6:148; Al-Yafī'ī, 1:144; Ibn Al-'Imād, *Shadhrāt*, I:76; Az-Zarkalī *Al-A'lām*, 8:324-5.]

⁷⁸⁶ Nāfi'ī Ibn Al-Azraq Ibn Qays (d. 65/682), another leader of the Khawārij and head of the Azāriqah group, was also from the Banū Ḥanīfah tribe of Najd. He settled at Baṣrah and joined the circle of the students of the famous Commentator of the Qur'ān, Ibn 'Abbās. He supported 'Alī against Mu'āwīyah, but parted company at the occasion of *taḥkīm* between them, and turned along with others against 'Alī. During the rule of Mu'āwīyah, his governor 'Ubaydullah Ibn Ziyād at Baṣrah dispersed the Khawārij, who joined the army of 'Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubayr and fought the Umayyads. But later on, when they found that Ibn Az-Zubayr did not approve their views with regard to 'Uthmān, they left him. Nāfi'ī returned to Baṣrah. Al-Mahlab Ibn Abī Ṣafrah waged war

against him and after a bloody battle killed him. [See Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*: 4:65 H.; Aṭ-Ṭabarī *Tārīkh*, 7:65; Adh-Dhahabī, *Lisān al-Mizān*: 6 144; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*,: 8:3154

⁷⁸⁷ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 3:8; ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 12; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V:250, 253, 256, 269.

⁷⁸⁸ Al-Walīd Ibn 'Uqbah Ibn Abī Mu'īt (d. 61/680), one of the brothers of 'Uthmān from his mother, embraced Islam the day Makkah was conquered. The Prophet appointed him as revenue collector over Banū Al-Muṣṭaliq, and 'Umar appointed him in the same capacity over Banū Taghlib. 'Uthmān, the third caliph appointed him governor at Kūfah after Sa'd Ibn Abī Waqqās in 25 A.H. He was charged with drinking wine; 'Uthmān called him back, punished him and put him in jail. After the death of 'Uthmān, he went to Iraq and settled there, away from the eyes of people. In the feud between 'Alī and Mu'āwīyah he did not side with anyone, except that wrote an elegy to 'Uthmān and persuaded Mu'āwīyah to avenge his murder. He died at Raqqah. [See Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Asqalānī*, *Al-Iṣbah*, 9149; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 9:143.]

⁷⁸⁹ Ḥajjaj Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Al-Ḥakam Ath-Thaqafī (40/661-95/714) a fiery orator and a great killer, was born in Ṭā'if, went to Damascus, entered in the service of the Umayyad government, was appointed commander of the army by 'Abdul-Malik, marched with a large army against 'Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubayr in Hijaz, killed him and scattered his men. Thereupon 'Abdul-Malik appointed him governor of Makkah, Madinah and Ṭā'if, and later on also put Iraq under him. Ḥajjāj quelled the revolt at Baghdad and ruled over the whole territory most high-handedly for twenty years. He built the city of Wāsiṭ where he died. [Ibn. Khallikān, *Wafayāt*: 1:123; Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*: 4:222; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*: 4:48; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 2:175.]

⁷⁹⁰ He is Al-Mukhtār Ibn Abī 'Ubayd Ibn Mas'ūd Ath-Thaqafī (1/622-67/687), a renowned opponent of the Umayyads, was born at Ṭā'if, moved with his father to Madinah during the reign of 'Umar. 'Umar's son 'Abdullah married his sister, Ṣafīyyah. Al-Mukhtār was loyal to the Banū Hāshim, when Ḥusayn was killed in 61 A.H., the Umayyad governor of Baṣrah caught him and put him in prison, but later released him at the intercession of 'Abdullah Ibn 'Umar. Al-Mukhtar then called people to pledge fealty to Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥanafīyyah, and along with his men fought the governor of Kūfah and defeated him. He then avenged the blood of Ḥusayn by killing Shāmir and others who had killed Ḥusayn. He ruled over Iraq for a time. It is said that he claimed he was a prophet, and received revelations. Later on he fought against 'Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubayr, but was killed by the latter's brother Musāb in Kūfah. Al-Mukhtar ruled for sixteen months. [See Ibn Al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 4:82-108; Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 7:146; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣbah*, 8547; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 8:70-71.]

⁷⁹¹ Ibn Kathīr has noted the *aḥādīth* on the point in his *Tafsīr*, vol. I: pp. 342-43.

⁷⁹² Sa'd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ Mālik Ibn Uhayb Ibn 'Abd Manāf (23 B.H./60-55/675), one of the top ten Companions whom the Prophet gave the good tidings of Paradise, embraced Islam at Makkah at the age of seventeen. Sa'd participated in the battle of Badr and all subsequent battles, and distinguished himself as a great horseman, which won him the title of *Fāris al-Islām*. He commanded the army which defeated the Persians at the battle of Qādīsiyyah. Thereafter, he was appointed governor of southern Iraq. During this period he built the city of Kūfah. He continued in the post throughout the reign of 'Umar as well as the first half of the reign of 'Uthmān, and thereafter returned to Madinah where he died. [See *Ṭabaqāt Ibn Sa'd*: 6:6; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣābah*, 3186; Abū Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-Awliyā'*: 1: 92; Ibn Al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat aṣ-Ṣafwah*, 1:138; Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 3:13

⁷⁹³ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm: 3719, ḥajj: 133, maghāzī: 77, ādāb: 43, aḍāḥī: 5, ḥudūd: 9, fitan: 8, tawḥīd: 24; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ḥajj: i47, qisamah: 29, 30; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 6; tafsīr: 9:2; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, quḍāt: 36; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, manāsik: 76, 84; fitan: 2; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 24, manāsik: 34, 72; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 230, III: 313, 371, 485, IV: 76, 306, 337, V: 37, 39, 49, 68, 73, 411, 412.

⁷⁹⁴ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, birr: 18; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 277, 360, III: 491.

⁷⁹⁵ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ṣalāh: 28; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 2; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, taḥrīm: 1, imān: 15, ḍaḥaya: 17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 149, 225.

⁷⁹⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 22, diyat: 2, fitan: 10; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qisamah: 33, fitan: 14, 15; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, fitan: 5; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, taḥrīm: 29, qisamah: 7; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 11; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 4: 401, 418, V: 43, 47, 51.

⁷⁹⁷ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm: 43, ḥajj: 132, maghāzī: 77, aḍāḥī: 5, ādāb: 95, ḥudūd: 9, fitan: 8, tawḥīd: 24; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 118-120, qisamah: 29, fitan: 50; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, sunnah: 15; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 28; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, taḥrīm: 29; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 5; Ad-Dārimī *Sunan*, manāsik: 76; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 230, 402, II: 85, 87, 104, III: 477, IV: 76, 351, 358, 363, 366, V: 37, 39, 44, 45, 49, 68, 73.

⁷⁹⁸ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ādāb: 73; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 111; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, imān: 16; Mālik, *Al-Muwattā'*, kalām: 1; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, II: 18, 44, 47, 60, 112, 113, 142.

⁷⁹⁹ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr: 63: 5, 7, maghāzi: 46; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, birr: 64; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, jihād: 78; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah: 12.

⁸⁰⁰ Usayd Ibn Al-Ḥuḍayr Ibn Sahrāk Ibn 'Utayk (d. 20/641), a distinguished Companion from the Aws tribe of Madinah, counted as one of great minds of the Arabs, was called *al-Kāmil*, the Perfect. He was one of the seventy men and women of Madinah who invited the Prophet at Al-'Aqbah near Makkah to come to Madinah and promised their support. He was appointed as one of the twelve monitors whom the Prophet sent for preaching Islam at Madinah. He participated in the battle of Uḥud and held his ground against the attack of the Quraysh. He participated in all subsequent battles. The Prophet praised him in these words: "What a man is Usayd Ibn Al-Ḥuḍayr," He narrated 18 *aḥādīth*. [Az-Zarkalī, *Al-A'lām*, 1:33.]

⁸⁰¹ For Sa'd Ibn 'Ubādah see note 761b.

⁸⁰² These exchanges occurred in the case of the slander which some hypocrites directed against 'Ā'ishah, the wife of the Prophet, and which was refuted by God through revelation. See the *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm*, by Ibn Kathīr, op. cit. vol. III: p. 269 under the verse 18:11.

⁸⁰³ For Usāmah see note 621.

⁸⁰⁴ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, diyat: 2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, imān: 158, 159; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, tafsīr: 11: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 200.

⁸⁰⁵ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, fitan: 20; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, fitan: 9, 22; Mālik, *Al-Muwatta'*, Qur'an: 35; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 240, 243, 247, 248.

⁸⁰⁶ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, tafsīr: 6:2, i'tisām: 11; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, 6 2; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 209.

⁸⁰⁷ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 7; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, taḥrīm: 6.

⁸⁰⁸ At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan: 7; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, I: 18, 26, III: 446.

⁸⁰⁹ Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 46; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, imāmah: 48; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, V: 196, 233, 243, VI: 446.

⁸¹⁰ Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, adhān: 54; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 60; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, ṣalāh: 60; An-Nasā'ī *Sunan*, imārah: 3, 5, 11, 43, qiblah: 16; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, adhān: 5, iqāmah: 46; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, III: 48, 51, 84, 163, 475, IV: 118, 121, V: 71, 272.

⁸¹¹ For Az-Zuhri see note 319.